

The Constitution and Mobilization of Soft Power in the People's Republic of China

Jia Guan

Department of International Relations

School of International, Political and Strategic Studies

The Australian National University

May 2013

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National
University

Contents

Acknowledgments	1
Abstract	2
List of Abbreviations	3
1 Introduction	4
1.1 I declare that the following thesis is my own work	4
1.2 and that all quotations are acknowledged.	4
1.3 Design of the study: methodology and main findings	4
1.4 The layout of this study	4
2 The Concept of Soft Power	21
2.1 Three approaches of power concepts	21
2.2 Review of Joseph S. Nye's concept	21
2.3 Concept of soft power in this study	26
2.4 Conclusion	27
3 The Changing Colour of Soft Power in Contemporary Chinese Discourse	49
3.1 Context of the emergence of the Chinese discourse of soft power	49
3.2 The evolution of the Chinese discourse of soft power	49
3.3 Construction and mobilization of Chinese soft power in contemporary Chinese discourse	80
3.4 Conclusion	92
4 Main Soft Power Ranking List in the World, 1995-1997	97
4.1 China's foreign policy transition from "leaning to one side" to "opening and reform"	97
4.2 Key elements of Maoist soft power	104
4.3 Maoist soft power rank, 1950-1960	109

Contents

Acknowledgements	i
Abstract	iii
List of Abbreviations	v
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Literature review: soft power and the PRC	2
1.2 The central question and the argument in brief	7
1.3 Design of this study: methodology and case studies	9
1.4 The layout of this study	18
2 The Concept of Soft Power in IR	21
2.1 Three approaches of power conceptualization in IR	21
2.2 Review of Joseph S. Nye's concept of soft power	24
2.3 Concept of soft power in this study	36
2.4 Conclusion	41
3 The Changing Colour of Soft Power in Contemporary Chinese Discourse	43
3.1 Context of the emergence of the Chinese discourse of soft power	44
3.2 The evolution of the Chinese discourse of soft power	45
3.3 Constitution and mobilization of China's soft power in contemporary Chinese discourse	60
3.4 Conclusion	72
4 Maoist Soft Power Reaching Out to the World: 1959-1965	75
4.1 China's foreign policy transition from "leaning to one side" to "double-anti". ..	76
4.2 Key elements of Maoist soft power	88
4.3 Maoist soft power tools: 1959-1965	109

4.4	Conclusion.....	135
5	China's Soft Power Mobilization in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games	145
5.1	The context of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games	146
5.2	Constitution and mobilization of China's soft power in the 2008 Games.....	162
5.3	Conclusion.....	188
6	China's Soft Power Trajectory: Change and Continuity	191
6.1	A comparison of China's soft power constitution and mobilization between Mao's China and contemporary China	192
6.2	Understanding the nature of China's soft power	204
6.3	Conclusion.....	211
7	Conclusion	213
7.1	Overview of theoretical framework	213
7.2	Empirical findings	215
7.3	A new perspective on soft power	218
7.4	The wider implications for IR and China in the world.....	220
	List of Interviewees.....	223
	Bibliography.....	225

Acknowledgements

A great lesson that I have learned from doing my PhD is that this is indeed the work of a team. Without the help and support I have received during the course of this project, I could never have made it happen. I am deeply grateful to everyone who has helped me in this process. In particular, I extend heartfelt thanks to my supervisor and advisors who have invested so much of their time and energy in my work. First and foremost, to my principal supervisor Dr Jacinta O'Hagan, I owe a great deal for her dedication to duty and the insight she has brought to this project. She has led me to sharpen my theoretical ideas to a level that I could not have imagined before. Cindy has provided consistent guidance and feedback at all stages of this study. She has shown incredible attentiveness and responsiveness to all my rambling drafts and has provided unfailing support and belief in this project. I really cannot thank her enough for all she has done for me.

Dr Kathy Morton oversaw the beginning of my PhD, patiently listened to my academic interests and prodded me to decide what I was trying to research. Kathy's expertise in China's international affairs has been of great benefit to this project. I would like to express my gratitude to her for leading me to this great topic as well as providing her insightful thoughts during my writing-up.

I am deeply thankful for Dr Peter Van Ness's insightful and practical suggestions on shaping my case studies and for providing timely feedback on my drafts. I have benefited a lot from his writings and gained considerable knowledge of Chinese politics and foreign policy. Pete has always been supportive to me particularly when I was lost and encountered difficulties during the course of my PhD. His encouragement, generosity and humour have made my PhD life more memorable.

My special thanks go to Dr Anne Gunn, an amazing lady with expertise in Chinese history. She offered timely help with my thesis editing when I was in the finishing-up stages. Being a writer whose mother tongue is not English, I deeply appreciate Anne's assistance in proofreading and editing.

I am grateful to the Department of International Relations for admitting me to this doctoral programme and providing a stimulating environment in which to work. I owe many thanks to Prof. William T. Tow and Prof. Lorraine Elliott who looked after me when my supervisor was on sabbatical leave and provided guidance on drafting chapters. I also would like to thank Prof. Christian Reus-Smit, Dr Ian Hall, Dr Yongwook Ryu, Dr Mathew Davies and Dr Paul Keal, who shared their work or research experience with me and often reminded me of the "normality" of the hardship of doing a PhD.

I owe my fellow PhD colleagues a huge debt for their support and help. A particular thanks to Wen-ti Sung, Sarah Logan, Beverley Loke, and Gregory MacCallion, who provided feedback and helped with proofreading of particular chapters for me. I would like to thank Peng Lu for his comments and discussion about various aspects of my work, and Yunbo Jiao for his skills in solving issues of technique. At an early stage in my program, I got a lot of help from Madeline Carr, Shannon Tow, Jason Hall, Jae Joek Park, Lacy Kate, and Tomohiko Satake. I would like to take this chance to thank them all.

My thanks also go to my dear friends Miwa Hirono, Emma Campell, Olivia Cable, Amy Chen, Jie Gu, Rongfang Pan, Jinghong Zhang and Thu Roberts, who shared laughs, tears and dishes with me, making my PhD life more colourful and comfortable.

From my fieldwork in China, I gratefully acknowledge the ANU-Beijing University Exchange Scholarship. I am deeply thankful to those Chinese scholars and officials who were generous with their time and participated in interviews. I am especially grateful to Prof. Shi Yinong at Renmin University of China, who guided me to this academic field and encouraged me to pursue a PhD degree at ANU. My apologies to the many other colleagues and friends in China who I have failed to acknowledge here, though some of their names will appear in my chapters.

My greatest debt is to my family – my husband and daughter, my parents and parents-in-law – for their self-giving devotion. My husband Zengyi Zhao's unfailing support and love has been an enduring comfort over the past few years and has allowed me to complete this thesis. The birth of my daughter Danning has brought all the happiness I could ever have imagined, and sometimes provided me with legitimate excuses to be distracted from my work. I thank my daughter and husband for their patience and forbearance when I was absent on fieldwork in China, and when I was preoccupied with work particularly in the last twelve months before the submission of the thesis. I am also hugely indebted to my parents, whose love and support made my pursuit of academic interests possible. I am deeply grateful for the sacrifices my parents and parents-in-law made, for their travelling from China to Canberra to help with baby-sitting and housework so that I could be fully concentrated on completing my PhD.

Speaking of past and future generations, I want to conclude with my earnest hope that China can nurture and develop its soft power so that China's new generation may not have to suffer the hardship experienced by past generations. For this reason, I dedicate this work to my parents!

Abstract

This thesis works on the central question of what constitutes China's soft power and how and why it is mobilized by the People's Republic of China. This thesis argues that soft power derives from the mobilization and promotion of non-material sources of power. It treats soft power not as a static quality but as multifaceted and dynamic. An exploration of China's soft power in the past (1959-1965) and present (during China's hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games) suggests that there is both change and continuity in the way in which China's soft power has been constituted and mobilized. Further, my thesis argues that the evolution of China's soft power correlates with China's changing national identity as perceived by the Chinese leadership. How the state seeks to represent itself on the world stage can shape the way it chooses to cultivate, interpret, mobilize and project its soft power. There are three characteristics that I believe make my current research significant.

First, my research contributes to debates about the nature of soft power in International Relations. The existing literature tends to view soft power as a "passive," "given" and "latent" mode of power. This study however demonstrates that soft power is not a static attribute of a state but can be dynamic, which is related to the on-going process of the (re)production of national identity. A state's sense of identity can shape the way in which soft power is constituted and mobilized. The constitution and mobilization of soft power are both derivative of and reproductive of that representation.

Second, my thesis casts new light on the understanding of China's soft power by taking a cross-disciplinary approach between history and international relations. The prevailing studies of China's soft power suggest that, in the context of China's rise, the deployment of soft power represents a "new" dimension in China's international engagement. However, my analysis of primary Chinese sources shows that elements of soft power were adopted in Maoist China. Under Mao, the Chinese state actively promoted China's "new" proletarian culture, the notion of China as an exemplary model of revolution and nation-building, and China's revolutionary foreign policy. These sources constituted what I call "Maoist soft power" and they were vigorously projected through China's cultural diplomacy and foreign aid programs. The research on "Maoist soft power" provides an interesting case to compare and contrast with China's soft power at present, allowing us to develop a deeper understanding of the nature of China's soft power, which is not static but contextual, dynamic and strategic.

The historical study of China's soft power links to the third aspect of this research: although generally understood to be an American post-Cold War invention, the concept of soft power can be a useful tool for analysis of any state's foreign policy.

Exploring China's evolving soft power, my research finds that soft power is not a "new" dimension of power to China. It has, however, been understood and used differently over time according to China's evolving perceptions of its national identity and role in the international system. My research aims to contribute to our understanding of China's soft power and to debates about the nature of soft power in International Relations.

Abbreviations

AAPSO	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
AIFF	Africa International Film Festival
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BOCOG	Beijing Organising Committee for the Olympic Games
CAJFD	China Academic Journals Full-text Database
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCTV	Central China Television
CDA	Chinese Diplomatic Archives (of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC)
CI	Confucius Institute
CNP	Comprehensive National Power
COC	Chinese Olympic Committee
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
GANFO	Games of the New Emerging Forces
GDP	Gross Domestic Growth
GLF	Great Leap Forward
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IOSC	Information Office of the State Council
IR	International Relations (the discipline)
KMT	Kuomintang

NSC	New Security Concept
ROC	Republic of China
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRC	People's Republic of China
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
TASS	Telegraph Agency of Soviet Union
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN	United Nations
US	The United States
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization

1 Introduction

Power is a key but contested concept in the discipline of International Relations (IR). Conventional conceptions of power focus on material formulations, such as military build-up and economic disparities between nations. However, the dissatisfaction with this simplistic conceptualisation of power has spurred investigations into other forms and facets of power. The development of the concept of soft power is one such endeavour. In contrast to material conceptions of power, soft power emphasizes non-material aspects of power rooted in a country's cultural, institutional and ideational appeal to others.

The American political scientist Joseph S. Nye coined the term "soft power" in 1990 and has developed his notion of soft power in his later works in the 2000s.¹ The term has caught on among politicians, academics, as well as policy analysts and commentators in the social media. Having observed the fast economic growth of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since the inception of the "reform and opening-up" policies at the end of 1978, scholars and policy analysts have picked up the term "soft power" to study China's international behaviour and evaluate China's global impact concerning its soft power practices.² Their studies suggest that the deployment of soft power is an emerging strategy of the PRC in the context of its rise, and scholars now ask whether China's soft power poses a threat to the dominant West, particularly the US unipolar liberal international order.³ Whilst there is disagreement regarding how much global influence the PRC has in terms of soft power, the consistent

¹ Joseph S. Nye has mainly developed his concept of soft power in his three books, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), and *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Based on his notion of soft power in these three books, Nye has further developed his argument of power. He maintains that in the information age, it is crucial to pay attention to the multiple dimensions of power and that success in world politics relies on the ability to combine hard and soft power, that is, "smart power." See Joseph S. Nye, *Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004) and *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

² For instance, Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Congressional Research Service, *China's Foreign Policy and "Soft Power" in South America, Asia, and Africa* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2008); Sheng Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2008); Mingjiang Li ed., *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2009); Carola McGiffert ed., *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World*, A Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative (Washington D.C.: the Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2009).

³ In particular see Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive*; Congressional Research Service, *China's Foreign Policy and "Soft Power" in South America, Asia, and Africa*; McGiffert ed., *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States*.

assumption underlying such debates is that the deployment of soft power is a new dimension of China's international engagement.

I have two main concerns regarding the above approach to studying China's soft power. The first concern is the utility of Nye's notion of soft power in contexts beyond the United States (US).⁴ Since Nye's conception of soft power has primarily developed in the context of the debates about maintaining American hegemony in the post-Cold War liberal international order, this empirical preoccupation leaves an open question of the extent to which his notion of soft power can be applied to contexts beyond the US. Is it really the case that soft power relies on a democratic regime? The second concern relates to the assumption that a "soft power" approach represents something "new" in the PRC's international engagement. Can this assumption actually hold up? Can we see elements of what we now call "soft power" that were mobilized and projected in the early period of the PRC? If there were such efforts, how do they contribute to the understanding of PRC's soft power?

Addressing these two concerns suggests that it may be valuable to distill the essential theoretical underpinnings of the concept of soft power from its primary historical context – the US unipolar era. It also prompts me to explore whether "soft power" is "new" to China.

This introduction is divided into four sections. The first section describes the context of this research. It reviews the literature of soft power with particular attention paid to the discussion of China's soft power. This broad literature review leads me to the research puzzles that have driven this study. Following this, the second section of this introduction articulates the central question that I shall work to answer and provides my argument in brief. The third section explains methodology and research design. It outlines the case studies that are the empirical focus of the thesis and provides the reasons for the case selection. Finally, this introduction gives a brief sketch of the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Literature review: soft power and the PRC

This section discusses the origin of the concept of soft power in the discipline of IR and the popularity of applying this concept to study China's international behaviour. I argue that current debate on China's soft power is driven but also dominated by the phenomenon of China's rise and the question of whether China's soft power will help the PRC's peaceful rise or pose a threat to the liberal international order. While China's soft power is a hot political and academic topic, most work treats soft power in the PRC as a recent phenomenon in close relation to its economic rise. This seems to imply that soft power is only possible after

⁴ In this regard, some other analysts have the same concern, see Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings*, 2; Geoffrey J. Randal, *The Seduction of Soft Power: Diplomacy in Modern Times* (The Australian National University (ANU) Thesis, 2008), 1-3.

attainment of potent hard power. This is a problem because it ignores the history of the PRC's soft power-based foreign policy practices, especially during eras of relatively weak material power. As such, current research on China's soft power lacks a deeper historical perspective on soft power as an aspect of China's international engagement and is short of analysis of what shapes that soft power. The remainder of this section reviews the context in which Nye developed the concept of soft power and the debate on China's soft power.

The concept of soft power was invented by Joseph S. Nye in 1990. He sought to use this concept to counter the then-prevalent but pessimistic view that the US was in decline at the end of the 1980s.⁵ Nye defines soft power as a co-optive or attractive power that operates through the appeal of culture, political values and agenda-setting in a way that shapes others' preferences in world politics.⁶ Exemplified by America's case, soft power is associated with intangible assets including "a universalistic culture," political values such as "democracy," "international institutions (working with others)," and "foreign policy (promoting peace and human rights)."⁷ Nye regards that this dimension of power presents a striking contrast to the hard command power usually associated with tangible resources such as military and economic strength.⁸ In the age of information and globalization characterised by "complex interdependence," Nye argues that hard power is not unimportant but its application and utility can be limited. At the same time, soft power has played an increasingly important role in begetting cooperation to deal with transnational issues.⁹ Soft power for Nye is significant for America in the post-Cold War era because this power would help to maintain American primacy in the liberal international order.

Nye's concept of soft power, which contests the conceptualization of power as simply military or economic power resources, has gained wide currency since it was introduced into diplomatic and political vocabulary.¹⁰ However, whilst his works on soft power provide a useful platform to think more about the concept of power and soft power in international relations, it should be noted that Nye's notion of soft power is primarily located in the post-Cold War era with the US as the only superpower in world politics. It thus leaves an open question of whether his idea of soft power can be applied to contexts beyond the US.

⁵ Nye, *Soft Power*, xi.

⁶ Nye, *Bound to Lead*, 31.

⁷ Nye, *Soft Power*, 5, 6, 14.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁰ See Nye, *Soft Power*, xi.

Nye's work of soft power was introduced into China in 1992.¹¹ Since then, the concept of soft power has become popular among Chinese political leaders, scholars and commentators. For instance, in his report to the 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2002, President Jiang Zemin stressed the more prominent role culture played in the competition for comprehensive national power.¹² At the 17th CCP Congress in October 2007, President Hu Jintao used the term "cultural soft power" (*wenhua ruanshili*) to highlight the importance of developing culture for enhancing national cohesion and competitiveness in overall national strength.¹³ In the meantime, recent years have witnessed a rapid growth of the number of articles that discuss (China's) soft power in Chinese journals and newspapers (see Chapter Three). While the definition of soft power – the ability to get what a country wants through attraction rather than coercion – has not been substantially questioned by most Chinese analysts, there are different meanings given to it with regard to what constitutes soft power and how to generate attraction.

Chinese intellectuals are interested in exploring the most likely sources generating China's soft power and how to use these sources in conducting Chinese foreign policy and enhancing China's global image. There is an emerging consensus on three key "sources" of China's soft power: (1) Chinese culture, (2) China as a model for development, and (3) Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy. These are regarded as the most important in promoting a dynamic image of a "New China" and enhancing China's global appeal (Chapter Three provides a more detailed analysis of the Chinese discourse of soft power).

China's embrace of the concept of soft power is largely driven by three factors. First, Chinese elites increasingly view soft power as constituting an indispensable part of "comprehensive national power (CNP, *zonghe guoli*)."¹⁴ Although China's economic power grows quickly,

¹¹ Nye's book *Bound to Lead* was translated into Chinese by He Xiaodong and Gai Yuyun as *美国定能领导世界吗* (*Is America Bound to Lead the World*), published by China's Military Translation Press in 1992.

¹² "全面建设小康社会，开创中国特色社会主义事业新局面——江泽民同志在党的十六大上所作报告全文（2002年11月8日）" (Build a well-off society in an all-round way and create a new situation in building socialism with Chinese characteristics, full text of Jiang Zemin's report to 16th Party Congress on Nov 8, 2002), *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily, later *RMRB*) (November 18, 2002), 1.

¹³ "高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜 为夺取全面建设小康社会新胜利而奋斗——胡锦涛同志在中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上的报告（2007年10月15日）" (Hold high the great banner of Socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive for new victories in building a well-off society in an all-round way, Hu Jintao's report to the 17th Party Congress on October 15, 2007), *RMRB* (October 25, 2007), 3.

¹⁴ Hu Angang and Men Honghua, "The rising of modern China: comprehensive national power and grand strategy," paper presented to "Rising China and the East Asian Economy" International Conference by KIEP, Seoul, March 19-20, 2004.

they recognize that China's soft power lags far behind the West and the US in particular¹⁵ and argue that China should urgently focus on catching up in this regard. Second, China's soft power provides a way of enhancing national cohesion. In the context of American "cultural hegemony," identifying and promoting China's soft power helps define the PRC's unique identity and restore Chinese pride in it.¹⁶ Third, conscious of the international suspicion and concern about China's fast economic and military development, Chinese political elites emphasize that soft power is particularly important to allay international worries about China's rise and to facilitate its "peaceful development" in the global community. Therefore, it is argued that it is necessary for the Chinese government to take active steps to enhance its attractiveness and to reassure the rest of the world that China's development generally is beneficial and does not pose any tangible threat to the existing international order.¹⁷ In summary, Chinese intellectuals tend to view soft power as something that needs to be actively cultivated and promoted by mobilizing sources of non-material power such as culture, developmental model and foreign policy and diplomacy.

However, compared to their Chinese counterparts, China observers in the West are generally negative regarding China's soft power. To begin with, they point to deficiencies that detract from China's capacity to develop soft power. These include the PRC's one-party authoritarian regime, poor human rights record, and weakness in international institutions including capacities in regards to agenda-setting and active shaping of these institutions.¹⁸ Second,

¹⁵ See for instance "透析中国'软实力'" (Analysing China's soft power), *解放军日报* (People's Liberation Army (PLA) Daily), October 3, 2005; Fang Changping, "中美软实力比较及其对中国的启示" (A comparison between China's soft power and that of US and its implications for China), *世界经济与政治* (World Economics and Politics) no.7 (2007), 21-27; Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin, "中美软实力比较" (A comparison of soft power between China and the United States), *现代国际关系* (Contemporary International Relations) no.1 (2008), 24-29.

¹⁶ Huang Renwei, "软实力与国家安全" (Soft power and national security), *学习月刊* (Study Monthly) no.1 (2003), 23-28. Also see The State Council of the People's Republic of China, "Outline of the National Plan for Cultural Development During the Period of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan," National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of the PRC <http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/hot/t20060529_71334.htm> (May 29, 2006).

¹⁷ For instance see Zheng Bijian, "中国和平崛起新道路和亚洲的未来" (China's new road towards its peaceful rise and the future of Asia, speech at Bo'ao Asian Forum in 2003), *Xinhuanet.com* <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-11/24/content_1195240.htm> (November 24, 2003); Zheng Bijian, "Ten views on China's development road of peaceful rise and Sino-European relations," The Foreign Policy Centre <<http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/664.pdf>> (December 15, 2005); Zheng Bijian, "China's 'peaceful rise' to great-power status," *Foreign Affairs* 84:5 (Sep/Oct 2005), 18-22; Yan Xuetong, "The rise of China and its power status," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 1:1 (2006), 5-33; Shi Yinhong, "China's peaceful rise is all about soft power," *China Daily* (June 14, 2007), 10.

¹⁸ Nye, *Soft Power*, 89; Joseph S. Nye, "American and Chinese power after the financial crisis," *The Washington Quarterly* 33:4 (2010), 143-153; Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and limits of Chinese 'soft power'," *Survival* 48:2 (2006), 17-36; Ingrid d'Hooghe, "The limits of China's soft power in Europe: Beijing's public diplomacy puzzle," *Clingendael Diplomacy Paper No.25* (The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', January 2010); Jonathan

some point out that China's soft power practices are a not so subtle ploy on the part of the PRC to contain Taiwan's international political influence as well as to gain access to valuable natural resources in regions such as Africa.¹⁹ These practices are in effect attempts to achieve "hard" ends rather than produce attractiveness. Third and more alarmingly, some see soft power as representing a "new domain" for zero-sum games in international politics. They view the rise of China's soft power as being at the expense of Western/US soft power, because Beijing propagates its authoritarian model of economic growth as a source of attraction in order to create a sphere of influence among illiberal states.²⁰ As a report prepared for the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations states, "the perceived decline in American soft power is relative – largely a comparative decline based on the rise of other powers – in particular the rapid emergence of China as a US 'peer competitor'".²¹

Regardless of the different implications that can be generated from the studies of China's soft power between Chinese and Western analysts, most see that soft power constitutes a "new sphere" of power for the PRC to expand its global influence. Much of the interest in China's soft power is a by-product of the obsession (both within China and internationally) with the phenomenon of China's rise and the question of whether China's soft power will help China's peaceful rise or pose a threat to the liberal international order.

Despite this intense focus on China's soft power and its implications, there are important questions about the nature of China's soft power that are as yet not being fully addressed.

The first question I raise is what the nature of soft power is and what constitutes soft power. In much academic writing on the topic, soft power is viewed as an objective resource that can be accumulated, measured, or maintained to gain or retain a superior position in international competition. Such resource-based definitions of soft power fail to develop a deeper understanding of the multifaceted and fluid nature of soft power. For instance, Nye says that American liberal culture constitutes American soft power. While many Europeans admire America's devotion to individualism and personal liberties, societies in the Middle East or Asia may not be attracted to such values.²² In this simple case, we can see that soft power is

McClory, *The New Persuaders: An International Ranking of Soft Power* (UK: Institute for Government, December 7, 2010); Jonathan McClory, *The New Persuaders II: A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power* (UK: Institute for Government, December 1, 2011).

¹⁹ See Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, "The conception of soft power and its policy implications: a comparative study of China and Taiwan," *Journal of Contemporary China* 17: 56 (2008), 425-447.

²⁰ Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive*, 43, 56-57.

²¹ Congressional Research Service, *China's Foreign Policy and "Soft Power" in South America, Asia, and Africa*, 3.

²² See Nye, *Soft Power*, 55-56.

quite subjective and relational: whether it is “soft power” depends upon not only the actor, but also the recipient.

Therefore, it is necessary to develop a deeper understanding of soft power rather than focus merely on measuring this power and gauging its impact. It is important to ask, for example, who projects “soft power,” who the targeted audience is, and who it is not.²³ In this sense, empirical case studies are needed to explore what constitutes a country’s soft power and how the state mobilizes this power to attract whom and for what purpose. It is necessary not only to consider the subjectivity of the state, but to take account of the targeted audience – to whom it is “soft power.” In other words, the study of soft power needs to pay attention to the role(s) of the state which projects soft power and its intentions as well as to the targeted audience.

Secondly, available research on China’s soft power inspired by China’s economic growth since the late 1970s leads to a big puzzle: is soft power a “new” dimension in the PRC’s international engagement? Recent studies of China’s soft power are not historically tenable: they are not based on a rigorous examination of the possible “soft power” efforts in pre-1978 China. In this sense, do these studies imply that soft power is a “given” and is solely determined by the rise of China’s hard material power? Or can we actually see elements of what we now call “soft power” that were mobilized and promoted in the early period in PRC’s international engagement? These questions raised by reviewing the current debate of China’s soft power suggest that, in order to more fully understand the nature and role of soft power in the PRC, a historical perspective is fruitful to study whether the PRC made attempts to mobilize and promote the elements of what we now call “soft power” in the past. What is the nature of such efforts at present? These puzzles have driven my study to investigate the PRC’s “soft power” in the past and present. In so doing, it allows me to compare and contrast the degree of change and continuity of China’s “soft power” in different eras of the PRC.

1.2 The central question and the argument in brief

From reading the available literature on soft power and particularly China’s soft power, the central research question I shall work to answer is:

How has soft power been constituted and mobilized by the PRC?

And the secondary question this study seeks to investigate:

²³ Ying Fan, “Soft power: power of attraction or confusion?” *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 4:2 (2008), 148.

How has the constitution and mobilization of the key sources of China's soft power varied across time and what factors shape the way that it is constituted and mobilized?

This study treats soft power as ideational, relational and social. Ideational factors include culture, ideologies, values, perceptions, and intentions – all subjective aspects of political elites' understanding of such elements. Soft power is relational. This means that soft power is defined by the relationship. Whilst some may be attracted by particular culture, ideologies, values and policies, some others may feel repelled. Soft power depends on whom the actor wants to attract and how the actor defines the relationship between itself and the recipient. Soft power is also a form of social power, which is constituted not simply by the resources of the actor but through the processes of engaging with others including the existing international system.²⁴ Soft power thus is a dynamic and multifaceted rather than a static attribute of the state.

This study argues that soft power derives from the mobilization and promotion of non-material sources of power. It demonstrates that whilst there are specific qualities of the constitution and mobilization of China's soft power today, such efforts to project its attraction through the mobilization of non-material sources of power are not new.

It also argues that China's soft power is multifaceted and dynamic. It demonstrates both changes and continuities in Beijing's efforts to attract targeted audiences through the mobilization and promotion of non-material power sources at different historical moments. How China's soft power is constituted at particular historical moments strongly reflects Chinese political elites' evolving sense of their national identity and the PRC's role in relation to others in the international system.

This study of China's soft power seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of China's soft power. It has the following three objectives:

- 1) Contributing to academic debate on the concept of soft power – an originally American-centric and post-Cold War concept – by exploring the formulation and practices of “soft power” in PRC's two historical contexts.
- 2) Critically evaluating Chinese political elites' understanding of the key sources of China's soft power, in part by an exhaustive collection of data pertaining to it and analysis. A further point here is to demonstrate how the constitution and mobilization of soft power is closely

²⁴ Christian Reus-Smit, *American Power and World Order* (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 44.

related to perceptions and representations of China's national identity and of its role in the international system.

3) Demonstrating how these understandings and interpretations, which evolve according to the PRC's evolving national identity and international self-positioning, have manifested in concrete soft power practices. I seek to make an empirical contribution especially regarding the empirical case studies through exploring primary Chinese data.

Whilst it acknowledges the value of measuring China's soft power, as the research questions suggest, this thesis focuses primarily on the efforts and strategies that the Chinese government made to mobilize soft power in the global stage and for what purpose of doing so. It does not provide an analysis of the effectiveness of these measures nor of the reception of these measures in target audiences. This is beyond the scope of the thesis but suggests an important area for future research building on this project.

1.3 Design of this study: methodology and case studies

In order to answer my research questions I decided to do a longitudinal historical analysis. A longitudinal historical approach allows this project to investigate whether there is antecedent to contemporary soft power and to compare the mobilization of soft power in the contemporary era with that at a significant juncture in the past.

The subject of this longitudinal analysis is the PRC. In the past six decades since its founding in 1949, the PRC underwent significant changes in its economic and political structure, wealth and power, and foreign policy posture. However the regime remains constant with one single party – the CCP – in power. At the same time, the international system has evolved from a bipolar system in the Cold War bifurcated by capitalist and socialist camps to an increasingly multipolar but integrated one in the post-Cold War, which in recent years is experiencing power shift from one dominant superpower to emerging forces. Under these changes, we have seen different “Chinas” with different images projected on the international stage. A longitudinal historical approach therefore enables this study to explore “soft power” the PRC may have mobilized in the past and to compare that with China's contemporary soft power. This allows this project to analyse the continuity and variation in the constitution and mobilization of China's soft power; how the configuration of China's soft power has contributed to China's international engagement; and the formation of China's national image at different times of the PRC.

In addition, the focus of the PRC allows me to address whether it is the case that soft power relies on a particular form of political regime that is essentially democratic. It pushes the

boundary beyond Nye's work in forcing us to rethink what soft power really means and how it is shaped and acted upon by a different political regime.

1.3.1 Analytical framework of this study

To advance an analytical framework to study China's soft power, it is important to step outside preconceived notions of the sources of soft power identified in the American context. This is because of the multifaceted nature of soft power pointed out above: soft power is ideational, relational, and social, and thus may vary when the subject or the relationship changes.²⁵ The sources of soft power Nye has identified, such as American liberal political culture and values, and agenda-setting in international institutions, are very much US-based. China, a different political entity from the US, may have a different story of soft power.

Consequently, I examine the Chinese discourse of soft power to discover how soft power has been conceptualized by the Chinese intelligentsia since this term was introduced into Chinese vocabulary in 1992. I used the China Academic Journals Full-text Database (CAJFD), currently the largest and most comprehensive database of Chinese journals and periodicals,²⁶ to obtain a Chinese understanding of (China's) soft power. I searched four sections in this database – "literature/history/philosophy," "politics/military affairs/law," "education & social science" and "economics & management" – with "软实力" (*ruan shili*), "软权力" (*ruan quanli*), "软力量" (*ruan lilian*) and "软国力" (*ruan guoli*) the four popular translations of the term of "soft power"²⁷ as "keywords" and used the "or" function in the "advanced search" with "precise matching" in the range of "core journals."²⁸ My analysis of Chinese discourse of soft power indicates that there are three central components treated by Chinese intellectuals as the key "sources" of China's soft power. They are: (1) Chinese culture, (2) China as a model for development, and (3) Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy. The key sources of soft power identified from the Chinese discourse form the foundation of operational framework for this project. It will explore how the three key sources of soft power,

²⁵ Joseph S. Nye, "Foreword," in Watanabe Yasushi and David L. McConnell eds., *Soft power superpowers: cultural and national assets of Japan and the United States* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), xiii; Nye, *The Future of Power*, 10, 21.

²⁶ See the "introduction" of 中国知网 (*China National Knowledge Infrastructure*) <<http://www.cnki.net/gvncnki/gvncnki.htm>>

²⁷ It should be noted that "*ruan shili*" (软实力) now is much more often used than the other three translations in Chinese.

²⁸ There are 4,664 Chinese journals collected by the CAJFD, of which 733 journals are regarded as "core journals" in the four sections of literature/history/philosophy, politics/military affairs/law, education & social science, and economics & management. See <http://ckrd85.cnki.net/kns50/Navigator.aspx?ID=1>. Due to the large quantity of Chinese journals, this survey was restricted to the "core journals."

namely, Chinese culture, China as a model for development, and Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy, have been conceptualized and mobilized by the PRC in different contexts.

A review of the articles on soft power in CAJFD also helps this study propose an operational definition of soft power, which is, “the purposeful efforts to attract targeted audiences through the mobilization of non-material sources of power.” Highlighting “purposeful efforts” is based on the observation that countries with rich non-material power resources do not necessarily have “soft power” at their disposal. There is a distinction between having the sources of soft power and the willingness and efforts to mobilize these to convert into soft power.

This understanding of soft power shares elements of national image projection in so far as both engage in an active and purposeful way of operation – consciously using power resources to project a positive national image to attract others. National image projection is defined by Shaun Breslin as “a concerted effort” by the state to promote a positive image. In the case of China, it is “a deliberate state-led project to promote the preferred idea of China’s underlying values, cultures and principles” in the hope that this will attract others.²⁹ There are then parallels in what Breslin calls “national image promotion” and the conception of the mobilization of soft power in this thesis. However, it recognizes that national image projection comprises only one important aspect of soft power. The conceptualization of soft power in this project is a more integrated one in so far as it examines the relationship between the identification and cultivation of “sources” of soft power with their mobilization in China’s engagement with particular audiences. In so doing soft power is conceptualized as not only ideational but also social and relational.

This thesis will demonstrate that the key sources of China’s soft power have not only been mobilized to promote a dynamic image of a “New China.” But more importantly, the way in which these sources were interpreted and mobilized tells us much about how China seeks to

²⁹ Shaun Breslin, “The soft notion of China’s ‘soft power’,” *Asia Programme Paper*: ASP PP 2011/03, Chatham House (February 2011), 9-11. In this article, Breslin identifies “four interrelated” but “separate varieties” of China’s “non-hard” power. The first is “soft power, understood as the latent power of attraction.” This relates to what I call the sources of soft power. The second variety is “proactive national image promotion,” which crosses the idea of the mobilization of soft power in this thesis. The third is “normative power promotion,” relating to how China understands its role in the international system and the distinctiveness of this approach, based on its world view, which in turn draws on its cultural predilections. The concept of normative power promotion perhaps is linked to my conception of soft power in two ways: it encompasses the dimension of China’s cultural identity which will be discussed in Chapter Three, and also shares elements of the active promotion of China’s role in the international system. The last dimension of China’s “non-hard” power Breslin conceptualizes as “imagined power,” derived from perceptions of China by others of growing material power and influence, particularly its economic power. The idea of “imagined power” relates to audience’s perceptions of China’s economic power, although to some extent it speaks to what I identify as one of the sources of soft power - the developmental model (see Chapter Three).

represent itself to the world, as well as informs us of conceptions of how the state should use its growing material power, and of Chinese ideas as to how international relations should be conducted by the state. Additionally, these sources have served as vehicles to represent and project particular ideas and values that encapsulate what China stands for, and that reflect China's national identity and global role in the international system. In this sense, it suggests that soft power is related to the concept of national identity.

National identity, as argued by Samuel S. Kim and Lowell Dittmer, seeks to define not only "what the state *is* (as represented by the myths, rituals, flag, constitution, and anthem that relate how the nation-state came to be and what it stands for)," but also "what the state *does* (via role performance in domestic and foreign policy)."³⁰ From this definition, national identity matters because it provides the values for the state and helps identify the state's credibility and its appeal to others (through defining "what the state is"). It also "provides a cognitive framework for shaping its [a state's] interests, preferences, worldview and consequent foreign policy actions."³¹ The significance of national identity in China's case has been acknowledged and analysed by a number of China scholars. For instance, Yongjin Zhang argues that "few nations have embarked upon a more turbulent quest than that of China in its search of its rightful place in the universal international society" in the post-1949 world.³² Allen Carlson notes that "a deep sense of national identity plays, in fact, a crucial role in shaping fundamental aspects of China's rise and aspirations. ...underlying the game of interest-based calculations lies the more fundamental issue of what kind of national sense of self will predominate."³³

Following these understandings of national identity, this thesis argues that soft power is closely related to national identity in the following ways. First, national identity helps shape the configuration and the practice of soft power in the international relations. This is because national identity informs the values upheld by the state, suggests the credibility and appeal of the state in the international arena, and frames the state's interests and foreign policy behaviour. "[B]eing the psychological foundation for the role and behaviour patterns of a country in the international arena," national identity thus "influences attitudes and policies

³⁰ Samuel S. Kim and Lowell Dittmer, "Whither China's quest for national identity?," in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 240.

³¹ Samuel S. Kim, "Northeast Asia in the local-regional-global nexus: multiple challenges and contending explanations," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *International Relations of Northeast Asia* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), 41.

³² Yongjin Zhang, *China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford), 4.

³³ Allen Carlson, "China's conflicted Olympic moment," *Current History* 106:701 (2007), 254.

alike.”³⁴ National identity thus can affect a state’s behaviour patterns including soft power practices. Second, the configuration and practice of soft power reflects and enhances the national identity, as soft power projects particular ideas and values that encapsulate what the state is and stands for.

It is now widely recognized that national identity does not emerge naturally, nor does it remain constant. Rather, it is forged through education and sometimes inculcation to reinforce a collective sense of self, and engaged in “an ongoing process or journey rather than a fixed set of boundaries, a relationship rather than a free-standing entity or attribute.”³⁵ This means that national identity is no static attribute but dynamic. “There is no guarantee that national identity at one time will be the same as at another.”³⁶ The state involved in the (re)production of national identity experience an open-ended process of cultivation, adjustments, reinterpretations and inventions regarding what the nation is and stands for. Constructivists argue that change in a state’s identity can cause considerable changes in its interests, which shapes national security/foreign policy and international behaviour.³⁷ The variability of national identity thus can have an impact on a state’s international behaviour in regards to the constitution and projection of soft power. The issue of national identity is especially relevant to the case of China’s soft power, given China’s abiding concern for cultural and political integrity. Following the recognition of the close relationship between soft power and national identity, this study pays attention to China’s national identity in order to understand the way in which China’s soft power is constituted and mobilized.

To recap, this subsection illustrates the analytical framework of this study. The key sources of soft power identified from the Chinese discourse, namely, Chinese culture, China as a model for development, and Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy, form the foundation of analytical framework for this project. In the case studies, I will explore how these three key sources of soft power have been conceptualized and mobilized by the PRC in different contexts. Additionally, this subsection examines the relationship between the concept of soft power and another two related concepts – national image projection and national identity. While it recognizes the parallel between the ideas of soft power and national image projection, it points out that national image projection relates to the idea of the mobilization of soft

³⁴ Robert A. Scalapino, “China’s multiple identities in East Asia,” in L. Dittmer and S. Kim eds., *China Quest for a National Identity*, 215.

³⁵ Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, “In searching of a theory of national identity,” in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China’s Quest for National Identity*, 13.

³⁶ Carlson, “China’s conflicted Olympic moment,” 254.

³⁷ Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in Peter J. Katzenstein ed., *The Culture of National Security* (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1996), 60-61.

power but may not contain the dimension of how soft power is constituted - the identification and cultivation of "sources" of soft power. From the exploration of the relationship between soft power and national identity, it highlights that understanding China's national identity is important to understand the way in which China's soft power is constituted and mobilized.

1.3.2 Case studies

In order to develop a more historically nuanced understanding of China's soft power, and to test whether soft power is a new phenomenon in China, I employ a longitudinal historical approach. It entails not only giving attention to soft power promoted by the PRC in recent years, but also investigation of whether the three key sources of China's soft power as described above were utilized in the early period of the PRC's international engagement. The case studies help me refine the parallels and differences between the ideas and practices of "soft power" in the PRC across time. In so doing, this study will lead us to see the different "Chinas" as it were. It also allows me to study soft power "by whom," "over whom" and in what context. As such, it will support my argument that soft power is ideational, relational and social. A state may "intentionally choose" what soft power it wants to represent itself on the world stage. The articulation and promotion of its "chosen" soft power is actually both derivative of and reproductive of a state's national identity.

The best way to undertake this longitudinal approach I believe is to employ a paired comparison between two periods of the PRC in the past sixty years. The significant change politically and economically in the late 1970s demarcated this state into one which prioritized "revolution" and the other orientated towards "reform." As pointed out earlier that prevailing research into China's soft power largely focuses on that in the reform era, this project therefore employs a "before" and "after" study to explore and compare soft power ideas, policies and practices in the different contexts of the PRC. This approach helps investigate China's different views of the international system and China's role in this system and how international relations should be conducted as well as how the identified soft power of China has influenced its behavior in international arena at different historical moments. Different perceptions of China's national identity are evident in these two periods, as explained by Ni Feng from Chinese Academies of Social Sciences (CASS) in his analysis of the shaping of China's foreign policy, "China is repositioning itself from a revolutionary country that rejected the existing international regime to a responsible power within the system."³⁸ The study of China's soft power in the two eras will help us understand China's repositioning role in the international system.

³⁸ Ni Feng, "The shaping of China's foreign policy," in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi eds., *The Rise of China and A Changing East Asian Order* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), 146.

The operational definition of soft power in this study, “the purposeful efforts to attract targeted audiences through the mobilization of non-material sources of power,” leads this thesis to focus on the specific episodes as “campaigns.” The extraordinary campaigns are particularly helpful to advance the “purposefulness” of the state in strategically mobilizing the sources of soft power to project China’s national image, reshape national identity and convey certain messages about what China is and stands for. The study of these campaigns in the two periods also provides valuable points of comparison to each other.

Two distinctive moments in the PRC’s engagement with the rest of the world attracted my attention and provide the basis for this study. They are: China in the first half of the 1960s and China in the 2008 Beijing Olympic period. In both cases, the PRC was very outward looking though China’s national image and posture differed greatly. The first is located at the peak of revolutionary China and the second represents the culmination of reformist China to date. Claiming itself as a “revolutionary” power and aligning itself with the Third World, the PRC in the first half of the 1960s was very active and distinctive on the world stage.³⁹ Due to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relationship from the late 1950s, China shifted its socialist-camp line of the 1950s, in which it was allied with the USSR against the US, towards an attempt to build a broad coalition of radical forces in the Third World against the two superpowers – the US and the USSR. Given that the young PRC was materially weak, why and how did it pursue a policy to challenge the two superpowers? Can we see non-material sources of power such as culture, model effect, and foreign policy that were mobilized and projected by the PRC to enhance its global appeal on the world stage? If Mao’s China did so, then who did it seek to attract? It is generally regarded that the PRC’s revolutionary period was characterized by an aggressive international posture that privileged hard coercive power.⁴⁰ Some China scholars argue that the revolutionary period stands in strong contrast with the reformist era when soft power becomes a new feature in China’s international engagement. The case of revolutionary China is chosen as a hard case to test whether the hypothesis that soft power is necessarily new to the PRC can hold up. It also provides an interesting site to explore continuity and variation in the constitution and mobilization of soft power and the factors that shape this.

³⁹ Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970).

⁴⁰ For instance, see Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), ch.6 and ch.7; Robert S. Ross, “China’s three rises, regional power transitions, and East Asia security: 1949 to the Twenty-First Century,” in William C. Kirby ed., *The People’s Republic of China at 60: An International Assessment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 92-95; Andrew Bingham Kennedy, *The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Here I clarify why I choose the PRC from 1959 to 1965 to examine China's soft power. Firstly, it is because 1959 signifies the point at which China emerged as an independent international actor (due to the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship) and as a potential "third pole" in the international arena. The Sino-Soviet collision in some respects provided the Beijing regime with a space within which to build its status as a model and a leader in the community of post-colonial states. However, with the inauguration of the so-called "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in 1966, Mao's China pulled away substantially from international involvement. This domestic political campaign damaged the PRC's diplomatic relations with various governments to the point that only one ambassador was left in residence abroad. Additionally, in developing a deeper historical understanding of non-material sources of power, I draw extensively within this case study on the declassified *Chinese Diplomatic Archives (CDA)* from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC from 1959 to 1965. The empirical data on that period – the declassified *CDA* – are at present only available through 1965. For these two reasons, the study of Maoist soft power is largely confined to the years from 1959 to 1965. In addition to the *CDA*, I also use many primary Chinese sources, such as the Chinese leaders' collected works, sources released by the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance, Chinese official documents and newspapers, and published memoirs.

The second case this project selects is the 2008 Beijing Olympics, which marked the culmination of the PRC's reform era to date. After three-decade material build-up resulting from the implementation of economic-driven reforms since the late 1970s, China has become increasingly outward looking and concerned about how it is perceived by the others and how China should orientate itself in the international system. Therefore, China's soft power that was premised on the mobilization of the elements of Chinese culture, development and its vision of itself and the relations with others in the international community are of particular importance. The projection of these can tell us much about conceptions of what contemporary China is and what it stands for – its national identity and global role, which is re-oriented in China's reform era. The principal element of China's national identity and global role in this era, identified from both Chinese intellectual and official discourse, is that of China as a responsible great power engaged in the international system and cooperation with other great powers, rather than a lone socialist global power in a post-Cold War and post-communist world.⁴¹ This analysis is further developed in Chapter Three.

⁴¹ Wang Jisi, "China's changing role in Asia," in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi, eds., *The Rise of China and A Changing East Asian Order* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), 6; Li Baojun and Xu Xiyuan, "冷战后中国负责任大国身份的建构" (China's self-identity construction as a responsible power in the post-Cold War era), *教学与研究 (Teaching and Research)*, no.1 (2006),

The mobilization and projection of soft power in the 2008 Beijing Olympics is the archetypal example of the way in which China made enormous efforts to enhance and project its soft power in its reform period. The Games provided China with a unique opportunity to build a global presence, earn admiration from other countries and intensively engage with the outside world through massive exercise of soft power and public diplomacy. The global significance of the Games turned the Beijing Olympics into a powerful platform for China to present what China is through the projection of its culture, development, and foreign policy posture in front of the largest audience it had ever had access to. China's contemporary soft power therefore is globally oriented: it not only targets at the "Global South," but is mobilized to also attain recognition from the "Global North."

The hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games thus represented a milestone in China's cultivation, reinterpretation, and mobilization of its key soft power resources – Chinese culture, development model, and modern foreign policy and diplomacy in contrast with those in revolutionary China. In this sense, the Beijing Games as an extraordinary campaign is not only illustrative of China's contemporary soft power but also provides an interesting case to compare and contrast the soft power that was conceptualized and projected in Maoist China.

This case study will examine how the Chinese interpreted their culture and defined their country's development as well as their relationship with the rest of the world in this campaign. First, I will use Chinese and English narrations of the historical relationship between China and the Olympic movement to identify in what sense hosting an Olympiad matters to the Chinese people and state. Second, I will investigate what kind of soft power China sought to mobilize when hosting the Games and for what purpose. To do this, I will refer to Chinese official and scholarly publications. The analysis of the two cases demonstrates that sources of soft power found in the contemporary era resonate with those in the Maoist case. However, the way in which these sources are constituted has changed markedly across the two cases.

In short, the two case studies are located in different contexts: the first one in the revolutionary period of the PRC and the second one in China's reform era. In both empirical studies, I seek to explore the international role(s) the Chinese authorities intended China to assume and the configuration of national identity they sought to project. I will identify consistency and variation in perceptions of China's international role in the two different eras, addressing the question of "soft power by whom." The two case studies also allow me to explore consistency and variation in who this audience was and how they were addressed.

49-56. The Chinese leaders' statements of "China being a responsible power" (*fu'ze ren de daguo*) emerged from China's response to the Asian Financial Crisis and became more explicit from their engagement with the discourse of "China's peaceful rise" in the early 2000s.

This in turn will tackle the issue of “soft power over whom.” Using the “three sources of China’s soft power” as a framework to compare and contrast the constitution and mobilization of non-material sources of power in two different eras of the PRC allows me to explore the degree of change and continuity of the constitution and mobilization of China’s “soft power” between the past and present. It also allows me to investigate the factors that shape these processes. It will support my argument that the nature of China’s soft power is historical, contextual, dynamic and strategic. It will further lead to my argument that the way in which soft power is constituted and mobilized is shaped by Chinese political elites’ evolving sense of China’s national identity and of China’s global role in relation to others in the international system. In addition, the comparison of the constitution and mobilization of China’s “soft power” also will help us to reconsider the concept of soft power by addressing cultural, political and historical assumptions in current scholarship.

1.4 The layout of this study

Chapter Two of this study explores the understanding of the concept of soft power in IR. It begins with a close review of Nye’s key works of soft power. Whilst his works on soft power provide a useful platform to think more about the concept of power and soft power in international relations, it should be noted that Nye’s notion of soft power is developed primarily in an American context. It thus leaves a question of whether his notion of soft power can be applied to contexts beyond the US. It thereafter examines the concept of soft power by locating it in the broad literature of power to identify where Nye’s concept of soft power fits in with the conceptualization of power in IR. In doing so, it leads me to introduce the working concept of soft power that will be used in this study by focusing on the nature and operational definition of soft power. Soft power in this study is treated as relational, ideational and social. This chapter concludes with an operational definition of soft power to steer the empirical study of China’s soft power, that is, the purposeful efforts the government makes to attract targeted audiences through the mobilization of non-material sources of power.

Following the theoretical discussion of the concept of soft power in IR, Chapter Three goes to contemporary Chinese discourse on this concept. Rather than limiting the concept to Nye’s use of it, Chinese intellectuals strongly advocate building a Chinese perspective on soft power. They focus in their analysis on the most likely sources of China’s soft power and on how these should be applied to facilitate China’s peaceful rise and to shape China’s identity as a responsible great power. Participants in this debate argue either for utilizing key elements of China’s soft power to make China appealing, or for assuaging the fears of particular societies about China’s intentions in world affairs. By reviewing Chinese contemporary discourse, I

identify three central components that are treated as the key “sources” of China’s soft power. They are: (1) Chinese culture, (2) China as a model for development, and (3) Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy. I utilize these sources of China’s soft power to build an operational framework in order to examine how “soft power” is constituted and mobilized by the PRC in different contexts.

Chapter Four, the first empirical study, is located in the context of the first half of the 1960s – the peak period for revolutionary China on the world stage. This chapter examines the PRC’s soft power projection from 1959 to 1965, when the Chinese government actively carried out its “revolutionary” policies and sought international prestige in world affairs more independently resulting from the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. The key feature of China’s national identity projected in the international arena was that it represented as a revolutionary leader with respect to the developing world. Drawing on the abundance of primary and secondary sources on the foreign policy of Maoist China, I chart the key elements of what I call “Maoist soft power.” First, China’s success in throwing off colonial shackles and founding a new nation made the country attractive to the post-colonial states. China’s experience in this regard provided a model for these Third World states and societies to emulate. In addition, Maoist China’s projection of an economic model which was different from the Soviets as well as the West was part of enhancing its attractiveness to those emerging societies, because, like the PRC, they did not have a sophisticated industrial structure. Second, the political culture it presented was a new “proletarian culture” and non-Western in a way that appealed to the Third World audience. Third, Chinese revolutionary foreign policies – the “double anti” and the “united front” to enhance the solidarity of the Third World – provide both models and vehicles through which the ideas and the leadership of China were projected. Additionally, the Chinese government employed instruments including cultural diplomacy and foreign aid. This chapter argues that although it was materially weak, in these early years the PRC derived a great deal of influence from its projection of “Maoist soft power,” although it left a controversial legacy for post-Mao China.

Chapter Five studies China’s soft power projection in its hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games. The Games presented a key opportunity to demonstrate China’s socio-economic achievements resulting from the “reform and opening-up” policies which began in the late 1970s. They also provided a powerful platform for China to project its emerging national identity as a responsible great power. This chapter illustrates China’s soft power projection in the 2008 Beijing Games through (1) the rehabilitation of traditional Chinese culture but with modernized elements; (2) China’s economic vitality and the model it provides for achieving modernization; and (3) the employment of an omnidirectional diplomacy to demonstrate its “good global citizenship.” By mobilizing and projecting these key sources of China’s soft

power, China sought to seize its Olympic moment to be seen as a rejuvenated global power that is an emerging power but does not pose tangible threats to the existing international system. Soft power, for contemporary China, not only represents a “charm offensive” to attract the “Global South,” but also has been used to allay Western fears of the “China threat” and shape China’s image as a responsible global power.

After the two empirical studies, Chapter Six examines the change and continuity in constitution and mobilization of China’s “soft power” in different historical contexts. It compares and contrasts the key sources of soft power and the way the PRC has mobilized them in two different eras. It compares the following factors: the context, the sources of soft power, the tools of mobilization and the target audience in the two case studies. The changes and continuities are evident across all these factors. It concludes that the change and continuity of China’s soft power is rooted in this country’s evolving sense of its national identity, the role it seeks to project in the world and its relations with the international system. It demonstrates that soft power in the PRC’s context is not something “new.” It is multifaceted and fluid. The dynamic feature of China’s soft power to a large extent is derived from changing Chinese perceptions of national identity, or what the PRC seeks to use to represent itself in the world. China’s orientation of itself in relation to others and the international system enable it to shape its soft power.

The conclusion of this thesis provides an overview of this study. It reviews the theoretical framework and summarizes the main empirical findings. This thesis demonstrates that soft power has been purposefully chosen and promoted by the Chinese government not only in the present but also in the past. It answers the research question – how “soft power” has been constituted and mobilized by the PRC, and what factors have shaped these processes – by comparing and contrasting soft power promotion through the two empirical studies within the PRC’s recent history. In addition, it argues that China’s evolving identity in the past decades is the key to understanding the change and continuity in China’s soft power. In so doing, the thesis both deepens our understanding of the nature and role of soft power in China, and also contributes to the development of a more nuanced conception of soft power.

2 The Concept of Soft Power in IR

The concept of soft power, developed by Joseph S. Nye from the late 1980s, has garnered worldwide attention from politicians to scholars. Despite its popularity, soft power remains a contested concept. My goal in this chapter is to provide an analysis of the concept of soft power. The first section reviews the concept of power discussed in the discipline of IR, so as to identify where the concept of soft power fits in with broad conceptualization of power. It then goes to Nye's key works on soft power to grasp a deepening understanding of this concept – why he coined this concept, where this concept is located in the literature of power in IR, and the issues surrounding it. Whilst his works on soft power provide a useful platform to think more about the concept of power and soft power in international relations, it should be noted that Nye's notion of soft power is cultivated primarily in an American context. It thus leaves unanswered question of whether his notion of soft power can be applied to contexts beyond the US. The third section provides a working concept of soft power as used in this study, focusing on the nature and operational definition of soft power. Soft power in this study is treated as relational, ideational and social. It is therefore important to see it as dynamic rather than static. What then becomes particularly important for the study of soft power is by whom it is practised, whom it is targeted at, and in what context. A working definition of soft power this study employs is, "purposeful efforts the government makes to attract targeted audiences through the mobilization of non-material sources of power."

2.1 Three approaches of power conceptualization in IR

Power is widely recognised by IR scholars as a contested concept. This section reviews the broad literature of the concept of power in political science, in particular, the major approaches to the conceptualization of power in IR. My goal is to find out where soft power fits in with the conceptualization of power in IR. In so doing, it facilitates a discussion of the nature of soft power and helps to develop a working concept of soft power in this study.

There are various approaches to defining power in IR. I identify three dimensions of conceptualizing power by referring to Steven Lukes's book *Power: A Radical View*. They are power perceived as (1) the strategies, struggles and practices that characterize the decision-making process to win conflicts; (2) the actions and inactions involved in the shaping of the agenda for the decision-making process (agenda/institution setting); and (3) the actions and

inactions similarly implicated in the shaping of perceived interests and political preferences (shaping normality).¹

The first dimension of power views power as obtaining dominance in conflicted situations.² The classic definition of power from this perspective is made by Robert Dahl: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do."³ Michael Barnett and Raymond Duval note the "sheer influence" and "compulsory" facet of power in Dahl's definition, particularly in international relations.⁴ This dimension of power implies that before its application, power should be assessed by power resources including material and other elements.⁵ David Baldwin calls this approach of defining power the "power-as-resources approach,"⁶ which roughly fits into a realist perspective in which states compete for resources and fight to win wars. "To be powerful is to win: to prevail over others in conflict situations," Lukes argues that this dimension of power has two "fallacies": one is the "exercise fallacy," that power can only mean the causing of an observable sequence of events; another is the "vehicle fallacy," that power is only equated with resources for the convenience of measuring power.⁷

The second dimension of power draws upon Bachrach and Baratz's "second face" of power that involves in the "mobilization of bias" and agenda shaping.⁸ We may call it "institutional" or "structural" power.⁹ This perspective of power looks at decisions designed to avoid the emergence of interests contrary to those of the decision-maker by "manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and political institutions and procedures." This dimension of power prevents "potential" or "latent" issues from becoming actual.¹⁰ It

¹ Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (2nd edition) (Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

² Ibid., 60.

³ Robert A. Dahl, "The concept of power," *Behavioral Science* 2:3 (1957), 202-203.

⁴ Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," *International Organization* 59:1 (2005), 49-50.

⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* (5th edition) (New York: Knopf, 1978), 117-155; Ray S. Cline, *World Power Assessment* (Boulder: Westview, 1977); Dennis Wrong, *Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), 124-145.

⁶ David A. Baldwin, "Power and international relations," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage Press, 2002), 179.

⁷ Lukes, *Power*, 70.

⁸ Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two faces of power," *American Political Science Review* 56:4 (Dec., 1962), 947-952; Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and nondecisions: an analytical framework," *The American Political Science Review* 57:3 (1963), 641-651.

⁹ See Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," 52-55.

¹⁰ Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and nondecisions: an analytical framework," 632, 641.

suggests the need to locate decision-making within the context of agenda-setting, with power exercised through systematic "mobilization of bias" to limit choices or to disadvantage others.¹¹ Antonio Gramsci's idea on how international institutions help stabilise and spread hegemony falls into this perspective of power and has been widely referred to by political scientists.¹² Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were the first to argue that to make or change international regimes (rules, norms and procedures) could be a source of power in a world featuring complex interdependence.¹³ The importance of agenda-setting power matters in that it can affect how people would understand "legitimacy" as agendas can frame what is legitimate or not.¹⁴ Whilst the first dimension of power emphasizes direct influence, the second highlights the indirect effect. However, in Lukes's eyes, these two dimensions of power share one similarity: they both focus on power as related to observable conflict between power wielder and recipient.¹⁵ This leads to his discussion of a third dimension of power.

The third dimension of power, Lukes proposes, is "active" or "inactive power" which does not necessarily focus on power in conflicted situations.¹⁶ For him, power can consist of the securing of consent through the shaping of thoughts, desires and beliefs to the extent that ensures the acceptance of a certain role in the existing order or the status quo since no alternative appears to exist, or because it is seen as natural and unchangeable, or indeed beneficial.¹⁷ Lukes argues that this dimension of power moves beyond limiting choices in observable conflicts, but it "may be at its most effective when least observable" as it shapes perceptions.¹⁸ As a consequence, when taken to the utmost extreme, power can control the meaning of "normality."¹⁹ This power "derives from status, inducing deference, relieves those who are secure in their positions from the need to focus on acting to preserve them."²⁰ This dimension of power, in Felix Berenskoetter's words, "revolves around the view that

¹¹ Ibid., 641.

¹² For example Robert Cox, "Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12:2 (1983), 162-175; Nye, *Bound to Lead*, 32; Barnett and Duvall, "Power in international relations," 60.

¹³ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 19-21.

¹⁴ Felix Berenskoetter, "Thinking about power," in Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams eds., *Power in World Politics* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 8.

¹⁵ Lukes, *Power*, 58-59.

¹⁶ Steven Lukes, "Power and the battle for hearts and minds," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33:3 (2005), 479-481.

¹⁷ Ibid., 482-484.

¹⁸ Lukes, *Power*, 1.

¹⁹ Lukes, "Power and the battle for hearts and minds," 491.

²⁰ Ibid., 480-481.

power is not only at work where there is a conflict of interests but also where there is (an apparent) consensus.”²¹

Lukes’s analysis of the multi-dimensional nature of power provides three ways to define power by focusing on (1) power resources; (2) agenda-setting (to limit others’ choices in conflicted situations); and (3) shaping of perceived interests and political preferences (to form consensus).

After reviewing the broad literature on the concept of power in IR, it is worthwhile to review Nye’s conception of soft power, because it is the foundation of the concept of soft power and has been widely debated and critiqued. The following section first outlines how Nye develops this idea and then critically reviews it. Built upon this critical review, the third section provides a working concept of soft power for this thesis.

2.2 Review of Joseph S. Nye’s concept of soft power

Nye’s development of the concept of soft power can be traced primarily through his three books: *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (1990), *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (2002) and *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004). This section begins with his vision of world politics before it illustrates Nye’s idea of soft power developed in these three books. This helps build an understanding of the broad context in which Nye coined the concept. It then critically reviews his notion of soft power, which facilitates a development of a working concept of soft power for this project.

2.2.1 Nye’s vision of the world politics

I consider Nye’s vision of world politics to be most clearly stated in his earlier book *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (1977) co-authored with one of the leading theorists of neoliberal institutionalism Robert Keohane. This book provides an institutionalist alternative to the realist perception of international politics that mainly focus on the distribution of material power among states. In his later works, we can see that Nye’s notion of soft power is established through the understanding of the contemporary world as a world of “complex interdependence.” This warrants looking at the main ideas in the book of *Power and Interdependence* to understand how the world politics was envisaged by Nye before it explores his notion of soft power.

²¹ Berenskoetter, “Thinking about power,” in Berenskoetter and Williams eds., *Power in World Politics*, 10.

In order to provide a more satisfactory theory than realism to explain the changes in world politics, Keohane and Nye advanced a concept of "complex interdependence" in the 1970s. This concept to a large extent was derived from the thinking about the crises America experienced in the 1970s: America's withdrawal from the Vietnam War, the oil embargo by the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Keohane and Nye observed that in those crises the use of military force and power balancing became inefficacious, due to the various and complex transnational connections and interdependencies between states and societies. They argued that complex interdependence was characterized by three features: (1) the multiple channels of action between societies, and trans-governmental and transnational relations, (2) the absence of a hierarchy of issues with changing agendas and linkages between issues prioritized, and (3) a decline in the use of military force and coercive power in complex international relations.²²

Under these characteristics of complex interdependence, the authors suggested that it would be difficult for states to control outcomes by merely using material means. Owing to issue linkages in world politics, they contended that measures such as military operations and economic sanctions to resolve global issues would be less effective. They thus proposed that agenda setting would be more important in international relations in the context of complex interdependence. In short, international relations under complex interdependence require attention to the importance of agenda setting and produce strong incentives for international actors to foster cooperation in world politics.

Viewing world politics through the lens of "complex interdependence" is the key for Nye to develop the concept of soft power. This is because under the situation of complex interdependence, Nye envisages that there are increasing issues outside the control of states as the result of "the diffusion of power from states to non-state actors."²³ Nye considers that utilizing soft power is an economical and effective strategy to let others follow your way or foster international cooperation in dealing with transnational issues which have been intensified in the information age.²⁴ In his later works, Nye has repeatedly reminded his readers that today's world politics resemble a complex three-dimensional chess game:

²² Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), 24-29.

²³ Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), xvi.

²⁴ Nye, *Soft Power*, 5.

On the top chess board, military power is largely unipolar...the United States is the only country with both nuclear weapons and conventional forces with global deployment. But on the middle chessboard, economic power is multipolar, with the United States, Europe and Japan representing two-thirds of world product, and with China's dramatic growth likely to make it the fourth big player...on this economic board, each power must often bargain with each other as an equal... The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that across borders outside government control. On this bottom board, power is widely dispersed amongst diverse actors such as states, non-states, multinational corporations and individuals. In this three-dimensional game, it is very important to notice the vertical connections among them.²⁵

It is on the bottom transnational board that the significance of soft power is highlighted as it is important to accomplish goals that involve power with others.²⁶ The remainder of this section reviews Nye's narrative of soft power to develop a deeper understanding his way of conceptualizing soft power.

2.2.2 Nye's conception of soft power

As discussed above, Nye's understanding of world politics through the perspective of "complex interdependence" is important for him to develop the concept of soft power. Nye is in an attempt to expand thinking about power from one face, "coercive power", namely, to push others to do otherwise not to do by military or economic might, to a second face, "co-optive power", that is to foster cooperation through attraction or persuasion in the realm of transnational relations. He seeks to prompt a debate on power, which is not confined to the "high politics" such as security and economic issues but extends to the "low politics" including values, cultures and rules. He also attempts to stimulate thinking about the means to success for the state-actors, the US in particular, in world politics. This subsection elaborates Nye's concept of soft power by looking at the context where this concept has been developed, the approaches to defining this concept and how to use this power in Nye's view.

²⁵ Joseph S. Nye, "The changing nature of world power," *Political Science Quarterly* 105:2 (Summer 1990), 183; Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, 39; Nye, *Soft Power*, 4.

²⁶ Nye, *The Future of Power*, xvii.

2.2.2.1 Context of developing soft power concept

Nye's principal motive for coining the term relates to concerns about America's global status from the later stage of the Cold War onward. In the 1980s, it was the debate that American had been declining that triggered Nye's invention of soft power in order to revisit American's role in the international politics from the dimension of non-material power. In the 1990s the debate about the decline of American power ebbed; there developed a certain triumphalism in the US and US foreign policy due to the end of the Cold War and US's pre-eminent power in the liberal international order further strengthened by its lead in technology revolution. The terrorist attacks in 2001 however provided a new and profound challenge that led Nye to warn Americans against the triumphalism of their hard power and recommend using soft power to work with others dealing with transnational issues. However, this does not suggest that Nye saw soft power as a substitute for hard power. Rather he thought that soft power could support hard power and soften the US image projected through its coercive hard power. The following provides details of the context within which Nye develops this concept.

Toward the end of the 1980s, the prevalent conventional wisdom was that the US was losing its preponderance as a consequence of the over-stretching of its material power. Scholars such as Paul Kennedy argued that the US had exceeded its available military resources at the expense of its economic durability, as previous great powers in world history had also done.²⁷ Nye however put forward the concept of soft power to counter this pessimistic view of American power and position in international affairs.

The serious challenge to American power at the time, in Nye's view, did not come from its economic competitors, such as Japan, whose economic rise evoked heated debate in those years, nor the decline of American material power, but from the "transformation of power." Trends in world politics such as the diffusion of power, the deepening of complex interdependence and the emergence of non-state actors in world politics had been making power "less fungible, less coercive and less tangible."²⁸ Under these circumstances, hard command power in terms of military and economic strength was losing its edge. Therefore, Nye contended that the problem at the end of the 1980s for America was not that it was in decline, but whether or not it would be willing to take on the "political leadership and strategic vision" by using "co-optive power", which can foster cooperation and persuade

²⁷ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987).

²⁸ Nye, *Bound to Lead*, 175-176, 188.

others to want what the US wants.²⁹ The co-optive power, with the ability to bring others to work with and follow the example set by America, derived from its capacity of agenda-setting and the appeal of American culture and values, becomes the essential foundation of the idea of soft power.

When entering into the new millennium, Nye's worry about US's global status resulted not only from the challenges of terrorism such as the Al Qaeda attack on Sept 11, 2001, but also from America's air of triumphalism as a result of its "unprecedented power" in the "unipolar moment" with the demise of its great rival the Soviet Union in 1991.³⁰ Nye warned American politicians to refrain from responding to terrorism by military means and "a foreign policy that combines unilateralism, arrogance, and parochialism", for it would "erode the soft power that is often part of the solution."³¹ He proposed an outline for America's international engagement through the means of soft power including a "strategy based on global public goods," "rules of prudence for humanitarian interventions," a "checklist for multilateral versus unilateral tactics," and "accountability of global institutions."³² The principal focus of his 2002 book is to encourage a foreign policy by mobilizing soft power to meet the global challenges such as from the terrorism.

Later Washington's application of unilateralism in the "war on terrorism" prompted Nye's further sharpening of the idea of soft power. In his 2004 book, Nye criticises the unilateral foreign policy employed by the Bush government and proposes practical measures as how the US could improve its international attractiveness in the aftermath of the Iraq War.³³ He reaches a conclusion that it is necessary to combine soft and hard power, which he calls "smart power," in implementing foreign policy. Nye also reminds policy makers and practitioners that it is equally important to work with others particularly America's allies rather than unilaterally, and to consider some of their interests in making and implementing American foreign policy.

From the discussion of the context that Nye develops the idea of soft power, we can see that his principal motive relates to the concerns about America's global status in and after the Cold War. He used this idea to dispute the declinism, a prevalent view about America in the

²⁹ Ibid., 260.

³⁰ Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, xvi. For the discussion of the "unipolar moment" see for instance Charles Krauthammer, "The unipolar moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70:1 (1990), 23-33; William Wohlforth, "The stability of a unipolar world," *International Security* 24:1 (Summer 1999), 5-41.

³¹ Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, xiv and xvi.

³² Ibid., 141-168.

³³ Nye, *Soft Power*, xii-xiii.

1980s, and to caution against triumphalism surged throughout the 1990s. In the course of this, it is apparent that this idea of soft power is closely associated with American context and interests.

2.2.2.2 Nye's approaches to defining soft power

Having reviewed the context in which the concept of soft power emerged, the following section considers in more depth Nye's approaches to defining soft power. To define soft power, Nye divided power into two forms: one is the directive or command method of exercising power, which can rest on inducement ("carrots") or threats ("sticks"); the other is the indirect way to exercise power, which can entail co-opting others rather than coercing them. He called the former "hard power," and the latter "co-optive power" or "soft power" which was equated with the "second face of power" identified by Luckes. His explanation of the two forms of power is worth quoting in length:

A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situation in world politics, as it is to get others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power – getting others to want what you want – might be called indirect or co-optive power. It is in contrast to the active command power behaviour of getting others to do what you want. Co-optive power can rest on the attraction of one's idea or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express... The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions. This dimension can be thought of as soft power, in contrast to the hard command power usually associated with tangible resources like military and economic strength.³⁴

From this we can see that soft power defined by Nye follows two approaches: soft power as resources and behaviour.

1) Soft power as *resources*

³⁴ Nye, *Bound to Lead*, 31-32.

The "power-as-resources approach," as pointed out earlier, assesses power by power resources including material and non-material elements and fits into realist approach to measuring power. This constitutes a "shortcut" and "useful" way to define power because possession of resources is concrete and practical and thus could be more appealing to policy-oriented analysts and practitioners.³⁵ Defining soft power through a "power-as-resources approach" leads to a focus on non-material resources. Nye articulates that a country's soft power lies in:

its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).³⁶

In America's case, Nye elaborates that the crucial resources of soft power for the US are "values of democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility, and openness" and they all contribute to American attractiveness.³⁷ Nye argues that the US has an advantage in soft power: the values on which it is built, such as democracy and liberalism, have global appeal; it has built itself leadership in international institutions; and it has global credibility in how it operates domestic and international politics by promoting democracy and human rights at home and abroad.³⁸ To measure America's soft power, Nye develops a lot of indicators such as the spread of English, Americans' achievements in science, technology and the arts, the number of foreign students and immigrants attracted to the US, and America's role in multilateral institutions (see Table 2.1). Whilst he reckons that America had plenty of soft power resources that contributed to America's leadership in world politics in his 1990 book, he urges Washington to increase investment in soft power one decade later.³⁹

³⁵ Ibid., 26.

³⁶ Nye, *Soft Power*, 11.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., 68-69.

³⁹ Nye, *Bound to Lead*; Nye, *Soft Power*.

Soft power resources	Conditions of attractiveness of these resources	Soft power mechanisms/tools	Indicators of soft power
Political values/ideology	Regimes or political beliefs that overlap	Democratic politics	Democratic forms and outcomes (e.g. indicators of social justice, human development, trust in government)
Credibility and reputation	Consistency of domestic and external actions	Human rights issues	Process and practices deliver good results for human rights, consistent with rhetoric Acceptance of immigrants, religious tolerance, race relations, tourism flows Leadership Political stability Economic prosperity Responsiveness to the changes Opinion polls?
Culture	When it includes universal values or when cultures are similar	Cultural diplomacy (education, high cultural contacts, academic and scientific exchange, spread of popular culture, sport, diasporas etc.)	Numbers of foreign students, Nobel prize winners, volume and numbers of educational and cultural contacts and exchanges, trade in cultural products, tourists, foreign broadcasts, sport as transmitter of positive values, population statistics
Foreign policies, international institutions and norms	When seen as legitimate and having moral authority by their audiences	Participation in multilateral diplomacy, agenda-setting or issue framing Foreign policy substance and style Cooperation with others Confront difficulty	Standing in international organizations (e.g. membership, financial status, active/passive, agenda-setting) Promotion of public goods, broadly shared values, inclusion of others (e.g. review positions taken internationally; foreign aid performance; peacekeeping contributions). Opinion polls? Participation in alliances, coalitions, regional and ad hoc groups Avoidance of arrogance, isolationism, unilateralism. Deal with history (e.g. Germany, Japan). Opinion polls?

Table 2.1: Soft power template from Nye's books in 1990, 2002 and 2004⁴⁰

As Nye has pointed out lately, "whether the capacity that those resources imply can actually be converted into preferred outcomes will depend upon the contexts and the country's skill in

⁴⁰ Thanks for Geoffrey J. Randal sharing his work with me. This table is revised by referring to Randal, *The Seduction of Soft Power*, 72.

converting resources into strategies that will produce preferred outcomes.”⁴¹ Accordingly, the analysis of soft power also needs to address the context in which the soft power develops and the strategies that the state uses to promote its soft power. That means the behavioural approach which exams the behaviour that mobilizes soft power also matters.

2) Soft power as *behaviour*

Nye is aware of the shortcomings of defining power as simply a set of resources, so he looks at soft power in behavioural terms as well. As noted above, Nye also pays attention to the ability of a state to change others' perceptions and preference through attraction, persuasion and agenda-setting. In this sense, soft power is judged by the outcomes of the object's preferences that are shaped by the subject's efforts. The power wielder thus has to know audience's initial preferences, and to assess how much the target's behaviour will be altered by the actor's soft power exercises. Nye's interests in preference shaping or attraction clearly relate to his institutionalist approach of international relations.

Considering Nye's approaches to defining soft power – one as non-material resources and the other as attraction through preference shaping or agenda-setting – I suggest that his conceptualization of soft power combines the first and second dimensions of power illustrated by Lukes. Nye's idea of soft power implies a convergence of realism and liberalism but leaves out the third dimension of power discussed by Lukes – how soft power contributes “normality” or “consensus.”⁴² His interest in the practical application of soft power in international politics leads him to insufficiently deal with the “normative” discussion of soft power, such as “what makes something or someone alluring to some and not to others” and “how does attraction happen.”⁴³ But we should understand that the “normative” dimension of soft power is not Nye's primary interest.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, it does point to important issues concerning how we conceptualize and define soft power that warrant further attention.

⁴¹ Nye, *The Future of Power*, 10.

⁴² Lukes, “Power and the battle for hearts and minds,” 477-493; John Gaventa, “Levels, spaces and forms of power: analysing opportunities for change,” in Berenskoetter and Williams eds., *Power in World Politics*, 217.

⁴³ Janice Bially Mattern, “Why ‘soft power’ isn't so soft,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33:3 (2005), 584.

⁴⁴ Nye has admitted that he treats soft power as a descriptive rather than a normative concept, in Nye, “Notes for a soft-power research agenda”, in Berenskoetter and Williams eds., *Power in World Politics*, 169.

Nye is hardly the first scholar to discuss the "soft" side of power, but his contribution lies in the way that he treats soft power as something that can be applied in implementing foreign policy. He has caught policy practitioners' attention with the idea that soft power resources can and should continue to be used and deployed through "concerted effort" to achieve political aims.⁴⁵ Nye thus draws readers' attention to the practical issues of soft power such as how to utilize soft power in foreign policy as well as the relationship between soft and hard power.

An important instrument of soft power pointed out by Nye is public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, as understood by Nye, not only includes broadcasting and selling a positive image, but also involves "building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies."⁴⁶ In other words, public diplomacy, by mobilizing soft power resources, helps build a positive image or shape a favourable international environment for the state to achieve its goals. Whilst Nye recognizes that it is not new for the state to promote a positive image, in the information age, public diplomacy becomes particularly important to shape public opinion. Technological advance has led to a great flood of information and people incur difficulties discerning what to focus on and believe. Public diplomacy seeks to utilize such information to shape a positive image of the state. For Nye, effective public diplomacy requires not only broadcasting, but more importantly, listening as well as genuine communication. In this "two way street," Nye argues that, "it is crucial to understand the target audience" and be consistent between words and actions.⁴⁷

Secondly, Nye notices the complicated relationship between hard and soft power in politics. On the one hand, hard and soft power may go in tandem. Military and economic success could bring about admiration and attract others through the myth of invincibility built on the state's material strength. Hard power could increase one's ability to establish and shape the international agenda according to its preferences which in turn might enhance status and power. Complementing hard power, soft power could lead a state to consume less hard power by channelling or limiting other activities and hence produce lesser resistance.⁴⁸ On the other hand, hard and soft power might not develop cooperatively. Nye warns that imprudent use of

⁴⁵ Matter, "Why 'soft power' isn't so soft," 588.

⁴⁶ Nye, *Soft power*, 107.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 111-112.

⁴⁸ Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, 10.

hard power might undermine soft power. He cites examples such as the Soviet "imperious policies" in the Cold War and Washington's application of unilateralism in the "war on terrorism."⁴⁹ In both situations, hard power operations eroded both countries' credibility and reputation. However, in spite of Nye's attention to the complex relationship between hard and soft power, he says little about the conditions under which one could reinforce the other and when one might undermine the other.

Additionally, Nye analyses the significance and limits of soft power in world politics. The significance of soft power, he argues, lies in that the state, by wielding its soft power, could obtain its desired outcomes from others due to their "admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness."⁵⁰ In contrast, compared to coercion that comes from the use of military power or economic sanction, shaping preferences would "last longer" and "cost less" to develop leadership in world politics and thus be more effective than coercion.⁵¹ In the meantime, he addresses the limits of soft power. He argues that soft power "does not touch everyone."⁵² Some values, such as individualism and liberty, may be attractive to some but may repel others.⁵³ The appeal of such values was contextual. Additionally, he reminds readers that soft power is difficult for governments to "control and employ."⁵⁴ He suggests that soft power in the information age is more a by-product of society than of deliberate government actions. The challenges for governments' applying and controlling soft power in world politics could, for example, come from the internet and non-state actors operating transnationally.⁵⁵ The latter are less restricted by conventional factors such as territorial borders but they can provide adverse information or opinions against governments.

In sum, this section reviews Nye's idea of soft power through the illustration of the context where he develops the idea, the approaches he defines soft power, his discussion of the relationship between hard and soft power as well as view of the significance and limits of soft power. These aspects all highlight the complexity of the concept of soft power, which leads me to a reflection on his idea of soft power. In the next subsection I undertake a critical

⁴⁹ Ibid, 10, 35.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 8.

⁵¹ Ibid., 8-9.

⁵² Ibid., 9.

⁵³ Ibid., xi.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 9.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 73-75.

review of Nye's evolving idea of soft power and use this to develop a working definition for this study.

2.2.3 A reflection on Nye's concept of soft power

Nye's discussion of soft power reflects an intricate picture of world politics by drawing readers' attention to the non-material dimension of power in the context of "complex interdependence" in the information age. Yet, there are certain points of ambiguity in his notion of soft power, which could be further clarified or strengthened.

The first important question this study brings forward is the utility of Nye's concept of soft power beyond the context of the US. As pointed out earlier, Nye sometimes regards soft power as possessive and measurable resources and tends to endorse a form of "universalistic" soft power based upon American culture and liberal political values.⁵⁶ On the other hand, he at times holds that soft power is conditional, contextual and dependable on its recipients, which could be out of the control of the state.⁵⁷ In this regard, he does not provide readers a satisfying and consistent analysis of soft power as might be desired. As discussed above, Nye's development of the concept is for the purpose of arousing American practitioners' attention as how to strengthen US power in the information age in which the nature of power has been changing. In the course of this his concept of soft power is cultivated primarily in an American context. It is this that raises the question of the degree to which this is a model of power that is particular to the US or one that can be applied to other states and societies.

Second, it is unclear in Nye's works what factors contribute to the formation of soft power. He has repeatedly referred to American democratic politics and liberal culture and favoured a universal form of soft power based on the example of America. Does he imply that soft power requires a particular form of political regime that is essentially democratic? Is it really the case that only democracies have soft power? However, given that in 1990 Nye argued that America was "bound to lead" because of its abundance of hard and soft power resources, but ten years later he started to warn that there was a "sharp drop in the attractiveness of the United States,"⁵⁸ it suggests that soft power does not solely rely on the existence of a particular regime; other factors may also influence the shape of soft power.

Third, a problem arises in measuring soft power. As we can see from Table 2.1, there are a number of indicators extracted from Nye's works on soft power, but some of them are

⁵⁶ Ibid., 11. Also see Reus-Smit, *American Power and World Order*, 42.

⁵⁷ Nye, *The Future of Power*, 9-10, 21.

⁵⁸ Nye, *Soft Power*, xii.

difficult to quantify and analysts often have to rely on opinion polls.⁵⁹ However, is it a precise way to measure soft power by opinions? Opinions are volatile and they cannot tell us to what extent they relate to the application of soft power. In fact, the history of international relations has told us that states' preferences, intentions and perceptions change constantly based on issues or contexts.⁶⁰ Therefore, it is difficult to tell that the changing perceptions of the target result from soft power projection. As Ian Hall and Frank Smith note, we do not know the counterfactual scenario: what perceptions of the country would have been if soft power was not employed by the state government.⁶¹ Nye recently admits that the effectiveness of soft power depends on other variables, such as context, the skills of the power wielder and the disposition of the audience.⁶² Thus students of soft power have to understand and analyse how these variables affect soft power practices in international politics.

In short, this section provides an analysis of Nye's conception of soft power and examines where his concept is located in the broad conceptualization of power in IR. It points out that Nye's motive for developing this concept is to attract politicians' attention to the changing nature of power in the information age and how to reinforce America power by mobilizing soft power against such a background. Given this, this thesis raises the question of whether his model of soft power can be applied to contexts beyond the US. Additionally, this section has discussed Nye's approaches to defining soft power. It has suggested that the way Nye defines the concept combines the first and second dimensions of power identified by Lukes – "power-as-resources approach" and power defined by behaviour. His concept of soft power implies a convergence of realism and liberalism but fails to address in any depth the question of what factors contribute to the formation of soft power.

The analysis of three approaches of power conceptualization in the field of IR and Nye's concept of soft power leads to the following discussion of the nature of soft power and the working concept of soft power in this study.

2.3 Concept of soft power in this study

Building upon the analysis of the approaches to conceptualization of power in IR and a critical review of Nye's idea of soft power, this section elucidates a working concept of soft

⁵⁹ Also see Nye, *Soft Power*, 36-42, 69-72.

⁶⁰ Robert Jervis, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁶¹ Ian Hall and Frank Smith, "The struggle for soft power in Asia: public diplomacy and regional competition," *Asian Security* 9:1 (2013), 8.

⁶² Nye, *The Future of Power*, 21.

power that this study will use by focusing on the nature and an operational definition of soft power.

As pointed out in the second section, Nye's concept of soft power is cultivated primarily in an American context. It is this that raises the question of the degree to which we can apply his concept to study soft power of other states particularly with different political systems and cultural traditions. Therefore, this study shift the focus of analysis of soft power from the US to the PRC, a country that is distinct from the former culturally, socially, politically and economically, to examine how soft power has been conceived and practised. The remainder of this section proposes a working concept of soft power to steer an empirical study of China's soft power. It first elaborates the nature of soft power. The nature of soft power is essential for us to have a clear understanding of this concept, in particular, what can constitute soft power, or the sources of soft power. This section then proposes an operational definition for the study of China's soft power.

2.3.1 The nature of soft power

In his discussion of power, Chris Reus-Smit refers to Barry Hindess's two conceptions of power. One takes "power as a simple capacity"; another takes "power as legitimate capacity."⁶³ Accordingly, Reus-Smit introduces two ideas of power. The first is that, when looking at "power as a simple capacity," power is regarded as possessive, primarily material, subjective and non-social. In his view, Nye's conception of soft power falls into this category.⁶⁴ Reus-Smit suggests that "soft" power resources are discussed by Nye as if they are material resources could be possessed and counted. American culture and values are deemed as universal and having the ability to be reproduced, interpreted and endowed with meaning only by American agency. This understanding, that the universality and legitimacy of American power is self-ordained and independent regardless of social interaction and process, therefore, is subjective. Reus-Smit thus concludes that such a perception of power is a "neo-conservative theory of power."⁶⁵

Following Reus-Smit's suggestion of taking "power as legitimate capacity," this study treats that the nature of soft power is ideational, relational and social.⁶⁶ Soft power is multifaceted and context based, and indeed is difficult to measure. It is very important to note the

⁶³ Reus-Smit, *American Power and World Order*, 42.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 64-65.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 42, 45-49, 65.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 41-45.

multifaceted nature of soft power. Otherwise, soft power could be taken as possessive, primarily material, self-ordained and independent.⁶⁷ This perspective of soft power is dangerous, because it could lead to myopia, viewing soft power in a conflicted situation,⁶⁸ within which states imagine a “war of soft power” to “fight” for global favourable opinions by “building up” soft power resources which are regarded as “possessive,” “material” and “self-ordained.” This view of soft power actually misses the point that soft power is shaped and reshaped by on-going social interactions in the global community.

Firstly, soft power is ideational. Ideational factors include culture, ideologies, values, perceptions, and intentions. By projecting these factors, it can enhance what the state is and stands for, and garner support of its policies from the international community. As David Lampton suggests, ideational factors frame and inform what a state “stands for” and “stands against”, either rhetoric or policies to advance on a particular standpoint.⁶⁹ According to a state’s standpoint, actions and announcements have the ability to appeal to specific countries, societies or groups. Equally important, ideational factors can guide or shape the way of wielding hard power. For instance, when military forces are used for aggression or conquest, can generate resentment, but respect for countries is enhanced when they send armies to peacekeeping or disaster relief missions.

Secondly, soft power is relational, rather than a “fixed reality.” Whether it is “soft power” depends not only on the actor, but also on the recipient. For instance, Nye describes that American liberal culture constitutes American soft power. While many Europeans admire America’s devotion to individualism and liberties, societies in the Middle East or Asia may not be attracted to such values.⁷⁰ In this sense, the recipient matters in defining soft power. Soft power may vary when the subject changes. For example, China’s soft power can be different from America’s. Even the same actor, its role can change over time. For instance, America’s sense of itself in the post-War era was different from what it was in the early 20th century. In the former period, America saw itself as a leader of the world, whilst in the early 20th century it was a rising power but marginalized by European powers such as Britain and France in world politics. The role of itself plays on the world stage can affect the way it

⁶⁷ Ibid., 42-43.

⁶⁸ Actually, a few studies have treated soft power in this way, for instance see Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive*; Congressional Research Service, *China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” in South America, Asia, and Africa*; McGiffert ed., *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States*. A “war” of soft power would ensue when viewing soft power in a conflicted situation.

⁶⁹ David Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 118.

⁷⁰ Also see Nye, *Soft Power*, 55-56.

defines and projects power. This role is not purely self-ordained, but perceived and shaped in relation to others. This point of view leads to the third dimension of soft power, which is social.

Thirdly, soft power is social. Social power "is not simply dependent on the existence of more than one actor, it is a product of a society's defining practices and institutions."⁷¹ Defining practices and institutions happens in a multi-directional process through various forms of social interaction. Both actors and targeted states may engage in a process of exchange of a set of ideas, such as the normative understanding of the world order, the rules or institutions which should guide state actions, and the practices or the change of policies. Also, learning from others and one's own mistakes and adaptation into new global contexts plays a significant role in shaping soft power practices.⁷² These factors may lead actors to shape and reshape soft power strategies. From this point of view, it is important to analyse how soft power is constituted and mobilized as a conscious strategy of governments in on-going social interactions.

In brief, soft power is multifaceted and fluid. Due to its ideational, relational and social nature, it is inaccurate to represent it as fixed and "universalistic" power. Soft power can come from different dimensions of power resources. Referring to Steven Lukes's multidimensional analysis of power, Sheng Ding suggests soft power can come from the following realms. First, it can rest on the "soft" attributes of a state, such as a country's culture, political values and foreign policies. Second, it can arise from relational attributes such as the attractiveness of its culture and values, and the acceptability of its foreign policies. Third, it can be derived from the structural dimension comprised of a country's favourable international norms, rules and institutions.⁷³ Therefore, owing to its relational, ideational and social nature, soft power should be understood as dynamic. It can come from multidimensional power resources rather than one-dimensional and static "soft" attributes of a state.

To sum up, the nature of soft power is that it is ideational, relational and social. As such, soft power is context based, dynamic and thus difficult to measure. What is particularly important for the study of soft power is by whom it is practised, whom it is practised on, and in what

⁷¹ Reus-Smit, *American Power and World Order*, 44

⁷² Charles E. Ziegler, *Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adap[t]ion in the Gorbachev Era* (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 12-13.

⁷³ Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings*, 39-47.

context. Drawing on some of this conception of soft power allows me to apply it to contexts beyond the US to study China's soft power.

2.3.2 Operational definition of soft power in this study

Soft power is treated in this thesis as purposeful efforts the government makes to attract targeted audiences through the mobilization of non-material sources of power. As it is analysed earlier, the concept of soft power in Nye's works sometimes is treated as "universalistic" and an underlying assumption is that soft power requires a particular form of political regime that is essentially democratic. At other times, soft power is regarded as conditional, contextual and dependable on its recipients, which could be out of the control of the state. In this regard, Nye does not give readers as satisfying and consistent an analysis of soft power as might be desired. To clarify the confusion, this study pays particular attention to a government's efforts to mobilize and project soft power. This focus on the efforts of government does not consider that non-state actors are insignificant, but in the case of the PRC – an authoritarian regime – this state government has far-reaching control over resources and instruments in order to manage its foreign relations.⁷⁴ This operational definition also highlights the following aspects.

First, this definition of soft power attaches importance to "the purposeful efforts" of mobilizing sources of soft power. The concept of "purposeful efforts" emphasizes that, although the existence of non-material sources of power provides resources, the state must be willing to mobilize them by putting them into policies and practice to let them speak to the audience. There is a distinction between having the sources of soft power and the willingness and capacity to mobilize these to generate soft power.

Second, this definition focuses on the "attraction" effect produced by mobilizing non-material sources of power. Concurring with Nye, soft power is not synonymous to influence, but more a form of power exercised through the capacity to attract. The concept of influence is much broader than the more specific concept of attraction – indeed attraction is only one element of influence. Influence includes elements such as coercion, threat and seduction. With reference to "influence," it is unclear what the specific nature of that influence is. However, soft power works by attraction: by convincing others to follow based on the appeal of one's ideas. Stressing the "attraction" effect, the concept of soft power not only is premised on the

⁷⁴ See for instance, Brian Hocking, "Rethinking the 'new' public diplomacy"; Ingrid d'Hooghe, "Public diplomacy in the People's Republic of China," both in Jan Melissen ed., *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 29, 96; Ying Fan, "Soft power: power of attraction or confusion?", 150.

capacities and activities of the projector of power influence – its intention to make itself attractive, but also depends on the attitudes of the receiver, or “audience” to these influences.

The third important issue I address is the sources of soft power and their mobilization. This study regards the main sources of soft power as ideational elements, such as culture, ideologies, perceptions, intentions and policies that advance a state’s stance regarding particular issues. However, it is worth noting that societies and their political cultures are not static. Change can be due to domestic factors, such as material, ideational or normative changes within that society. For instance, in China’s case, an obvious example is the revolutionary shifts in the 20th century, from imperial to republican and then a communist system. These changes can be impelled or linked to changes in the broader international system they are in association with. Changes are not necessarily endogenous, but can also evolve as societies interact with other societies and cultures.

Regarding the sources of soft power, it again needs to be pointed out that there is a distinction between having the sources of soft power and mobilizing these sources. Sources of soft power are potential soft power and cannot equate with soft power *per se*. The state needs to have the will, intention, and efforts to mobilize and promote these soft power sources and to let these sources speak to its targeted audience. The state government needs to utilize tools or vehicles to convert these non-material sources of power into soft power. Cultural exchange, propaganda, media, international events such as the Olympics, and the various forms of diplomacy including public diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy can be used as tools to project soft power.

To sum up, this section first elaborates the nature of soft power, which is regarded as ideational, relational and social. Understanding soft power in this way is essential to develop the thinking on what may constitute soft power, or what I refer to as the sources of soft power. Due to the dynamic feature of soft power, what is particularly important to focus on soft power is practised by whom, on whom and in what context. Second, this section provides an operational definition for this study of China’s soft power, that is, the purposeful efforts the government makes to attract targeted audiences through the mobilization of non-material sources of power. The key aspects of this definition are the “purposeful efforts,” the “attraction” effect, and the relations between the sources of soft power and their mobilization.

2.4 Conclusion

This conceptual chapter provides an analysis of the concept of soft power and introduces a working concept for my study of China’s soft power. I first review the three approaches to

defining power in IR, which helps understand where Nye's concept of soft power fits in. His "power-as-resources approach" and power defined by behaviour – agenda-setting or ability to attract suggest a convergence of realism and liberalism. Whilst his efforts to develop a concept of soft power provide a useful platform to think more about power in world politics, there are certain points of ambiguity in his notion of soft power which could be further clarified or strengthened, for instance, where "attraction" comes from, and "what makes something or someone alluring to some and not to others." This study suggests that the study of one's soft power needs to pay particular attention to the subject (who practises this power and for what purpose), its identity (as identity informs what this subject stands for and against thus shapes its behaviour), the object (whom it is practised on), and in what context.

After the review of the ideas of (soft) power in IR, this chapter concludes with a working concept of soft power for this study of China's soft power. It pays attention to the nature of soft power, which is ideational, relational and social, and the "purposeful efforts the government makes to attract targeted audiences through the mobilization of non-material sources of power."

Following the discussion of the concept of soft power in IR in English literature, the next chapter explores the Chinese discourse of soft power in recent years. I will examine Chinese thinking about the concept and the key aspects of soft power which interest Chinese intellectuals. I will then have a full analytical framework for the empirical study of China's soft power.

3 The Changing Colour of Soft Power in Contemporary Chinese Discourse

After Nye introduced his concept of soft power in 1990, it quickly travelled to China. Nye's book *Bound to Lead* was translated into Chinese and published in China in 1992.¹ Since then, his perspective on power has increasingly attracted attention from Chinese policy makers, Chinese scholars, and policy analysts and commentators. The phrase "soft power" (*ruan shili*) frequently appears in Chinese public discourse and the Chinese uses this term to discuss China's soft power.

While the previous chapter discussed the concept of soft power in English literature, this chapter explores Chinese thinking about the concept and which of its key aspects Chinese intellectuals are interested in. In so doing, it seeks to develop an operational analytical framework to steer case studies of the constitution and mobilization of China's soft power in the PRC's international politics.

This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section provides a broad context within which the debate on soft power in China takes place. The following section traces the emergence of the "soft power" discussion within Chinese discourse since this concept was introduced to China. In contrast to the illustration of soft power in Nye's writings, Chinese elites' interest in "soft power" arose neither from a concern to maintain hegemony, nor from any preoccupation with the "war on terror." Rather, it initially came from concerns about how to cope with American hegemony in the post-Cold War era and protect China's unique cultural identity. Subsequently, two themes have dominated the Chinese discourse on soft power. First, there has been an interest in its application as a possible tool to counter the "China threat" theory. Secondly, Chinese scholars and policy makers have explored how soft power can contribute to China's own national development strategies and to China's national identity as a responsible great power. This evolving understanding of soft power suggests that the Chinese relate soft power closely to national identity. They believe that China's soft power can enhance China's cultural identity, an essential dimension of its national identity, as well as build China as a responsible global power in contemporary world politics. Based on

¹ As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, Nye's book *Bound to Lead* was translated into Chinese and published in 1992.

the review of the emergence of soft power discourse in China, the third section investigates the Chinese understanding of the key elements of China's soft power. A survey of China Academic Journals Full-text Database (CAJFD) shows that particular attention has been paid to three sources. They are (1) Chinese culture, (2) China as a model for development, and (3) China's foreign policy and diplomacy. These sources all point to the realization of China's great power status and international responsibilities in particular to achieve China's peaceful rise. Finally, the chapter suggests an operational analytical framework for the empirical studies of China's soft power in the PRC's international politics.

One important caveat however needs to be added here. China's power in international relations is multi-dimensional by nature, and soft power is only one of the dimensions. While the discussion of soft power has recently intensified in Chinese discourse, this does not mean that soft power is dominant in the Chinese ideological realm or that hard power is regarded as less important in Chinese thinking.

3.1 Context of the emergence of the Chinese discourse of soft power

The emergence of a Chinese discourse of soft power is the result of the interaction between the ever changing international environment and China's domestic situation. The dynamics of world politics as well as those in the Asian-Pacific region have had a significant impact on the Chinese view of power. Events such as the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the observation of the US dominance in the 1990s, the Asian financial crisis, and the "war on terror" have all had important influence on Chinese thinking about power and more particularly on what makes a great power. The fall of the USSR is illustrative: Chinese elites recognized that military strength alone does not make an enduring great power (as discussed below). America's leading role in the technological revolution in the 1990s made its power more prominent and consequently contributed to its international influence. The severe financial crisis experienced by many Asian countries in 1997-98 served as a good example of economic interdependence and led China to ponder what role China (or big powers) needed to play in the process of globalization. Last but not least, the uncertainties of today's world are magnified by non-traditional security issues, such as terrorism, epidemics and climate change. These challenges cannot always be resolved by coercive material power but highlight the significant role of communication and cooperation between international actors that plays in meeting the challenges. A wide array of global and regional events in the post-Cold War era, therefore, has affected the Chinese vision of the world and of China itself.

The striking changes in China's reform period since the late 1970s have also shaped the

Chinese world view. The most profound event was the 1989 Tiananmen crisis. Chinese political elites interpreted this crisis as the consequence of a conspiracy initiated by Western capitalists to expand American political values. Consequently, Chinese ideological elites became more hostile to American liberal values, and the discussion of political reforms was shelved. Instead, they further stressed the importance of developing "Chinese socialist culture" and studying Chinese traditional culture to maintain Chinese unique identity. Furthermore, with China's continuing economic growth, leading to the international debate on "China's rise" and "China threat" dating from the mid-1990s, Chinese elites have increasingly paid attention to other forms of power in addition to military and economic power. In the meantime, as more scholars from various disciplines of social sciences such as culture, history, economics and international studies have participated in the discussion of soft power, Chinese understanding of soft power has become more comprehensive and sophisticated. However, it needs to be pointed out here that this review of the Chinese discourse of soft power pays more attention to the views from Chinese IR specialists than those from other disciplines of social sciences.

3.2 The evolution of the Chinese discourse of soft power

Chinese discussion of soft power started in the early 1990s and has become increasingly intense since the beginning of the 21st century. In this section, I identify four phases of soft power discussion in Chinese discourse to provide a comprehensive understanding of Chinese perspectives on soft power in the last two decades. To begin with, immediately after Nye's concept of soft power was introduced into China in 1992, the Chinese elites adopted a quite cautious view of the concept, since soft power represented the expansion of American hegemony in terms of culture and political values. In a second phase, from the mid-1990s, however, more positive views of soft power began to emerge as soft power was incorporated into the discussion of how to develop China's "comprehensive national power" (CNP, *zonghe guoli*). In a third phase, soft power became viewed as a tool for national image building to allay foreign fears derived from the international discourse of the "China threat." In a fourth phase, and most recently, intellectual interest has focused on whether China might provide alternative forms of soft power as a developmental model to other societies.

Identifying how the discourse of soft power has evolved in contemporary China helps to distinguish what are seen as the most important constituent elements of China's soft power, and how they could be employed in China's international strategy. However, it needs to be kept in mind that although I identify four phases in the emergence of the Chinese soft-power

discourse, the development of Chinese interest in soft power does not strictly follow this four-phase trajectory; sometimes various concerns mix together or one particular interest overshadows the others.

Before the analysis of the development of the Chinese discourse of soft power, I provide a picture of the surging popularity of the term “soft power” in Chinese journal articles from the CAJFD.² When using “soft power” as a keyword searching in the “core journals,” there were only 15 articles in the CAJFD in the entire decade of the 1990s. In contrast, the overall number of such articles skyrocketed to 2,143 in the new century (see Table 3.1). This search demonstrates that there has been a rapid development of Chinese research interest in soft power in the new century, and the pace of growth particularly has increased after 2005.³ Coincidentally, the vocabulary of “soft power” has appeared in speeches made by the Chinese leaders since 2006.⁴

Year	92-99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12
Number	15	9	10	9	14	34	43	86	155	9	221	507	517	529

Table 3.1: Number of articles from core journals in the database of the CAJFD with “soft power” as a keyword from 1992 to 2012

Whilst the first discussions of soft power were from the field of International Relations,⁵ there have been more and more Chinese intellectuals from other disciplines of social sciences joining in the discussion of soft power. As a result, firstly, Chinese writings on this topic have expanded to different issues and aspects other than international relations; and secondly, various Chinese organizations and institutes have been set up to meet the increasing interest

² For the search method, see Introduction.

³ Although this “core journals” search in the database of the CAJFD showed 9 articles in 2008, using the “all journals” function gave a result of 1,589.

⁴ See Shen Zhuanghai, “文化软实力的中国话语、中国境遇与中国道路” (Cultural soft power in Chinese discourse, its state and future path in China), in Zhang Guozuo ed., *中国文化软实力研究报告 (2010)* (Annual Report on China's Cultural Soft Power Research (2010)) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian, 2011), 305.

⁵ The first Chinese articles on soft power were written by Wang Huning in 1993 and 1994, when he was a professor of international politics at Fudan University in Shanghai. It is worth noting that Wang Huning was hand-picked by the former president Jiang Zemin as the Deputy Director of the Policy Research Office of the CCP (1998-2002) and was then director of this organization (2002-2007). He acted as Secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat from 2007. Wang became a member of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. He is the first Chinese high-level official with an educational background in International Politics.

in soft power by organizing conferences and conducting research projects.⁶ Therefore, Chinese understanding and interpretation of soft power has become more comprehensive and sophisticated.

3.2.1 Phase one: “cultural sovereignty” vs. “cultural imperialism”

In the early 1990s, when the term “soft power” first appeared in Chinese discourse, it was interpreted as a synonym of “cultural imperialism.” As discussed in the last chapter, in his book *Bound to Lead*, Nye argued that America’s soft power derived from American culture, values and institutions, and due to this soft-power strength the US was bound to lead the world. However, for many Chinese, this argument represented American government’s new strategy of exporting American culture and values to expand its dominance beyond military and economic affairs to the field of culture and international institutions; such a strategy would eventually undermine China’s unique cultural identity if China did not take any measures.

This interpretation was made in the wake of the Tiananmen tragedy in June 1989, and the collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1991, respectively. China subsequently had to cope with sudden changes in the West’s China policy and international isolation. Ideological elites of the CCP believed that these changes resulted from the Western capitalist implementation of “peaceful evolution.” This strategy was seen to be designed to cause the worldwide collapse of socialism, by intentionally promoting Western values and bourgeois culture. As Deng Xiaoping stated at the time, Western countries after the Cold War were “staging a third world war without gunsmoke. By that I mean they want to bring about the peaceful evolution of socialist countries from socialism to capitalism.”⁷ He maintained that Western capitalists intended to impose on the peoples of the world their set of values, such as “human rights, freedom and democracy,” which were “designed to safeguard the interests of the strong, rich countries...to bully weak countries, and...pursue hegemony and practise power politics.”⁸ He warned that “the spread of bourgeois liberalization” would bring “turmoil” in China, and stressed that stability and the

⁶ For instance, see Zhang Guozuo, “2009 年中国文化软实力态势分析” (Chinese cultural soft power research of 2009), in Zhang Guozuo ed., *Annual Report on China’s Cultural Soft Power Research (2010)*, 3-4.

⁷ Deng Xiaoping, “坚持社会主义，防止和平演变（一九八九年十一月二十三日）” (Adhere to socialism and prevent peaceful evolution towards capitalism, September 23, 1989), *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* (Beijing: Renmin, 1993), vol.3: 344.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 345.

adherence to socialism was of "overriding importance."⁹

In its reaction to the Tiananmen crisis, the CCP spurred Chinese nationalism by launching a series of patriotic campaigns, to advance "socialist spiritual civilisation" against "bourgeois liberalization,"¹⁰ and to "enhance political awareness, and guide the Chinese people to establish correct ideals and convictions, and a proper perspective on life and values."¹¹ Through these national patriotic campaigns, the CCP mobilized domestic support, discredited Western political values and helped itself through the crisis after June 1989.

In the meantime, Western criticism and isolation of China provoked a strong wave of nationalism and "anti-imperialism" among the Chinese public. This kind of popular reaction has its origins in the phrase "*bainian chiru*" (one hundred years of humiliation), which expresses the feeling among Chinese people that China has been a "victim" of the international system ever since the period between 1839 and 1945, when China was invaded by European and Japanese imperial powers. The phrase continues to resonate strongly in discussions of nationalism and anti-imperialism. Many Chinese intellectuals believe that, in the 19th century, imperialism appeared in China in the form of gunboats; after China won its independence in 1949, Western imperialism adopted a new form of power rooted in Western culture and values, attempting to transform China culturally and politically. This kind of thinking became more consolidated in the wake of the fall of the USSR. Chinese intellectuals reached the same conclusion as the CCP leaders, that these events were the consequence of "peaceful evolution" and "cultural imperialism" from the West.¹² This phenomenon confirms

⁹ Deng Xiaoping, "善于利用时机解决发展问题" (Seizing the opportunity to solve the problems of development, December 24, 1990), *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, vol.3: 364-5.

¹⁰ "江泽民亲切寄语共青团干部 当前应进行爱国主义社会主义民族自尊心的教育" (Jiang Zemin's talk to the cadre of Communist Youth League, we must carry out the education about patriotism, socialism and national self-esteem), *RMRB* (July 17, 1989), 1. Adhering to the "Four Cardinal Principles" was of the utmost importance in the "socialist spiritual civilisation," namely, (1) to uphold the socialist path, (2) to uphold the people's democratic dictatorship, (3) to uphold the leadership by the CCP, and (4) to uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

¹¹ Jiang Zemin, "在庆祝中华人民共和国成立四十周年大会上的讲话" (Speech at the 40th anniversary of the PRC, September 29, 1989), *RMRB* (September 30, 1989), 1.

¹² For example, Gao Sipin, "增强反和平演变的战略意识" (Strengthening strategic awareness of anti-peaceful evolution), *高校理论战线* (*Theoretical Front In Higher Education*), no.5 (1991), 18-22; Dan Chun, "国际传播中的帝国主义理论" (Imperialism in international communication), *新闻战线* (*News Front*), no.8 (1992), 44; Wen Xi, "独立、主权和发展" (Independence, sovereignty and development), *当代思潮* (*Present Ideological Trends*), no.3 (1993), 37-53; Luo Yuchao, "西方人权观念及其文化帝国主义特征" (The concept of human rights in the West and its characteristics of cultural imperialism), *湖南师范大学社会科学学报* (*Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University*), no.3 (1995),

David Lampton's observation, that "perceived intervention in Chinese internal affairs and strident attempts by Washington or others to foster political change in China can actually increase popular support for the regime."¹³

In this context, American soft power, generated from American culture and values, was associated with "cultural imperialism." The first Chinese discussants of the concept of soft power were IR scholars. They suggested that the real danger from American soft power and "cultural imperialism" was the erosion of China's own "cultural sovereignty" in the post-Cold War era which witnessed American primacy in world affairs. Wang Huning, then professor of international politics in Shanghai, published the first Chinese articles on "soft power" (*ruan quanli*), arguing that culture was the key source of a state's soft power. He posited that in international politics there was a "power shift" from the reliance on violence and wealth to a knowledge-based power structure. He contended that control over knowledge would become the focal point in future global power politics.¹⁴ In his second article related to soft power, Wang maintained that as culture has assumed increasing importance in international politics, "Western countries have stepped up their efforts to control or influence international affairs and the development of developing countries by using cultural forces." Instead of getting other countries to change by using carrots and sticks, he added, the West was switching to a softer method of exercising power, namely, inducing others to want the same things that people in the West want. China, he warned, must not jump on this bandwagon but must hold on to its "cultural sovereignty" and respond to this new cultural stratagem for political hegemony by "maintaining its own position and orientation."¹⁵

The key question, following this thinking, was how to respond to American "cultural hegemony" and the policy of "peaceful evolution," and how to keep China's cultural sovereignty in the era of globalization. Wang proposed that the Chinese government should adhere to an independent foreign policy, uphold the principle of sovereignty and not succumb to Western concepts such as human rights. He insisted on the importance of maintaining the

26-31.

¹³ David Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power*, 145.

¹⁴ Wang Huning, "作为国家实力的文化：软实力" (Culture as a country's power: soft power), *复旦大学学报 (社科版)* (*Journal of Fudan University (social sciences edition)*), no.3 (1993), 91-96.

¹⁵ Wang Huning, "文化扩张与文化主权：对主权观念的挑战" (Cultural expansion and cultural sovereignty: challenge to the concept of sovereignty), *复旦大学学报 (社科版)* (*Journal of Fudan University (social sciences edition)*), no.3 (1994), 9-15.

diversity of the world including China's own contribution to it.¹⁶ He realized, however, that Chinese culture, in order to exercise "soft power" on the global stage, must rejuvenate itself and be transformed into a culture that represents universal human values.¹⁷

In effect, Wang's proposition is just one example demonstrating the conflict between some sort of exceptionalism and universalism in the minds of Chinese intellectuals. They often feel caught in a conflict between emotions of hatred towards the expansion of the West, and a rational dedication to modernization.¹⁸ On the one hand, they feel antipathy to the global domination by Western culture and the marginalization and denial of China, and want to preserve China's unique identity in the aspects of culture and politics. On the other hand, they come to realize that it is necessary to reconstruct Chinese culture according to international standards if it is to have any chance of being seen as a legitimate universal culture.

To summarize, the early Chinese thinkers about soft power associated this concept with "cultural imperialism" from the West and envisaged that there would be a fierce international competition over the aspect of culture. They perceived that there was an unequal cultural relationship between the West and the rest. This way of seeing soft power has a significant impact on China's thinking about security and building China's own soft power. The research on cultural security and cultural soft power emerges in the following decade, which is discussed later.

3.2.2 Phase two: the concept of "comprehensive national power (CNP)"

Whilst the first Chinese intellectuals took a rather cautious approach toward Nye's concept of soft power, later discussants engaged with his concept in a more positive way. This section explores how soft power discussion in China fits into the endogenous Chinese concept of CNP.

The research into CNP aims to answer the question of what makes a great power and to formulate China's strategy to become such a power.¹⁹ Systematic research into CNP has

¹⁶ Ibid., 13-14.

¹⁷ Wang Huning, "Culture as a country's power," 96.

¹⁸ Chen Xiaoming et al., "东方主义与后殖民文化" (Orientalism and post-colonial culture), *钟山* (*Zhong Shan*), no.1 (1994), 138.

¹⁹ Huang Shuofeng, "漫谈综合国力" (A random talk on CNP), *世界知识* (*World Affairs*), no.24 (1987), 12-13.

developed since the end of the Cold War.²⁰ In general, the term refers to the combination of many different elements of a sovereign state's capacity for survival and development, "including material and ideational ethos and international influence."²¹ For example, Huang Shaofeng, a pioneer of CNP research, distinguishes three categories within CNP: "hard" components (i.e. economic power, scientific and technological power, national defence power, and natural resources), "soft" elements (i.e. political power, diplomatic power, and cultural and educational factors) and "coordinating power" (i.e. political structure, leadership, decision-making, management and coordination capabilities).²² Therefore, CNP is a multi-dimensional and multi-issue linked concept. Chinese strategic analysts have adopted both qualitative and quantitative approaches to calculate and estimate China's CNP in relation to other big powers over the next few decades. Although there have been debates on exactly what elements should be included in CNP and how to weigh the different elements, it is generally recognized that there are "soft" and "hard" components, and the "soft" ones are equally as important as the "hard" ones.²³

Whilst the early development of the CNP concept did take into account elements of what we now see as soft power, it was not until the mid-1990s that analysts explicitly put the term "soft power" into the CNP toolbox.²⁴ These analysts drew readers' attention to the fall of the USSR. They considered that despite the large scale of its economy and military, the USSR had not paid sufficient attention to the cultivation and development of soft power. The Soviet loss in the Cold War was attributed to its unbalanced development of hard and soft power.²⁵

²⁰ It involves the research institutes such as Chinese Academy of Social Science, Chinese Academy of Military Science and China Institute of Contemporary International Relations.

²¹ Hu Angang and Men Honghua, "The rising of modern China: comprehensive national power and grand strategy," paper presented to "Rising China and the East Asian Economy" International Conference by KIEP, Seoul, 19-20 March 2004, 2.

²² Huang Shuofeng, 大较量: 国力球力论 (The Great Combat: National Power and Global Power) (Changsha: Hunan Press, 1992), 12-19.

²³ Yan Xuetong, "The rise of China and its power status," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 1:1 (2006), 16.

²⁴ For example, Xi Runchan, "增强综合国力问题的战略思考" (Strategic thinking on strengthening CNP), *世界经济 (World Economics)*, no.12 (1996), 11-13&25; Ma Jiangyuan, "高科技发展与综合国力系统的优化分析和预测" (The development of high-technology and the analysis and prediction of CNP), *学术界 (Academia)*, no.1 (1997), 79-85; Sheng Jiru, "不能忽视增强我国的'软实力'" (China must not neglect strengthening its "soft power"), *瞭望 (Outlook)*, no.41 (1999), 12-13; Mei Qiyu, "综合国力有'硬'、'软'之分" (There are "hard" and "soft" ingredients in CNP), *政工研究动态 (Political Research Trends)*, no.22 (1999), 1.

²⁵ Zhu Tingchang, "世纪之交中国的综合国力评估" (The assessment of China's CNP at the cross of the century), *世界经济与政治论坛 (Forum of World Economic and Politics)*, no.3 (1999), 1; Sheng

The Soviet example of developing CNP was perceived negatively and was used to remind Chinese policy-makers that CNP was an ever-changing index due to the various tangible and intangible indicators and that attention needed to be paid to the coordinated development of hard power and soft power.²⁶

The prominence of soft power in CNP thereafter has intensified. Soft power has come to be considered as an important factor in China's national power and strategy. One outstanding example comes from Jiang Zemin's political report to the 16th CCP Congress in 2002, where he pointed out that "in today's world, culture intertwines with economics and politics, demonstrating a more prominent position and role in the competition for comprehensive national power."²⁷ In *China's International Status Report 2005*, more specifically, researchers introduced the strengthening of soft power as one of the criteria to estimate the increase of China's CNP.²⁸

The CNP discussion in China demonstrates that before Nye's soft-power concept was known to the Chinese intelligentsia, some Chinese scholars had already identified elements of what we now know as "hard power" and "soft power." This probably constitutes a reason why the concept of soft power has become so popular in China, as it resonates in academic circles. Additionally and more importantly, Chinese scholars take the CNP as a "system," in which "soft" elements are as important as "hard" ones and a balanced development of all the aspects of CNP needs to be noted. This leads to the issue of the relation between hard power and soft power. The development of soft power indicators steers researchers to questions such as what constitutes China's soft power, how to evaluate it and how to develop it. Unlike the defensive posture in its first phase, soft power at this stage is endowed with positive meaning in China's national development.

3.2.3 Phase three: China's peaceful rise

The third important phase of the emergence of soft power in Chinese discourse is related to China's image building, known as "China's peaceful rise/development." Alongside its rapid economic growth, China has been pursuing international recognition for its achievements and

Jiru, "China must not neglect strengthening its 'soft power'," 12.

²⁶ Xi Runchan, "Strategic thinking on strengthening CNP," 12.

²⁷ "Jiang Zemin's report at 16th Party Congress on Nov 8, 2002," *RMRB* (November 18, 2002), 1.

²⁸ Zhang Youwen et al., *中国国际地位报告 2005* (China's International Status Report 2005) (Beijing: Renmin, 2005).

growing international influence. The discourse of China's peaceful rise serves two functions for China: at first, it was a reaction to the theory of "China threat"; subsequently the discourse has incorporated the concept of soft power to demonstrate or suggest how China can achieve its rise by peaceful and benign means. This discourse shows Chinese sensitivity to China's international image and reputation, and its eagerness to obtain international recognition and respect for what it has achieved. What is more, this process, from reaction to initiative, in which Chinese scholars have shown empathy, learning and adaptation in response to the "China threat" thesis, undercuts realist propositions which have shaped that theory.

The discourse of "China threat" occurs in the context of international concerns about the implications of China's fast and phenomenal economic and military growth, particularly since the latter part of the 1990s. Generally, there are two explanations of "China threat" in IR. First, according to the "democratic peace theory," non-democratic regimes are potential threats to world peace, and thus China's one-party political system always alarms the liberals. The experience in the Cold War further demonstrated that it was difficult for the two different types of ideological regimes – communist and capitalist – to live together in world politics. Secondly, particularly from the pessimistic view rooted in the power-transition theory²⁹ and offensive realism,³⁰ China's increasing material capacity is perceived as a threat to the extant regional and international systems. There will be, it is feared, a high possibility of a conflict between a more demanding China and those who would resist the changes China desires. These perceptions and theories lead to the conclusion that China poses a threat to those who have benefited from the existing international order underpinned by American power, and thus China needs to be countered and restrained.

Chinese political elites they have all along been aware of the Western theories of "China threat." For example, after the Tiananmen crisis, Chinese leaders were conscious that leading advanced democracies had singled out China as a problematic power.³¹ Many Chinese intellectuals came to know that the rapid growth of China's economic power in the 1990s confounded many conservatives in the West who were worried how the Chinese Communist

²⁹ For a brief review of power-transition theory regarding China's rise, can see Avery Goldstein, "Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: theoretical expectations and evidence," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol.30, no.4-5 (2007), 639-82.

³⁰ The best example is John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

³¹ Qian Qichen, *外交十记 (Ten Episodes in Diplomacy)* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 2003), ch.6.

government would use its growing material power.³² These intellectuals complained that the "China threat" discourse was derived from a "Cold War mentality," which featured confrontational or zero-sum game thinking. They also felt it unfair that the West was unwilling to recognize China's achievements in enhancing domestic living standards and as a positive force in the region. Throughout the 1990s, although many discussed and refuted "China threat" theories, there was no major response as to how to alleviate those concerns. It was not until 2003 that former Vice President of the Central Party School and Chairman of the China Reform Forum, Zheng Bijian, made a breakthrough by putting forward the idea of "China's peaceful rise."³³

In essence, the "peaceful rise" thesis posits China's growth by means of an alternative path to the strategies described by traditional power transition, such as hostile balancing, escalating zero-sum competition and expansionist war. Zheng explains that "China's rise through peaceful development" had two aspects: (1) engagement rather than isolation from economic globalization and (2) efforts to "achieve a win-win situation with the international community." As such, China's rise strategy does not seek to challenge the existing international system but rather attempts to increase cooperation within the system. The goal is basically to complete China's modernization and to make China become a medium-level developed country.³⁴ This explanation suggests that China's rise is domestically focused and represents a two-way process of interaction between its domestic and international environments. The term "peaceful rise" was soon acknowledged and embraced by Chinese leaders in their international speeches.³⁵ It can be seen that this topic initially was not a

³² See Wang Zhongren, "思考中国威胁论" (Thinking about the theories of "China threat"), *世界知识* (*World Affairs*), no.12 (1997), 6-7.

³³ Zheng Bijian, "中国和平崛起新道路和亚洲的未来" (China's new road towards its peaceful rise and the future of Asia, speech at Bo'ao Asian Forum in 2003), accessed at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-11/24/content_1195240.htm.

³⁴ Zheng Bijian, "Ten views on China's development road of peaceful rise and Sino-European relations," December 15, 2005, accessed at: <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/664.pdf>; Zheng Bijian, "China's 'peaceful rise' to great-power status," *Foreign Affairs* 84:5 (Sep/Oct 2005), 18-22.

³⁵ For example, Wen Jiabao, "把目光投向中国" (Turn eyes to China, speech at Harvard University on December 11, 2003), in which he remarked that "China today is a big power dedicated to reform and opening up and peaceful rise," accessed at: <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1061/2241298.html>; Hu Jintao, "胡锦涛在纪念毛泽东同志诞辰 110 周年座谈会上的讲话" (Hu Jintao's speech at the 110th birth anniversary of Mao Zedong, December 27, 2003), in which he stated that "to adhere the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics" requires us to follow "a developmental road of peaceful rise," accessed at: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/70190/70193/14286125.html>; Zeng Qinghong, "走和平发展道路: 谋亚太共同繁荣" (Peaceful development: for the prosperity of the Asia Pacific, speech at the UN Economic Commission for the Asia Pacific, April 26, 2004), accessed at:

rigorous academic one but was a political and historical theme based on necessity and China's historical obligation of realizing "great power" status.

Nevertheless, the leadership's attention provided academia with a great deal of impetus for investigating the subject. Scholars, institutes and publications began discussing the "theory of China's peaceful rise" at considerable length, although at first they focused on its shortcomings and problems. Many felt that the word "rise" (*jueqi*) sounded a bit aggressive, which went against the doctrine of "hiding one's brightness and keeping a low profile" (*tao guang yang hui*) and would make its neighbours and the US uneasy.³⁶ Some argued that it is premature to talk about a rise, as China largely remains a developing country.³⁷ A few policy analysts raised the Taiwan issue, pointing out that the use of force against "Taiwan independence" should not be constrained by a pledge to pursue a peaceful international strategy.³⁸ In the middle of this debate, the Chinese government changed the term "rise" to "development" in a white paper entitled "China's Peaceful Development" at the end of 2005.³⁹ However, "peaceful rise" is still being widely used in government as well as academic circles across China.

Despite the problems in the theory, discussions about how China can achieve its goal of a peaceful rise gradually have pointed at soft power. At the domestic level, scholars suggest that China needs to properly handle domestic issues and mobilize national cohesion to maintain its economic development and preserve domestic stability.⁴⁰ At the international level, a grand strategy is recommended, incorporating moves to gain regional acceptance for China's expanding sphere of influence and a self-conscious image building to counter fears

<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/2470260.html>.

³⁶ Wang Jisi, "'和平崛起'提出的意义" (The significance of advancing "peaceful rise"), *教学与研究* (*Teaching and Research*), no.4 (2004), 7.

³⁷ Liu Xige, "和平崛起的几个问题" (A few questions of peaceful rise), *教学与研究* (*Teaching and Research*), no.4 (2004), 17.

³⁸ Shi Xiaohu and Si Yintao, "中国和平崛起面临的六个安全挑战" (The six security challenges facing China's peaceful rise), accessed at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-06/01/content_1503173.htm; Meng Xiangqing, "和平崛起与安全崛起" (Peaceful rise and security rise), *教学与研究* (*Teaching and Research*), no.4 (2004), 15.

³⁹ Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, *中国的和平发展道路* (*China's Peaceful Development*), Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, December 2005.

⁴⁰ Wang Yizhou, "中国和平崛起的国内基础" (Domestic basis for China's peaceful rise), *教学与研究* (*Teaching and Research*), no.4 (2004), 10.

that equate this expansion with the emergence of a “China threat.”⁴¹ Characterized as non-violent, gradually implemented and mutually beneficial, “China’s peaceful rise,” according to the Chinese IR specialist Shi Yinhong, largely depends on soft power.⁴² Chinese scholars of international studies envisage that soft power can contribute to China’s peaceful rise by shaping a favourable international environment through two instruments. One is diplomatic engagement, particularly through multilateralism, to deliver Chinese ideas on addressing and handling global issues; and the other is cultural promotion to foster cultural affinity with other regional actors.⁴³ These two instruments will be discussed further in the next section. Soft power, in this regard, exercises “persuasive power,” persuading other regional powers to accept China’s rise.

This third phase of the Chinese discussion of soft power has been addressed in the context of China’s rise. This reflects that the focus of soft power has shifted to China’s foreign policy and great strategy – how soft power can be developed and enhanced to help China realize peaceful rise.

3.2.4 Phase four: China as a model for development

Having reviewed how the concept of soft power is related to the interest in protecting Chinese cultural identity, enhancing CNP and achieving China’s peaceful rise, the rest of this section explores another strand of Chinese soft-power discourse – the “China model” (*Zhongguo moshi*).

China’s economic and social achievements in its reform era have prompted substantial academic research into the explanations of China’s successes. The 2004 publication *Beijing Consensus* by Joshua Cooper Ramo, which demonstrates the alternative development model

⁴¹ Li Jie, “提升软权力对实现我国和平崛起战略的作用” (The role of enhancing soft power in China’s strategy of peaceful rise), *太平洋学报* (*Pacific Journal*), no.12 (2005), 64-71; Luo Jianbo, “论中国和平发展视野中的国家形象塑造” (China image building in the view of peaceful development), *新远见* (*New Thinking*), no.9 (2007), 45-59; also see the writings under the title of “中国和平崛起之路” (The road of China’s peaceful rise) in the website of 中国网 (www.china.com.cn), which involves distinguished Chinese scholars from IR, politics, history, strategy and security studies, accessed at: <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanli/hp/530363.htm>.

⁴² Shi Yinhong, “China’s peaceful rise is all about soft power,” *China Daily* (June 14, 2007), 10.

⁴³ Chen Zhirui, “关于和平崛起的文化战略” (Cultural strategy in peaceful rise), *教学与研究* (*Teaching and Research*), no.4 (2004), 20; Song Xiaofeng, “试析中国和平崛起中的软实力因素” (Soft-power factors in China’s peaceful rise), *求实* (*Truth Seeking*), no.8 (2005), 76-79; Yu Xintian, “软力量建设与中国对外战略” (Soft power building and China’s external strategy), *国际问题论坛* (*Forum of International Studies*) (autumn 2007), 15-25; Zhao Quansheng and Liu Guoli, “The challenges of a rising China,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol.30, no.4-5 (2007), 596.

China has used to achieve its successes, has provoked international interest in this development model and its implications.⁴⁴ Ramo attributes China's accomplishment to "innovation-led growth," "sustainability and equality," "self-determination" and continuous reforms in a dynamic society.⁴⁵ The term "Beijing Consensus" is eye-catching because it draws attention to the comparison between Chinese approaches to development and the "Washington Consensus" embraced by the West. The latter was initially coined by John Williamson in 1989 to prescribe a set of ten neo-liberal policies for underdeveloped countries in Latin America based on their interaction with Washington-based international financial institutions.⁴⁶ Many commentators envisage the "Beijing Consensus" as a competitor to and even a replacement for the "Washington Consensus." Ramo's proposition has received international attention from high-profile foreign media reports.

In contrast, the low-key "China model" is a topic that Chinese political elites have engaged with over decades. It emerged from speculation about the robustness of the Soviet command economic model in the 1980s, and again in deliberation on the "socialism with Chinese characteristics" model in the 1990s.⁴⁷ Most recently there has been debate about what the "China model" is and what its implications are for China and the world in the 21st century.⁴⁸ It can be seen that the "China model" was a theme that first occupied Chinese researchers on the issues of the development of China's economy and domestic institutions. Subsequently, the emergence of the "Beijing Consensus" debate in the West has intrigued many Chinese IR analysts, who are enthusiastic about how the "China model" can enhance China's soft power and international clout.

Generally, Chinese debate on this subject covers four key questions: (1) the relationship between the "Beijing Consensus" and the "Washington Consensus"; (2) whether the "Beijing Consensus" is the same as the "China model"; (3) whether the "China model" has universal

⁴⁴ Joshua Cooper Ramo, *Beijing Consensus* (London, U.K.: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004). The author is a senior advisor to the investment firm Goldman Sachs and adjunct professor of Tsinghua University in Beijing. The Chinese translation of *Beijing Consensus* can be found in Huang Ping and Cui Zhiyuan eds., *中国与全球化：华盛顿共识还是北京共识* (*China and Globalisation: Washington Consensus or Beijing Consensus*) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian, 2005).

⁴⁵ Ramo, *Beijing Consensus*, 11-24.

⁴⁶ See John Williamson, "Did the Washington Consensus fail?" Outline of Remarks at CSIS, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, November 6, 2002, accessed at: <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=488>.

⁴⁷ See Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, vol.3: 2, 139, 178, 237, 261, 292.

⁴⁸ See Yu Keping et al ed., *中国模式与“北京共识”：超越“华盛顿共识”* (*China Model and the "Beijing Consensus": Beyond the "Washington Consensus"*) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian, 2006).

value; and (4) the relationship between the "China model" and China's soft power.⁴⁹ Many study these questions using a comparative method, comparing Chinese experience with those developing states which implemented policies along the lines of the neo-liberal policies prescribed by the "Washington Consensus." These studies actually lead to one central dichotomy: universalism vs. the uniqueness of China's development model.

Some Chinese scholars explore the universality of experiences and values underlying China's development.⁵⁰ The "China model" characterized by "protecting national interests," "pragmatism," "harmony without uniformity" (*he er bu tong*) and "anti-shock therapy" is in striking contrast with the "Washington Consensus," featuring liberalization and privatization.⁵¹ Based on China's economic achievements in the reform era, these scholars argue that the "China model" has global appeal particularly in the developing world.

In contrast, some other analysts emphasize the "Chineseness"⁵² of the country's development experience, and maintain that the "China model" is based on the PRC's own distinctive qualities and conditions. Some of them also point out that there are a lot of problems within China's development, such as pollution, corruption and income disparity, making talk about the universal value of China's model look premature.⁵³ Nevertheless, both sides consider that with China's continuing economic growth, the "China model" or Chinese experience of national development can be a source of soft power for China.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Tang Huiyun, "国内学术界中国软实力研究现状评估" (Review of the studies on China's soft power in China), *国际关系学院学报 (Journal of University of International Relations)*, no.3 (2008), 21.

⁵⁰ Zhou Jianjun and He Hengyuan, "中国转型的世界意义: '从华盛顿共识'到'北京共识'" (International significance of China's transition: from "Washington Consensus" to "Beijing Consensus"), *世界经济与政治论坛 (Forum of World Economic and Politics)*, no.1 (2005), 72-75; Cai Tuo, "探索中的'中国模式'" (Exploring "China model"), *当代世界与社会主义 (Contemporary World and Socialism)*, no.5 (2005), 12-14.

⁵¹ Chen Dawei, "半个世纪之路——从华盛顿共识到北京共识" (The path of half a century – from Washington Consensus to Beijing Consensus), *理论探讨 (Theoretical Investigation)*, no.5 (2007), 74-75.

⁵² The concept of "Chineseness" can be referred to Wang Gungwu, *The Chineseness of China: Selected Essays* (Hong Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

⁵³ Yuan Shan, "关于'北京共识'研究的若干问题" (Some issues on the study of "Beijing Consensus"), *当代世界与社会主义 (Contemporary World and Socialism)*, no.5 (2004), 17-21; Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi, "国际政治中的软力量以及对中国软力量的观察" (Soft power in international politics and the observation of China's soft power), *世界经济与政治 (World Economics and Politics)*, no.7 (2007), 12.

⁵⁴ Yuan Shan, "Some issues on the study of 'Beijing Consensus'", 18; Zhang Jianjin, "'北京共识'与中

Chinese officials are naturally very cautious about the term “Beijing Consensus,” and are certainly not promoting it. Firstly, Beijing does not want to be seen as a challenger to Washington’s global leadership.⁵⁵ The “Beijing Consensus” versus “Washington Consensus” debate has gone beyond the issue of economic development to the other topics including political system, culture and foreign policy, which is discussed later. The CCP is particularly sensitive to avoid any links between the “China model” and the promotion of China’s one-party system as well as support for authoritarian governments. Such links are likely to be associated with the “China threat” to the liberal and democratic values of the West, which could impede China’s peaceful rise project.⁵⁶ Secondly, the Chinese leadership insists that each country should adopt a path of development suitable to their specific conditions. Throughout the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly told the leaders of developing countries that, “conditions vary from one country to another,” therefore, “you must always remember one point: suit your own conditions... The world’s problems cannot all be solved in the same way. China has its own way,” and your country “must also find its own way.”⁵⁷ In China’s approach to foreign affairs, Deng established a policy style which holds that China must “keep a low profile” and “never take the lead.”⁵⁸ Deng’s doctrine requires China not to export its ideology. It restrains China from dealing with international relations based on ideologies and from seeking to be a hegemon. To date, this low-key approach still constrains Beijing from taking the lead in international affairs in general and from exporting its model in particular.⁵⁹

国软实力的提升” (The “Beijing consensus” and the enhancement of China’s soft power), *当代世界与社会主义* (*Contemporary World and Socialism*), no.5 (2004), 11-12; Yu Keping and Zhuang Junju, “热话题与冷思考——关于‘北京共识’与中国发展模式的对话” (Hot topic and calm thinking – the dialogue on Beijing consensus and China model for development), *当代世界与社会主义* (*Contemporary World and Socialism*), no.5 (2004), 9; Pang Zhongying, “从‘北京共识’看中国影响” (Observing China’s influence from “Beijing Consensus”), *中国招标* (*China Bid*), no.42 (2005), 46.

⁵⁵ Interview with Dr Ren Xiao, Deputy Dean of Institute of International Studies of Fudan University, Canberra, December 4, 2009.

⁵⁶ Interview with Dr Yu Keping, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Translation of the CCP Central Committee, Canberra, May 18, 2012.

⁵⁷ Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, vol.3: 178, 261. Such a recommendation can be found his talks to the leaders from Zimbabwe, Poland, Yugoslavia, Mozambique and the USSR, see Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, vol.3: 136-40, 178, 236-43, 260-1, 291-2.

⁵⁸ Deng’s “Sixteen-Character Principles” for China’s foreign affairs: observe cool-headedly, stand firmly, cope with difficulties calmly, and keep a low profile. Later he added “never take the lead” and “accomplish something.” See Quansheng Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach* (Hong Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 53-54.

⁵⁹ See the discussions in “国际格局 2012：再思韬光养晦——‘环球时报’年会议题——” (International

Whether China's economic performance serves as a "model" for other developing countries to emulate is still a subject of debate. Nevertheless, the intense debate on "Beijing Consensus" around the world actually shows that China's soft power is increasing. The "Beijing Consensus" or "China model" has become an issue transcending economics and bringing in politics, foreign policy, and culture. The accretion of economic power and social capital have certainly boosted China's confidence, pride and capacity to project its political and cultural influence abroad.

To recap, this section identifies a four-phase development of the Chinese discourse of soft power in recent years. There have been various concerns mixed together and soft power has been assigned to different roles to achieve different purposes. It demonstrates that the Chinese understanding of soft power – including the content and the purpose – is not fixed. The interaction of the global and domestic context and the swelling number of Chinese participants in soft power discussions all together account for this evolving understanding. As China becomes increasingly open and materially wealthy, it receives more and more attention from the outside. The concerns of other societies also have a correspondingly stronger impact on Chinese domestic thinking. Moreover, the Chinese leadership plays an important role in shaping the ongoing Chinese discourse, such as the discussions about culture and peaceful rise.

3.3 Constitution and mobilization of China's soft power in contemporary Chinese discourse

The first section of this chapter has discussed the emergence of a Chinese discourse of soft power in the last two decades. It explores how this concept serves Chinese interests in defending the country's cultural identity and in realizing China's peaceful rise, and how the concept of soft power resonates with Chinese concepts of CNP and a "China model." From this analysis, this section identifies the key components of China's soft power from Chinese discourse. They are (1) Chinese culture, (2) China as a model for development, and (3) China's foreign policy and diplomacy. Soft power, in the view of many Chinese analysts, does not come naturally from the growth of hard material power. Rather, it has to be intentionally cultivated and built up by mobilizing Chinese sources of soft power.⁶⁰ Therefore,

situation of 2012: rethinking "keep a low profile" – issue one at Annual Conference of Global Times held on December 17, 2011), accessed at: <http://world.huanqiu.com/zhuanli/2011-12/2265056.html>.

⁶⁰ Yan Xuetong, "中国软实力有待提高" (China's soft power needs to be enhanced), June 2006,

this section also sketches Chinese thinking about the cultivation and mobilization of these key sources of China's soft power in international politics.

It is widely argued that China in the new century faces two new challenges. One is to counter the "China threat" theory and persuade the international community, especially China's neighbours, to accept China's rise as a desirable event. The other is to project China's national identity as a responsible great power by assuming more international obligations and engaging in international affairs through cooperation with other great powers. To meet both challenges most Chinese IR scholars agree that it is inevitable that China must strengthen its soft power.⁶¹ While the definition of soft power – the ability to get what a country wants through attraction rather than coercion – has not been substantially questioned by most Chinese analysts, there are different meanings given to it with regard to what constitutes soft power and how to generate attraction.

3.3.1 Chinese culture and a "going out" strategy

Today, Chinese culture is a salient topic within the overall debate on China's soft power. The argument that "culture is the core of China's soft power" dominates the Chinese discourse of soft power, evidenced by the term "cultural soft power" (*wenhua ruan shili*) appeared in Hu Jintao's report to the 17th Party Congress on October 15, 2007.⁶² The major explanations for this argument are summarized as follows.

Firstly, the argument that "culture is the core of China's soft power" is tied to the function of culture. Zhang Guozuo, Director of the Chinese Soft Power Research Centre shows that internally, cultural soft power has the capacity to enhance national cohesion and innovation; and externally, it has the function of "infiltration, persuasion and attractiveness."⁶³ As such, culture is the "soul" of soft power. The cultural factor of soft power can affect the "rise and

accessed from: <http://www.ccwe.org.cn/ccweold/journal/2/1.pdf>; Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin, "中美软实力比较" (A comparison of soft power between China and the United States), *现代国际关系* (*Contemporary International Relations*), no.1 (2008), 24-29.

⁶¹ Cao Dong, "近年来国内外关于软实力研究的综述" (An overview of soft power study in and out of China), *领导科学* (*Leadership Science*), no.35 (2009), 48.

⁶² "Hu Jintao's report to the 17th Party Congress on October 15, 2007," *RMRB* (October 25, 2007), 3. In 2009, a Research Centre on China's Cultural Soft Power was established in Changsha, Hunan Province, which obtained support from different levels of the Chinese government and research institutes. See Zhang Guozuo "The Chinese cultural soft power research of 2009," in Zhang Guozuo ed., *Annual Report on China's Cultural Soft Power Research* (2010), 2-7.

⁶³ Zhang Guozuo, "The Chinese cultural soft power research of 2009," 23.

fall of a nation" and can contribute to the "recognition and respect" from other countries.⁶⁴

Secondly, many Chinese scholars believe that China's "five thousand years of civilisation" demonstrate the vitality of Chinese culture and prove that China has abundant cultural resources. For instance, Yu Xintian, a Chinese IR and culture specialist, suggests that Chinese traditional culture has always played a significant role in defining the "Chinese nation" (*zhonghua minzu*) and has contributed to the growth of China's national power and its regional influence in East Asia. The socio-economic success of East Asian "Tigers" in the latter part of the 20th century and China's current achievement all provide evidence of Chinese cultural merits. Furthermore, China's splendid civilisation has left many cultural assets, ranging from ancient Chinese philosophy, language and art to food and medicine.⁶⁵ Concepts and values in Confucianism, such as "humane authority" (*wang dao*), "winning respect through virtue" (*yi de fu ren*) and "harmony without uniformity" (*he er bu tong*), influenced imperial China's governance and China's relations with other countries and societies, and continue to play a role in building China's international influence.⁶⁶

Thirdly, in addition to arguments which hold up the merits of Chinese culture, some scholars argue that Chinese culture may provide an alternative to the confrontational approach which features in modern civilisation, a product of modern Western history and culture. For instance, the philosopher Zhao Tingyang at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) suggests in his monograph "*Tianxia* System" that the problem in international politics today is not "failed states" but a "failed world." He explains that Western political theories use "nation/state" as basic unit of analysis. This approach leads to the division of the world according to radical distinctions between friends and enemies, between inside and outside, which is easily converted into absolute "Otherness" and thus causes confrontations and

⁶⁴ Ibid., 25.

⁶⁵ Interview with Yu Xintian, senior research fellow at Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, Shanghai, March 10, 2010.

⁶⁶ For instance see Luo Jianbo, "软实力与中国外交" (Soft power and China's diplomacy), *新远见* (*New Thinking*), no.5 (2008), 45; Zhu Hanmin, "中国古代'文化'概念的'软实力'内涵" (The connotation of "soft power" in the concept of "culture" in Ancient China), Qu Yongfang and Wei Leyi, "儒学与中国文化软实力" (Confucianism and China's cultural soft power), Liu Liping, "儒学伦理传统与中国文化软实力建设" (Confucianism ethnics tradition and the construction of China's cultural soft power), in Zhang Guozuo ed., *Annual Report on China's Cultural Soft Power Research* (2010), 193-99, 336-42, 343-50; Yan Xuetong, "How assertive should a great power be?," *The New York Times*, March 31, 2011; Yan Xuetong, "How China can defeat America," *The New York Times*, November 20, 2011. In these two articles, Yan emphasizes the importance of ancient Chinese philosophy such as "human authority" (*wang*) to a great power.

conflicts. In contrast, traditional Chinese philosophy observes the world through the dimension of “*Tianxia*-state-family,” which is believed to provide a broader framework for social and political interaction. Because all is under the heaven, there is “no outsider.” In *Tianxia* system, it stresses “ethics” (*dao de*) and human relations, and the distinctions such as friends and enemies are more relative than absolute. In this sense, Zhao suggests that Chinese traditional culture is more appealing in that it is a culture of transforming enemies into friends rather than making the radical distinction – the Self and the Other.⁶⁷ The study of ancient Chinese political thought to find alternative approaches in addressing and solving today’s international issues has become popular in Chinese IR circles.⁶⁸

Despite China’s glorious cultural history, Chinese analysts of soft power are aware of the hard reality of the competition in the “cultural industry” including mass media and the international trade in mass cultural products. Some argue that Chinese traditional cultural legacies actually reflect rather the soft power of “Chinese civilisation” (*Zhonghua wenming*) than the soft power of the “PRC.”⁶⁹ To enhance the latter, China needs to develop “dynamic” soft power through conducting international public relations, particularly in expanding the influence of the Chinese media and dealing with the Western media.⁷⁰ Some point out that China has lagged far behind its Western counterparts in competing for business in cultural products, such as movies, television programs, books, popular music and fashion.⁷¹ At a time of expansion in American popular culture, many are afraid that the Chinese voice will be drowned in a sea of international media, resulting in the waning of Chinese culture and ultimately the weakening of Chinese cultural identity. They argue that China needs to make strenuous efforts to change the “unbalanced situation” in cultural promotion and strive for “discursive power” (*huayu quan*).⁷²

⁶⁷ Zhao Tingyang, 天下体系：世界制度哲学导论 (*Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution*) (Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu, 2005).

⁶⁸ The prominent examples are Qin Yaqing, “国际关系理论中国学派生成的可能和必然” (Possibility and necessity of building a Chinese School in IR), *世界经济与政治* (*World Economics and Politics*), no.3 (2006), 7-13; Yan Xuetong, *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

⁶⁹ Interview with Dr Wu Guanjun, Institute for Advanced Study in Social Science of Fudan University (now Professor of Politics at East China Normal University), Shanghai, March 11, 2010.

⁷⁰ Wu Xu, “中国软实力不能吃老本” (China’s soft power cannot just rely on traditional cultural legacies), *Global Times* (June 27, 2007), 10.

⁷¹ Ni Xun, “全国政协委员谈增强文化软实力的着眼点” (CPPCC National Committee members discuss how to enhance cultural soft power), *Guangming Ribao* (January 3, 2008).

⁷² Zhang Guozuo, “The Chinese cultural soft power research of 2009,” 37-38.

From the analysis above, the conclusion that “culture is the core of China’s soft power” is largely drawn from the comparison between Chinese and Western culture. Many suggest that “the competition over cultural power is the core of soft power competition” and believe that the Chinese government must have a cultural strategy.⁷³ In September 2006, a cultural “going out” strategy was explicitly written in “The National Planning Guidelines for Cultural Development in the Eleventh Five-Year Period.” It proposes measures to utilize various festival occasions and mass media to promote Chinese culture, to cultivate international sales networks for Chinese cultural products, and to provide support to major overseas-oriented cultural enterprises.⁷⁴ At the 6th Plenary Session of the 17th CCP Central Committee in October 2011, this cultural “going out” strategy was further stressed in the decision regarding culture development and reform of the cultural system, including the expansion of Confucius Institutes abroad.⁷⁵

However, some scholars have pointed out problems in the “going out” strategy of Chinese culture. Some argue that the “appreciation of Chinese culture and interest in learning Chinese language would not automatically increase...support for or understanding of China’s policy. It is impossible to ascertain to what degree we can achieve our political objectives by projecting our cultural soft power.”⁷⁶ According to this argument, China needs to pay attention to other aspects of soft power. Other scholars point out that the attraction of Chinese culture is confined to Asia; it has not constructed a value system with global appeal.⁷⁷ Yu Xintian concludes, “[t]he construction of China’s core value system serves not only to prop

⁷³ For instance, Li Haijuan, “软实力竞争背景下的文化战略” (Cultural strategy within the context of soft power competition), *毛泽东邓小平理论研究* (*Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories*), no.12 (2004), 50.

⁷⁴ “国家‘十一五’时期文化发展规划纲要（全文）” (The National Planning Guidelines for Cultural Development in the Eleventh Five-Year Period (full text)), *Xinhua News Agency*, September 13, 2006.

⁷⁵ “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on major issues pertaining to deepening reform of the cultural system and promoting the great development and flourishing of socialist culture, passed at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee on October 18, 2011,” translated by English Section of the Central Document Translation Department of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, accessed from: www.cctb.net/bygz/wxfy/201111/W020111121519527826615.pdf.

⁷⁶ Gao Yifei, “中国的软实力在欧洲的视角” (China’s Soft Power in European Perspective), *改革内参* (*Reform Reference*), no. 32 (2010), 38–40; also see Zhang Zhizhou, “文化外交与中华文化‘走出去’的动因、问题与对策” (Cultural diplomacy and Chinese culture “go out”), *当代世界与社会主义* (*Contemporary World and Socialism*), no.3 (2012), 12–16.

⁷⁷ Zhao Kejin and Peng Pingping, “中国文化软实力面临的困境及其解决路径” (The difficulties in China’s cultural soft power and its solution), *当代世界与社会主义* (*Contemporary World and Socialism*), no.3 (2012), 22–26; Shi Yinhong, “Value-added,” in “Debating China’s future,” *China Security* 4:2 (2008), 21.

up the Chinese dream, but also to make the outside world understand and embrace the Chinese dream.” Only when it has “world-wide appeal,” can “the cultural China” become more “eye-catching.”⁷⁸ Some analysts also show their concerns about the state-centric approach of promoting Chinese culture. They think associations between this cultural strategy and China’s broader political agenda may weaken the credibility of Chinese culture.⁷⁹

Despite these reservations about China’s cultural strategy, many Chinese scholars and policy analysts already believe that culture constitutes a “core” source of China’s soft power. The role that culture plays in enhancing national cohesion and international appeal has been confirmed and emphasized by the Chinese leaders. The Chinese government has already decided to promote a “cultural China,” which will be discussed in Chapter Five.

3.3.2 China as a model for development

Another source of China’s soft power discussed widely by the Chinese intelligentsia is the “China model.” As noted in the previous section, Chinese political elites have worked on this topic since the 1980s. But Joshua Cooper Ramo’s publication *Beijing Consensus* prompted a new wave in the debate on “China as a model for development.”

The prestige of China as a model for development has been premised on China’s persistent economic growth since the implementation of the policies of “reform and opening up” at the end of 1978. It is considered that China’s economic success presents the developing world with a new recipe for achieving social prosperity.⁸⁰ While there is still debate concerning what the “China model” is, some features of this model have been summarized by a number of scholars. For example, noted economist Lin Yifu (Justin Lin) considers that the essence of China’s achievement lies in flexibility and pragmatism.⁸¹ Suisheng Zhao describes the “China model” as “authoritarian capitalism,” a pattern of incremental reform towards a controlled

⁷⁸ Yu Xintian, “中国核心价值体系建设的国际视野” (International dimension of building China’s core value system), *国际问题论坛* (*Forum of International Studies*) (winter 2008), 24.

⁷⁹ Zhang Zhizhou, “Cultural diplomacy and Chinese culture ‘go out,’” 15; Fang Changping, “中美软实力比较及其对中国的启示” (A comparison between China’s soft power and that of US and its implications for China), *世界经济与政治* (*World Economics and Politics*), no.7 (2007), 27.

⁸⁰ For instance, see Yu Keping et al ed., *中国模式与“北京共识”: 超越“华盛顿共识”* (*China Model and the “Beijing Consensus”: Beyond the “Washington Consensus”*) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian, 2006); S. Philip Hsu, “In search of China’s development model: beyond the Beijing Consensus,” in S. Philip Hsu, Yu-Shan Wu and Suisheng Zhao, eds., *In Search of China’s Development Model* (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 13-15.

⁸¹ Andrew Batson, “Lin urges flexibility in fighting poverty,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 29, 2008.

decentralization and gradual liberalization of a market economy.⁸² Likewise, Taiwanese scholar S. Philip Hsu refers to China's development model as the "Janus-faced state-led growth." He argues that "the state has played a much more critical role vis-à-vis the market in steering China's economic take-off." However, he suggests that the state's ultimate role "is to be comprehended as to nurture and accelerate marketization, liberalization and privatization, rather than to replace them."⁸³ These scholars argue that China's development path goes against the Western prescriptions for the developing world – wholesale privatization and rapid liberalization.

Therefore, in many scholars' view, the state plays a big role in China's economic development in contrast with the idea of *laissez-faire* under the Western liberal democratic system. The "China model" differs from that of the West, and China's economic development cannot be fully explained by Western economic theories.⁸⁴ As was claimed by former Chinese President Jiang Zemin in his speech at the University of Cambridge in 1999:

The Chinese nation has persistently pursued an independent national spirit and road to development. We, the Chinese people, regard independence as the foundation on which to build the country. Independence and self-reliance should not rule out learning from other countries and drawing upon the fruits of world civilization since the two are complementary to each other. However, it must be pointed out that the absorption and learning process is by no means one of simple imitation and China cannot copy the development model of Western capitalist countries, nor can it mechanically follow other countries' models of building socialism.⁸⁵

The discussion of the "China model" serves two ends. First, it provides an effective counterpoint to the "China collapse theory,"⁸⁶ and thus it has enhanced the CCP's leadership

⁸² Suisheng Zhao, "The China model and the authoritarian state," *East Asia Forum* (August 31, 2011), accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/31/the-china-model-and-the-authoritarian-state/>

⁸³ S. Philip Hsu, "In search of China's development model," 4.

⁸⁴ Interviews with Professor Shi Yinhong of International Politics of Renmin University of China, Beijing, March 22, 2010; Dr Yu Keping, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Translation of the CCP Central Committee, Canberra, May 18, 2012.

⁸⁵ Jiang Zemin, "在英国剑桥大学的演讲（一九九九年十月二十二日）" (Speech at Cambridge University, October 22, 1999), *RMRB* (October 23, 1999), 1.

⁸⁶ For example, see Jack A. Goldstone, "The coming Chinese collapse," *Foreign Policy*, no.99

role in China's national development. In the "China collapse theory," the PRC's imminent collapse was predicted, not unlike that of the Soviet Union in 1991, because of the envisaged policy mismanagement under the illiberal authoritarian political system. However, the PRC has not only survived but also maintained rapid economic growth in the post-Cold War era, even when many other societies both in the West and Asia have suffered from financial crises. The publication of *Beijing Consensus* further bestows greater international recognition on "reform with Chinese characteristics", not only as an economic development model but as an alternative model of political system and social structure. In this sense, the "China model" to some extent provides the CCP with leadership credentials in China's modernization process, mainly on the basis of economic development and national strength improvement rather than reform of the political system.

Second, Chinese scholars suggest that the "China model," seen as an alternative to the Western neo-liberal model for economic development, enhances China's global appeal. For instance, Xiao Gongqin and Wu Jiaxiang, noted proponents of neo-authoritarianism in China, consider that China's current development model demonstrates the attractiveness of its modernization process because it succeeds in leading the country to economic prosperity and political stability in the long term.⁸⁷ Due to China's socio-economic successes, some analysts posit that the "China model" can serve as a model for developing countries to emulate. As Men Honghua, Professor of International Strategies in the Central Party School of the CCP put it bluntly:

Because of the failure of the 'Washington Consensus' in Latin American and other developing countries, these states have increasingly turned to the Chinese model of economic growth and political stability. African leaders have been interested in how China has achieved rapid growth while maintaining political stability, and have frequently visited China to seek the experience.⁸⁸

(Summer 1995), 35-53. A review of "China collapse" theory by Chinese scholar can be referred to "Groundless of China collapse theory" in Liu Dengge, *中国的是非 (Yes or No Questions of China)* (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui, 2003), ch.2.

⁸⁷ See Mark P. Petracca and Mong Xiong, "The concept of Chinese neo-authoritarianism: an exploration and democratic critique," *Asian Survey* 30:11 (1990), 1099-1117.

⁸⁸ Men Honghua, "中国软实力评估报告（下）" (Assessment of China's soft power, part 2), *国际观察 (International Observation)*, no.3 (2007), 38.

Therefore, some participants in the discussion of the "China model" propose that the attractiveness of the China model to other developing countries as an alternative model of development makes this model a source of soft power for China.⁸⁹

Despite the merits Chinese scholars have found in the "China model," some are sceptical. They maintain that China's modernization is not yet complete, and consequently it is too early to conclude that there is a unique Chinese model of socio-economic development.⁹⁰ As Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi point out, "due to deficiencies in its own reform process, China cannot offer a cohesive model on which to base their own efforts, and as a result, it is far too soon to talk about a 'consensus' derived from the Chinese experience."⁹¹ The so-called "new left" thinkers in China are keen to point out those "deficiencies" of the current patterns of economic development in China such as the income gap, workers' rights, environmental pollution, education and social welfare.⁹² They call for further political reform in China to improve the "China model." Zheng Yongnian also suggests that Chinese scholars should not use the term "Beijing Consensus," because it sounds too proactive and expansionist.⁹³

In spite of the imperfections in China's political and economic reforms, in the Chinese discussion of the "China model," there is a clear message that China's development model constitutes another source of China's soft power. The significance of this model is not only for China's domestic economic growth, but also for other societies which may take China as a model for national development.

⁸⁹ In addition to the Chinese writings, the view that the "China model" constitutes a source of China's soft power was obtained from my interviews from the end of 2009 to 2012.

⁹⁰ Yuan Shan, "关于'北京共识'研究的若干问题" (Some issues on the study of "Beijing consensus"), *当代世界与社会主义* (*Contemporary World and Socialism*), no.5 (2004), 17-21; Zhang Jianjin, "'北京共识'与中国软实力的提升" (The "Beijing consensus" and the enhancement of China's soft power), *当代世界与社会主义* (*Contemporary World and Socialism*), no.5 (2004), 11-12.

⁹¹ Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi, "国际政治中的软力量以及对中国软力量的观察" (Soft power in international politics and observation of China's soft power), *世界经济与政治* (*World Economics and Politics*), no.7 (2007), 6-12.

⁹² In China the "new left" generally describes intellectuals who oppose a neo-liberal market economy, but call for increased social welfare, argue for greater democratic participation (but without formal elective democracy), and support more assertive foreign policies. For an assessment of key "new left" members and their interests see, Leslie Hook, "The rise of China's new left," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 170:3 (April 2007), 8-14.

⁹³ Zheng Yongnian, "切莫夸大'北京共识'" (Do not exaggerate "Beijing Consensus"), *联合早报* (*zaobao*), February 15, 2005.

3.3.3 China's foreign policy and diplomacy

The above two elements – Chinese culture and China as a model for development – are the qualities and capacities of China which other societies may want to learn from or to emulate. A third important source of China's soft power relates to China's cultivation of its soft power through articulating foreign policy and conducting diplomacy. In this sense, China's foreign policy and diplomacy are both sources and vehicles of China's soft power in so far as they represent and project particular ideas and values which encapsulate what China stands for, and which enhance China's role as a responsible great power in the post-Cold War world.

In the context of the rise of China, many Chinese scholars and policy analysts suggest that the Chinese government needs to clearly articulate its peaceful and constructive foreign policy. They also advise that it is necessary for the government to carry out an omnidirectional diplomacy dealing with international issues with other major powers to assuage the worries about China's rise and establish a favourable image of China as a responsible international actor.⁹⁴ They suggest that China should not only be seen as a good international citizen through abiding by the norms of the existing international system, but also be an active international actor by providing public goods.⁹⁵

One important change in Chinese thinking about China's diplomacy relates to the advancement of the "new security concept" (NSC, *xin anquan guan*), which to some extent has catalysed the Chinese government's journey to initiate and engage with international institutions to deal with regional or international issues.⁹⁶ The NSC is based on the premise that a "Cold War mentality" needed to be replaced by less confrontational approaches to

⁹⁴ See the various writings under the title of "中国和平崛起之路" (The road of China's peaceful rise) in the website of 中国网 (www.china.com.cn), which involves distinguished Chinese scholars from IR, politics, history, strategy and security studies, accessed at: <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanli/hp/530363.htm>; Li Baojun and Xu Xiyuan, "冷战后中国负责任大国身份的建构" (China's self-identity construction as a responsible power in the post-Cold War era), *教学与研究* (*Teaching and Research*), no.1 (2006), 49-56.

⁹⁵ Interviews with Dr Su Changhe, Professor of International Relations at Shanghai International Studies University (now Professor of International Relations, Fudan University), Shanghai, March 12, 2010; Dr Chen Yugang, Associate Professor of International Relations, Fudan University, Shanghai, March 15, 2010; Dong Manyuan, Deputy Director of China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, April 8, 2010; Dr Liu Feitao, research fellow, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, April 8, 2010; Two Chinese officials at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, April 16, 2010; Two Chinese diplomats, Canberra, May 28, 2010.

⁹⁶ See for instance Yang Luhui, "地缘政治演变与中国新安全观——以上海合作组织新机制为视角" (Geopolitical evolution and China's new security concept: from the perspective of new mechanism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), *社会科学* (*Journal of Social Sciences*), no.3 (2007), 54-61.

security politics. These approaches include “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equal dialogue and consultation, and cooperation” designed to generate a “fair and reasonable new international order.”⁹⁷ The rudiments of the NSC appeared in April 1997 when China signed a series of security agreements with Russia and five other Central Asian countries.⁹⁸ These agreements dealt with border issues among these countries and subsequently provided the foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The underlying rationales for China adopting this doctrine reflect its significant understanding of the sweeping structural changes driving international relations after the Cold War. In this context, scholars advocate that China must cooperate and engage with other international actors to maintain a peaceful environment to help China continue its “peaceful development.”⁹⁹ The proposal of NSC also reflects Chinese intention of undermining American-led alliance systems in the East Asia, because this represented Chinese leaders’ efforts to induce American allies in this region to accept Chinese recipe for building regional security by the cooperation from regional powers.¹⁰⁰

Following the recognition of the changing nature of security in the post-Cold War era, Chinese analysts and policy makers increasingly accept that there are “collective interests” in dealing with global issues including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, epidemics and climate change.¹⁰¹ Chinese liberal IR scholars have increasingly pointed out the importance of building a positive global image of China by shouldering proper international responsibilities. Such efforts will help shape a more stable regional and global environment for China’s development and enhance China’s political and diplomatic influence.¹⁰² In this sense, Men Honghua proposes that “China should provide more global

⁹⁷ The Information Office of China’s State Council, *中国的国防 (National Defence of the PRC)*, Beijing: The Information Office of China’s State Council, July 1998, accessed from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-11/15/content_630690.htm

⁹⁸ Among the most prominent of these agreements are “The Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in Military Field along the Border Areas” and “The Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces along the Border Areas.”

⁹⁹ See Li Xuebao, “新安全观与中国的和平发展之路” (New security concept and China’s peaceful development path), *社会主义研究 (Socialism Studies)*, no.1 (2005), 116-118; Wu Zhaoxue and Ma Yanchen, “中国新安全观与构建和谐世界” (China’s new security concept and the construction of a harmonious world), *世界经济与政治论坛 (Forum of World Economics & Politics)*, no.6 (2006), 84-89.

¹⁰⁰ William Tow and Richard Rigby, “China’s pragmatic security policy: the middle-power factor,” *The China Journal*, no.65 (January 2011), 165.

¹⁰¹ This view is summarized from my interviews conducted in Shanghai, Beijing and Canberra from late 2009 to early 2012. Such a view can also be seen from the speeches by the Chinese leaders cited earlier.

¹⁰² See David Scott, “China and the ‘responsibilities’ of a ‘responsible power’ – the uncertainties of

and regional public goods to build its responsible, constructive and reliable image.”¹⁰³ More concretely, China has to make diplomacy towards its neighbourhood a pressing target, further strengthening cooperation with regional organizations, such as the ASEAN+3 arrangement, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the SCO.¹⁰⁴ Luo Jianbo, an expert on Sino-African relations at the Central Party School, calls for enhanced coordination with the US and other global powers on issues such as the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the development of oil and other natural resources.¹⁰⁵ Guo Shuyong, Professor at Shanghai Jiaotong University, suggests that China’s involvement in UN peacekeeping operations is one way China can demonstrate that it is an “internationally socialized country.”¹⁰⁶ These liberal Chinese IR experts attach great importance to foreign policy and diplomacy in enhancing China’s soft power and China’s responsible great power identity.

In short, China’s foreign policy and diplomacy are both sources and vehicles of China’s soft power in so far as they project particular ideas and values that enclose what China stands for and that shape China’s responsible great power identity in contemporary world affairs. There are two dimensions to this. On the one hand, the way in which China conducts foreign policy and diplomacy can be influential in making it attractive to others as engaged, cooperative, and prepared to play a responsible role in handling international issues. On the other hand, diplomacy is in and of itself a vehicle through which other elements of China’s soft power can be projected, such as Chinese government’s standpoint of international issues, Chinese culture and the Chinese approach to economic growth and development. Central to the debate around the relationship between China’s foreign policy and diplomacy and its soft power is a concern by policy analysts as well as policy makers to enhance China’s soft power in this regard.

appropriate power rise language.” *Asia-Pacific Review* 17:1 (2010), 72-96; David Shambaugh and Ren Xiao, “China: the conflicted rising power,” in Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally ed., *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 36-72.

¹⁰³ Men Honghua and Hu Jun, “新一届中央领导集体的外交战略思想（一）” (Diplomatic and strategic thoughts of the new leadership, part 1), *Shanghai Studies on CCP History and Construction*, no.4 (2005), 26-29.

¹⁰⁴ Men Honghua, “中国软实力评估报告（下）” (Assessment of China’s soft power, part 2), *国际观察* (International Observation), no.3 (2007), 41.

¹⁰⁵ Luo Jianbo, “中国对非洲外交视野中的国家形象塑造” (National image building in the vision of China’s diplomacy toward Africa), *现代国际关系* (Contemporary International Relations), no.7 (2007), 53.

¹⁰⁶ Guo Shuyong, “新国际主义与中国软实力外交” (New internationalism and China’s soft power diplomacy), *国际观察* (International Observation), no.2 (2007), 50-51.

3.4 Conclusion

To conclude, a strong interest in the concept of soft power has surged in Chinese discourse in recent years. Soft power is now increasingly considered to be an indispensable factor in China's grand strategy of peaceful rise, the conceptualization of CNP, and strengthening China's responsible great power identity.

This chapter has first explored how the soft power discourse has evolved in recent years in China. Initially, the Chinese intellectuals' response to Nye's notion of soft power was quite negative. They took it as American "cultural imperialist policy" that would erode Chinese cultural identity, and hence they strongly recommended that China should develop its soft power particularly by mobilizing Chinese cultural assets to protect its cultural identity. However, a more open and positive view has subsequently emerged in Chinese discussion of soft power. On the one hand, a domestic dimension has been incorporated into the concept. Soft power is seen to be one important factor of the CNP and needs to serve the interests of China's domestic politics. Sources of China's soft power such as Chinese culture can be mobilized to help enhance national cohesion, and the "China model" can be used to justify the rule of the CCP. On the other hand, soft power is considered as an international strategy for China's rise and for building China's responsible great power identity. Many Chinese intellectuals strongly believe that it is necessary to use soft power to assuage external concerns about China's rise, establish a favourable international image across the world, and shape an international environment conducive to China's long-term growth. The changing perceptions of soft power in China reflect the reality that China has been and is still undergoing a social, political and economic transformation.

This chapter has then identified the most commonly discussed sources of China's soft power, which are: Chinese culture, China as a model for development and Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy. These three sources of soft power are considered as the most important components of China's soft power. They can enhance China's global attractiveness either in the sense of providing a successful model for other societies to admire or emulate, or in assuaging the fears of particular societies about China's intentions in world affairs.

However, as the previous chapter has pointed out, sources of soft power do not equal soft power *per se*; these sources need to be intentionally cultivated, interpreted, mobilized and projected to let them speak to the particular audiences. As the definition of this study suggests, soft power is treated in this thesis as purposeful efforts the government makes to attract targeted audiences through the mobilization of non-material sources of power. Drawing upon

this analysis of the concept of soft power and Chinese discourse of soft power, I put forward an operational framework for empirical studies of China's soft power. Utilizing what I describe as the key "sources" of China's soft power, I will investigate to what extent we can see the patterns of mobilizing and projecting these key "sources" of China's soft power occurring in the past and present. Put more specifically, I will examine the purposeful efforts to mobilize and promote China's culture, developmental model, and foreign policy and diplomacy as ways to attract or reassure other societies in the past and present of the PRC. It thus allows me to compare and contrast these processes of mobilization and projection of China's soft power in the past and present. It also allows me to compare who the Chinese government was seeking to attract, for what purposes and through what tools. The following two chapters will go through these questions, exploring how these key "sources" of China's soft power were interpreted, mobilised and promoted in the PRC's international engagement at two historical moments. Through this comparison of the constitution and mobilization of the key sources of China's soft power, I seek to identify what factors have shaped the constitution and mobilization of China's soft power in the PRC.

4 Maoist Soft Power Reaching Out to the World: 1959-1965

It is generally regarded that the PRC's revolutionary period was associated with belligerence and assertiveness which relied upon hard coercive power.¹ However, one leading China scholar once told students of Chinese foreign policy that weapons and material strength alone cannot explain the significance of the PRC in a global power equation in its early days.² Drawing on the relative abundance of primary and secondary sources on the foreign policy of Maoist China, this chapter argues that the prominence of the PRC in its early history derived in great part from its projection of soft power, the non-material dimensions of power. The CCP's imagination of China as "a great power" born of its path of revolution shaped the trajectory of what this study calls "Maoist soft power."

Mao's China during 1959-1965 provides an illuminating case pertaining to the historicity of China's soft power, a time Beijing was prepared to carry out its "revolutionary" policies and actively seek international prestige due to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.³ The Sino-Soviet collision in some respects provided the Beijing regime with a space within which to build its status as a model and a true leader in the community of (post)colonized non-Western world. However, due to the inauguration of the so-called "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in 1966, Mao's China turned inwards and generally retreated from international affairs.

¹ For instance, see Henry Kissinger, *On China*, New York: Penguin Press, 2011, ch.6 and ch.7; Robert S. Ross, "China's three rises, regional power transitions, and East Asia security: 1949 to the Twenty-First Century," in William C. Kirby ed., *The People's Republic of China at 60: An International Assessment*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011, 92-95; Andrew Bingham Kennedy, *The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

² Jonathan D. Pollack, "China and the global strategic balance," in Harry Harding ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 173.

³ In terms of the exact time of the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, I take the view that by 1959 China and the Soviet Union were on an irreversible collision course, which is discussed in the first section of this chapter. For those who argue that China and the Soviet Union broke up in 1959, see for example, William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, M.A.: M.I.T. Press, 1964); Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (New York: Atheneum, 1969); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Lorenz M. Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). However, some other scholars argue that the process of breakdown became "irredeemable" around the very early years of the 1960s, see Odd Arne Westad ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998); Wang Dong, "The quarrelling brothers: new Chinese archives and a reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet split, 1959-1962," Cold War International History Project Bulletin Working Paper #49 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2005).

The projection of Maoist soft power sought to reinforce China's identity as a revolutionary Third World power – a leader in the world revolutionary movement and a truly leading fighter against the US imperialism and a competitor of the USSR in the Communist and developing world. The projection of Maoist soft power to some extent amplified China's weak hard power and made China conspicuous in front of global audience.

This chapter also demonstrates that Maoist soft power projection interwove the aims of attracting international as well as domestic audiences, thus seeking to legitimate the revolution at home and build a leadership role in the developing world. On the one hand, the mission of fulfilling China's "proletarian internationalism" served as a constant source of domestic mobilization for the purpose of legitimizing revolution at home and maintaining its momentum. On the other hand, through the promotion of the "revolutionary" character of the "new" China, the Chinese sought to build China as an exemplary model of nation building for the post-colonial states to emulate. The promotion of Maoist soft power, therefore, served as a means to transform China's state and society, as well as its international outlook.

This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section discusses the international and domestic context of Maoist China, to unfold Maoist understanding of the PRC's status, power and aims in world politics. The second section elaborates the key sources that constitute Maoist soft power. Following the research framework, it explores how Chinese culture, Chinese model for nation building and Chinese foreign policy were understood and interpreted by the Chinese leaders. The third section analyses the key tools employed by the Chinese government, namely, cultural diplomacy and foreign aid, to attract the Third World countries. The last section provides a conclusion of Maoist soft power and the legacy it has left for post-Mao China.

4.1 China's foreign policy transition: from "leaning to one side" to "double-anti"

The PRC was born on October 1, 1949, at a crucial juncture of the Cold War, when the two contending camps were emerging, the capitalist led by the US and the communist by the Soviet Union (USSR). Nevertheless, in many key aspects, Maoist China was not overshadowed by the two camps, but played a pivotal role in configuring and reinforcing the Cold War in Asia, and intensifying the hostility between the two political ideologies (communism versus capitalism) globally. To a large extent, this was because Communist Chinese leaders and Chairman Mao in particular, had their own vision of China and the international system. They not only intended to restore China's great power status but wanted to make political change in the entire world according to their experience and ideas. As a

result, as soon as the PRC was founded, the CCP leadership was determined to break with the legacies of the "old" China, to "make a fresh start" in China's foreign affairs.⁴

This policy of "making a fresh start" represented an anti-US policy adopted by the CCP, and demonstrated that the Chinese Communist leaders were determined to break away from Chiang Kai-shek's diplomatic practice in the Republican period, which greatly relied upon America's support. PRC enmity towards the US stemmed from not only divergences in political ideology but also historical frustration and America's China policy.⁵ Washington had supported the Kuomintang (KMT) government against the CCP in China's Civil War (1945-1949) and it continued to do so after the KMT retreated to Taiwan. What is more, Washington's decision to intervene in the Korean War in 1950 and dispatch the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait on June 27, 1950 was perceived by the Chinese leaders as interfering in China's internal affairs (the enterprise of unifying China), and endangering China's sovereignty and border security.⁶ The Chinese government consequently decided to participate in the Korean War in October 1950 and launch the "Great War of Resisting America and Assisting Korea" (1950-53).⁷ In return, the US enhanced its support of Taiwan militarily and economically, and backed it as the only legitimate representative of China in

⁴ Zhou Enlai, "我们的外交方针和任务 (1952年4月30日)" (Our diplomatic policies and tasks) in 周恩来外交文选 (*Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai*) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1990), 48.

⁵ During the Cold War, there was a big debate in the US questioning "who lost China?" From the available Chinese sources and research into Cold War history, many scholars however provide evidence that, even before the founding of the PRC, it was unlikely that the CCP would approach the US. For example, according to Shi Zhe – the Chinese leaders' Russian-language interpreter – recalled that when Liu Shaoqi (then a member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee, later Vice-Chairman in 1949 and Chairman from 1959 to 1968) visited Moscow to talk to Stalin in May 1949, Liu made clear that China would stand with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to fight against imperialism. See Shi Zhe, 在历史巨人身边——师哲回忆录 (*At the Side of Historical Giants: Shi Zhe's Memoirs*) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1991), 402; Mao Zedong, "On the people's democratic dictatorship (June 30, 1949)," in which he argued that from China's previous seven decades' experience, there had been no "third road," that is, where China could sit on the fence between the USSR and the US; China must lean to the socialist side, in Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1965), vol.4:415-17; Mao, "Cast away illusions, prepare for struggle (August 14, 1949)", in which he contended that "'Prepare for struggle', is addressed to those who still cherish certain illusions about the relations between China and the imperialist countries, especially between China and the United States," thus he suggested that the "new China" would take an anti-US policy, in *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.4:429-30. In addition, Chen Jian, a historian of Cold War history, argues that "America's 'lost chance' in China is a myth." See Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 38-48.

⁶ Propaganda Sector of the Chinese People's Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea Association compiled, 伟大的抗美援朝运动 (*The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea*) (Beijing: Renmin, 1954), 4.

⁷ Mao, "关于派志愿军去朝鲜作战问题 (一九五〇年十月二日)" (On dispatching the People's Volunteer Army to the Korean War, October 2, 1950), in Mao Zedong, 毛泽东外交文选 (*Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Policy*) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1994), 139-41.

the United Nations (UN) with veto power in the Security Council. "US imperialism" was therefore perceived by the CCP as the only force that stood in the way of unification of China and interfered in China's domestic affairs, making the US the most dangerous enemy of China.⁸

Chinese perception of the "American threat," however, enabled the Maoists to hold high the banner of "anti-US imperialism" and to mobilize the great masses to embrace Chairman Mao's doctrine of "continuous revolution" internally and externally. For Mao and his followers, the seizure of power in China in 1949 was not the conclusion of the mission of Chinese revolution; "Rather, Mao was very much concerned about how to maintain and enhance the revolution's momentum after its nationwide victory."⁹ The ultimate goal of the Chinese revolution was to transform the "old China" that was weak in material power and decaying in terms of prowess into a "new China" full of strength and international influence. Equally important, it was their mission to destroy the "old world" which the imperialists and reactionaries belonged to, and redefine the values and rules of the existing international system, which of course was seen to be dominated by the US. In this sense, Maoist China employed the discourse of "anti-US imperialism" to represent China as one of the most "revolutionary" and "progressive" forces in the international area, and a leader in the world revolutionary movement. Given the Chinese perception of the "American threat," security imperatives and convergence in political ideology led the PRC to lean to the socialist camp led by the USSR.¹⁰ Chinese leaders decided to ally with the USSR and other socialist countries to confront the Western bloc led by the US. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was consequently signed in Moscow on February 14, 1950. It was designed to ensure that China could receive military, economic and technological assistance from the USSR, to support China's participation in the Korean War, and boost national economic development based on the Soviet experience in the early 1950s.¹¹ It was

⁸ Mao, "Casting away illusions, preparing for struggle" and "Friendship or aggression," in *Selected Works of Mao*, vol. 4: 425-32, 441-450.

⁹ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 47.

¹⁰ See Mao, "On the people's democratic dictatorship," *Selected Works of Mao*, vol. 4: 415-17.

¹¹ Wu Xiuquan, "跟随毛主席第一次访问苏联" (The first visit to the Soviet Union with Chairman Mao), in Chinese Communist Party History Studies ed., *亲历重大历史事件实录 (Memoirs of Living through Significant Historical Events)* (Beijing: Dangjian Duwu, 2000), vol.4: 182-3; Shen Zhihua, "新中国建立初期苏联对华经济援助的基本情况——来自中国和俄国的档案材料 (上)" (Essential information on Soviet economic aid to China in the early days of the PRC – materials from Chinese and Russian archives (part one)), *俄罗斯研究 (Russian Studies)*, no.1 (2001), 53-66, and "新中国建立初期苏联对华经济援助的基本情况——来自中国和俄国的档案材料 (下)" (Essential information on Soviet economic aid to China in the early days of the PRC – materials from Chinese and Russian archives (part two)), *俄罗斯研究 (Russian Studies)*, no.2 (2001), 49-58; Qi Dexue, "中

widely argued that China's policy of leaning to the USSR helped the Chinese government deter the US threat from the east coast and consolidate China's new-born regime.¹² To a large extent, this Treaty laid a foundation for China to become a major player in world affairs, virtually extended and enhanced the antagonism of the bipolar system in Asia, and endowed the Cold War with global meaning.

However, the close relationship between the two socialist giants did not last long; the tension between the two communist parties was exposed to the public in the late 1950s after Nikita Khrushchev came to power in the USSR. Although there was evidence that the CCP was dissatisfied with the way that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) treated it in the Stalin period,¹³ it was under Khrushchev's leadership that the friction between the two Parties was uncovered. First and foremost, the ideological differences produced and intensified tension between the two communist parties. As Donald Zagoria has suggested, the crux of the Sino-Soviet conflict was "a direct result of the ideological commitment [of leaders on both sides] to worldwide revolution and of differences on how to promote it."¹⁴

4.1.1 The emergence of the differences in political ideology between the CCP and the CPSU

The differences in political ideology between the two Parties emerged after Khrushchev consolidated his leadership in the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s, and concerned de-Stalinization, the judgment of the world situation and the mission of the communist parties.

苏同盟在抗美援朝战争中的作用”(The role of Sino-Soviet alliance in the war of resisting America's aggression and assisting Korea), *世界历史 (World History)*, no.4 (2010), 4-12.

¹² Meanwhile, some researchers and sources point out that the Soviet support was limited and conditional, and China made compromises with the USSR in achieving the Treaty. For example, the Treaty specified that the USSR could maintain its special rights in Northeast China, which laid down distrust between the two Communist Parties. See Mao, “同苏联驻华大使尤金的谈话（一九五八年七月二十二日）” (Talk to Soviet Ambassador in China Pavel Yudin) in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Policy*, 323; Xie Yixian ed., *中国当代外交史 (1949-2009) (Diplomatic History of Contemporary China (1949-2009))* (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian, 2009), 30; Shen Zhihua, “无奈的选择：中苏同盟建立的曲折历程（1944-1950）” (A reluctant choice: complicated process of the establishment of Sino-Soviet alliance, 1944-1950), *近代史研究 (Modern Chinese History Studies)*, no.6 (2010), 51-52.

¹³ For example, see Mao, “Talk to Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin,” 326; Yang Kuisong, *中华人民共和国建国史研究 (A Study on the History of P. R. China's Establishment)* (Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin, 2009), vol.2: 91-3; Harold C. Hinton, ‘Sino-Soviet Relations: background and overview,’ in Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, eds., *China, the Soviet Union, and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1982), 9; Ross Terrill, *Mao: A Biography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 202; Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1951), is a good source to see Mao's scepticism about Stalin before the founding of the PRC.

¹⁴ Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet conflict*, 5.

The divergence was ignited by Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, in which he negated his predecessor Stalin. He attacked Stalin's personality cult and criticised many of Stalin's domestic and foreign policies, and thereafter started the de-Stalinization campaign. Khrushchev's action toward Stalin shocked and upset the CCP leaders because they had not been consulted in advance;¹⁵ the CCP had exalted Stalin and followed Stalin's experience in building socialism at the very early stages of the PRC.¹⁶ What also upset the Chinese Maoists was that Khrushchev was less enthusiastic about world revolution, and instead posited the necessity and possibility of "peaceful coexistence" between the different regimes, especially between the USSR and the US.¹⁷ How could the Chinese revolutionaries make peace with the "evil" US imperialism, especially after fighting the brutal battles of the Korean War which had just finished three years before? In Chinese Maoists' view, the negation of Stalin and the advocacy of "peaceful coexistence" could eventually undermine the CCP's authority as well as Mao's cult of personality at home and repudiate the great cause of "continuous revolution" all over the world.

Chairman Mao believed that de-Stalinization was "a grave error," and a possible threat to his own authority.¹⁸ In response to the de-Stalinization campaign, he displayed his contempt by remarking that "[i]n the Soviet Union, those who once extolled Stalin to the skies have now in one swoop consigned him to purgatory." He was alert to the fact that "in China some people are following their example." To clarify the confusion, he reached a verdict that in the "opinion of the [Chinese] Central Committee," "Stalin's mistakes amounted to only 30 per cent of the whole and his achievements to 70 per cent, and that all things considered Stalin was nonetheless a great Marxist."¹⁹ Mao's comment not only demonstrated his disagreement with Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, but it displayed that Mao had placed himself in

¹⁵ Wu Lengxi, *十年论战：1956-1966 中苏关系回忆录* (*Ten-Year War of Words: A Memoir of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966*) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1999), 4-5.

¹⁶ For the remarks that China had followed Soviet experience to build its socialism in its early days, see Mao, "Strive to build a great socialist country (September 15, 1954)" and "On the ten major relationships (April 25, 1956)," *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.5: 148-9, 284-306. The Chinese had called Stalin "a great teacher" and "a great Marxist-Leninist," see Mao Zedong, "毛主席致电吊唁斯大林逝世" (Chairman Mao Zedong sent a telegraph of condolences on the death of Stalin), *RMRB* (07/03/1953), 1; Editorial, "关于无产阶级专政的历史经验" (On the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat), *RMRB* (05/04/1956), 1.

¹⁷ The suggestion of "peaceful coexistence" made by Khrushchev included reaching agreements with major world powers in terms of ceasing the arms-race, a ban on nuclear weapon tests, disarmament and détente between East and West. See China's Central Compilation and Translation Bureau ed., *苏联共产党第二十次代表大会文件汇编（上）* (*The Compilation Documents for the CPSU's 20th National Congress*) (Beijing: Renmin, 1956), vol.1: 27-34.

¹⁸ Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 136.

¹⁹ Mao, "On the ten major relationships," vol.5: 304.

a higher position than Khrushchev, because to some extent the role of Soviet leader(s) needed the approval from their Chinese counterpart – the CCP.

Khrushchev's open criticism of Stalin and advocacy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West thus led Chinese leaders to re-evaluate the Sino-Soviet relationship. Mao was especially concerned about the importation of "weak points" from the CPSU and the Soviet influence on or even control of Chinese politics. In his speech, "On the Ten Major Relationships," he reminded his Communist colleagues that,

It must be recognized that there are always two aspects, the strong points and the weak points [of Soviet socialism]. ... Our policy is to learn from the strong points of all nations and all countries...but...we mustn't copy everything indiscriminately and transplant mechanically. Naturally, we mustn't pick up their shortcomings and weak points. We should adopt the same attitude in learning from the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.²⁰

Furthermore, for the first time, in this same speech, Mao warned about the danger of overdependence on the USSR and publicly called for China to take "a more independent stance in the cause of revolution and "anti-U.S imperialism." Mao emphasized: "The Soviet Union differs from our country in that, firstly, tsarist Russia was an imperialist power and, secondly, it had the October Revolution. As a result, many people in the Soviet Union are conceited and very arrogant." He expressed his alarm that "there are people who, having been slaves too long, feel inferior in everything and don't stand up straight in the presence of foreigners." Mao thereafter requested the Chinese people to overcome this sentiment of inferiority, "we need to bestir ourselves, enhance our national confidence and encourage the spirit typified by 'scorn US imperialism,' which was fostered during the movement to resist US aggression and aid Korea."²¹ Not only did Mao call for an independent China, strong and reliant on no one, but also he made it clear that China should take up the banner of "anti-US imperialism" and continue the road of revolution.

The Sino-Soviet ideological difference also appeared in ideas about how to develop socialism and achieve communism at the national level. As mentioned earlier, after the founding of the PRC, Chinese leaders followed the Soviet experience of building socialism by making its

²⁰ Ibid., 303.

²¹ Ibid., 305-6.

First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957).²² In 1956, it appeared to the Chinese government that China would fulfil its First Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule.²³ The significant achievements in national development enhanced the CCP's confidence that China was able to pursue communism without following the Soviet steps. Chairman Mao therefore called on his people to take more initiative in consolidating socialism and achieving communism in China. In 1958, China launched Mao's bold project – the Great Leap Forward (GLF) – to speed up industrialization and communization all over the country.

However, the CCP's initiative was not welcomed by the USSR. The Soviet model and leadership in the communist world was challenged by the GLF campaign and the scheme to move ahead with the "People's Communes."²⁴ China's policies were criticised by the leaders of the CPSU. In his report to the 21st Congress of the CPSU in January 1959, Khrushchev insinuated that China's socialist construction was "skipping over a stage" and was "egalitarian communism."²⁵ He even told his US counterpart that the People's Communes were "in essence reactionary," which was an absolute insult to the CCP.²⁶

On all accounts, the divergence in political ideologies between the CCP and CPSU began to surge from 1956 and concerned the following three issues. The first issue related to how to assess the role of Stalin. Should he be negated completely or was he despite everything a great leader? Second, how should the communist world deal with the West – "peaceful coexistence" or "continuous revolution?" The third and probably the most significant question was who could provide leadership in the communist world in the post-Stalin era. Holding even higher the rhetorical banner of "anti-imperialism" and "continuous revolution", and launching the GLF to transform an underdeveloped country into communism in practice, China certainly projected an image as an independent sovereign nation capable of providing leadership in the socialist camp as well as the underdeveloped world.

²² Generally China had followed the Soviet model in its First Five-Year Plan (FFYP), which gave priority to the development of large-scale heavy industry at the expense of agriculture and lighter industry. Because of the extensive investment in heavy industry, China relied on Soviet aid and experience. On the discussion of China's FFYP, see for example, Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China and After: a history of the People's Republic*, 3rd edition (NY: Free Press, 1999), 107-120; Cong Jin, *1949-1989 年的中国曲折发展的岁月 (The Years of China's Tortuous Development, 1949-1989)* (Henan: Henan Renmin, 1990), 1-9.

²³ Editorial, "我国伟大社会主义事业的里程碑" (The milestone of the great socialist enterprise in our country), *RMRB* (15/09/1956), 1.

²⁴ Wang Gungwu, *China and the World since 1949: the Impact of Independence, Modernity and Revolution* (London [etc.]: Macmillan, 1977), 53.

²⁵ The Editorial Departments of *RMRB* and *Hongqi*, "The origin and development of the differences between the leadership of the CPSU and ourselves (September 6, 1963)," in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1965), 77.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

4.1.2 Sino-Soviet disputes in international issues in the late 1950s

The already public Sino-Soviet rift was aggravated by the following bilateral or international issues. To begin with, in 1958, indignation was aroused by the two proposed projects for the joint construction of a long-wave radio station in Northeast China²⁷ and the establishment of a joint submarine flotilla²⁸ by the USSR and China. Moscow requested that the two projects should be jointly constructed and managed and owned by the two sides. Mao responded to his Soviet comrades that China would need Moscow's help and advice but nevertheless the ownership of the two projects should belong to China unconditionally. In the talks with Soviet leaders about these two proposals, including both Ambassador Yudin and Khrushchev in July 1958 in succession, Mao lost his temper. He charged that Soviet leaders intended to control China by implementing these two projects, which infringed upon China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.²⁹ By associating them with the historical relationships between the CCP and the CPSU, he accused the Soviet leaders of distrusting their Chinese comrades and claimed that the Soviets had long adopted an attitude of "big-power chauvinism" toward China, which hurt the "dignity" of the Chinese people.³⁰ Finally, the proposed establishment of a joint submarine flotilla was abandoned. Although an agreement on the construction of a

²⁷ According to Chinese sources, on April 18, 1958, the Minister of Defence, Peng Dehuai, received a telegraph from the Soviet Defence Minister Rodion Malinovskii, in which the latter proposed to cooperate with China in the establishment of a long-wave station in China. Malinovskii explained that the Soviet Union did not possess a long-wave radio station in the Far East but the station was needed for long-distance communication to facilitate the activities of Soviet submarines in the Pacific. The Soviets thought that China had a suitable place to build such a station and might like to cover the major cost of establishing it, and it would be managed and used by both sides. See Xie Yixian ed., *Diplomatic History of Contemporary China*, 157; Cong Jin, *The Years of China's Tortuous Development*, 348-350.

²⁸ On July 21, 1958, Ambassador Yudin called on Chairman Mao to report the Soviet position on four issues of the current world situation on behalf of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. The third issue was regarding China's earlier request that the Soviet Union provide technological assistance for enhancing China's navy to defend China's coastal area. Yudin proposed that China and the Soviet Union establish a joint submarine flotilla. He explained that unlike the geography of China, with its long coastal lines and good natural harbours, the Soviet Union did not possess such good geographical conditions. Mao was offended by this proposal and asked, "so according to your [Soviet] opinion we have to create a 'cooperative' [in this issue]? [Do you mean that] we should jointly create the fleet, otherwise you will not offer any assistance [for China's naval build-up]? That is to say that you force us to create a 'cooperative'?" See Wu Lengxi, *Ten-Year War of Words*, 159.

²⁹ The CCP believed that "if the ownership (of companies, actions and projects) could not be under Chinese control, it would damage China's sovereignty." See Luo Hanping, *文革前夜的中国 (China on the Eve of Cultural Revolution)* (Beijing: Renmin, 2007), 113. Actually, Mao was quite upset when Moscow requested conducting cooperatives between the PRC and the USSR from 1950 to 1951, especially for the four joint-stock companies in Xinjiang and Northeast China managing airline, petroleum, nonferrous and rare metal, and shipbuilding. See Mao, "Talk to Soviet Ambassador to China Pavel Yudin," 328-339; Yang Kuisong, *毛泽东与莫斯科的恩恩怨怨 (Mao's Gratitude and Resentments towards Moscow)* (Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin, 1999), 425. To a large degree, Chinese leaders' super-sensitiveness toward sovereignty issues was due to the Chinese "victim mentality" formed in China's modern history.

³⁰ Wu Lengxi, *Ten-Year War of Words*, 156-167.

long-wave station and dispatch of Soviet experts to China was signed on August 3, 1958 after Mao and Khrushchev's intensive meetings in Beijing, the distrust between the leaders of the two countries was increasing.³¹ The psychological rift was further intensified by Mao's initiation of the Taiwan Strait Crisis which happened just three weeks after Khrushchev's visit to Beijing. During Khrushchev's visit to Beijing from July 31 to August 3, 1958, Chinese leaders did not inform him of the plan to shell the Jinmen (Quemoy) islands, which are just a few kilometres away from China's coastal province Fujian but controlled by the KMT in Taiwan.³² Mao carefully scheduled the bombardment to "shock the international community." According to Wu Lengxi, then director of the *Xinhua News Agency*, the shelling of Jinmen was purposefully to "support the Arabs' anti-imperialist struggle as well as to crack down on the Nationalist army's frequent and reckless harassment along the Fujian coast across from Jinmen and Mazu [Matsu]." In mid-July 1958, American troops invaded Lebanon and British troops invaded Jordan to suppress the Iraqi people's rebellion. Mao sought to protest against US-British actions in the Middle East in this way:

[T]he bombardment of Jinmen, frankly speaking, was our turn to create international tension on purpose. We intended to teach the Americans a lesson. America had bullied us for many years, so now that we had a chance, why not give it a hard time? ... Americans started a fire in the Middle East, and we started another in the Far East. We would see what they would do with it. In our propaganda, however, we still need to condemn the Americans for causing tension in the Taiwan Straits.³³

Therefore, according to Mao's explanation, China's purposeful military action was used to demonstrate China's support for the worldwide anti-imperialist struggles. By triggering a crisis in the Taiwan Straits, it would distract the imperialist forces in the Middle East, and hence "The Arab world would be delighted, and African and Asian people would take our

³¹ Khrushchev expressed how upset he was at a meeting with Mao during his visit: "Comrade Mao Zedong, the NATO countries have no problem in mutual cooperation and supply, and we two cannot even reach an agreement on such a matter." Liu Guoxin, *中华人民共和国历史长编* (*A Macro History of the People's Republic of China*) (Nanning: Guangxi Renmin, 1994), vol.2: 41. However, for Mao himself, it was not an issue of cooperation but a step by Moscow to control China, a threat to China's sovereignty and integrity. See Mao, "Talk to Soviet Ambassador to China Pavel Yudin," 328-330. Some details of the conversation between Mao and Khrushchev, see Henry Kissinger, *On China* (London and New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 168-171.

³² Wu Lengxi, *Ten-Year War of Words*, 173.

³³ Wu Lengxi, "Inside story of the decision making during the shelling of Jinmen," in "Mao Zedong's handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese recollections and documents," translated and annotated by Li Xiaobing et al, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, nos.6-7 (Winter 1995-6), 208.

side.”³⁴ In this regard, the PRC actually mobilized its coercive power against the US to promote China’s prestige in the anti-imperialism struggles in the Third World.

However, it needs to be admitted that the primary goal of shelling Jinmen was not simply to support the Arabs’ anti-imperialist struggle; China intended to call international attention to the fact that the issue of Taiwan was China’s own business which should only be solved by the Chinese people and not by any other international forces. China wanted to display its capability and its determination to manage its domestic and international affairs independently. In this regard, it may be safe to conclude that Chairman Mao used this crisis to test whether their Soviet comrades truly supported the PRC to resolve the Taiwan issue. Khrushchev’s advocacy of peaceful coexistence, as discussed earlier, from Mao’s point of view, was not only problematic in terms of communist ideology, but also made Moscow an unreliable ally in countering “US imperialism.” Therefore, if the Taiwan Crisis went to the brink of war, it would become an opportunity to see how the Kremlin would choose between its new policy of peaceful coexistence and its alliance with Beijing.³⁵

The sudden and intensive artillery bombardment of the islands on August 23, 1958 thus not only shocked Washington, but also caught Moscow off guard. Moscow in the following weeks kept close contact with Beijing to inquire about China’s intention in shelling Jinmen. Beijing told its ally that the shelling was designed to attract international attention to the Taiwan issue and distract the US from the Middle East; it was not a step leading to the liberation of Taiwan, nor intended to provoke a direct confrontation with the US.³⁶ Only after Moscow got to the bottom of Beijing’s plan did it issue a statement on September 8 to demonstrate its support of China’s action.³⁷ In Washington’s eyes, the CCP’s military operation was undertaken with Moscow’s full support from planning to implementation, since the Soviet top leader had visited Beijing three weeks before the crisis.³⁸ Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders perceived that China’s unilateral action in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958 signified “an implicit challenge to the unity of the communist bloc under Kremlin leadership – and was therefore anathema to Soviet leaders on both political and ideological groups.”³⁹ Therefore,

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ For this hypothesis, see Kissinger, *On China*, 173-174.

³⁶ Wu Lengxi, *Ten-Year War of Words*, 179.

³⁷ “美国赶快悬崖勒马” (The United States [needs to] stop as soon as possible), *RMRB* (09/09/1958), 1.

³⁸ Some scholars even think that it was Mao’s plot “to induce Khrushchev to go to Beijing to play his assigned role in that design.” See Kissinger, *On China*, 174.

³⁹ Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev’s nuclear promise,” in “Mao Zedong’s handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese recollections and documents,” translated and annotated by Li Xiaobing et al, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 225.

although the Sino-Soviet relationship appeared close in public, in reality a scar was left on the minds of the leaders of the two communist parties; "the Sino-Soviet rift was deepening and would erupt in earnest only a year later, in the autumn of 1959."⁴⁰

It was around this time that the Sino-Indian border conflict broke out, and the Soviet government issued a TASS statement which did not favour China. In March 1959, the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet, and New Delhi accepted the Dalai Lama's exiled government. This resulted in subsequent Sino-Indian disputes about the Tibet issue as well as the historical problem of the Sino-Indian border. A Sino-Indian border skirmish broke out in late August.⁴¹ The clash was apparently instigated by the Indians.⁴² Despite this fact and despite China's explanation concerning the situation on the Sino-Indian border to the Soviet diplomat in Beijing and an appeal for Soviet understanding, Khrushchev disregarded Beijing. He believed that it was Beijing's scheme to sabotage his forthcoming visit to the US. A TASS statement was released on September 9, which expressed "regret" at the conflict between China and India. What made Chinese leaders more angry was that it complained that the conflict "jeopardized the relaxation of international tensions," and "complicated the situation prior to the meeting between Khrushchev and Eisenhower."⁴³ It thus publicised the rift between China and the USSR. To Chinese leaders, this statement not only failed to demonstrate that the Kremlin stood on Beijing's side, but indicated that Moscow virtually supported India's position.⁴⁴ Furthermore, they interpreted Khrushchev's issuance of the statement on the eve of his visit to the US as a "gift" presented to Eisenhower "so as to curry favour with the US imperialists and create the so-called 'spirit of Camp David'."⁴⁵ The CCP suspected that Soviet leaders had actually started to implement a policy of détente and intended to settle international affairs by collaboration with the US government.⁴⁶ The Sino-Indian border conflict thus consolidated the CCP's belief that the CPSU lacked revolutionary spirit and was an untrustworthy ally of China.

⁴⁰ Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev's nuclear promise," 225; also see Xie Yixian ed., *Diplomatic History of Contemporary China*, 157; Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 79.

⁴¹ Wu Lengxi, *Ten-Year War of Words*, 208-10.

⁴² Wang Dong, "The quarrelling brothers," 20; also see Wu Lengxi, *Ten-Year War of Words*, 209-10; Odd Arne Westad ed., *Brothers in Arms*, 23.

⁴³ Wu Lengxi, *Ten-Year War of Words*, 214.

⁴⁴ Mao, "Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, 24 September 1962," in Stuart Schram ed., *Chairman Mao Talks to People, Talks and Letters: 1956-1971* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 190.

⁴⁵ The Editorial Departments of *RMRB* and *Hongqi*, "The origin and development of the differences between the leadership of the CPSU and ourselves (September 6, 1963)," in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, 77.

⁴⁶ Wu Lengxi, *Ten-Year War of Words*, 217.

In the meantime, a number of other events happened which worsened the already stressed Sino-Soviet relationship. First, in June 1959, Moscow notified Beijing that it had to suspend its plan to provide a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture due to the Soviet-American negotiations at Geneva on the banning of nuclear weapon tests. The Soviets thus broke the agreement on new technology for national defence signed with China on October 15, 1957.⁴⁷ Moscow's abrupt action greatly upset the Chinese leaders and Chairman Mao in particular, who had longed to have nuclear arms to enhance China's great power status and force the US to treat China equally at the negotiating table.⁴⁸ Second, on July 16, 1959, Moscow decided to recall all Soviet experts from China and drastically reduced economic and military aid to China, just when China was experiencing serious economic plight. Moscow's decision certainly made China's economic recovery harder.⁴⁹ These events further impelled the CCP to adopt a policy of self-reliance, relying on nobody but Chinese people themselves to develop its economy and nuclear weapons. To achieve that, the CCP returned to nationalism to enhance Chinese morale and obtain the masses' support for the CCP's policies. This actually formed a pattern in China's management of domestic politics and international relations, particularly in its radical years: the CCP repeatedly utilized the struggles against "US imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism" to mobilize the great masses' support of CCP policies and project its leadership role in the world revolutionary movement.⁵⁰

All in all, by 1959, most evidence demonstrated that China's relationship with the Soviet Union had arrived at a "point of no return."⁵¹ The rift was partly derived from disputes about practical issues concerning China's national interests and sovereignty, such as the project to establish the joint submarine flotilla. However, differences in political ideology held by the leaders of the two Parties were more fundamentally the cause. The Soviet leaders preached "peaceful coexistence," "peaceful competition" and "peaceful transition" and advocated seeking "a world without weapons, without armed forces and without wars."⁵² In contrast, the CCP held that although people should strive for peace, they should not be afraid of war,

⁴⁷ The Editorial Departments of *RMRB* and *Hongqi*, "The origin and development of the differences between the leadership of the CPSU and ourselves (September 6, 1963)," 77.

⁴⁸ Yang Kuisong, *A Study on the History of P. R. China's Establishment*, vol.2: 194, 201.

⁴⁹ Xie Yixian, ed., *Diplomatic History of Contemporary China*, 161-162.

⁵⁰ See The Editorial Departments of *RMRB* and *Hongqi*, *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*.

⁵¹ Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, 18.

⁵² N. S. Khrushchev, "Replies to questions by Roberto J. Noble, Director of the Argentine paper *Clarín*, December 30, 1959," quoted in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, 76.

especially nuclear war.⁵³ The ideological differences between the two Parties in the late 1950s, as a result, planted seeds for and intensified the later open polemic debates and divorce in the early 1960s.

Thus, in the early 1960s, Mao's China arrived at a foreign policy called "double-anti." Whilst "US imperialism" continued to serve as China's primary "vicious" enemy through the 1950s to the 1960s, the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the late 1950s made Chinese leaders consider the Soviet Union as an unreliable ally and probably a potential enemy. The CCP in the 1960s thus carried two banners in its international engagement: "anti-US imperialism" and "anti-Soviet revisionism and big power chauvinism."⁵⁴ The rhetoric and practices of "double-anti" were central to mobilize the great masses to support Maoist "continuous revolution" and project China's central role in the communist world as well as the world revolution.

4.2 Key elements of Maoist soft power

In the context of the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and the Maoist perception that the Soviet spirit of revolution had "degenerated", the CCP considered that on behalf of authentic Communists, it was their mission to support the "oppressed" peoples all over the world. The Sino-Soviet split thus to a large degree provided China with a space within which to build itself as a model and a leader in the communist world and world revolutionary movement. To play such a role, Maoist China could not only rely on its hard coercive power, but had to mobilize its soft power to persuade and attract the audience all over the world.

The CCP believed that the PRC's significance and prestige was deeply rooted in the cause of world revolution, so those who sought revolution and national independence provided the target audience, as it were, of Maoist soft power. They believed that China could project its attractiveness in the following three aspects. In the first place, the "new China" was regarded as a model for the underdeveloped world in terms of winning national liberation and achieving national development. On the one hand, Communist China had already provided a

⁵³ Luo Hanping, *China on the Eve of Cultural Revolution*, 111. For Mao's argument on war and nuclear weapons, see Mao, "Imperialists and all the reactionaries are paper tigers – excerpts from a speech at the Moscow Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Worker's Parties, November 18, 1957," in Renmin Press ed., *Imperialists and All the Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers* (Beijing: Renmin, 1958), 23-24; Mao, "Talk to Marshal Montgomery on three principles and nuclear weapons (September 1961)" in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Policy*, 475-7.

⁵⁴ For instance see "Annual report of China's cultural delegation in Laos, January 26, 1962," *Chinese Diplomatic Archives (CDA)* (Beijing: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC), archival no.106-00672-01; "Suggestions and work summary for the cultural exchanges between China and Guinea, 10 January to 16 May 1963," *CDA*, no.108-00901-01; "Report of the visit of Ghanaian writer Williams to China, July 7 to August 25, 1963," *CDA*, no.108-00921-01.

successful model in throwing off colonial shackles and founding a new nation. This alone made it attractive. On the other hand, it also provided a national development model to attract the emerging states, because unlike the West as well as the USSR, none of them (including China) had a sophisticated industrial structure. In the second place, the political culture it projected was post-colonial, liberationist, modernising but non-Western, which claimed to represent the interests of the proletariat. It might well appeal to other post-colonial societies. Thirdly, Chinese foreign policy provided both vehicles and channels through which Chinese ideas and leadership were spread.

4.2.1 China as an exemplary model of nation building

Despite its youth and fragility, at the very beginning of the PRC, Chinese Communists made it clear that owing to “proletarian internationalism,” it was their duty to provide support for the peoples in the underdeveloped world. The CCP promoted its experience in waging a war of national liberation and in national development for others to emulate. China as an exemplary model of nation building, in this sense, can be divided into two categories: one was for national liberation in colonial and semi-colonial countries; the other was for socialist construction for those who had secured national independence.

4.2.1.1 China as a model (I): national liberation movement

As soon as the PRC was established, its leaders stressed that China’s path to national liberation could serve as a model for the other colonial and semi-colonial countries.⁵⁵ However, China’s role in this regard was shadowed by China’s bigger brother, the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, due to the Sino-Soviet rift and Chinese perception of the “degeneration” of the revolutionary spirit of the CPSU, in the late 1950s the CCP vigorously promoted its experience of national liberation for those who were undergoing the process of securing national liberation to emulate. At the Eighth National Congress of the CCP in 1956, Chairman Mao declared: “We must actively support the movement for national independence and

⁵⁵ For the argument that China could serve as a model for national liberation movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries, one of the best known statements was Liu Shaoqi’s address to the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries. See Xinhua News Agency, “刘少奇在亚洲澳洲工会会议上的开幕词” (Liu Shaoqi’s inauguration speech at the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries), *RMRB* (22/11/1949), 1; also see Editorial, “‘武装的人民反对武装的反革命’是不是中国革命独具的特点?” (“Armed people against the armed counter-revolution” – is it a unique feature of Chinese revolution?), *RMRB* (16/06/1950), 1; Lu Dingyi, “中国革命的世界意义 (为纪念中国共产党诞生的三十周年而作)” (The world significance of the Chinese revolution – in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the CCP), *RMRB* (23/06/1951), 1.

liberation in various Asian, African and Latin American countries.”⁵⁶ Meanwhile, the CCP repeatedly elaborated the CCP’s experience of revolution and the concept of “continuous revolution” to demonstrate Chinese support for the struggles of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to achieve or safeguard their national independence.⁵⁷

In Maoist theory, there were two types of national liberation movement, and both belonged to revolution.⁵⁸ The first one was “led by bourgeois nationalists and aimed at the establishment of true independence from foreign control or imperialism and the abolition of so-called feudal patterns of landholding.” The 1911 *Xinhai* revolution led by Sun Yat-sen as well as the Algerian revolution (1954-1962) were good examples of this kind of revolution. The second one was led by communists, composed of “a two-stage revolution” (first to win national independence and then to build up a socialist system) which led eventually to communism.⁵⁹ Obviously the Chinese revolution belonged to the second category, and Mao called it a “new democratic” revolution, because the communist party took the leadership in contrast with the first bourgeois-led revolution. When talking to international audiences, however, the Chinese leaders did not highlight the distinction between the two kinds of revolution. Rather, they intentionally mixed them under one single title, “the national liberation movement” (*minzu jiefang yundong*).⁶⁰ The CCP stressed that the two types of revolution shared common foes and goals. Their common enemies were foreign imperialism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, and the aim for all the underdeveloped countries undertaking revolution was to obtain national independence and “grasp our own destiny in our own hands.”⁶¹

⁵⁶ Mao, “中国共产党第八次全国代表大会开幕词” (Speech at the Eighth National Congress of the CCP), in Mao Zedong, *建国以来毛泽东文稿* (*Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC*) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian 1992), vol.6: 203.

⁵⁷ Mao, “Some experiences in our Party’s history, September 25, 1956,” *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.5: 324-29. This talk was delivered to representatives of some Latin-American Communist Parties.

⁵⁸ For the two types of revolution, see Mao’s “On new democracy, January 1940,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol.2: 347.

⁵⁹ Mao’s “On new democracy”; also see Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1970), 51-52.

⁶⁰ Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, 52.

⁶¹ Mao, “The present situation and our tasks, December 25, 1947,” *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.4: 168. In this article, Mao defined bureaucrat-capitalism: “monopoly capital, combined with state power, has become state-monopoly capitalism. This monopoly capitalism, closely tied up with foreign imperialism, the domestic landlord class... oppresses not only the workers and peasants but also the urban petty bourgeoisie, and it injures the middle bourgeoisie.... This capital is popularly known in China as bureaucrat-capital. This capitalist class, known as the bureaucrat-capitalist class, is the big bourgeoisie of China.”

The next issue was how to achieve national liberation in relevant countries and how China's experience was applicable to them. The success of the Chinese revolution was largely credited to Chairman Mao's "successful and creative application" of universal Marxism-Leninism to suit the concrete conditions of China. Therefore, the CCP highlighted Mao's revolutionary theory in general and his "three magic weapons" (*san da fabao*) formed in the Chinese revolution in particular. These three principal weapons were "party building," where the party served as the "vanguard of the proletariat;" "armed struggle" with a revolutionary army controlled by the party; and "correctly handling the issue of the united front."⁶² The essence of the Chinese model for revolution, in the last analysis, was attributed to the leadership of the CCP and the Party-led armed struggle. As Peter Van Ness argues, "the idea that the local communist party should gain control of the nationalist movement and use it as a vehicle to attain state power, after which it can transform the national revolution into a socialist one...is at the heart of Mao Zedong's whole theory of new democracy."⁶³ In 1965, Marshal Lin Biao's famous article "Long Live the Victory of People's War", referring to all those elements, promoted Mao's strategy with regard to national liberation movements and the strategy of people's war as a universal guideline for revolution in the underdeveloped world.⁶⁴ Lin sought to promote "people's war" to enhance Mao's leadership in the entire revolutionary world.

However, one should bear in mind that revolution using "three magic weapons" was an ideal type which Maoist China endorsed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Under the policy of "anti-imperialism" and "anti-revisionism," it also promoted revolutions that were not led by the communists, such as the examples of Algeria and Indonesia, whose revolutions were led by bourgeois nationalists.⁶⁵ This was obviously for the sake of building "the broadest possible" international united front to mobilize all the "oppressed peoples" of the world to oppose their common and principal enemy, US imperialism.

⁶² Mao first expounded these three elements in his article "Introducing *The Communist*, October 4, 1939," *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.2: 285-96, and later in "On the people's democratic dictatorship, June 30, 1949," *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.4: 422; also see A. M. Halpern, "The foreign policy uses of the Chinese revolutionary model," *The China Quarterly*, no.7 (Jul.-Sep. 1961), 1-16, in which these three elements were named as a "tripod."

⁶³ Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, 72.

⁶⁴ Lin Biao, "人民战争胜利万岁——纪念中国人民抗日战争胜利二十周年" (Long live the victory of people's war), *RMRB* (03/09/1965), 1.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

4.2.1.2 China as a model (II): national development

Whilst China highlighted its experience of national liberation to attract the peoples who were seeking national independence, it also set an example of socialist construction for those who were undertaking national development.

The Maoists' intention to stand as an example of socialist construction dated back to the mid-1950s, when the Chinese leaders reviewed China's First Five-Year Plan. This Plan was shaped by the Soviet developmental model, which gave priority to heavy industry by transferring some of the profits from agriculture and lighter industry, and it was achieved with the aid of loans and technical assistance from the USSR.⁶⁶ However, Chairman Mao soon decided to depart from the Soviet model of development and explore a "China model" for advancing Chinese socialism. As China entered into 1958, Mao defined another "revolution" in his article "Sixty Points on Work Methods," which prefaced the launch of the GLF.⁶⁷ He wrote:

Our revolutions come one after another. Starting from the seizure of power in the whole country in 1949, there followed in quick succession the anti-feudal land reform, agricultural co-operativization, and the socialist reconstruction of private industries, commerce and handicrafts. The three great socialist reforms – i.e. the socialist revolution in the ownership of means of production – were basically completed in 1956 and there came the socialist revolution on the ideological and political front last year. This revolution may draw to the end of one stage by 1 July this year.... now we must start a technological revolution so that we may overtake Britain in fifteen or more years. Chinese economy is backward and China is materially weak.... We must make a spurt [forward in production].... After fifteen years, when our foodstuffs and iron and steel become plentiful, we shall take a much greater initiative. Our revolutions are like battles. After a victory, we must at once put

⁶⁶ Yang Kuisong, *A Study on the History of P. R. China's Establishment*, vol.2: 191; also see Shen Zhihua, "Essential information of Soviet economic aid to China in the early days of the PRC."

⁶⁷ It was in May 1958 that the GLF campaign was formally launched, when the General Line for Socialist Construction was put forward by Mao at the 2nd Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee. See Editorial, "毛泽东思想万岁" (Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought), *RMRB* (01/07/19660), 1.

forward a new task. In this way, cadres and the masses will forever be filled with revolutionary fervour, instead of conceit.⁶⁸

There were a few considerations for launching the GLF in China. First, the speed of its national development in the first few years made the CCP very optimistic about China's future. The PRC spent three years to restore order in China's economy, and another three years to realize the socialist transformation of the national economy, which meant that socialist public ownership of the means of production had been built.⁶⁹ It took China six years to achieve the process which had taken the Soviets 19 years.⁷⁰ This process represented a "miracle" created by a CCP-led China and convinced the CCP that it should not passively follow a Soviet path, but that China could take the lead and make more miracles by itself.⁷¹

Second, despite the achievements China had made in the First Five-Year Plan, Mao was preoccupied with "revolution anxiety", which had a significant impact on the launch of the GLF. For Mao, what was most important for the CCP was to maintain the momentum of revolution and push the revolution forward constantly. Khrushchev's concept of "peaceful coexistence" presented a striking contrast to his "continuous revolution" theory. As discussed earlier, in Mao's eyes, the Soviet advocacy of "peaceful coexistence," "peaceful competition" and "peaceful transition" would inevitably lead the communists to deviate from the ideal of revolution and to be afraid of imperialism and war.⁷² Mao perceived that the détente policy actually negated the imperative of armed struggle and proletarian dictatorship. It thus not only produced a negative influence on the CCP's leadership in China but also threatened the cause of international communism and world revolution. In order to prevent China from falling into Soviet ways and to maintain the momentum of revolution in China, Mao came up with the GLF to elevate the revolution into a higher stage.⁷³

Third, in the context of the anxieties of the revolution and the Sino-Soviet rift, Mao's China sought to set itself as an alternative to the Soviet model in terms of national development: to realize communism in a developing country. It had been argued from Marx to Stalin that industrialization was a prerequisite for realizing communism. That is to say, communism

⁶⁸ Mao, "工作方法六十条（草案）（一九五八年一月）" (Sixty points on working methods (draft) – January 1958), in *Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC*, vol.7: 51.

⁶⁹ Editorial, "我国伟大社会主义事业的里程碑" (The milestone of the great socialist enterprise in our country), *RMRB* (15/09/1956), 1.

⁷⁰ Yang Kuisong, *A Study on the History of P. R. China's Establishment*, vol.2: 192.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 72.

could only be achieved from a highly industrialised economic base. However, the reality faced by the Chinese was an agricultural underdeveloped China, with a large population in rural areas, in contrast with the situation in the Soviet Union. Due to this reality, Chinese leaders understood that there were limits to their ability to follow the Soviet model of national development.⁷⁴ They therefore wondered if there was any other approach to communism more suited to countries with low levels of industry. Eventually, Mao succeeded in launching the GLF, with organizational changes and massive mobilization of resources and people. He believed that these measures "could provide the dramatic breakthroughs necessary for rapid growth, which, in turn, would free China from the apron strings of Moscow and also from other 'objective' constraints."⁷⁵ The GLF and the People's Communes were extensively promoted to developing countries as well as to foreign guests who visited China. Being China's initiative, this project demonstrated China's political will to achieve communism on its own and its intention to set an example for national development in the underdeveloped world.

Last and probably the most significantly, the GLF actually represented widespread nationalistic sentiment in favour of restoring China's great power status in Mao's generation. This needs to be understood in the context of the Chinese "victim mentality," formed and reinforced up to contemporary times. The Chinese "victim mentality" is unique, according to Chen Jian, "because it formed such a sharp contrast with the long-lived Central Kingdom concept." "The Chinese felt that their nation's modern experience was more humiliating and less tolerable than that of any other victimized non-Western country in the world, and they firmly believed that China's victim status would not end until its weaknesses had been turned into strength."⁷⁶

Perhaps due to the uniqueness of this Chinese "victim mentality", Chinese leaders were agonized by China's awkward international status and its weakness in material power. They felt that the PRC was unequally treated by the world powers, particularly the US. Chairman Mao nursed his grievance, noticing that American delegates sought to derail the talks about the Taiwan issue in Sino-US ambassadorial talks in Geneva in September 1955.⁷⁷ He felt

⁷⁴ Chinese leaders had discussed the drawbacks of Soviet style development as well as the Chinese way of socialist development, see June Grasso, Jay Corrin, and Michael Kort, *Modernization and Revolution in China: from the Opium Wars to World Power*, 3rd edition (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 174-5; Cong Jin, *The Years of China's Tortuous Development*, 1-6; Asbjørn Løvbræk, "The Chinese model of development," *Journal of Peace Research* 13:3 (1976), 207-226.

⁷⁵ June Grasso et al, *Modernization and Revolution in China*, 176.

⁷⁶ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 12.

⁷⁷ Xie Yixian ed., *Diplomatic History of Contemporary China*, 89-90. In his meeting with Khrushchev in October 1959, Mao also aired his grievance at Americans' arrogance towards China in the Geneva

insulted by the inequality China had encountered in international relations.⁷⁸ To change this, it was imperative to overtake other world powers, particularly the US, as he told Chinese entrepreneurs one month later: "Our goal is to catch up with and surpass America.... Once we catch up with America and surpass it, we can take a break. Now we appear poor, [and thus] we were bullied.... We must strike back."⁷⁹ Mao further revealed his unhappiness about China's international status in his talk to Sukarno, the president of Indonesia, when he visited China to celebrate the PRC's National Day in 1956. Mao remarked that "China was a big country, but China was not powerful" so that "China was looked down upon" and bullied by the US and could not enter into the UN. The PRC was denied formal recognition by many countries because of Washington's support for the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan). To solve this issue, there were only two approaches available for the Chinese: "one is to make the PRC more powerful, the other is to take back Taiwan as soon as possible."⁸⁰

For Mao and many other Chinese leaders, "to make the PRC more powerful" was fundamental, because only then would it have international leverage against the US on the Taiwan issue and be able to regain its "rightful role" in contemporary international relations. Therefore, China had to enhance its material power, but not at a steady pace. Wanting to realize China's "big power dream" in a short time, Maoists expected sudden great leaps in China's socialist construction.

These are the major considerations that catalysed Maoists to launch the GLF campaign in 1958. Under Mao's instigation, the GLF in agriculture started first. From 1957 to 1958, it was widely reported that the food production had increased astonishingly.⁸¹ This spurred Mao on to the aim of creating miracles in industry. In January 1958, Mao defined the mission: "we

talks. See "Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong," CUIHP, accessed from http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/va2/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=HOME.document&identifier=5034C225-96B6-175C-904C329159CA3F25&sort=Collection&item=Sino-Soviet Relations.

⁷⁸ Yang Kuisong, "从 1955 年起毛泽东就憋着一口气" (From the year of 1955 Mao had been nursing a grievance), *南方周末* (*Southern Weekly*) (03/04/2008), B11.

⁷⁹ Mao, "在资本主义工商业社会主义改造问题座谈会上的讲话 (一九五五年十月二十九日)" (Speech at the meeting of socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, October 29, 1955), Mao Zedong, *毛泽东文集* (*A Collection of Mao Zedong's works*) (Beijing: Renmin, 1999), vol.6: 500.

⁸⁰ Mao, "关于恢复中国在联合国的合法席位问题 (一九五六年九月三十日)" (The issue of restoring PRC's legitimate position in the UN, September 30, 1956), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Policy*, 264-5, 269, 271.

⁸¹ Mao referred to the increase of China's agricultural production in his speech at the 15th Supreme State Conference on September 5, 1958, see *Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC*, vol.7: 380, 397.

shall catch up with Britain in fifteen years.”⁸² Eight months later, however, Mao bypassed Britain and now claimed that China aimed at catching up with and even surpassing America in five to seven years.⁸³ No matter how unrealistic the goals of the GLF sounded, no one could challenge Mao’s projects in particular and his authority in general, owing to the unique Chinese “victim mentality” and popular passion for restoring China’s great power status.

The key elements of China’s model for socialist construction at the time were as follows. The first element was to speed up “the transition to communism,” which was reflected by the General Line for Socialist Construction. Mao characterised the General Line as “going all out, aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism,” which became the guideline for the GLF.⁸⁴ However, a speed-up of socialist construction was needed to maintain the balance between industry and agriculture. Industry and agriculture were to be developed in tandem by making use of both modern technology and traditional methods.⁸⁵ This was from the Maoist view that modernization in the Soviet way, with emphasis on heavy industry, could lead to a fast-growing gap between industrial cities and the agricultural countryside in backward countries.⁸⁶ While Mao was unwilling to slow down the speed of industrialization, his solution was to carry out industrialization on a large scale by bringing industry to the countryside. Industry in this sense would not be concentrated exclusively in urban centres but scattered throughout China’s large rural area.

Thirdly, for organizing industrialization in the countryside, self-reliant People’s Commune units were established, in which the peasants lived and worked together like a truly revolutionary corps: “The communes were designed to be the nation’s basic social unit, organizations of agricultural and industrial production as well as incubators of revolutionary Communist behaviour.”⁸⁷ This method represented a Chinese alternative to the Western approach to modernization, which was rejected by Mao:

⁸² Editorial, “乘风破浪” (Ride on the wind and break through the waves), *RMRB* (01/01/1958), 1; Mao, “Speech at the 14th Supreme State Conference, January 28, 1958,” in Schram, *Chairman Mao Talks to the People*, 93; Mao, “Sixty articles on work methods,” *Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC*, vol.7: 51.

⁸³ See Mao, “对北戴河会议工业类文件的意见（一九五八年九月二日）” (Comments on the documents of industry presented in Beidahe Conference, September 2, 1958), *Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC*, vol.7: 368.

⁸⁴ “Long Live Mao Zedong’s Thought,” *RMRB*.

⁸⁵ Mao, “On the ten major relationships.”

⁸⁶ Wang Gungwu, *China and the World since 1949*, 90.

⁸⁷ June Grasso et al, *Modernization and Revolution in China*, 183.

The process of modernization in the West had moved the social order in the direction of increased urbanization, reliance on bureaucracies, large-scale production, social stratification, specialization of labor and domination of elites. The communes were intended to break up this lock-step process by bringing industry to the countryside, thereby avoiding the assorted social and political ills that accompanied urbanization.⁸⁸

The Maoists aimed to reject centralized planning under the control of government bureaucrats. Instead, they mobilized the great masses to be self-reliant and take the initiative to build small-scale manufacturing facilities in their own villages and neighbourhoods. That was where the “the most creative initiative” – “backyard steel furnaces” came from. With its aim of building a Communist utopia in China, the GLF was probably the most radical program unleashed in the PRC since it was founded. It marked the start of China’s most radical years and produced far-reaching influences on its domestic and foreign policies in the following two decades. Nevertheless, Chairman Mao was adept at mass mobilization to support his “continuous revolution” projects in China. His party members also promoted the GLF in foreign states to build China’s image as a model for socialist construction. The General Line of Socialist Construction, the GLF and the People’s Commune were called “the three red flags” and were vigorously promoted by the CCP in diplomacy, which is discussed later.⁸⁹

4.2.2 A “new” Chinese culture: proletarian culture

The second strand of Maoist soft power evolved from Chinese culture. The culture promoted by Maoist China was neither traditional nor Western, but was a post-colonial “proletarian culture.” It was claimed to represent the interests of the proletariat. This “new” culture promoted China’s “revolutionary” political identity as well as nationalism – the glory of one’s own nation.

A clear definition of culture however could not be found in Mao’s writing; rather, culture for Mao could mean everything. It is concluded that Mao referred to culture as “not only...how people were educated, what they read, how they created their art and music – although these were important – but also...how people interrelated, how people thought, and even how people amused themselves.”⁹⁰ For Mao, there was no pure culture for culture’s sake. Culture

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ “The sum of the cultural work aimed at foreign countries in the last ten years and guidelines and tasks for the future, Beijing, 01/07/1960,” CDA, no.102-00015-03.

⁹⁰ June Grasso et al, *Modernization and Revolution in China*, 208.

was interrelated with all the other aspects of society, including politics, revolution, literature and art, education, and social norms and values.

However, among all these aspects, politics played the most significant role in shaping culture. This point of view was reflected in Mao's speech at the Forum on Literature and Art in Yan'an in 1942:

In the world today all culture, all literature and art belong to definite classes and are geared to definite political lines. There is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above or art that is detached from or independent of politic.⁹¹

Culture, in this sense, was subordinate to politics and should be guided by politics according to Mao. The nature of politics however was determined by the prevailing class of the society according to Marxism. It thus meant that class also mattered in the shaping of culture. Mao made this point by following Marxists' argument that cultural consciousness reflects the political and economic values of the prevailing class.⁹² Therefore, when a society was in its feudal or capitalist stage, culture or culture related actions were identified with the values of the privileged upper-class. Working classes were seldom entitled to obtain or produce knowledge. In contrast, when a society "progressed" into a proletarian stage, a "new" culture – a "proletarian" one – ought to be established and serve the needs of the majority of population, that is, the working classes, which consisted of the workers, peasants and soldiers in the first place.⁹³

The establishment of a "proletarian culture" in Mao's theory was "an indispensable part of the entire revolutionary cause", because culture in its turn exerted a great influence on politics and revolution. He warned his colleagues that if they failed to recognize this, they "could not carry on the revolutionary movement and win victory."⁹⁴ The importance of culture, more specifically revolutionary culture, had been explained in an earlier essay: "Revolutionary culture is a powerful revolutionary weapon for the broad masses of the people. It prepares the ground ideologically before the revolution comes and is an important, indeed essential, fighting front in the general revolutionary front during the revolution."⁹⁵ This weapon would

⁹¹ Mao, "Talks at the Yanan Forum of Literature and Art (May 1942)," *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.3: 86.

⁹² Mao, "On new democracy," 340.

⁹³ Mao, "Talks at the Yanan forum of literature and art (May 1942)," 84.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Mao, "On new democracy," 382.

“unite and educate” people, so that they would “fight the enemy with one heart and one mind.” In this sense, culture served as a tool in the work of the united front. By educating the great masses and uniting them under the discourse of revolution and communism guided by the CCP, it not only helped defeat the enemy of the great masses in China, such as imperialism and bureaucrat-capitalism – i.e. the KMT, but would push the revolution into a higher stage. In other words, revolutionary culture actually consolidated the leadership of the CCP in China.

Whilst the relationship between politics, class and culture was clear, what represented a “new” culture according to Mao? On the one hand, this national culture should belong to “the broad masses” and serve the majority of the nation’s population. It should encourage “the liberation and development of the individuality of hundreds of millions of people.”⁹⁶ On the other hand, this individual liberation and development should be “scientific” according to Marxist materialism. To build this “new” culture, Mao asked people to oppose “all feudal and superstitious ideas” and those theories with capitalist and imperialist features which manifested the interests of previously dominant classes. For example, in China, feudal and superstitious ideas included “the worship of Confucius, the study of the Confucian canon, the old ethical code and the old ideas.”⁹⁷ In the world, the capitalist and imperialist culture was largely manifested by colonialism and racism. Mao called to the great masses, “Imperialist culture and [feudal and] semi-feudal culture are devoted brothers and have formed a reactionary culture alliance against...new culture...and must be swept away.... There is no construction without destruction.... The two are locked in a life-and-death struggle.”⁹⁸ Mao’s requirement of the “destruction” of the “old” cultures was later reflected by his advocacy for movements to raise the social status of youth, the poor and women who had been usually oppressed under the “old” societies, to break the hierarchical order under the guidance of class theories, and to build a utopian community constituted by the People’s Communes.⁹⁹ In conclusion, his ideal of building a “new” culture was to establish a utopia in which a universal equal relationship would be established among all mankind regardless of age, class, gender or race.

In addition to the emphasis on the decisive role of politics and ideology played in building China’s “new” culture, Mao also stressed the “ethnic” or “national” (*minzu de*) aspect of the culture. He stated, “New-democratic culture is national.... It belongs to our own nation and

⁹⁶ Mao, “On coalition government,” *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.3: 233.

⁹⁷ Mao, “On new democracy,” 369.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ See “Transforming man, nature, and society,” in Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, revised and enlarged edition (New York: Praeger, 1969), 331-71.

bears our own national characteristics.”¹⁰⁰ Mao thus criticized the idea of “wholesale westernization,” as well as the mechanical absorption of Marxism, because they failed to combine with specific Chinese national characteristics and meet the actual needs of Chinese people. “In applying Marxism to China,” Mao stressed that the Chinese Communists should follow this principle, “the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form if it is to be useful.”¹⁰¹

Therefore, the establishment of a “new” Chinese culture undoubtedly should be based on the principle of the absorption of Marxism with Chinese national characteristics. This represented one of the CCP’s early efforts to sinicize Marxism. First, due to the particularity of the Chinese revolution, there would be a two-stage revolution, and the establishment of “new” Chinese national culture should be guided by this two-stage revolution. China had long been a feudal society and entered into a semi-colonial stage owing to the invasion of the imperialist powers in its recent history. Chinese society thus had become “predominantly colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal.”¹⁰² The factors of feudalism, capitalism and imperialism represented the reactionary forces. Due to the various enemies and different tasks of Chinese revolution, there would be a two-stage revolution in China. In the first stage of the revolution, a “new democratic” one led by the CCP aimed at obtaining national independence, the theme of the “new” culture “is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the broad masses.” However, when China entered into the second stage of the revolution – a “socialist” one for the overthrow of capitalism, the “new” national culture would have a socialist content and reflect socialist politics and economy.¹⁰³

Second, this two-stage revolution informed the content of the “new” culture. In the first stage, Chinese people needed to oppose “all feudal and superstitious ideas.” Also, it required building a culture to unite the great masses including the bourgeoisie for the purpose of opposing imperialism. For example, in the Anti-Japanese War (1931-1945), it was “the culture of the anti-Japanese united front.”¹⁰⁴ After obtaining national independence, however, it was the proletariat’s task to arm the other classes with socialist ideology.

The third and probably the most subtle issue was how to deal with China’s thousands of years of civilization dating from feudal times. Once again, Mao categorized culture according to the

¹⁰⁰ Mao, “On new democracy,” 380.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 380-81.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 341.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 379.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 373.

standard of class. "It's imperative to separate the fine old culture of the people, which had a more or less democratic and revolutionary character, from all the decadence of the old feudal ruling class."¹⁰⁵ As a result, he was more supportive of promoting Chinese culture that was created by the great masses and reflected the revolutionary spirit of Chinese people, which included folk art, the revolutions carried out by Chinese peasants and so on. This kind of culture was widely dispersed both at home and abroad in post-1949 China, which is further discussed in the section of China's revolutionary diplomacy.

In conclusion, Mao saw the forms of culture in a relative way. It was the "progressive" tasks of the revolution that designated the nature of culture, and culture mainly served as a means for the united front. In the first stage of the Chinese revolution, the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie were members of the alliance against imperialism and feudalism, and the CCP's cultural workers should unite them for that purpose. But when it came to the second stage of the revolution, the entire bourgeoisie became the target for ideological rectification and even struggle.¹⁰⁶ Despite the difference of the struggle targets in China's two-stage revolution, one key aspect was certain, that is, to maintain the leadership of the CCP and communist ideology – Mao Zedong Thought in particular – in steering peoples' minds. The ideas of class and revolution were embedded into Chinese cultural policies. By cultural means, the CCP not only could consolidate its leadership in China but also could mobilize the great masses to support its policies.

4.2.3 China's revolutionary foreign policy

The third important strand of Maoist soft power in the 1960s was rooted in China's revolutionary foreign policy, which provided a platform by means of which Chinese revolutionary concepts and the leadership of the CCP in the world revolution was projected. The revolutionary feature of Chinese foreign policy in the 1960s was mainly reflected by its "double-anti" policy and the adoption of the tactics of the united front in international

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 381. However, it is unclear from Mao as how to distinguish the revolutionary part that had been created by the people from the feudal and reactionary part in China's "old" culture. Actually Mao maintained himself as the final judge in this area, which was reflected in the brutal project of the "Culture Revolution."

¹⁰⁶ The bourgeoisie included intellectuals, industrialists and business people, leading religious figures, the members of democratic parties and democratic personages. See Mao, "Main points of the resolution adopted at the enlarged meeting of the political bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, February 18, 1951," *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.4: 48. The standpoint that the bourgeoisie were the target of socialist revolution was implicitly expressed in Mao's writings before 1949, but was explicitly demonstrated in his statements and the movements instigated by him after 1949, which reached a peak in the Cultural Revolution. See Mao, "The struggle against the 'three evils' and the 'five evils', (November 1951 – March 1952)," *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.4: 66-69; Mao, "The contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie is the principal contradiction in China (June 6, 1952)," *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.4: 77.

engagement. Whilst the former sought to promote the idea that China was an independent force which represented the large non-aligned third world in between the two superpowers, the latter served to persuade revolutionary forces all over the world to support China's policies and its role in the world revolution.

4.2.3.1 The policy of "double-anti"

As discussed in the first section, the CCP began to be doubtful about Moscow's practices and theories from the time of the 20th National Congress of CPSU in February 1956; China however still clung to the two-camp theory. This theory held that the world was divided into two hostile and irreconcilable camps – the socialist camp and the capitalist/imperialist camp. This view of the world led to the PRC's adoption of the policy of leaning to the socialist bloc as its first foreign policy. The idea of the two camps was reaffirmed in Mao's speeches in Moscow in November 1957.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the CCP's uncertainty about the two-camp theory increased after 1959. The disagreements between the CCP and CPSU, and Khrushchev's approach to the US, hugely impacted upon the solidarity between the two socialist giants. They helped the Chinese leaders conclude that the two camps might not really as irreconcilable as had originally been thought. China's foreign policy of "leaning-to-one-side" hence turned out to be problematic. Chinese leaders needed to make a new foreign policy to clarify the confusion due to the ongoing frictions between the CCP and the CPSU, to justify the PRC's international engagement, and to mobilize their people to support China's international policies and actions. This led to the transition to the policy of "double-anti."

In the spring of 1960, the Chinese leadership started to send out signals indicating a shift in China's foreign policy. Under Mao's guidance, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP drafted three articles titled "Long Live Leninism." They were published in *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) on the occasion of the commemoration of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birthday and later published as a booklet in Chinese, English, Russian, German, Japanese and French.¹⁰⁸ These three articles publicly criticised Soviet propositions of "peaceful coexistence," "peaceful competition" and "peaceful transition." They argued that Lenin's ideas of "proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat" in the fight against imperialism were still "irrefutable truths" in today's world. Imperialism was still the main source of war and "the most vicious enemy of the people of the entire world." As such, it was imperative for the communist countries to unite to oppose imperialism and help the

¹⁰⁷ Mao, "在莫斯科共产党和工人党代表会议上的讲话（一九五七年十一月）" (Speeches at 1957 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, November 1957), *Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC*, vol.6: 625, 630-44.

¹⁰⁸ Wu Lengxi, *Ten-Year War of Words*, 264-265.

armed struggles of people all over the world.¹⁰⁹ When Mao later met foreign leaders such as Kim Il Sung and Marshal Montgomery in 1960, he remarked that there would be no “peaceful coexistence,” but only “coexistence under the state of cold war,” because there was guerrilla warfare in many oppressed countries and it was impossible for them to maintain peace with Western imperialism, the US in particular.¹¹⁰

It is worth noting that in Chairman Mao’s talks to these two leaders, he did not fully negate the possibility of “coexistence” (although in the context of cold war). Mao’s response to “coexistence” was tactical, because he was expecting good results from the GLF.¹¹¹ However, when the GLF produced severe consequences all over the country from 1960 to 1962, Mao temporarily had to keep restraint on domestic and foreign policies. It once again revealed how domestic policies were closely connected to foreign policies.

In effect, in these transitional years, Chairman Mao’s authority was to some extent undermined by the GLF and he had to garner support and develop a unified understanding of his policies within the Party.¹¹² In the aspect of foreign policy, Mao’s “continuous revolution” was challenged by the advocacy that China should adopt a foreign policy according to its own capacity and carry out it in a pragmatic way. Wang Jiaxiang, the Minister of International Department, Central Committee of Communist Party of China (IDCPC), pointed out that China should not over issue “cheques” for the aid of foreign revolutions

¹⁰⁹ The Editorial Department of *Hongqi*, “列宁主义万岁!” (Long live Leninism!), *RMRB* (20/04/1960), 1. Together with the other two articles “Forward along the path of the great Lenin!” and “United under Lenin’s revolutionary banner!,” these three articles were compiled and translated into English as a book *Long Live Leninism*, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1960.

¹¹⁰ Mao, “同蒙哥马利元帅谈国际局势（一九六〇年五月二十七日）” (Talk to Marshal Montgomery on international situation, May 27, 1960), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Policy*, 421-35; “毛泽东等同金日成的谈话记录，1960年5月21日” (Record of Mao Zedong’s and other comrades’ talk with Kim Il Sung, May 21, 1960), quoted in Jin Jichong ed., *毛泽东传 (Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976)*, Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 2003, accessed from <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/70190/70192/70271/4765491.html>

¹¹¹ Wu Lengxi, *Ten-Year War of Words*, 338-9; Yang Kuisong, *A Study on the History of P. R. China’s Establishment*, vol.2: 220-1.

¹¹² Actually many Chinese leaders had reservations about the GLF. But most of them either kept silent or maintained that the achievements during the last few years were major. However, the Defence Minister Marshal Peng Dehuai and the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian provided sharp opinions on the GLF at the Lushan Conference in July 1959. Their opinion, especially Peng’s, actually challenged Mao’s infallibility and pointed to his personality cult. Peng’s and Zhang’s views of the GLF were supported by the Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the CCP, Zhou Xiaozhou, and the PLA Chief of Staff, Marshal Huang Kecheng. Chairman Mao felt that his authority was challenged, and the momentum of continuous revolution and the cause of communism were threatened. He thereafter launched attacks on them as the “Peng-Huang-Zhang-Zhou Anti-Party Group” in August 1959, and their “crimes” were further elaborated in the Cultural Revolution. On the details of the Lushan Conference, see Cong Jin, *The Years of China’s Tortuous Development*, 187-221. For the English version of Mao’s speech at the Lushan Conference, see Mao, “Speech at the Lushan Conference, 23 July 1959,” in Schram ed., *Chairman Mao Talks to People*, 131-46.

beyond its economic capacity. Chinese foreign policy should be practical and realistic, should be based on China's reality and should serve China's national development. He maintained that defending world peace was the primary task for the people of the world, and even suggested that it was inappropriate to completely negate the idea of "peaceful coexistence." He contended that it was better to use "negotiations and other peaceful means" to solve disputes between countries.¹¹³ According to his observation, Wang embraced the proposition of "peaceful coexistence" in the World Peace Conference held in Moscow in July 1962.

Wang's argument undoubtedly challenged Mao's basic conclusion that war was a form of class confrontation, and inevitable as long as classes existed. Mao believed that the most effective means to prevent war was revolution, and thus had great expectations of the rising national liberation movements in the Third World. He insisted that it was the PRC's obligation to support those movements due to the spirit of "proletarian internationalism." Mao was provoked by Wang's argument. He offered harsh criticism, charging Wang with "revisionism" and claiming that his view was compatible with those of imperialists, reactionaries and revisionists. Mao warned his colleagues that Wang's argument represented "a compromise with Khrushchev and a 'revisionist road' within our Party, and must be opposed."¹¹⁴ In this way, China's foreign policy was further radicalized. At the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP in September 1962, Chairman Mao affirmed the significance of "class struggle." He maintained that due to the existence of classes, there were three tasks facing Chinese people, which were "anti-imperialism, anti-revisionism and anti-reactionaries."¹¹⁵ As Mao instructed, Premier Zhou Enlai made a speech in this Plenum, where he said "the contradiction between us and US imperialism is the major contradiction," "the struggle against revisionism has entered into a stage of face-to-face fighting," and "we must also attack reactionary nationalism [Nehru's India]." He declared that "*the truth of Marxism-Leninism and the centre of world revolution have now transferred from Moscow to Beijing* [emphasis added].... We now should take up this role and act bravely for this just

¹¹³ Wang Jiaxiang, "要根据自己国家的情况决定自己的政策（一九五九年十月十日）" (Decide policies based on the reality of one's own country, October 10, 1959); "关于支持别国反帝斗争、民族独立和人民革命运动问题——实事求是，量力而行（一九六二年三月三十一日）" (The issue of the support of anti-imperialist struggles, national independence and people's revolution – be practical and realistic and according to one's capacity, March 31, 1962); "略谈对某些国际问题的看法（一九六二年六月二十九日）" (A brief view on some international issues, June 29, 1962), in Wang Jiaxiang, *王稼祥选集* (Selected Works of Wang Jiaxiang) (Beijing: Renmin, 1989), 441-3, 444-5, 446-60.

¹¹⁴ Xu Zehao, *王稼祥传* (Biography of Wang Jiaxiang) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo, 1996), 567.

¹¹⁵ Mao, "Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, 24 September 1962," in Schram ed., *Chairman Mao Talks to People*, 188-90.

cause.”¹¹⁶ Indeed, it was after this Plenum that Beijing adopted a more radical foreign policy. The CCP intensified disputes with the CPSU and other communist parties which took the CPSU's views. From the end of 1962 to 1965, *Renmin Ribao* and *Hongqi*, the Party's major mouthpieces, published various articles criticizing Soviet “revisionist” ideology and “big power chauvinism” practices and charging the CPSU with being a “betrayer” of the great cause of world revolution.¹¹⁷ China thus openly divorced with the Soviet Union and officially started its “double-anti” policy.

When China carried out its “double-anti” policy, it nonetheless promoted the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. China maintained that it had been oppressed by the superpowers and needed to defend itself against these reactionary forces, but at the same time however was a peaceful force standing firm with other like-minded states and people to safeguard world peace. This led to China's policy of forming an international united front.

4.2.3.2 The support of world revolution: the intermediate zone and the united front

China's “double-anti” policy and its increasing support of world revolution represented two sides of a coin and there was interplay between the two. The “double-anti” policy in some respects provided China with a space within which to build its status as a model and a leader in the community of post-colonial societies. This foreign policy also highlighted the distinctiveness of the soft power of Maoist China. It attempted to build a community free from the control of the two superpowers, to be an alternative to the capitalist system and to provide a model that was different from the Soviet one in that China had successfully thrown off colonial shackles and founded a new nation with a very low level of industrialization. Maoist China sought to present itself as undertaking a just cause for mankind as a leader of the world revolutionary movement. It targeted the audience in the vast area caught between the US and the USSR, which represented an “intermediate zone” in Chairman Mao's conceptualization,

When China gradually took the “double-anti” as its foreign policy, one problem posed to the CCP was “how to reconcile its hostility towards a state that was neither counterrevolutionary

¹¹⁶ “周恩来在八届十中全会上的报告（一九六二年九月二十六日）”（Zhou Enlai's report at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, September 26, 1962), quoted from Yang Kuisong, *A Study on the History of P. R. China's Establishment*, vol.2: 236.

¹¹⁷ See Wu Lengxi, *Ten-Year War of Words*, 531-933. The open polemics between the two parties however started from 1963. The CCP published nine articles to respond to CPSU's criticism and elaborate Chinese arguments. The nine articles were compiled into a book called *关于国际共产主义运动总路线的论战* (*The Polemic on General Line of the International Communist Movement*) (Beijing: Renmin, 1965) and English edition was published by the Foreign Language Press in the same year.

nor particularly imperialistic, by accepted Marxist standards, with its ideology."¹¹⁸ The CCP's one major approach was to redefine the structure of world politics. Chinese leaders charted a new picture for the "oppressed peoples" as well as "peace-loving countries." Mao's notion of the "intermediate zone" and his strategy of forming "the most extensive united front" represented this attempt.¹¹⁹

In the early 1960s, Mao divided the "intermediate zone" into two parts. The first part consisted of the independent countries and those striving for independence in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which was called "the first intermediate zone." The second part consisted of the areas of Europe and Oceania, and the other capitalist countries such as Canada and Japan, and was defined as "the second intermediate zone." Mao claimed that when the two superpowers were collaborating together to reign over the world, the "contradictions" within the two blocs headed by the two superpowers began to evolve. Mao argued that while the relationships between the Soviet Union and its fellow socialist countries were becoming unpleasant, countries belonging to the second intermediate zone were dissatisfied with America's control. These fellow countries in the two camps were seeking to free themselves from the control of the two superpowers. Mao then took the example of De Gaulle's France, praising its determination to develop an independent foreign policy free from Washington's control. In this regard, Mao believed that those capitalist countries had something in common with the peoples of underdeveloped countries, that is, their opposition to control from America.¹²⁰

The main intention of Mao's conceptualization of an "intermediate zone" was to propose a "broad united front" to oppose hegemony, in other words, to oppose the superpowers' manipulation of the destiny of the rest. By forming an international united front, Maoists sought to persuade the people who belonged to the "intermediate zone" to engage in the fight against hegemonism. As Liu Ningyi, the Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, declared at the Third Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) conference held in Moshi, Tanzania, in February 1963,

¹¹⁸ J.D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy, Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine* (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1977), 85.

¹¹⁹ The two ideas actually had been developed by Mao in China's Anti-Japanese War and Civil War with the KMT. The CCP implemented these ideas and strategies to unite the people who had been sitting on the fence, to strengthen its power, which helped the CCP in its fight to win the wars. In post-1949 China, the CCP continuously promoted these ideas to win international friends and sympathizers for the Chinese revolution.

¹²⁰ Mao, "中间地带有两个（一九六三年九月，一九六四年一月、七月）" (There are two intermediate zones, September 1963, January and July 1964), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Policy*, 506-9.

All countries, whether big or small, are equal and independent. The problems of the world must be solved jointly by all countries of the world.... The attempt to decide major problems of the world and to manipulate the destiny of mankind by one or two countries runs counter to the trend of our times and is against the interests of the people.... The countries of Asia and Africa as well as all peoples are firmly opposed to the big powers bullying and oppressing and giving orders to the smaller countries.¹²¹

Several points in this statement are worthy of note. First, this statement demonstrated Chinese dissatisfaction with the existing international system, a hierarchical world order dominated by two superpowers. Second, as Peter Van Ness has pointed out, it was perhaps the first time that a Maoist proposal for an international united front had gone beyond the socialist countries as well as the "oppressed peoples" to extend to "all peoples" opposed to the big powers, which might include some Western countries.¹²² What is more, it was also perhaps the first time that China implied that the Soviet Union was another target of the international united front, though it was secondary to the "principal enemy" – US imperialism. The declaration by Liu Ningyi revealed that the Sino-Soviet relationship had been broken and that China had carried out its "double-anti" policy to attract the vast potential audience in the "intermediate zone."

The concepts of "intermediate zone" and "international united front" therefore defined the priority of the foreign audience that China sought to win in its international engagement. The first target consisted of the communist countries and parties which disagreed with the Soviet leadership. This priority of China's united front work was decided by the nature of the Chinese regime. Having claimed that it was the authentic successor of Marxism and the cause of revolution, the CCP sought to strengthen its force against the revisionist CPSU and consolidate its leadership in the communist world.

The second but equally important target was the revolutionaries spreading in Asia, Africa and Latin America. On the one hand, the struggles undertaken by these revolutionaries not only gave "great support to the socialist countries," but also constituted "an extremely important force safeguarding the socialist countries from imperialist invasion."¹²³ On the other hand, the revolutionaries in the underdeveloped world though relatively isolated were profoundly

¹²¹ "Liu Ningyi's speech at the Third Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization," *RMRB* (07/02/1963), 3.

¹²² Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, 58.

¹²³ The Editorial Department of *Hongqi*, *More on the Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1963), 47.

dissatisfied with the status quo and were seeking a way to change it. To them, China's experience was quite relevant. China projected itself as a model, either in terms of obtaining national liberation or in the aspect of national development. China claimed that there were two main "similarities" between itself and those underdeveloped countries. First, they were all "non-white" and with "colonialist" or "semi-colonialist" history. Second, recently emerged from "colonialism" and only just having started its modernization, China was more persuasive to win their affinity than the Soviets, who were "white," more advanced in industrialization and whose revolution was so long ago.¹²⁴

The last group of people that China sought to "unite," despite their limited numbers compared with the first two groups, were those from the West who opposed American domination or were "sympathetically disposed towards China, either because of its new revolutionary dynamism or out of respect for its great cultural past."¹²⁵ That is to say, they were either disappointed at the existing international system, or dissatisfied with their own governments or societies and trying to find an alternative ideology in revolutionary China, or interested in Chinese culture per se, such as sinologists. China targeted these bodies to win favourable public opinion internationally.

In addition to the identification of the audience, the CCP informed the mission of the international united front. Secondary to opposing US imperialism, the CCP added another task for the international united front, namely, to counter revisionism.¹²⁶ It thus sought to represent an alternative in the bipolar system and to be a just force in the international community. The CCP criticised Soviet leaders for in effect collaborating with US imperialism and ignoring the rights of small nations. They claimed that Moscow's present stand "goes against the united front against US imperialism and its lackeys in defence of world peace."¹²⁷ This was why the CPSU had reduced its support for revolution in the Third World. By 1964, in continuing denunciations from the CCP, the CPSU was not only a "revisionist," but also a

¹²⁴ In this regard, there was some sort of competition between the PRC and the USSR to win friends, prestige and influence in the Third World. See for example, Robert A. Scalapino, "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 42:4 (July 1964), 640-654.

¹²⁵ Herbert Passin, *China's Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 12; some may call them "leftists or activists" evident in the student movements in the West in the 1960s.

¹²⁶ However, by 1968, the USSR was given a new designation – "social imperialist" due to its invasion of Czechoslovakia in August and was ranked with the US as another leading oppressor country, see "Diabolical Social-Imperialist face of the Soviet Revisionist renegade clique," *Peking Review*, no.43 (October 25, 1968), 8-10. Before that, the US was regarded as the principal enemy of the oppressed peoples.

¹²⁷ "Two different lines on the question of war and peace: fifth comment on the open letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (November 19, 1963)," *The Polemic on General Line of the International Communist Movement*, 256.

player of “great power chauvinism” and a “splitter.”¹²⁸ In contrast, China projected itself as a serious contender against imperialism, colonialism and the exploitative capitalist order. The PRC constantly depicted the developing nations, including itself, as the main force of global change, “propelling the wheel of world history” because of their just cause.

The CCP’s promotion of the intermediate zone and the international united front therefore reflected its dissatisfaction with the bipolar world system, and its intention of uniting all possible forces around the world to overthrow the system dominated by the two superpowers. In this sense, it resonated with China’s foreign policy of “double-anti.” In the meantime, both “double-anti” policy and united front strategy aimed at building an image of China as a major player on the international stage, an alternative to the two superpowers and a genuine leader of the international revolutionary movement.

To sum up, this section identifies three key elements of Maoist soft power. They are the China model for national liberation and development, a “proletarian” culture, and China’s “double-anti” foreign policy and united front strategy. These non-material aspects of Maoist China’s strength were perceived to be central to China’s “revolutionary” identity. Maoist China not only projected these non-material elements rhetorically, but also promoted them through international engagement to win friends and prestige, to attack opponents, and to gain legitimacy and recognition as a key player in the international community. The next section investigates how these elements were mobilized and promoted through China’s diplomacy.

4.3 Maoist soft power tools: 1959-1965

As demonstrated above, from the late 1950s the PRC sought to promote itself as a leader of the world revolution, a key player in world politics and an alternative model to the two superpowers in the fields of culture, national development and foreign policy. This then leads to the question of how the newly-born China could achieve its ambitious goals. Based on sources of Chinese foreign policy during Mao’s time, including the recently declassified Chinese documents on foreign affairs (1959-1965), it can be argued that two main instruments were adopted in China’s diplomatic practice: one was cultural diplomacy and the other was foreign aid. According to J.M. Mitchell’s definition, cultural diplomacy is “the involvement of culture in international agreements; an application of culture to the direct support of a country’s political and economic diplomacy.”¹²⁹ The following analysis

¹²⁸ “Peaceful coexistence – two diametrically opposed policies: sixth comment (December 12, 1964)”; “The leaders of the CPSU are the greatest splitters of our times: seventh comment,” *The Polemic on General Line of the International Communist Movement*, 296, 303-58.

¹²⁹ J.M. Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 81.

demonstrates that a sustained cultural diplomacy was used by Mao's government to promote its revolutionary cause and build a new image of China. Given China's limited economic resources, cultural diplomacy was probably the most fruitful tool in its diplomacy. In addition, China employed foreign aid as another major tool to deliberately export Maoist ideas of revolution and national development. China's foreign assistance played an important role in the battle of ideas with the two superpowers regarding revolution and political ideology.

4.3.1 China's cultural diplomacy

The significance of cultural interaction in strengthening the solidarity of the underdeveloped world was raised by Chinese leaders very early in the PRC's history. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai made the following statement:

Asian-African countries need to cooperate in economy and culture, so as to overcome our backwardness in these areas owing to the exploitation and oppression by colonialism.... Our cultural exchanges should respect and learn from each nation's culture and not dismiss the advantage of any nation's culture.¹³⁰

In this statement, Premier Zhou not only highlighted the importance of cultural cooperation in the underdeveloped world for the purposes of solidarity and anti-colonialism, he also encouraged cultural diversity in the non-Western world. Chinese leaders thus favoured lifting levels of nationalism in post-colonial societies: they should cherish and develop their own ethnic culture and get rid of cultural influences from the former colonialist powers.

Premier Zhou's advocacy of cultural cooperation soon developed into a strategy for China's international engagement, which was called "culture leads (*wenhua xianxing*)."¹³¹ According to this strategy China should make friends and build its influence by means of cultural interactions. The explanation for this strategy was first that culture could facilitate people's understandings of a foreign country. Second, there were various forms of culture that could be used in cultural interactions, and cultural work therefore could be carried out in a flexible, subtle, and less sensitive and expensive way, compared to economic and political means. Additionally, cultural exchanges might produce a spill-over effect: once there were cultural interactions between China and targeted societies, the impact would extend to the other fields

¹³⁰ Zhou Enlai, "在亚非会议全体会议上的发言（一九五五年四月十九日）" (Speech at the Bandung Conference, April 19, 1955), *Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai*, 118.

¹³¹ Han Nianlong ed., *Diplomacy of Contemporary China* (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 1990), 168.

and international issues.¹³² Therefore, the Chinese government made great efforts to encourage cultural interactions between itself and targeted countries, particularly those in Asia, Africa and Latin America. An idealized process of cultural interactions is illustrated by Figure 4.1.




Figure 4.1: Process of Cultural Interactions

Chen Yi, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, elaborated the ideal process of China's cultural interactions with foreign countries, "Cultural interactions should be in the vanguard of diplomacy. Leading the way with culture, China can make friends everywhere, enhance [mutual] understanding, and all else will follow, [and] it will contribute to the establishment of diplomatic relations [between China and other countries]."¹³³ It needs to be pointed out that cultural interactions might not have been directly carried out by the Chinese government, but were nevertheless supervised by Beijing due to its complete control of the cultural agenda

¹³² Interview with Yu Xintian, senior research fellow at Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, Shanghai, March 10, 2010.

¹³³ Wu Di, "毛泽东和新中国对外文化交流" (Mao Zedong and China's cultural exchanges with foreign countries), *中外文化交流* (Cultural Exchanges between China and Foreign Countries), no.6 (1993), 5.

and its meticulousness about diplomacy and organization.¹³⁴ These cultural interactions were not only for culture's sake, but were closely connected to politics. They raised the unjustness of colonialism, imperialism and the existent bipolar system, meanwhile providing an alternative – the Chinese path of revolution and development. As a larger audience was exposed to Chinese revolutionary and political ideas, it would help build empathy for China's path and create the psychological prerequisites for the change in the audience's life and society. Once the seeds of discontent with the status quo and the hope of change were planted, they would be enforced by the contrast between the perceived unjustness of local reality and a prescribed and promising alternative model. By constant repetition of the themes, public opinion could therefore be moulded toward what Maoist China wanted. The targeted poor might endorse revolution and the state might establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. If the former, China would support the revolutionaries by rhetoric and by sending arms or other material assistance, or by training the revolutionaries in Maoist ideology; if the latter, China would sign a cultural agreement with the targeted states and then implement scheduled cultural, economic and political activities each year. Friendship and solidarity would thereafter be strengthened by continuous interactions in various fields. Admittedly this was an idealized process of Chinese cultural interactions with foreign countries, dating from very early in the PRC's history. The effectiveness of cultural interactions or diplomacy could be affected by various factors, including the nature of the targeted state (such as whether it endorsed revolution or preferred some other alternative to the existing system), the competition between the projectors, and the projector's domestic and international policies and so forth.

Aware of the importance of cultural interactions to China's diplomacy, the Chinese government employed various forms of cultural interaction in its engagement with foreign societies, including movies and radio broadcasts, touring performances, exhibitions, exchange of intellectuals and students, distribution of printed material and so on.

¹³⁴ Although some cultural exchanges were carried out by so-called non-governmental organizations, such as the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries or the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, they were not independent, because the top leaders of these organizations were appointed by the central government and the funding was from the government. What is more, as the first generation of Chinese leadership believed that there were no little things in the foreign affairs, the central government tended to deal with almost everything related to foreign countries. When reviewing the *CDA* from 1959 to 1965, I found a lot of evidence in this regard.

4.3.1.1 Chinese movies and radio broadcasts

Chinese movies and radio broadcasts received a high priority among Beijing's various forms of cultural interaction and probably reached the widest audience in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They were used to target the poorly educated great masses of people in the underdeveloped world. Through audio-visual means, China promoted its ideas of revolution and national development as well as showing Chinese concern and moral support for the struggles of the "oppressed" societies. A diplomatic report from the Chinese embassy in Mali summarized that "to the great masses, movies and pictures are the most effective promotion tools. Movies are particularly efficacious, [because] they are the most eye-catching and expose lots of issues in a few hours... [From the response from the local people,] watching one Chinese movie is better than making several speeches."¹³⁵ Another report from Somalia said, "there are not many literate people... Since our work is addressed to the great masses in Somalia, the priority of our promotion scheme should be given to audio-visual methods, with books, newspapers and magazines as complements."¹³⁶ Therefore, Chinese movies played a significant role in China's interactions with foreign societies. China screened its movies in many third world societies and signed contracts to hold "Chinese Movie Week" every year in countries such as Iraq, Laos, Burma, Cambodia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Japan, Yemen, Tanganyika and Zanzibar (Tanzania in 1964), Tunisia, the United Arab Republic (UAR), Guinea, Mali, Algeria and Somalia in addition to the socialist countries.¹³⁷ Many Chinese movies not only were well-received by the masses of the underdeveloped world but also won awards in international film festivals held by Third World countries, which is discussed below.

Beijing was very careful about the selection of movies targeted to a foreign audience. In general, they advanced the CCP's experience and achievements in and after the revolution. On the one hand, a great variety of Chinese movies reflected the hardship and class struggle in the "old" Chinese society before 1949 in contrast to the happiness enjoyed by the Chinese in the "new" China. Meanwhile, they promoted the significance of armed struggle, guerrilla warfare, and the CCP's correct leadership in the revolution, the prowess of the PLA and the necessity of uniting "oppressed" peasants and workers. Well-received Chinese movies included "The White-Haired Girl" (*Bai Mao Nü* 1950), "The Letter with Feathers" (*Jimao Xin* 1954), "Guerrillas Sweep the Plain" (*Pingyuan Youjidui* 1955), "Guerrillas on the Railway" (*Tiedao Youjidui* 1956), "The Daughter of the Party" (*Dang de Nü'er* 1958)

¹³⁵ "Cultural work summary in 1961, Chinese embassy in Mali, 26/02/1962," *CDA*, no.108-00797-01.

¹³⁶ "Cultural work summary in 1963, Chinese embassy in Somalia, 19/01/1964-09/02/1964," *CDA*, no.108-01018-06.

¹³⁷ From the survey of the *CDA* (1959-1965) with the key word "culture" (文化 *wenhua*).

“Seahawk” (*Hai Ying* 1959), “Liberate Shanghai” (*Zhan Shanghai* 1959), “Youth in the War” (*Zhanhuo Zhong de Qingchun* 1959), “Red Detachment of Women” (*Hongse Niangzi Jun* 1961), “Revolutionary Family” (*Geming Jiating* 1961), “Little Soldier Zhang Ga” (*Xiaobing Zhang Ga* 1961), “After Armistice” (*Tingzhan Yihou* 1962), “Start A Prairie Fire” (*Liaoyuan* 1962), “Angry Tide” (*Nuchao* 1963) et cetera.¹³⁸ It is worth noting several of them were dubbed into other languages. For instance, “The White-Haired Girl,” “The Daughter of the Party” and “Red Detachment of Women” were dubbed into the west African language Bambara to attract audiences in Mali and neighbouring countries.¹³⁹ Through these movies, Beijing provided a good example of a successful national liberation movement and instigated the “oppressed” to carry out their revolutions.



The White-Haired Girl (film 1950). The film described the oppression suffered by millions of Chinese peasants and women in Chinese society before 1949 by describing the fate of the leading female character *Xi'er*. It expressed the theme that “the old society (before 1949) turned a person into a ghost and the new society (after 1949) turns the ghost back into a person”. In 1951, it won the Special Honorary Prize at the Sixth Karlovy Cary International Film Festival (Czechoslovakia). More than six million people watched the film in the first round of release in China. In the 1950s, it was screened in more than 30 countries and regions. It was so popular that it was turned into an opera in 1958 and a ballet in 1965. Source: chinaculture.org, January 19, 2004, accessed from <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/film/85136.htm>

On the other hand, there were Chinese movies which propagated the image of the “new” China, such as the enhanced social status of women, the poor and minorities, the new life and achievements in Communist China, and Chinese ethnic culture. For instance, “Five Golden Flowers” (*Wu Duo Jinhua* 1959) portrayed the happy life of Chinese minorities and their efforts to build socialism in the PRC. This movie won the Silver Award for Best Director and Best Actress in the 2nd Afro-Asian Movie Festival in Cairo in 1960. Another example was the documentary “The Celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the PRC” (*Huanqing Shinian* 1959), which filmed a military parade and mass pageant in Tiananmen Square and displayed the PRC’s achievements in all fields in the previous decade. This documentary received a high

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ “Premier Zhou Enlai met a cultural delegation from Mali government, Beijing, 04/05/1963,” CDA, no.108-00367-03.

priority in the promotion of film overseas. It certainly provided an example for the underdeveloped world of what sort of future they could achieve. After watching this documentary, a large number of foreign audiences were amazed by Chinese achievements in such a short time. They expressed their admiration of China, which gave them confidence for their own country's future.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, Chinese ethnic culture was demonstrated by cartoons such as "Tadpoles Looking for Their Mum" (*Xiaokedou Zhao Mama* 1960), which displayed the beauty of Chinese ink wash painting. "Golden Trumpet Shell" (*Jinse de Hailuo* 1963), another example of Chinese traditional ethnic arts, employed paper cut and puppet play and was granted the Lumumba Award in the 3rd Afro-Asian Movie Festival in Djakarta in 1964.



Film still: "Five Golden Flowers" (*Wu Duo Jinhua* 1959)



Documentary "The Celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the PRC" (*Huangqing Shinian* 1959)



Film stills: "Tadpoles Looking for Their Mum" (*Xiaokedou Zhao Mama* 1960) in the left used ink wash painting; "Golden Trumpet Shell" (*Jinse de Hailuo* 1963) on the right employed paper cut and puppet play.

¹⁴⁰ "Report of the 2nd Afro-Asian Movie Festival, Chinese embassy in UAR, 04/03/1960-12/03/1960," CDA, no.107-00180-03; "Cultural relations between China and Iraq in 1959, Chinese embassy in Iraq, 28/05/1958," CDA, no.107-00410-01.

In addition, China produced documentaries to demonstrate Chinese concern and moral support for the struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In 1960, for example, China went to Cuba to film "Cuba in Combat" (*Zhandou zhong de Guba*), which described Cuba's revolution and atmosphere of anti-US imperialism. It attracted large audiences in Cuba, China and Africa.¹⁴¹ A year later, China produced "A Corner in Africa" (*Feizhou zhi Jiao*) to show China's understanding of Northeast Africa. It won the "Africa Prize" in the 4th Africa International Film Festival (AIFF) in Somalia. In 1963, another Chinese documentary on Africa, "Unyielding Algeria" (*Buqu de A'erjiliya*) again won the "Africa Prize" in the 5th AIFF. China also used documentaries to reflect the friendship between China and certain developing countries, such as "The King of Laos Visits China" (1956) and "Welcome Burmese Friends" (1960), which were screened in both countries with local languages. It is worth pointing out that the latter presented the friendly atmosphere when Burmese Prime Minister U Nu visited China in October 1960, during which he signed the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty with the Chinese government. This documentary was intentionally screened in "Chinese Movie Week" in Yangon one month later to consolidate the friendship between the two countries.¹⁴² Additionally, Chinese documentaries were used to demonstrate the Chinese political stance on certain international issues. One of the best examples was the documentary "Resolving the Sino-Indian Border Dispute Peacefully" (*Weile Heping Jiejue Zhong-Yin Bianjie Wenti* 1963). It clarified China's policy and its resolution to peacefully resolve this dispute. It showed that the attack and provocation had come from the Indian army and government, and that China was forced to fight back. This documentary was presented to foreign audiences to seek international support and sympathy.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ "《战斗的古巴》纪录片元旦上映" ("Cuba in Combat" on screen on New Year's Day), *RMRB* (27/12/1960), 4; "Report from Mali, 16/02/1962," *CDA*, no.108-00797-01.

¹⁴² "Burma Prime Minister U Nu's China visit, Beijing, 22/09/1960," *CDA*, no.204-00715-01; "Chinese delegation's Burma visit, Beijing, 01/11/1960-31/12/1960," *CDA*, no.03-00165-03.

¹⁴³ "《为了和平解决中印边界问题》影片即将上映" ("Resolving the Sino-Indian Border Dispute Peacefully" onscreen soon), *RMRB* (17/03/1963), 2; "达尔维想像不到的——《为了和平解决中印边界问题》观后" (Dalvi was inconceivable – after watching "Resolving the Sino-Indian Border Dispute Peacefully"), *RMRB* (16/04/1963), 6; "The reception of the delegates of Kenya Africa National Union visiting China, Beijing, 27/02/1964-18/07/1964," *CDA*, no.108-01001-02.



Chinese documentaries (from left to right): “Cuba in Combat” (*Zhandou zhong de Guba* 1960), “A Corner in Africa” (*Feizhou zhi Jiao* 1961) and “Unyielding Algeria” (*Buqu de A'erjiliya* 1963)

In effect, when screening movies in Third World countries China faced competition from Western countries all the time, and it was the same with the Soviet Union after their public split in the early 1960s. This competitive environment is revealed by reports from Chinese embassies in Third World countries. One report from Guinea, for instance, described how American and British embassies in Guinea had protested against the movie contract signed between the Chinese and Guinean governments, and said that West Germany had asked to hold a movie week in Guinea.¹⁴⁴ Another report from Mali in 1963 depicted the situation after screening the documentary “Celebrating National Day” (1962). Following “The Celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the PRC” (1959), this documentary once again highlighted the “China model” for the underdeveloped world to build their countries. What made a big difference was that the film showed only Stalin’s portrait with no portrait of Khrushchev. The report wrote, “When the images of Chairman Mao and Soviet leader Stalin appeared on the screen, applause broke out in the hall... Soviet and Czechoslovak diplomats left despondently.”¹⁴⁵ Chinese competition with the Soviets in the Third World became more intense after 1962. For example, Beijing asked a Cambodian cinema not to import Soviet movies after 1963.¹⁴⁶ These episodes revealed the competition in cultural promotion between China and the world powers at the time.

The achievement of China’s movie exports was remarkable. In 1959, China exported 883 films, a high point in the export of film in the Maoist era. In 1964, more than 70 countries and regions screened Chinese movies. By the end of 1965, China had built up connections with

¹⁴⁴ “Implementation of the cultural plan between China and Guinea in 1961, Chinese embassy in Guinea, 23/01/1961-24/12/1961,” *CDA*, no.108-00723-01.

¹⁴⁵ “Cultural exchange between China and Mali, Mali, 19/02/1963-11/12/1963,” *CDA*, no.108-00892-06.

¹⁴⁶ “Report from the culture division of the Chinese embassy in Cambodia, 01/01/1964-10/04/1964,” *CDA*, no.106-01204-01.

more than 680 film companies in about 90 countries and regions and attended nearly 50 international film festivals and exhibitions with 76 films awarded prizes.¹⁴⁷

Chinese radio broadcasts constituted another important tool of Beijing's overseas propaganda due to the large audience it could reach. It was reported that the weekly hours of radio programs beamed abroad increased substantially during the first two decades of CCP power on the mainland. In 1965, China broadcast 1,027 hours per week to countries outside its borders, a tenfold increase compared to 100 hours per week in 1953.¹⁴⁸ It is argued that China's radio broadcasts gave priority to the Far East: "Over half the broadcasting time during 1965 – 582 hours per week – was devoted to programs for listeners in the Far East, which were heard in five Chinese dialects and thirteen other languages." In contrast, Beijing broadcast 70 hours per week to South Asia and the Near East as well as to Africa in six languages to each area, and 39 hours to Latin America in Spanish and Portuguese.¹⁴⁹ Although it is hard to assess the effectiveness of the radio program promotion, a change was noted by one article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1966 of a previously apathetic Panamanian school teacher who had been listening to radio programs with revolutionary content, and subsequently became discontented and demanded answers to why things were not better.¹⁵⁰

Reviewing Chinese movies and radio programs promoted by the Chinese government at the time, they were mostly less personal and commercial, but more political and diplomatic. By promoting these audio-visual programs, the Chinese exported China's revolution, policies and political ideas. They targeted the great masses with little education in the Third World, building an image of China as an alternative model to the two superpowers and a leader in the world revolution.

4.3.1.2 Touring performances

A second visual means employed by China in overseas cultural interactions was touring performances. They served as a special envoy to promote Chinese ethnic and revolutionary culture overseas. Chinese acrobatics and ethnic songs and dances were widely popular in the underdeveloped world. Chinese acrobats, for example, played a special role in the relationship between China and Afro-Asian countries. Reviewing the *CDA* for the years

¹⁴⁷ Zhou Tiedong, "新中国电影对外交流" (New China's films in interactions with foreign countries), *电影艺术 (Film Art)*, no.1 (2002), 115.

¹⁴⁸ Research and Reference Service, US Information Agency, *Communist China's Propaganda Activities: 1965*, May 1966, 6, quoted from Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, 116.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ George C. Lodge, "Revolution in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs* 44:2 (Jan., 1966), 197.

1959-1965, Chinese acrobatics troupes visited 16 Afro-Asian countries and performed more than 200 times.¹⁵¹ For example, Chinese acrobatic troupes made an increasing presence in Africa in the 1960s, particularly in Northern and Eastern Africa. In January 1960, the China National Acrobatic Troupe visited 27 African cities in Sudan, Ethiopia, Guinea and Morocco, and performed 98 times in front of 160,000 people. In 1964, the Shenyang Acrobatic Troupe visited 20 African cities and performed 86 times. Even in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese acrobats went abroad. The Taiyuan Acrobatic Troupe visited Somalia and performed 13 times in 1966.¹⁵²


In contrast to the well-received acrobats in Africa, Chinese ethnic songs and dances were more popular in China's neighbourhood and demonstrated the influence of Chinese traditional culture in this region. Various ensembles of Chinese ethnic songs and dances went to Southeast Asian countries, such as Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, and were used to entertain foreign leaders and guests when they visited China. In addition, Chinese revolutionary movies, such as "White-Haired Girl" and "Red Detachment of Women" were adapted into Beijing opera and reformed ballet staged both at home and abroad to arouse the great masses' sentiment of struggle. The difference between styles of cultural promotion in the targeted countries was illustrated by Zhang Zhixiang, the Party Secretary of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries:

Cultural work directed toward foreign countries needs to serve politics, [when we carry out cultural work, we need to] gain a mastery of the features of cultural activities, spot the differences in timing, location, object and specialty, and enhance the artistic quality of struggle and the influence [on local people]. It is an instrument not only for struggle, but for solidarity. ... 'White-Haired Girl' could be exported to Cuba, but in Cambodia we need to promote songs and dances.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ These 16 Afro-Asian countries were Burma, Laos, Iraq, Yemen, Burundi, Ethiopia, Central Africa, Guinea, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, UAR and Uganda.

¹⁵² The above figures are obtained from Teng Yun, 当代中外文化交流史料 (Historical Material from China's Cultural Exchange with Foreign Countries in the Contemporary Period) (Beijing: Wenhua Yishu Chubanshe, 1990), 428-458.

¹⁵³ "The sum of the cultural work aimed foreign countries in the last ten years and guidelines and tasks for the future, Beijing, 01/07/1960," CDA, no.102-00015-03.



The most popular Chinese acrobatic performances overseas in the 1960s



Illustration 1.6: Acrobat Xia Juhua's performance in Cuba in 1963 (source: Xinhua News Agency, accessed from http://www.chinese.cn/quyi/article/2009-09/27/content_29279.htm)



(Left) Actresses of the Central Ensemble of Ethnic Songs and Dances who visited Burma in 1960, source: <http://www.zymzgw.com.cn/upimg/2009724185713.jpg>; (right) "Red Detachment of Women" ballet poster (1964).

4.3.1.3 Exhibition and printed material

Third, exhibitions and printed material were used to promote Maoist ideology, and Chinese policies and achievements. Exhibitions held in underdeveloped countries demonstrated China's achievements in socialism and modernization by displaying pictures, agricultural apparatus and machines. The Chinese government's key policies - the "three red flags" i.e. the General Line for Socialist Construction, the GLF and the People's Commune - were vigorously promoted in overseas exhibitions in the early 1960s.¹⁵⁴ With vivid pictures and objects, China sought to impress on the spectators its achievements encompassing industry,

¹⁵⁴ For example, "The sum of the cultural work aimed at foreign countries in the last ten years and guidelines and tasks for the future, Beijing, 01/07/1960," CDA, no.102-00015-03; "The mutual visits of Chinese and Iraqi cultural delegations and the implementation of the Sino-Iraq cultural plan, Beijing, 06/04/1960-13/08/1960," CDA, no.107-00410-03; "The 1961 cultural work summary and the plan for 1962, Chinese embassy in Mali, 16/02/1962," CDA, no.108-00797-01.

agriculture, culture, education, public health, and sports. The images of soldiers, women and minorities were highlighted as well, projecting a modern China within which all were equal and could contribute to revolution and national development.¹⁵⁵



The “three red flags” (*san mian hongqi*): General Line for Socialist Construction, the GLF, and the People’s Communes

Chinese printed material was widely circulated in various languages around the world. Chairman Mao’s works received the highest priority among all the Chinese publications in overseas circulation. The English version of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, first published by Lawrence & Wishart (affiliated to the British Communist Party) in 1956 in 12,000 copies, targeted leftists in Europe and intellectuals in English-speaking countries. In June 1962, the Japanese Communist Party published 7,000 copies of the fourth volume of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* in Japanese, and was sold out within one month.¹⁵⁶ Nevertheless, compared to the developed world, Chairman Mao’s works were a lot more vigorously promoted in the Third World to distribute the Chinese revolutionary experience. Some of them were free and some were exported at nominal cost. Iraq, for instance, which had intended to get rid of the control of the West for a long time, issued 90,000 copies of translations of Mao’s works in 1958, but this reached 330,000 one year later.¹⁵⁷ This increase related to China’s domestic policy – the launch of the GLF. Since the beginning of the GLF, Chinese officials had repeatedly emphasized Mao’s views that “the East wind prevails over the West wind” and “Imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers.” Mao’s works were given priority to consolidate the development of the international revolution movement. In the early 1960s, with the public divorce between China and the USSR, Mao’s works were extensively issued in Africa and became a “best seller” in many African countries. According to the statistics from the China International Publishing Group, from 1962 to 1966, China

¹⁵⁵ See for instance “The overview of the cultural work in Somalia in 1963 and the plan for 1964, Chinese embassy in Somalia, 19/01/1964-09/02/1964,” CDA, no.108-01018-06.

¹⁵⁶ He Mingxing, “红色经典的海外遗产” (The legacy of the red classics overseas), 南风窗 (*For the Public Good*), no.2 (2009), 89.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

issued 1,380,000 books and booklets in Ghana, 970,000 in Ethiopia, 850,000 in Nigeria, 640,000 in Algeria, and 530,000 in Tanzania, most of which were Mao's works.¹⁵⁸

Second, Chinese magazines were widely available throughout the Third World. *China Pictorial* was probably the most widely circulated magazine, a monthly picture magazine in 19 different languages.¹⁵⁹ In Latin America, for instance, each issue had a circulation of 3,000 copies in Argentina, 2,500 in Brazil, and 1,100 in Uruguay. The case of Cuba was the most outstanding. It issued 2,000 copies in 1959 but reached 100,000 in 1961.¹⁶⁰ Together with *China Reconstructs* and *Women of China*, another two widely circulated Chinese magazines, they projected an image of a modern China under the communist regime. *Peking Review*, announcing itself as a "weekly magazine of Chinese news and views," was almost universally available in various languages around the world.



Chinese printed material circulated widely overseas (from left to right: (first row) *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, *Peking Review*, *China Reconstructs*, *Women of China*, and *People's Pictorial* (no. 19, 1959); Celebrating National Day; (second row) 1960 annual cover image: First Summit of Mount Everest; 1961: Condolence on Mei Lanfang's (noted Peking Opera singer) Death; 1963: Scientist Zhu Kezhen; 1964: Film *Ashima* (Sani ethnic minority); 1965: reformed Peking Opera *The Legend of the Red Lantern*)

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Chinese, Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, Chuang, Korean, Russian, English, Japanese, Vietnamese, Indonesian, Arabic, Hindi, German, French, Spanish, Sweden, Swahili, and Italian, quoted from Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, 115; also see, He Mingxing, "The legacy of the red classics overseas," 90.

¹⁶⁰ He Mingxing, "The legacy of the red classics overseas," 90.

4.3.1.4 The exchange of intellectuals

Fourth, the exchange of intellectuals was a two-way approach. It was used to attract educated people to learn Chinese political ideology and to send Chinese intellectuals to learn from the targeted societies and spread Chinese ideas. Different from the above forms of China's cultural interactions, intellectual exchange usually happened after a diplomatic relationship was established between China and the other countries. As more independent countries appeared in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s that formed diplomatic relationships with China, China promoted the exchange of intellectuals and educational cooperation with these countries, particularly from the late 1950s. Chinese statistics on education once again demonstrate that China shifted its target of attraction or persuasion after the late 1950s, from the socialist bloc to the post-colonial countries. The numbers of Chinese students studying abroad and foreign students studying in China from 1959 to 1965 are evidence of the shift in China's targeted countries. The Chinese government dramatically reduced its students in the USSR after 1961, but the number of students sent to post-colonial countries such as the DPRK, Vietnam and Cuba increased markedly in 1964 (see Table 4.1). In terms of foreign students studying in China at the time (see Table 4.2), the majority were from post-colonial countries, for example, Vietnam, DPRK and Somalia.¹⁶¹ The case of Vietnamese students was extraordinary. Vietnamese students in China increased to 3200 in 1965, which constituted 96.6% of all foreign students in China. This sudden increase directly related to the US escalation of the Vietnam War in August 1964 and China's assurance to Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam that it would supply unconditional support to the Vietnamese people.¹⁶² China's support of the Vietnamese revolution certainly attracted more Vietnamese to travel to China to learn about the Chinese revolution experience at a critical moment of their nation's destiny.

¹⁶¹ Albania and Mongolia were the exceptions, members of the socialist bloc who still supported the PRC after the Sino-Soviet split.

¹⁶² Xie Yixian ed., *Diplomatic History of Contemporary China*, 183-186.

Country \ Year	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	total
USSR	460	317	74	55	20	3	54	983
Albania	2	7	4	2	2	40	10	67
Romania	4	13	3	1	3	33	15	72
Poland	4	5	6	1	1	20	14	51
Czechoslovakia	6	11	9	6		4	13	49
Bulgaria	16	6	8	2			3	35
Hungry	11	7	3	1			5	27
German Democratic Republic	7	24	1	5	3	12	15	67
Britain				1				1
Switzerland	2	5	1		2	6		16
Denmark	5	5			2			12
Sweden	5							5
Norway	3	2						5
DPRK		1	3	8	6	38	14	70
Mongolia	6	1	2	1				10
Vietnam		2	3	2	4	48	34	93
Cuba				18	15	120	5	158
Iraq	14	5				6	10	35
Other Countries	25	33		7	1	326	256	648
							Total	2404

Table 4.1: The number of Chinese students studying abroad 1959-1965 (Department of Planning, Ministry of Education, PRC ed., 中国教育成就: 统计资料 1949-1983 (*Achievement of Education in China: Statistics 1949-1983*), Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu, 1985, 126-130.)

Year Country	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	total
USSR	21		21	20		13		75
Albania	5	4	102	47	22			180
DPRK	41	4	16	1	27		21	110
Mongolia	11	28	25	9	4			77
Vietnam	106	253	263	133	59	115	3200	4129
Laos			2	1	2			5
Indonesia	20	1	1	1	5	19		47
Sri Lanka	4	1	2	2	1			10
Pakistan						7		7
Nepal	1	14	6	6	11	13	17	68
Sudan		5						5
Congo (Brazzaville)			3			2		5
Somali		41	3				7	51
Tanzania							6	6
Japan				2		6	24	32
France	1					21	8	30
Italy	5						1	6
Canada	1							1
Other Countries	42	84	24	16	31	35	26	258
							Total	5102

Table 4.2: The number of foreign students in China 1959-1965 (Department of Planning, Ministry of Education, PRC ed., *中国教育成就: 统计资料 1949-1983 (Achievement of Education in China: Statistics 1949-1983)*, Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu, 1985, 136-143.)

While there is limited information about the details of student exchanges between China and Africa provided by the source from the Chinese Ministry of Education, *Educational Cooperation and Exchanges between China and African Countries* offers complementary data. According to the latter, in 1960, for example, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries of the PRC provided the Somali National Alliance with scholarships for 60 Somali students studying in China, and likewise the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPK, Cameroon) received scholarships for 100 Cameroonian students. Whilst there were only 24 African students studying in China in the 1950s, the number of African students

increased to 164 in China in 1966. Similarly, the figure of Chinese teachers who went to Africa increased from 3 in the 1950s to 14 in the 1960s.¹⁶³ The development of the exchange of intellectuals in the 1960s, to a large part, was attributable to Premier Zhou's three visits to Africa from 1963 to 1965, which aimed to strengthen the relationship between China and the newly independent African countries.¹⁶⁴

4.3.1.5 International cultural events

Fifth, attending or hosting international cultural events was another approach to promote Chinese political views in the international arena. Those cultural events did not confine themselves to culture, but extended to the issues of politics, and the solidarity and development of underdeveloped societies. Chinese leaders often associated cultural events with the national liberation movements of underdeveloped nations. For instance, before the Chinese delegation went to the Asian-African Women's Conference in 1958, the Chinese female political figure Song Qingling (Madame Sun Yat-sen) emphasized the significant role of women in the work to achieve Asian-African nations' independence and world peace, in her telegraph to the Conference.¹⁶⁵ Another good example was the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) hosted by Jakarta in 1963, which exemplified how sport was utilized by governments to achieve political aims. Beijing fully supported Indonesian advocacy of the GANEFO as a counter to the Olympic Games because the International Olympic Committee (IOC) incorporated Taiwan and Israel as its members.¹⁶⁶ Beijing therefore was extremely active in working for the success of the GANEFO and provided immense financial support for the participants.¹⁶⁷ Additionally, in the 1960s, Beijing held international cultural events to protest against US imperialism in Vietnam and expose Soviet "revisionism" regarding revolution and "splittism" in Third World solidarity, for example, the

¹⁶³ Sino-African Educational Cooperation and Exchanges Editorial Team compiled, *中国与非洲国家教育合作与交流 (Educational Cooperation and Exchanges between China and African Countries)* (Beijing: Beijing University, 2005), 13, 23.

¹⁶⁴ He Wenping, "中非教育交流与合作概述" (A survey of Sino-African educational exchange and cooperation), *西亚非洲 (East Asia and Africa)*, no.3 (2007), 14.

¹⁶⁵ "宋庆龄和全国妇联电贺亚非妇女会议" (Song Qingling and All China Women's Federation sent a telegraph to Asian-African Women Conference), *RMRB* (14/02/1958), 5.

¹⁶⁶ For example, see "The conversation record of President Liu Shaoqi and the Cambodian sports delegation, Beijing, 12/09/1963," *CDA*, archival no.106-01124-01; "The conversation record of Comrade Zhang Lianhua and the delegation of Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, Beijing, 09/07/1964," *CDA*, no.108-01092-05.

¹⁶⁷ For instance, see "The overview of the cultural work in Somalia in 1963 and the plan for 1964, Chinese embassy in Somali, 19/01/1964-09/02/1964," *CDA*, no.108-01018-06.

1964 Beijing Scientific Symposium¹⁶⁸ and the 1966 Beijing Asian-African Writers' Emergency Meeting.¹⁶⁹ Beijing's involvement in these international cultural events certainly was not just to understand and cooperate with other nations in the field of culture, but more importantly, it made use of these cultural events to express China's international political views and compete with both superpowers for prestige and influence in world politics.

To sum up, given the limited economic resources in these early days of the PRC, sustained cultural diplomacy was probably the most fruitful instrument in its international engagement. The Chinese government employed various forms of cultural interactions, such as granting scholarships to foreign students studying in China and welcoming foreigners to visit China. It extended the means of propaganda to the two-way approach and noticed the differences in the audiences. The audio-visual methods of cultural promotion such as movies, radio broadcasts, touring performances and exhibitions were employed to attract the large number of illiterate people in the underdeveloped world. On the other hand, China exported printed material, exchanged intellectuals with the targeted societies and welcomed foreign visits to persuade educated people of the benefits of China's alternative political system. By means of cultural diplomacy, Beijing projected an alternative model for a large audience in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

4.3.2 Foreign Aid

Foreign aid was another major tool of Maoist soft power.¹⁷⁰ Maoist China's foreign aid demonstrated that the PRC intended to build an alternative leadership role in competition with Western aid which was usually motivated by economic payoff and with conditions attached. Foreign aid in Mao's China was used to export Chinese ideas of revolution, national development and the way of carrying out international affairs to attract "like-minded" nations. China's foreign aid in its early days was not for the purpose of securing economic benefits, such as market access and natural resources. Mao's government insisted that foreign aid must not bring economic profit to the donor, but should strengthen the independence and development of the recipients. Therefore, foreign aid was an important tool of Maoist soft

¹⁶⁸ Xiong Weimin, "在科学和政治之间：1964年的北京科学讨论会 薛攀皋先生访谈录" (Between science and politics: the 1964 Beijing Scientific Symposium, interview record of Mr. Xue Pangao), *科学文化评论* (*Science and Culture Review*), no.2 (2008), 58-70.

¹⁶⁹ "Report of the Asian-African Writers' Emergency Meeting," *RMRB* (10/07/1966), 5.

¹⁷⁰ Whether foreign aid can be counted as a tool of soft power is a debatable question. Joseph Nye originally excluded foreign aid and assistance from his framework of soft power, regarding that they belonged to coercive power either buying favour or punishing by withdrawal. However, recently he acknowledges that soft-power tools include economic assistance, see Joseph Nye, "The war on soft power," *Foreign Policy*, April 12, 2011. In this chapter, foreign aid in Maoist China is considered as a tool of soft power because it involves moral support and suasion.

power. Beijing used foreign aid to demonstrate the CCP's "proletarian internationalism" and build itself as a moral authority regardless of its substantial economic weakness.

The form of the PRC's foreign aid was developed and diversified with social vicissitudes, which varied from financial grants, interest-free loans, infrastructure build-up and medical aid, to military assistance including military training, consultancy and equipment. However, the basic model of the PRC's foreign aid was consistent. From the very beginning, the Chinese government stressed that its foreign aid would comply with the principles of "non-political conditionality" and "non-interference in internal affairs"; its purpose was to consolidate national independence and self-reliance in the recipient countries. This policy symbolised China's independent stance and was underpinned by the foundation of Chinese foreign policy, that is, "the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence."¹⁷¹

4.3.2.1 Asia

Despite its considerable economic difficulties at home, Beijing was a major supporter of communist movements and neutral states in the Third World, particularly those in Asia and Africa in the years following the Bandung Conference. Due to geopolitical factors and Chinese traditional influence, Southeast Asia was the first region to receive Chinese foreign aid.¹⁷² Beijing sought to build relations with those nations on poor terms with Moscow, and meanwhile aimed to project a leadership role in its neighbourhood by providing foreign aid to nationalist countries such as Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, the DPRK, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Syria, Vietnam and Yemen.¹⁷³ For example, in February 1959, China granted 10,000 tonnes of wheat to help Yemen out of a drought. In 1964, China granted 10 million pounds in interest-free loan to the Yemen government and agreed both to repair the road built by China and to undertake the construction of a hospital and a college of

¹⁷¹ The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

¹⁷² It is not hard to understand that Southeast Asia received a priority in China's foreign relations due to the geopolitics and its traditional influence in the region based on the tribute system. For Beijing's support of communist movements in Southeast Asia, see Quansheng Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy*, 55. China increased its focus on Africa from the mid-1950s as more African nations emerged from Western colonisation and China saw an opportunity for its presence in this "new" continent. For China's increasing engagement with African countries in the Maoist period see Philip Snow, *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988); Tareq Y. Ismael, "The People's Republic of China and Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 9:4 (1971), 507-529; Robert A. Scalapino, "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 42:4 (July 1964), 640-654. Latin America, however, probably received the lowest priority in Chinese foreign policy, see Ernst Halperin, "Peking and the Latin American Communists," *The China Quarterly*, no.29 (Jan. - Mar. 1967), 111-154.

¹⁷³ A survey of CDA from 1959 to 1965 with the key word "aid" (援助 *yuanzhu*).

technology.¹⁷⁴ In the early 1960s, China also offered help in building infrastructure such as roads and bridges in Burma, Laos, Nepal and Vietnam. After the development of its own industry in the 1950s, China went overseas to help post-colonial nations to build their own preliminary industries. At the end of 1963, Cambodia built a textile mill, a plywood factory and a paper factory with help from China. Eventually these three factories produced half of the gross industrial output value of Cambodia.¹⁷⁵ In contrast, China provided considerable assistance, mainly military aid, to Vietnam, and actively supported Vietnamese communist guerrillas. According to a Chinese source, from 1962 to 1966, China provided Vietnam with 270,000 guns, 200 million bullets, 540 artilleries, 900,000 shells, 700 tonnes of detonators and numerous pieces of military equipment and material assistance.¹⁷⁶

The PRC's motivation in providing foreign aid to the Asian countries was mixed with considerations of realpolitik and ideology exportation, and was partly derived from security concerns. On the one hand, China needed to solve border issues with countries including Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mongolia, with all of which it signed border agreements from 1960 to 1963.¹⁷⁷ On the other hand, China wanted to develop buffer zones on its peripheries to defend itself against attack from the other powers. Historically, China felt that it shared a common lot with neighbouring countries such as Korea and Vietnam against invasion from Japan from the late 19th century to the 1940s as well as from the US afterwards, making an analogy that "if the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold." That was why China participated in and provided significant assistance to the Korean War and the Vietnam War in the early 1950s and 1960s respectively.

While it is true that China's foreign aid to its neighbouring countries involved security and strategic considerations, China simultaneously promoted its ideational power in its foreign aid, that is, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Chinese leaders especially stressed the principles of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit which were strongly upheld by the post-colonial countries. Compared with the Western powers, including the Soviet Union, which had never suffered from colonization, China probably knew a lot more of what the newly-independent nations desired because they shared a similar colonial history. China also understood the struggle of the non-aligned states in the

¹⁷⁴ "The conversation record of the Sino-Yemen relations on economy, military and culture, Beijing, 04/06/1964-05/06/1964," CDA, no.204-01524-02.

¹⁷⁵ The above figures are from Zhang Yuhui, *中国对外援助研究 (Research on China's Foreign Aid)*, PhD Thesis (Party School of the Central Committee of the CCP, 2006), 79-80.

¹⁷⁶ Wang Taiping ed., *中华人民共和国外交史: 1957-1969 (Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China 1957-1969)* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 1998), 35.

¹⁷⁷ Xie Yixian ed., *Diplomatic History of Contemporary China*, 119-125.

bipolar system due to its agonized relationship with the USSR. Foreign aid was important to the less developed countries, but these nations also cherished independence, equality, respect and non-interference in their internal affairs when treated by the other powers. Aware of the needs of post-colonial nations, China highlighted the Five Principles and sought to build a new and more principled approach to international relations. Later, China formulated a specific policy of foreign aid when it engaged with African countries.

In addition to the concerns with the traditional balance of power and periphery security, China provided considerable foreign aid to socialist counties such as Mongolia, Albania, Hungary (and Cuba) garnering support to counter Soviet influence and play a leadership role in the communist camp.¹⁷⁸ According to the Vice Premier Li Xiannian's report to the Standing Committee of the 2nd People's National Congress, China provided 1.154 billion RMB foreign aid to socialist countries in 1961 and 1962, taking up 84% of its foreign aid in these two years.¹⁷⁹ At the same time, for the purpose of the exportation of Maoist ideology and support of revolutions in the region, China provided extensive assistance for the communist movements in Burma, Cambodia, Japan, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.¹⁸⁰ Chinese leaders believed that providing foreign aid to these forces was "China's internationalist obligation." The benefit of foreign aid however was mutual: "while we (China) supported them (post-colonial countries) by means of finance, material and technology, once they develop their economy and anti-imperialist strength, it actually will help us."¹⁸¹

4.3.2.2 Africa

The promotion of "internationalism" was further exemplified when Beijing expanded its foreign aid to Africa in the latter part of the 1950s. Although China's presence in Africa was quite late, it actively courted Africans' affections with both assistance and engagement. In the first place, China provided extensive military and material assistance to revolutionary movements in countries and regions such as Algeria, Angola, Congo (Leopoldville),

¹⁷⁸ Zhang Yuhui, *Research on China's Foreign Aid*, 77-79.

¹⁷⁹ Li Xiannian, "关于 1961 年和 1962 年国家决算的报告 (一九六三年七月四日)" (Report of the national budget in 1961 and 1962, 04/07/1963), in Research Centre of the Central Committee of the CCP, *建国以来重要文献选编 (Selected Important Documents since the Founding of the PRC)* (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1997), vol.16: 531.

¹⁸⁰ Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*; Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy*; A.M. Halpern ed., *Policies toward China, Views from Six Continents* (New York, published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill, 1965), Ch. 9-12 and 17; Quansheng Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy*, 55; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Philippine Communism and the Chinese," *The China Quarterly*, no. 30 (Apr. - Jun., 1967), 115-148.

¹⁸¹ Li Xiannian, "Report of the national budget in 1961 and 1962, 04/07/1963."

Mozambique and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).¹⁸² It also set up military training fields both in China and in Africa to train African revolutionaries in the arts of guerrilla warfare based on Mao's military theory.¹⁸³

In the second place, China provided economic and technological assistance for the development of the newly-born African nations. Its foreign aid started from the support of the Egyptian government's fight over the Suez Canal, during which China provided 20 million Swiss Francs as a financial grant. In 1960, China helped Guinea build a match and cigarette manufacturing plant, which was China's first development project in Africa. From late 1961 to early 1962, China sent seven agricultural specialists to Mali to assist with their experiments in sugarcane and tea. In 1963, China dispatched its first medical team to Algeria, initiating a new form of foreign aid in China's international engagement.¹⁸⁴ Nevertheless, it was the Chinese leaders' three visits to Africa in 1963 and 1964 that really attracted Africa's attention to China. From 13 December 1963 to 5 February 1964, Premier Zhou and Vice-Premier Chen Yi toured ten African countries: the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.¹⁸⁵ Zhou drew African people's attention to the historical connection between China and Africa¹⁸⁶ and their common experience of oppression at the hands of the colonial Europeans, and thereby proceeded to formulate the five principles governing China's relations with Third World countries and the eight principles of China's aid to foreign countries (see Box 1). Zhou thus sent out two key messages to African peoples. One was that since China had succeeded in its revolution, "Africa is ripe for revolution;" the other was that China would provide tangible support to African people, "but only if it was asked to."¹⁸⁷ This revealed the substance of China's approach to Africa: China would respect African nations and would not impose its own will

¹⁸² Zhang Yuhui, *Research on China's Foreign Aid*, 81, 91; Snow, *The Star Raft*, 77; Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, 93.

¹⁸³ Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, 114; Snow, *The Star Raft*, 76-78.

¹⁸⁴ The above figures are from Zhang Yuhui, *Research on China's Foreign Aid*, 80-81, 91-92.

¹⁸⁵ "Premier Zhou Enlai's three tours of Asian and African countries", 17/11/2000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18001.htm#>. For details of the tours to Africa see Chen Dunde, *周恩来飞往非洲：探路在 1964 (Zhou Enlai's Visits to Africa: Exploring in 1964)* (Beijing: Jiefangjun Wenyi), 2007.

¹⁸⁶ The historical connection between China and Africa referred to Zheng He's voyage to the East African coast in the early 15th century during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).

¹⁸⁷ Snow, *The Star Raft*, 76.

on less developed countries. It therefore promoted an image of China as a new and different force on the world stage and an alternative to Soviet and Western powers.¹⁸⁸

To sum up, from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, there were significant changes in world politics, particularly the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split, which had a huge impact on China's foreign policy in general and foreign aid in particular. China thus expanded its foreign aid from its peripheries to the Middle East, Africa and Latin America¹⁸⁹ to enhance its political leverage in world politics. Until the end of 1965, China's foreign aid extended to 32 countries: 13 of them were in Asia, 16 in Africa, 2 in East Europe and 1 in Latin America.¹⁹⁰ China demonstrably increased its focus on Africa and Asia. Due to this expansion, the amount of China's foreign aid saw steady growth, from 0.35 billion RMB in 1959 to 1.845 billion RMB in 1965. The average growth reached 22.5% in these seven years. Accordingly, the percentage of foreign aid in China's financial expenditure increased from 0.664% to 3.747% in 1965. While its revenue was in flux at the time, China's foreign aid grew fast and this trend continued in the following years of the 1960s (see Figure 4.2 and Appendix 1).

¹⁸⁸ Admittedly, China's foreign aid to Africa was used to undermine Taiwan in Africa and to obtain support from African countries in China's bid to replace the ROC/Taiwan in the UN. Nonetheless, the Taiwan issue at the time was secondary to China's competition with the two superpowers. If China could build its leadership in world politics and display its capacity to counter the superpowers, Taiwan's influence would decline. For Taiwan's foreign aid see Lin Dechang, *海峡两岸援外政策之比较研究 (A Comparison of Foreign Aid Policies between the PRC and Taiwan)* (Taipei: Chengwen, 1999).

¹⁸⁹ Due to the scope of this chapter, China's foreign aid to Latin America is not discussed. Compared to Asia and Africa, its foreign aid to Latin America was minor, mainly confined to Cuba. The figures for China's foreign aid to Cuba can be referred to Zhang Yuhui, *Research on China's Foreign Aid*, 79.

¹⁹⁰ These 32 countries were Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon (Sri Lanka after 1972), DPRK, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Syria, Vietnam, Yemen in Asia, Angola, Algeria, Central Africa, Congo (Brazzaville), UAR/Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe in Africa, Albania and Hungary in Eastern Europe, and Cuba in Latin America. Most of the aid was sent to the state governments but in a few cases to the national liberation movements mentioned earlier. The list of the recipients of China's foreign aid was obtained from the survey from the CDA from 1959 to 1965 with the key word "aid" (援助), and referred to Zhang Yuhui, *Research on China's Foreign Aid*, 84-85, 100; Snow, *The Star Raft*, 76-79; Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, 112-114; Wolfgang Bartke, *China's Economic Aid* (London: C. Hurst, 1975).




Figure 4.2: Growth of the PRC's foreign aid (1958-1969), Unit: Billion RMB. The percentage of foreign aid (FA) in PRC's financial expenditure (FE) is calculated based on Appendix 1 in this chapter.

Box 1: The five principles guiding China's relations with the Third World countries and the eight principles for China's aid to foreign countries (extracted from "Premier Zhou Enlai's three tours of Asian and African countries", 17/11/2000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18001.htm#>.)

*The five principles guiding China's relations with the Third World countries were: a. China supports the Arab and African peoples in their struggle to **oppose imperialism** and old and new **colonialism** and to win and safeguard national independence. b. It supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the Governments of Arab and African countries. c. It supports the desire of the Arab and African peoples to achieve **unity and solidarity** in the manner of their own choice. d. It supports the Arab and African countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultations. e. It holds that the **sovereignty** of the Arab and African countries should be respected by all other countries and that **encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed**.*

*The eight principles for China's aid to foreign countries were: a. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of **equality and mutual benefit** in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual. b. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly **respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges**. c. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible. d. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to **help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development**. e. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital. f. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them. g. In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique. h. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will **have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country**. (Emphasis added)*

4.4 Conclusion

When Mao's China faced increasing antagonism from the US and the USSR beginning in the late 1950s, according to the available sources including the declassified *CDA* from 1959 to 1965, soft power played a significant role in China's international engagement. At a time when China was materially weak, the Chinese government made purposeful efforts to mobilize its key sources of non-material power. These sources were utilized to attract and persuade the peoples in post-colonial societies and Chinese citizens that the PRC represented a just force in world politics and an alternative to the Western powers including the USSR. The key sources of non-material power promoted by Maoist China were China itself as an exemplary model of nation building, its "proletarian culture" and revolutionary foreign policy. The major tools of Maoist soft power were China's cultural diplomacy and foreign aid.

When promoting its soft power through cultural interaction, China noted the differences of each target audience. Taking into account the poorly educated peoples from the underdeveloped world, Chinese visual arts which manifested China's revolutionary identity and age-old civilisation were vigorously promoted. Visual arts were easily accepted and well received by this group of people. In contrast, regarding "educated" leftists and "progressive forces" such as nationalists, China provided scholarships for students in the Third World to study in China and distributed its publications which elaborated Chinese revolutionary thoughts. Additionally, China made use of international conferences and organizations, and the meetings of foreign leaders and "progressive forces" to advance China's political standpoint and vision. China sought to persuade these "elites" to build favourable public opinions internationally. These differential methods not only promoted China's political culture but also delivered China's political ideas.

When offering foreign aid, beginning in the late 1950s, China expanded out of its immediate neighbourhood to the far-away African countries with favourable terms, and more significantly it set new standards such as the respect of sovereignty and non-political conditionality as stated in the Eight Principles of China's Foreign Aid. Maoist China's foreign aid was characterized by heavy ideological and political considerations. It did not take into account economic profit but was largely defined by the needs and requests of the recipient countries. It was practised to demonstrate China's "obligation of proletarian internationalism", to compete with the two superpowers, and thus to project a leadership role in this field.

Maoist soft power was unique. Its ideological intent was a conspicuous feature. However, it should be noted that the uniqueness of Maoist soft power was not only determined by the Chinese, but was also the result of the interactions between the PRC and the other major international forces. The increasing antagonism between the PRC and the two superpowers

propelled the Chinese government to enhance its international engagement with the less developed world by projecting Maoism and a "proletarian" political culture, and carrying out a "revolutionary" diplomacy that differed from that of other major world powers. China's alienation of the two blocs and the emerging non-aligned forces in the bipolar system provided Mao's government with the opportunity and space to build itself as a leading third force in world politics.¹⁹¹

The PRC gained a political dividend from Maoist soft power projection. It helped the PRC generate its influence and prestige in different international affairs, such as the movements of national liberation in the developing world and the world student movement in the West.¹⁹² This prestige transformed into a political asset which was extremely important for the PRC to win support from the Third World countries and sympathy from the leftists in the West. It shaped Beijing's leadership role in the Third World and the international communist movement. In the meantime, however, the fear of communist infiltration, which had given China a formidable reputation of being "the political villain" in the US-influenced parts of the world ever since the Dulles era, was further enhanced.

Therefore, this chapter argues that to a large degree, Maoist soft power contributed to the PRC's second wave of diplomatic recognition since 1949. There were 19 countries which set up diplomatic relations with the PRC from 1959 to 1965. Except France, all the others are post-colonialist countries and 16 of them are African nations (see Appendix 2). Reviewing all the diplomatic relations that China established by the year 1965, it is evident that from 1959 to 1965 the PRC extended its efforts to win international support from the socialist bloc to more post-colonial states. This implies that Maoist soft power projection played a significant role in the extension of the PRC's foreign relations.

Due to Maoist soft power projection and the support obtained from the post-colonial states, it is further argued that the PRC thereafter could replace the ROC as the only legitimate power to represent China in the UN in 1971.¹⁹³ At the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly in

¹⁹¹ See Chih-yu Shih, *China's Just World: the Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1993), ch.3.

¹⁹² For excellent and detailed discussions of the correlation between China and the national liberation movements, see Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, 77-197; Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy*, 114-236. For the discussion of the correlation between China's revolution and the world student movement in the developed societies, see W. Richard and Amy A. Wilson, "The red guards and the world student movement," *The China Quarterly*, no.42 (Apr.-Jun. 1970), 88-104.

¹⁹³ Admittedly there were several factors that contributed to the PRC's entry into the UN as the only legitimate government of China in 1971. Some scholars may argue that it was the US engagement with the PRC in the very late 1960s that led the PRC to obtain its seat in the UN. While the importance of Sino-US rapprochement is undeniable, the third world nations' support was crucial. Without China's

1971, 23 countries lodged a joint proposal to restore the lawful rights of the PRC as the only representative of China in the UN.¹⁹⁴ Most of them were the targets of China's cultural interaction and foreign aid. This proposal finally was approved by 76 members of the UN, with 35 vetos and 17 abstentions. Among these 76 countries, 51 were developing countries and most of them engaged with China by means of culture or foreign aid.¹⁹⁵ It thus demonstrates that the PRC's acquisition of legitimacy in the UN derived from China's Maoist soft power offensive. Chairman Mao expressed his sincere appreciation to the Third World, "In any case, we should not forget the immense support from the Third World for this issue [that the PRC was able to restore its rights in the UN]."¹⁹⁶

The influence of China's soft power projection in the early 1960s can be attributed to the following two factors: first, Chinese leaders made a proper judgment that the Third World would be an emerging and third force of world politics in the bipolar system of the Cold War. Accordingly they projected China's identity firmly in line with this group as an alternative to the two superpowers, and thereby they could garner support from the Third World to oppose the two superpowers simultaneously. Second, looking at the 1960s, Chinese words were in general consistent with their deeds. The Chinese opposed hegemony not only in words but in their actions. They believed in revolution, and instigated and supported revolutionaries who wanted to carry out struggles to change world politics. Chinese consistency in words and actions was very important to their winning international support and building up an image as a revolutionary force and a leader in the world revolutionary movement.

influence in the Third World, the West and the US in particular might not have realized what a significant role the PRC had played in world politics from the 1950s to the 1960s, and the US might not have had the intention to engage with China.

¹⁹⁴ The UN, "2758 (XXVI) Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations (October 25, 1971)" accessed from UN website: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/26/ares26.htm>

¹⁹⁵ The 23 countries which provided the proposal were Albania, Algeria, Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Pakistan, Yemen (Democratic), Congo (Democratic), Romania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Yemen (Arab), Yugoslavia and Zambia. See *RMRB* (28/10/1971), 6. The 51 developing countries which voted in favour of the proposal were Afghanistan, Algeria, Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Yemen (Democratic), Congo (Democratic), Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, Yemen (Arab) and Zambia. See *RMRB* (27/10/1971), 1.

¹⁹⁶ Wang Xingfang, *中国与联合国 (China and the United Nations)* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 1995), 47.

However, it needs to be pointed out that the projection of Maoist soft power imposed a heavy cost on the Chinese state and society.¹⁹⁷ Firstly, due to the policies of “double-anti” and self-reliance, the PRC alienated itself from the areas dominated by the two superpowers as well as the major international institutions and organizations that had come into operation after World War II. It left China very limited room to get foreign aid and develop its economy by international cooperation. Further, the PRC’s material assistance to the movements of communist and national liberation in addition to their foreign aid to post-colonial states went too much beyond its economic capacity. It thus aggravated the already serious economic situation for the PRC. China’s policies were much more radicalized in the second half of the 1960s and led to the “Cultural Revolution” (1966-1976). The radical domestic and foreign policies almost devastated China’s domestic economy and destroyed its foreign relations in the second half of the 1960s.¹⁹⁸ While some other East Asian societies were taking off economically, the PRC was on the edge of collapse in the early 1970s.

Secondly, by the end of the 1960s, China had arrived at an impasse in its national security. It not only had to continue to deal with the encirclement from the US in the Pacific, but had to handle the increasing danger from its northern border which finally led to a clash with the Soviets in 1969. Thus, at the end of the 1960s, Chinese leaders had to make a major shift in foreign policy. Security imperatives led Chairman Mao to approach the US, which contradicted his earlier claim that “the US imperialists are the most ferocious and most arrogant aggressors in the history of mankind.” Maoist China’s rapprochement with the US shocked and confused Mao’s revolutionary fellows and leftists around the world. It shattered China’s revolutionary image and moral authority.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁷ In the so-called “three years of natural disaster (1959-1961),” it is estimated that China’s economic loss was about 120 billion RMB and abnormal deaths reached 40 million in mainland China. Despite the disaster, the PRC still increased its foreign aid, which can be seen from the chart of China’s Foreign Aid. For China’s economic difficulties in 1959-1961 see Cong Jin, *The Years of China’s Tortuous Development*, 268-273. Scholars have pointed out that actually the huge cost was not from “natural disaster,” but was a man-made tragedy due to the campaign of the GLF. For the most comprehensive and recent research on the impact of the GLF see Yang Jisheng, *Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012).

¹⁹⁸ A few countries broke diplomatic relations with China in the late 1960s, e.g. Dahomey (Benin), Central Africa, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya and Tunisia. Some of these were because of China’s radicalization in its foreign relations and some were due to military coups d’état in foreign countries, such as Indonesia. See Xie Yixian ed., *Diplomatic History of Contemporary China*, 204-6.

¹⁹⁹ See Peter Van Ness, “Collapse of moral authority and the end of the civilizer state: comparing two cases – Mao’s China and George W. Bush’s United States,” The East Asia Institute (EAI) Fellow Program Working Paper No. 37, October 2012.

The further impact was that China to some extent lost its identity in the 1970s and 1980s, as Maurice Meisner has called it, "neither capitalist nor socialist."²⁰⁰ In Mao's China, the traditional order and philosophies, such as Confucianism, were to a large degree destroyed by a few campaigns. This created huge impacts on society as well as on the legitimacy of the CCP after the Maoist era. Chinese people in general have lost interest in revolution and Maoist ideology. The ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought has collapsed in Chinese society and cannot provide support for the CCP's rule. In its place, patriotic education and nationalism have begun to surge in post-Mao China. In short, these aspects are the deficits of Maoist soft power, which led Mao's successors, sooner or later, to discard much of what was most distinctively Maoist. As the Party's mouthpiece, the *Beijing Review*, declared in 1984, the CCP "does not recognise any so-called leadership or guiding 'centre' or any ready-made 'model' in the international Communist movement." And it further claimed that "neither at present nor in the future will our Party act as a 'centre' or create a 'model'".²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ "Maoist China was not capitalist because it had abolished an essential condition of capitalism – private ownership of the means of production. It was not genuinely socialist because the masses of producers, workers and peasants alike, were denied the means to control the products and conditions of their labour – and also denied the means to control the state, which increasingly stood above them as both the economic and political manager of society." Meisner, *Mao's China and After*, 424.

²⁰¹ "Foreign contacts of the communist party," *Beijing Review*, no.42 (1984), 19.

Appendix 1: PRC's Foreign Aid (1958-1969)²⁰² (in Billion RMB)

Year	Foreign Aid (FA)	Financial Expenditure (FE)	FA/FE (%)	Revenue
1958	0.276	40.94	0.664	38.76
1959	0.35	55.286	0.633	48.712
1960	0.363	65.414	0.555	57.229
1961	0.519	36.702	1.414	35.606
1962	0.854	30.525	2.798	31.355
1963	0.91	33.963	2.679	34.225
1964	1.25	39.902	3.133	39.954
1965	1.845	46.633	3.956	47.332
1966	2.029	54.156	3.747	55.871
1967	1.972	44.185	4.463	41.936
1968	2.056	35.984	5.714	36.125
1969	2.196	52.586	4.176	52.676

²⁰² The General Office of the Ministry of Finance (compiled), “国家预算决算” (National budget and final accounting of revenue and expenditure), *中华人民共和国财政史料* (*Historical Material of PRC Finance*) (Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji, 1983), vol.2, 419-420. The foreign aid figures from 1958 to 1964 are spread in the annual reports of China's national budget and final accounting of revenue and expenditure made by the Vice Premier Li Xiannian in the same book, but were only available in 1965. The other foreign aid figures of 1965-1969 are cited from Zhang Yuhui, *Research on China's Foreign Aid*, 165. The percentage of FA/FE is calculated by the author. Please note that except for the foreign aid figures of 1965-1969 the other figures of the above table are slightly different from the ones in Zhang's thesis. The figures of FE and revenue cited by Zhang are consistent with the data in China Data Online produced by China Data Centre at University of Michigan, see <http://chinadataonline.org/>, but China Data Online does not have the figures of China's foreign aid. In addition, Wolfgang Bartke's research covers in detail China's aid to less developed countries from 1956 to 1973. However, his study does not include China's foreign aid to socialist countries or China's military aid, see Wolfgang Bartke, *China's Economic Aid*, 7, 9-11.

Appendix 2: Countries Establishing Diplomatic Relations with China, 1949-1965²⁰³

Number	Name of the country	The date of establishing diplomatic relations with China (dd/mm/yy)
1.	USSR	02/10/1949
2.	Bulgaria	04/10/1949
3.	Romania	05/10/1949
4.	DPRK	06/10/1949
5.	Czechoslovakia	06/10/1949
6.	Hungary	06/10/1949
7.	Poland	07/10/1949
8.	The German Democratic Republic	27/10/1949
9.	Albania	23/11/1949
10.	Vietnam	18/01/1950
11.	India	01/04/1950
12.	Indonesia	13/04/1950
13.	Sweden	09/05/1950
14.	Denmark	11/05/1950
15.	Burma	8/06/1950
16.	Liechtenstein	14/09/1950
17.	Switzerland	14/09/1950
18.	Finland	28/10/1950

²⁰³ See the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/2193/>

19.	Pakistan	21/05/1951
20.	Norway	05/10/1954
21.	Yugoslavia	02/01/1955
22.	Afghanistan	20/01/1955
23.	Nepal	01/08/1955
24.	Egypt	30/05/1956
25.	Syria	01/08/1956
26.	Yemen	24/09/1956
27.	Ceylon (Sri Lanka since 1972)	07/02/1957
28.	Cambodia	19/07/1958
29.	Iraq	25/08/1958
30.	Morocco	01/11/1958
31.	Algeria	20/12/1958
32.	Sudan	04/02/1959
33.	Guinea	04/10/1959
34.	Ghana	05/07/1960
35.	Cuba	28/09/1960
36.	Mali	25/10/1960
37.	Somali	14/12/1960
38.	Congo (Leopoldville, Democratic)	20/02/1961
39.	Laos	25/04/1961
40.	Uganda	18/10/1962
41.	Kenya	14/12/1963

42.	Burundi	21/12/1963
43.	Tunisia	10/01/1964
44.	France	27/01/1964
45.	Congo (Brazzaville, Republic)	22/02/1964
46.	Tanzania	26/04/1964
47.	Central Africa	29/09/1964
48.	Zambia	29/10/1964
49.	Benin	12/11/1964
50.	Mauritania	19/07/1965

1	1000	1000
2	1000	1000
3	1000	1000
4	1000	1000
5	1000	1000
6	1000	1000
7	1000	1000
8	1000	1000
9	1000	1000
10	1000	1000
11	1000	1000
12	1000	1000
13	1000	1000
14	1000	1000
15	1000	1000
16	1000	1000
17	1000	1000
18	1000	1000
19	1000	1000
20	1000	1000
21	1000	1000
22	1000	1000
23	1000	1000
24	1000	1000
25	1000	1000
26	1000	1000
27	1000	1000
28	1000	1000
29	1000	1000
30	1000	1000
31	1000	1000
32	1000	1000
33	1000	1000
34	1000	1000
35	1000	1000
36	1000	1000
37	1000	1000
38	1000	1000
39	1000	1000
40	1000	1000
41	1000	1000
42	1000	1000
43	1000	1000
44	1000	1000
45	1000	1000
46	1000	1000
47	1000	1000
48	1000	1000
49	1000	1000
50	1000	1000
51	1000	1000
52	1000	1000
53	1000	1000
54	1000	1000
55	1000	1000
56	1000	1000
57	1000	1000
58	1000	1000
59	1000	1000
60	1000	1000
61	1000	1000
62	1000	1000
63	1000	1000
64	1000	1000
65	1000	1000
66	1000	1000
67	1000	1000
68	1000	1000
69	1000	1000
70	1000	1000
71	1000	1000
72	1000	1000
73	1000	1000
74	1000	1000
75	1000	1000
76	1000	1000
77	1000	1000
78	1000	1000
79	1000	1000
80	1000	1000
81	1000	1000
82	1000	1000
83	1000	1000
84	1000	1000
85	1000	1000
86	1000	1000
87	1000	1000
88	1000	1000
89	1000	1000
90	1000	1000
91	1000	1000
92	1000	1000
93	1000	1000
94	1000	1000
95	1000	1000
96	1000	1000
97	1000	1000
98	1000	1000
99	1000	1000
100	1000	1000

5 China's Soft Power Mobilization in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games

Whilst the previous chapter has illustrated China's projection of Maoist soft power in PRC's revolutionary period, what can be said about China's soft power campaign in its reform era? China's hosting of the 29th Olympiad provides an excellent case study for examining the constitution and mobilization of the three key sources of soft power as they apply in the contemporary debate. It provides this study with a prism to compare and contrast two versions of Chinese soft power: the Olympiad's reformist version, and the Maoist version in the previous chapter's empirical study.

As many experts on sports and politics have noted, the Olympics have never been an exclusively sporting event. They have been intertwined with various issues such as culture, ideology, economics, politics and international relations.¹ Moreover, the socio-political meaning of the Games changes depending on the host country's stage of socio-economic development and its different political and strategic objectives.² The hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympiad in China, in front of the largest audience it had ever had access to, gave China a powerful platform to actively use its soft power to demonstrate how it seeks to represent itself in the global community. After three-decade material build-up through economic reforms, China seized the moment to project itself as a strong and vigorous nation but simultaneously a "good global citizen" on the world stage. Soft power, for today's China, complementing and amplifying its increasingly growing hard power, is utilized to both attract and soothe global audience. It involves not only promoting its culture to win admiration, and offering a worthy development model for other societies to respect or emulate, but also assuaging the fears of particular societies about the intentions of a newly strong China in international politics. In this sense, China's soft power takes on a strong "dualistic" character.

The hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games represented a milestone in China's cultivation, reinterpretation, and mobilization of its key soft power resources – Chinese culture, its development model, and its modern foreign policy and diplomacy in contrast with those in revolutionary China. The Games provided a great site to project a "cultural China" by re-

¹ For instance, Richard Espy, *The Politics of the Olympic Games* (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1979); Christopher R. Hill, *Olympic Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Susan Brownell, *Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People's Republic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008).

² Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture* (London: Routledge, 2000).

embracing its traditional culture but in a way that blends in modern and multidimensional aspects including what has been learned from the Western world. It was an opportunity to present a “modern China” born of on-going reform and economic development, achieved by opening its economy but with the state retaining firm control. It also provided a platform for China to recast itself as a rejuvenated but responsible global power within the existing liberal order, prepared to cooperate and engage with other world powers to handle global issues.

Therefore, China’s “charm offensive” by mobilizing and projecting these key sources of China’s soft power at its Olympic moment in particular was not only targeted at the “Global South,” but mobilized to attain recognition from the “Global North.” It aimed at making China appealing while allaying the fears of the “China threat” and shaping China’s image as a responsible global power.³ Of equal importance, from the process of bidding to the celebration of the Games, the role of the Chinese leadership – the CCP – was more or less enhanced and consolidated both domestically and internationally. The mission of fulfilling China’s “great power dream” and the pride in the glory of the Chinese nation served as a potent source of domestic mobilization to support the current regime.

The discussion that proceeds consists of three sections. The first section discusses the broad international and domestic background before China engaged to host this mega event and explains why the Olympics mattered in China. The second section analyses the key sources of China’s soft power that were mobilized and promoted at the time of hosting the 2008 Olympic Games. These included (1) the rehabilitation of traditional Chinese culture but in a way that blends in modern aspects of the Chinese culture; (2) China’s economic vitality and its model of achieving modernization; and (3) the employment of an omnidirectional diplomacy to demonstrate its “good global citizenship.” The third section highlights the key sources and targeted audience of China’s soft power at the moment of the hosting of the Beijing Games. This empirical study of a reformist version of soft power at the time of staging an Olympiad leads to an analysis comparing and contrasting China’s soft power mobilization and projection in the past and present of the PRC in the next chapter.

5.1 The context of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games

Before it moves to the discussion of China’s soft power projection through staging the Beijing Games, this section portrays its broad domestic and international context and explains

³ In this regard, Yongjin Zhang argues that it is not China’s soft power that co-opts others; rather, China’s international behaviour has been transformed by the dominant international norms and rules. See Yongjin Zhang, “The discourse of China’s soft power and its discontents,” in Mingjiang Li ed., *Soft Power*, 55. Whilst I agree with Yongjing Zhang’s observation, I also consider that China’s soft power projection nevertheless aims to change others’ behaviour or attitudes toward China for China’s continuing development purpose.

why the Chinese were so keen to host an Olympiad. In doing so, firstly, it helps to elucidate China's changing role as a rising power in the post-Cold War international system. Secondly, China's shifting role in the evolving international system affects Chinese perception of power. Thirdly, it helps to understand why China put in such an enormous amount of efforts to promote itself by hosting an Olympiad.

5.1.1 The rise of China on the world stage

The 2008 Olympic Games arrived in China in the context of China's rise resulting from the persistent implementation of economic-driven reform from the end of 1978. Many commentators remarked that the 2008 Beijing Games represented a "coming out" party for China to showcase its newly gained material strength.⁴ The success was not only about China, but also should be understood as the consequence of mutual engagement and recognition between China and the evolving international system since the 1970s.

During most of the Maoist era, the PRC experienced non-engagement and non-recognition from the post-war international system and from many states. However, this situation reached a turning point in the 1970s, when China began its participation and integration in the prevailing international system. This turning point started with the PRC's replacement of the Republic of China (ROC) in the UN in 1971. The PRC's entry into the UN not only legitimated the Beijing regime in the international community, but "re-established the universality of that global international organization."⁵

The mutual engagement and recognition between China and many other international forces that started in the early 1970s brought significant changes to the country. First, China began to participate in and interact with various post-war international political and economic regimes. Second, many more states established diplomatic relations with China, which enabled more bilateral interactions. Third, China "went through a period of apprenticeship to master the rules of the game of parliamentary politics at the General Assembly and other institutions."⁶

Fourth and most importantly, the mutual engagement and recognition in the 1970s laid the foundation for China to re-orient itself within the existing international system and provided incentives for Mao's successors to open up China to the outside world. China began to see itself as a part of the existing international system.⁷ As such, it fundamentally challenged the

⁴ For example, Lee M. Sands, "The 2008 Olympics' impact on China," *China Business Review*, July-August 2008, accessed at: <https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0807/sands.html>.

⁵ Yongjin Zhang, *China in International Society since 1949*, 61.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁷ However Beijing in the 1970s still pronounced its opposition to the prevailing international system

Maoist vision of China and the world where China represented the antithesis of the prevailing international system and sought revolutionary changes to it by means of war and revolution. In the post-Mao period, the themes of war and revolution were gradually replaced by the aspiration for peace and development.⁸ The changing perception of China and the world propelled China's further integration and accommodation into international political and economic systems through the arduous implementation of the program of modernization and the policies of "reform and opening up" in the post-Mao era.

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR created a new international geopolitical context. For China, it produced a welcome relief due to the disintegration of the Soviet adversary – the colossus on its northern borders. However, in the meantime, it brought challenges to the ruling party – the CCP – involving controversy over the legitimacy of Communist rule as well as how to run a "modern socialist state."⁹ Reacting to these challenges, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping emerged from his retirement and took a "Southern tour" through the economic hubs of southern China in early 1992 to send a clear message to both Chinese citizens and international China observers that China would continue its economic liberalization but with the CCP in control.¹⁰ However, despite still being a one-party political system, the PRC is no long commanded by paramount leaders. It has become more factional and bureaucratic.¹¹ In addition, the fall of the USSR prompted a debate within the Chinese intelligentsia over what makes a great power. Chinese analysts generally took the Soviet model of developing its power as a negative example. They suggested that the Soviets paid excessive attention to the expansion of hard military power and that the unbalanced development between military and economic, between hard power and soft power, contributed to the Soviet loss in the Cold War and its diminished global presence.¹² Consequently, these analysts strongly recommended that in the post-Cold War era

and hegemonism, in particular, the Soviet aggressive international policies. The PRC still sought changes of the international system, but such challenges by China in the 1970s were mostly made from the perspective of an "insider." See Qin Yaqing, *国际体系与中国外交 (International System and China's Diplomacy)* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 2009), 86.

⁸ See Liang Shoude, *邓小平理论与当代中国国际关系学 (Deng Xiaoping Theory and Contemporary China's International Relations)* (Harbin and Beijing: Heilongjiang Jiaoyu & Beijing Daxue, 2003), 53-68.

⁹ Kissinger, *On China*, 456-458.

¹⁰ Deng Xiaoping, "在武昌、深圳、珠海、上海等地的谈话要点" (Talking points [from Deng's visits to] Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai, January 18-February 21, 1992), *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, vol.3: 370-383.

¹¹ For recent discussion of China's political and social changes, see Willy Lam, *Changing of the Guard: Beijing Grooms Sixth-Generation Cadres for 2020s* (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2010); Zhao Litao and Lim Tin Seng eds., *China's New Social Policy: Initiatives for A Harmonious Society* (Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2010); David Shambaugh ed., *Charting China's Future: Domestic and International Challenges* (London; New York: Routledge, 2011).

¹² Zhu Tingchang, "世纪之交中国的综合国力评估" (The assessment of China's CNP at the turn of

China must strengthen its comprehensive national power (CNP) by a coordinated development between hard power and soft power to achieve long-lasting great power status.¹³

Therefore, the changing international environment has affected not only Chinese elites' perception of China's role in the international system, but also the way of conducting their reform and developing the country. The basic goal of reform under the CCP's leadership is simple and clear, which is to ensure continuing sustained economic growth and enrichment for the Chinese population, but to avoid dramatic regime change.¹⁴ Guided by this economically-driven reform, China's economy has moved from a self-reliant and rigid centrally planned economy in the Maoist period to a more liberal and market-oriented system. China has experienced phenomenal economic growth in the past decades. For the thirty years from 1979 to 2008, China's economy grew at an annual rate of about 10 per cent.¹⁵ China's gross national income (GNI) per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) increased from \$250 in 1980 to \$6230 in 2008. China also made great strides in poverty reduction. By the World Bank's estimate, by 2008, 662 million Chinese people had risen above the poverty line.¹⁶

In addition to material growth, the Chinese leadership has paid enormous attention to shaping and reinterpreting Chinese culture by the rehabilitation of traditional culture, so as to enhance national cohesion at a time when the ideology of communism and Maoism were losing public appeal.¹⁷ They launched various national patriotic campaigns by advancing "Chinese socialist culture" and Chinese cultural heritage such as Confucianism to enhance Chinese people's belief in the regime and pride in their country.¹⁸ Chinese culture has become more dynamic by incorporating its own traditional culture as well as modern aspects learned from other societies.

Accompanying its massive domestic transformation was China's more positive and cooperative role in world affairs. The Chinese government demonstrated its willingness to

the century), *世界经济与政治论坛* (*Forum of World Economic and Politics*), no.3 (1999), 1; Sheng Jiru, "China must not neglect strengthening its 'soft power'," 12.

¹³ Xi Runchan, "Strategic thinking on strengthening CNP," 12.

¹⁴ Wang Fei-ling, "Preservation, prosperity and power: what motivates China's foreign policy?" *Journal of Contemporary China* 14:45 (2005), 669-694; Scott, "China and the 'responsibilities' of a 'responsible power'."

¹⁵ See "data" of the World Bank website, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

¹⁶ See "data" of the World Bank website, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD/countries>; and http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVCALNET/Resources/Global_Poverty_Update_2012_02-29-12.pdf, 3.

¹⁷ Yingjie Guo, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: the Search for National Identity under Reform* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, ch.2.

play a constructive and responsible role by cooperating with other powers to tackle international issues. China has become deeply integrated into the international political economy and actively participated in multilateral political, economic and strategic international organizations, particularly since the mid-1990s. According to Marc Lanteigne, China's behaviour in this regard represents "a notable departure from traditional foreign policy preferences for bilateral linkage (especially in matters related to security) and from a longstanding aversion to committing the country to formal strategic regimes."¹⁹ This dimension of the change of China's diplomacy is elaborated in the second section.

China's emerging material strength and increasing global presence since the commencement of its reform and opening in the late 1970s thus drove the Chinese movement from the fringes to the centre of the world stage at the beginning of the 21st century. The rest of the world generally welcomed China's "reform and opening up" policies, but no one (even the Chinese) anticipated that China could accumulate its material power so quickly. It therefore raised a high-profile debate about whether China's rise would pose a threat to the West and the prevailing liberal order. Responding to international concerns about China's rise, Chinese political elites brought out the concept of "peaceful rise/development" and made it a national policy to reassure other states of its benign intentions and to project a positive image to facilitate its continuing development and integration into the international system.²⁰ The 29th Olympiad arrived in China within this context. Hosting the Games provided China with a central stage to display what China is and what role it seeks to play in the global community. It also represented an opportunity for the CCP to lift its leadership role both at home and abroad.

The historical change in China's national development path and its sense of itself and the world coincided with China's relations with the Olympic Movement, which is explained next.

5.1.2 Sport as the continuation of politics and the Olympic Movement in China

This subsection provides a discussion of the relationship between sport, particularly the Olympics, and politics, so as to grasp why the Olympic Games are of such importance to the Chinese people and the state, broadcasting a renewed image of China across history.

Nowadays, probably nobody would deny that many large-scale international cultural events are just a continuation of politics, and it cannot be truer than with the Olympic Games. The

¹⁹ Marc Lanteigne, *China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 101.

²⁰ Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, *中国的和平发展道路 (China's Peaceful Development)* (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, December 2005).

main reason is that the Games and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) have been structured and developed *within* the modern international state system: the athlete is a representative of a state; the national Olympic committees are organized by state boundaries; the IOC is composed of Olympic committees that are organized by state boundaries; and IOC members themselves are regarded as "sport ambassadors" representing their states.²¹ Albeit an international organization, the Games' primary actor is the state. As such, there has been an inherent tension between internationalism, by which the founder Baron Pierre de Coubertin meant the appreciation of the differences between the participating countries, and the tendency to homogenize world cultures through the worldwide expansion of the Olympic Movement.²²

Due to the structure of the Olympic Games and their great public exposure, it is impossible to keep politics out of the picture; rather, they "increasingly serve as an arena for debate about modern nationhood and international relations."²³ In this sense, sport in general and the Olympics in particular are used as a political means to achieve political ends. For one thing, the Games have always provided a superior platform for the nation state to obtain recognition and legitimacy. For this reason, "[t]o be a nation recognized by others...a people must march in the Olympic Games Opening Ceremonies."²⁴ The state needs this spotlight to gain universal recognition of its membership. Secondly, the Games are frequently used as a tool of diplomacy to demonstrate national predisposition and positions toward international affairs. Richard Espy, an expert on Olympic politics, observes that, "[b]y sending delegations of athletes abroad, states can establish a first basis for diplomatic relations or can more effectively maintain such relations." By contrast, "the cancellation of a proposed sports visit to another nation can be used by a state as a means of voicing displeasure with that specific government or with its policies."²⁵ Thirdly, the Games have significance for promoting "official" versions of political and public culture, history, society, development and nation-branding, as shown in the rivalry in the Cold War between the US and the USSR both in sports competitions and for hosting rights. Large-scale global events thus have been used as a stage for the projection of socio-political successes as well as the distinctiveness of each nation, and sometimes "for the symbolic contestation of modernity...between different models of development."²⁶ These representational usages can all be found in China's

²¹ Espy, *The Politics of the Olympic Games*, 9.

²² Brownell, *Training the Body for China*, 32.

²³ *Ibid.*, 313.

²⁴ Quoted from Xin Xu, "Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight: China's national identity and the 2008 Beijing Olympiad," *The Editorial Board of the Sociological Review* 2006, 95.

²⁵ Espy, *The Politics of the Olympic Games*, 3.

²⁶ Wolfram Manzenreiter, "The Beijing Games in the Western imagination of China: the weak power

approach to the Olympic Movement since the early 20th century.

China claimed that its aspiration to host an Olympiad was the culmination of a 100-year-old dream (*bai nian meng xiang*). In the Chinese media, many referred to the year 1908 as the starting journey of the Chinese Olympic dream, because they believed it was the year that the famous “three questions about the Olympics” had been raised in China. These questions were: (1) when would China be able to send a winning athlete to the Olympics? (2) When would China be able to send a winning team to the Olympics? And (3) when would China be able to invite the entire world to come to Beijing for an Olympiad?²⁷ Whilst some scholars questioned whether these exact expressions were formulated 1908, a general consensus was that it was at the beginning of the 20th century that the European Olympics caught Chinese attention.²⁸ Chinese elites would obsess over variations of these questions for the remainder of the 20th century. No one associated with these questions in the early 20th century could have dreamed that China would have to wait a whole century before it could host an Olympiad. “One World, One Dream,” the motto for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, exactly expressed the Chinese desperate yearning for an Olympiad held in their own country.

The modern Olympic movement introduced to China in the early 20th century was significant for the Chinese people and nation. It represented a provocative challenge meant to stimulate the modern and nationalist sentiments of the Chinese people and the international role of China. The Chinese yearning for the Olympics directly reflected their anxiety about their declining national fortune and international image since the mid-19th century, a time when China was weak, invaded by major world powers and forced to make “unequal treaties” with them. However, it was after the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895, in which China was defeated by its smaller neighbour Japan, once a tributary state of the Chinese empire, that the situation became particularly alarming. In previous wars, the Chinese elites had attributed their failure to the Europeans’ advanced technology and weapons, whereas the Sino-Japanese War evoked a deep feeling that there must be something fundamentally “wrong” in the Chinese people’s physique and psyche. Yan Fu, a well-known scholar and an English-Chinese translator, coined the phrase “sick man” (*bingfu*) in 1895 to express his anxiety about China’s

of soft power,” *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 34:1 (2010), 32.

²⁷ For example, “奥运三问” (The three questions of the Olympics), the eighth episode in the Chinese documentary *辛亥百年·一瞬间* (100th Anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution – A Flash), 2011; “百年奥运梦 体育强国路” (100-year-old Olympic dream, the road to being a great sporting power) (July 31, 2008), *Renmin Ribao Online*: <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/123400/123579/7593154.html>

²⁸ Cui Lequan, “奥林匹克在中国的发展” (Development of the Olympic Movement in China), *武汉体育学院学报* (*Journal of Wuhan Institute of Physical Education*), no.4 (2007), 2; Zhang Bo, *近代中国的奥运记忆* (*The Olympic Memory in Modern China*) (Tianjin: Tianjin Guji, 2008), ch.2 “奥运三问：事实还是捏造” (The three questions of Olympics: fact or fabricated).

weakness. To make China strong again, Yan argued, the Chinese had to improve their physical strength, intelligence, and morality. The improvement of Chinese people's physical strength was of the first necessity.²⁹ One year later, the Shanghai journal *Shiwu Bao*, under the editorship of a leading reformist scholar Liang Qichao, published a translation of an English journal article which called China "the sick man of the East" (*dongfang bingfu*). This English article regarded that "China has long been insensitive and deeply sick. However, only after the Sino-Japanese War did other countries recognize the real situation of China [its deep-rooted sickness]."³⁰ Perhaps this was the first time that such a name-calling had occurred. What is more, *Shiwu Bao* soon published another translated article "The World's Four Sick Men" (*Tianxia Si Bingren*), which ranked China with Turkey, Persia and Morocco. The article characterised the symptoms of China's sickness as "the government has no strategy and the people lack prowess," despite China's large territory and population and its rich endowment of resources. It concluded that "had there not been intervention by other powers, China could have been conquered by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War."³¹ Later, the label "sick man of East Asia" became associated with the Chinese, and it continued to haunt and humiliate the Chinese for the following half-century. While the Chinese elites wanted to use this phrase to prompt the Chinese people to fight for their nation, the foreign press picked it up to show their changing attitude toward China – from respect for a country once seen as civilised, prosperous and admirable, to contempt for a China that seemed ever more barbaric and backward.

To purge the shame and rebuild the image of China and its people, leading scholars and politicians since then have repeatedly picked up the phrase "sick man of East Asia" to urge the populace to strengthen their physical training and make great efforts to save their nation. Firstly, Olympic-style physical culture was imported and promoted in China as the kind of endeavour required of a modern and healthy populace. China as a nation had valued letters and belittled arms for too long and it was high time that the Chinese liberated and strengthened their bodies by importing modern physical culture from the West.³² Wang Zhengting, a Republican diplomat wrote in 1930: "If people want to pursue freedom and equality in today's world where the weak serve as meat on the chopping block, they first must

²⁹ Yan Fu, "原强" (The origins of national strength), in Wang Shied., 严复集 (*Collections of Yan Fu*) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986), 5, 13, 14, 18, 26.

³⁰ "中国实情" (The real situation of China), *时务报* (*Shiwu Bao*), no.10 (November 1, 1896), 15-16, accessed from database "National Index to Chinese Newspapers and Periodicals": <http://www.cnbkxy.com/ShanghaiLibrary/pages/jsp/fm/index/index.jsp>

³¹ "天下四病人" (The world's four sick men), *Shiwu Bao*, no.14 (December 15, 1896), 12-13.

³² For instance, Liang Qichao, *新民说* (*Theories of New Citizenship*) (Shenyang: Liaoning Publishing House, 1994), 150-56; Zhang Zhidong, *劝学篇* (*Exhortation to Learning*) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1991).

train strong and fit bodies.”³³ The most effective way of training the body, according to many Chinese elite intellectuals in the Republican era, was through militarized sports.³⁴ Secondly, the purpose of the populace’s physical training was tied to the ultimate goal of the Chinese: to save their nation and strengthen the race (*jiu guo qiang zhong*).³⁵ For instance, Chiang Kai-shek made an inscription for *Shishi Yuebao*’s special issue on Republican China’s Fifth National Games held in October 1933: “National power relies on a warlike spirit...[we] should use sports to save the nation. We Chinese can thereby achieve our heroic national ambition.”³⁶ The underpinning logic for this kind of argument was that if the citizens were sick, the nation naturally became vulnerable; conversely a strong people could lead to a great nation.³⁷ The improvement of Chinese physical quality and China’s national survival and revival were closely connected. The Chinese elite thus embraced Olympic-style sports competition as an instrument to prompt the populace to exercise and boost morale for the fight for their nation. The embrace of modern international sports in China represented a systematic effort to link “individual strength, discipline, and health” with the military, industrial and “diplomatic ‘strength’ of the national body.”³⁸ What is more, many Chinese believed that through the vehicle of international sports competitions, the Chinese people could convey what they stood for and could achieve, and consequently overcome historical humiliation and regain international recognition.

Chinese historical perceptions of modern physical culture greatly affected China’s policy and practice of international sports. International sports games and the Olympics in particular were frequently and purposefully used by Chinese politicians as a tool of politics and diplomacy. For instance, China’s first attendance at the Olympic Games, in the 1932 Los Angeles Games, was actually more driven by political calculations than by enthusiasm about the Games *per se*. At first, China’s Nationalist government did not intend to participate due to the severe domestic situation caused by the Japanese invasion in 1931. However, when the Nationalist authorities received information that Manchukuo, the puppet state created in 1932

³³ Quoted in Song Ruhai, *我能比呀: 世界运动会丛录 (I Can Compete: Records of the Olympic Games)* (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1930), preface 1.

³⁴ Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams*, 20-24.

³⁵ For example, Sun Yat-sen once argued “today we advocate physical exercise because it is crucial for us to strengthen our race and protect our nation... If we want to make our country strong, we must first make sure our people have strong bodies.” Quoted in Gu Shiquan, *中国体育史 (History of Sport in China)* (Beijing: Beijing Tiyu Daxue, 2003), 204.

³⁶ *时事月报 (Current Events Monthly)* 9:4 (1933), accessed from “National Index to Chinese Newspapers and Periodicals.”

³⁷ Liang Qichao, *Theories of New Citizenship*, 160; also see Mao Zedong, “体育之研究 (On physical culture),” *新青年 (New Youth)*, 1 April 1917.

³⁸ Andrew D. Morris, *Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 3.

by Japan in China's Northeast, might take part in the Games, they were full of indignation at this Japanese attempt to gain legitimacy for their invasion of China's territory. As a result, they decided to attend the Games to represent the only legitimate body of China – even with a delegation of only one single athlete.³⁹

After the Communist takeover, the CCP were fully aware that national sports policy could influence the PRC's national image building and international prestige. Sport has been implicitly or explicitly defined as a supplementary vehicle of the PRC's diplomatic struggle for its international legitimacy and prestige. International sports competition has to some extent been deliberately employed by Chinese Communist leaders to fulfil subtle diplomatic tasks.⁴⁰ For instance, Beijing withdrew from the Olympic movement from 1958 until "the two Chinas" issue was resolved in 1979.⁴¹ The PRC's withdrawal was a symbolic act to protest against Western support for the ROC as the only legitimate body of China in the IOC. To strengthen its protest, China played a leading role along with Indonesia in rallying the other underdeveloped countries to create a Games of the New Emerging Forces to oppose the IOC, though it was held only once in Jakarta in November 1963. Another classic example was the famous "ping-pong diplomacy." On April 6, 1971, the Chinese leaders deliberately sent out an invitation to an American ping-pong team to visit China, when the latter was taking part in the 31st World Table Tennis Championships in Japan. By this invitation, the CCP gave an important message that they would like to resume their contact with the US government. This episode helped break the ice and gave rise to the comment that "the small ball" (ping pong) eventually moved the "big ball" (the globe).⁴² Additionally, China's boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics was utilized to protest "Soviet chauvinism" in the Communist bloc and its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In contrast, its participation in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics was a demonstration of its alignment with the US.

A review of China's historical views of and relationship with modern sports helps us understand the role of sports in Chinese international relations and moreover why China should see it as a historical responsibility to host an Olympiad. The significance of modern sports, and the Olympic Games particularly, was recognized and embraced by the Chinese elite at a critical juncture in the expansion of Western civilisation and the saving and re-

³⁹ "1932 年, 刘长春为何单刀赴会?" (The year 1932, why Liu Changchun attended Olympics alone?), February 20, 2006, *Jing Bao*, accessed at: http://www.thefirst.cn/900tian/90006_2_27_8.htm

⁴⁰ Xin Xu, "Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight," 93.

⁴¹ Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams*, 2008, 75-116; Hill, *Olympic Politics*, 40-53; Zhang Qing, 申奥纪实——亲历中国重返奥运和两次申奥 (Witness of the Olympic Bids: Personal Experience of China's Return to the Olympics and Two Olympic Bids) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2008), 1-2, 13-30.

⁴² Xie Yixian ed., *Diplomatic History of Contemporary China*, 222.

building of the Chinese nation. Sport has been endowed with a nationalist sentiment to become a vehicle to transform the “sick man of East Asia” into a legitimate, equal, and strong modern nation that is worthy of respect by the entire world. Modern international sports thus have been infused with nationalism in the Chinese context – as another means of fighting for the nation, and have been perceived by the Chinese political elite as a continuation of politics and an effective tool of diplomacy. Overall, the whole process of China’s entry, withdrawal and re-entry into the Olympic system represents Chinese aspiration for the international recognition of its status and legitimacy in the international community.

5.1.3 Two bids for the Olympic Games

Even though the Chinese had long noticed the significance between politics and sports, it was not until after the PRC had acquired its recognition from international society and its membership of the IOC in 1979 that the Chinese authorities started to work on the possibility of hosting an Olympiad.⁴³ This was also the time that the PRC re-designed its path of national development by implementing the policies of “reform and opening-up” and started its “new long march” toward the goal of being a modern, rich and strong nation within the existing international system. Reformist Chinese leaders decided to socialize with the rest of the world by various channels, such as trade, cultural exchange, sports, tourism, and pragmatic diplomacy. Participating and successfully hosting international sports events greatly suited the state’s interest to engage with the international community. Projecting China’s “greatness” through hosting an Olympiad was regarded as an effective mechanism for fulfilling the “great power dream (*qiangguo meng*)” and an essential component of China’s re-emergence on the world stage.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, an aspirant Olympics host city has to overcome many hurdles. For Beijing, it took two bid attempts to obtain the right to host: the first attempt in 1993 failed; and the second bid in 2001 succeeded.

5.1.3.1 The 1993 bid for the 2000 Summer Games

The success of the 1990 Beijing Asian Games, its first experience of hosting an international Games, made the dream of hosting the 2000 Summer Olympic Games seem within reach.⁴⁵ On March 1, 1991, the State Council of the PRC approved the joint application from the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) and the Beijing municipal government for Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympiad. On December 4, 1992, Beijing delivered its application package to IOC headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland.⁴⁶ Beijing thus started its Olympic Games

⁴³ Zhang Qing, *Witness of the Olympic Bids*, 31.

⁴⁴ Interviews with two Chinese officials at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, April 16, 2010.

⁴⁵ Zhang Qing, *Witness of the Olympic Bid*, 52-53.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

bidding journey.

In the proposal, the Beijing 2000 Olympic Games Bid Committee highlighted the Chinese Olympic dream, China's determination to further socialize itself to be in tune with the rest of the world through the Olympics, and Beijing's cultural assets as a candidate host city.⁴⁷ The slogans of the Beijing 2000 bid – “a more open China awaits the 2000 Olympic Games” and “a chance for Beijing, a miracle returns to the world”⁴⁸ – demonstrated China's re-imagination of itself and its determination to engage with the rest of the world.

However, Beijing did not get the chance. In 1993 Beijing was defeated by Sydney, which received 45 votes, 2 more votes than Beijing.⁴⁹ There were two leading explanations for this outcome. For one thing, concerns over China's human rights issues remained strong during the deliberation, because of the fresh memory of Beijing's crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen protest. Beijing's bid consequently was strongly attacked and opposed, particularly by the US.⁵⁰ Another common explanation in China attributed this loss to the biased view of China from the West. The Chinese were aware of the decisive Anglo-European force in the IOC. It was said that almost half of the IOC seats were held by the European countries, and two-thirds of the committee's executive board were European.⁵¹ Many Chinese believed that this factor led to Beijing's loss to Sydney.⁵² Beijing's loss led the Chinese to link their loss with the notion of “clash of civilisations.” Some Chinese analysts argued that it had been a cultural or ideological bias that resulted in the failure of Beijing's 1993 bid.⁵³ However, both arguments have their limitations. From the first time Beijing made its bid in 1993 to its second attempt in 2001, there was neither substantial development of China's human rights held by the international public opinions⁵⁴ nor significant changes in Anglo-European

⁴⁷ *Beijing 2000, the Year of the Games – a Summary*, Beijing: Beijing 2000 Olympic Games Bid Committee, 1993.

⁴⁸ Zhang Qing, *Witness of the Olympic Bid*, 56.

⁴⁹ For details of all rounds of voting in 1993, see Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams*, 237.

⁵⁰ Brownell, *Training the Body for China*, 323; Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams*, 235-237.

⁵¹ Robert Knight Barney et al, *Selling the Five Rings: the International Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2002), 286, quoted from Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams*, 238.

⁵² Interview with Dr Li Ning, Deputy Director of Department of Physical Education of Beijing University, April 12, 2010.

⁵³ For the linking of Beijing's loss with the idea of “clash of civilisations”, see for example, Li Xiguan et al, *妖魔化中国的背后 (Behind Demonizing China)* (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1996); Wang Bo et al, “终于，我们走到了奥运” (At last, we have arrived at the Olympics), *世界知识 (World Affairs)*, no.15 (2008), 20-37. For the concept of “clash of civilisations” see Samuel P. Huntington, “The clash of civilisations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72:3 (Summer 1993), 22-49.

⁵⁴ See the Reports of China from Human Rights Watch, <http://www.hrw.org/home>. For example, *Dangerous Minds: Political Psychiatry in China Today and its Origins in the Mao Era*, 13 August 2002, 2785, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3deb868a1.html>; also see, Minky Worden ed., *China's Great Leap: the Beijing Games and Olympian Human Rights Challenges* (New

influence at the IOC.⁵⁵ Following the above arguments, Beijing should have lost its second attempt as well. But Beijing did succeed in 2001. A much simpler explanation for China's loss was later revealed by Australia's Olympic Committee, that it had bribed two IOC officials to secure the crucial two vote margin over Beijing.⁵⁶

Although the Chinese authorities were disappointed at the IOC's decision, some officials admitted that the international political environment was not good for China in the early 1990s and China's comprehensive power was not strong. Accordingly, they stressed that China had to work hard to develop its economy and improve its global image. In this regard, China needed to be more open and to continuously socialize with the rest of the world.⁵⁷

Although China's first bid failed, it represented an important attempt in this broad process in which China sought to reposition itself as an engaged and harmonious power. This motive guided the Chinese authorities for their second bid.

5.1.3.2 The 2001 bid for the 2008 Summer Games

Fully aware of the significance of the Olympics for national development and branding as well as for international recognition and prestige, the Chinese leaders determined to win the right to host an Olympiad. At the end of the 1990s, Beijing decided to make another bid for the hosting rights. On April 7, 1999, Beijing once again submitted its application to IOC headquarters.⁵⁸ This official decision was backed by overwhelming popular support and the Chinese people's great enthusiasm for hosting the first ever Olympic Games in China. In 2001, the IOC undertook a Gallup poll, which showed a 95% approval rating for a bid to host the 29th Olympiad among Beijing residents.⁵⁹ Beijing appeared more confident and ready this time.

First, Chinese leaders made a strong argument that a truly international Olympic Movement

York: Seven Stories Press, 2008).

⁵⁵ The member list of the IOC is available at: <http://www.olympic.org/content/the-ioc/the-ioc-institution/1/ioc-members-list/>. However, this list only shows the current IOC members. As such, we cannot see the earlier members as well as those who might have left the organization during the time. Nevertheless, it allows an approximate calculation. There are 14 Europeans (including those from the USA, Canada, and Australia, and 1 from Russia) vis-à-vis 6 from other countries by the year of 1992, before the 1993 bid. Although there is a big increase in non-European members since 1994, from 6 to 22 by 2001, European members still take up more than half of this list, which is 33 Europeans (including 2 Russians) versus 28 non-Europeans by 2001.

⁵⁶ See Kevan Gosper and Glenda Korporaal, *Olympic Life: Melbourne 1956 to Sydney 2000* (St. Leonards, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 328-348; Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams*, 239-240.

⁵⁷ Interview with an official of General Administration of Sport of China, Beijing, December 9, 2011.

⁵⁸ “申奥大事记” (Memorabilia for the Olympics bid), *RMRB* (July 13, 2001), 9.

⁵⁹ “北京奥申委新闻发布会掌声最热烈” (Vehement applause in the the Beijing Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) press), *RMRB* (July 13, 2001), 8.

would have to encompass the non-Western world. In his letter to the IOC in 2000, China's President Jiang Zemin wrote:

It will be of extremely great significance to promoting and carrying out the Olympic spirit in China and across the world and to facilitating the cultural exchanges and convergence between East and West if the Games of the XXIX Olympiad are held in China, a rapidly developing country with a long-standing civilization and 22 per cent of the world's population.⁶⁰

Second, Beijing's 2001 bid promoted what China could do for the world through the Games, unlike the more passive "waiting for a chance" sentiment in its first bid slogan. It demonstrated China's confidence and its strong sense of the internationalism of the Olympic Movement. Beijing highlighted that, "history has presented a unique opportunity for the IOC to create an unparalleled legacy for Olympianism through its 2008 decision. China is ready to welcome the world." What is more, "the Olympic Games in Beijing will be a bridge of harmony between cultures and embody the Olympic movement's unique integration of sport and culture."⁶¹ Accordingly, the emblem Beijing chose for its 2008 bid was a stylized traditional Chinese handicraft pattern known as "China knot," incorporating the typical colours of the five Olympic rings. The design looks like a dynamic human figure in a stance that portrays someone doing "Taiji", a traditional Chinese exercise. The choice not only highlighted China's traditional sporting culture but symbolized the unity and cooperation among peoples from all over the world.⁶²



Figure 4.1: The emblem for the bid for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games: China knot

⁶⁰ Jiang Zemin, "Letter of support by Jiang Zemin," *Candidature Files*, vol.1, available at: <http://images.beijing2008.cn/upload/lib/bidreport/jiang.pdf>

⁶¹ Quoted from Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams*, 2008, 244.

⁶² The illustration is based on the explanation from the designer, Chen Shaohua, "北京申奥标志是如何出炉的" (how did the emblem for Beijing Olympics bid emerge), *华商报* (Huashang Bao), November 8, 2000, available at: <http://sports.sina.com.cn/o/0893092.shtml>

In addition, Beijing promised to provide the world with a “*Xin Beijing, Xin Aoyun* (New Beijing, Great Olympics),” which was its bidding slogan. It is worth pointing out the difference between the Chinese version and English one. The Chinese slogan literally means “New Beijing, New Olympics.” So why the difference when put into English? One Chinese official explained to a foreign journalist that if China proclaimed a “new Olympics” in English, “it would seem as if China wanted to change the Games,” and “the IOC wouldn’t like that. They’d think here’s this Communist country that’s trying to take over the Olympics.”⁶³ The subtlety of the language indicated one lesson China had learned on how to communicate with the international audience, “the importance of considering what others might think of China and making adjustments to be sure that nothing is offensive.”⁶⁴

On all accounts, in its second bid, the Chinese authority was trying very hard to send a message to IOC members and the international public that China was a normal nation, a peaceful force, willing to socialize with the rest, not an isolated and ideologically determined country any more. The Chinese efforts eventually paid off. The IOC members chose Beijing in 2001. In the conclusion of the IOC’s report on Beijing’s bid, it writes:

This is a *Government-driven bid* with considerable assistance of the NOC (National Olympic Committee). The combination of a good sports concept with *complete Government support results in a high quality bid*. The Commission noted the process and pace of change taking place in China and Beijing, and the possible challenges caused by population and economic growth in the period leading up to 2008, but was confident that these challenges could be met. There is an environmental challenge, but the strong Government actions and investment in this area should resolve this and improve the city. It is the Commission’s belief that a *Beijing Games would leave a unique legacy to China and to sport*, and the Commission is confident that Beijing could organise excellent Games.⁶⁵ (emphasis added)

From the IOC report, it is explicit that there were two factors that contributed to Beijing’s success. On the one hand, due to the wholehearted support from the central government of the PRC, many IOC members believed that Beijing had the financial, mobilization and operational capacity to host the Games. On the other hand, there were political considerations

⁶³ Peter Hessler, *Oracle Bones: A Journey between China’s Past and Present* (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 261.

⁶⁴ Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams*, 243.

⁶⁵ IOC Archives, Minutes of the 112th IOC Session, Moscow, July 13-16, 2001, 240, quoted in Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams*, 246.

– a Beijing Games would have an unprecedented influence on China and the Olympic movement. As discussed earlier, China's human rights record in the light of the Tiananmen crisis was one factor that led to China's loss of its 1993 bid. This mindset was balanced by the desire of many others in the IOC and international community to fully socialize China through the Olympics. They anticipated that if the 2008 Olympiad could be held in Beijing, it would help to accelerate openness in China and enhance China's integration into the global community.⁶⁶ It is generally argued that the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics and the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics represented the "turning points" for the integration of Japan and South Korea into the international community. An analogy perhaps had been made between China and its two close East Asian neighbours. It thus had generated the expectation that the 2008 Beijing Games would be a "turning point" for China, especially for China's political regime and its international behaviour.⁶⁷

As for China, the success of this bid was backed by considerable Chinese effort made in the previous eight years. Firstly, in spite of the isolation after the Tiananmen tragedy, the CCP leaders emphasized that China would stick to the trajectory of economic reform and openness to the world. They also highlighted the importance of global capitalist institutions to China's development, such as the norms of the market economy, free trade and open capital flows.⁶⁸ China's economy grew rapidly in the 1990s with the average annual growth rate reaching 10.6%.⁶⁹ Undoubtedly, China's economic power enabled Beijing to provide sufficient financial support for the Games. Secondly, its stance of openness to the world and engagement of the international community since the late 1970s demonstrated its sense of membership of the international community. China's openness and integration into the existing international system was generally welcomed by the external world. Its sophisticated diplomacy in the 1990s was recognized by other world powers and regional actors. The Sino-US relationship was maintained under the framework of engagement in the 1990s. China's "good neighbourly foreign policy" was well received in the region.⁷⁰ In the late 1990s, China

⁶⁶ See Jere Longman, "Beijing wins bid for 2008 Olympic Games," *New York Times*, July 14, 2001.

⁶⁷ Susan Brownell, "The Beijing Olympics as a turning point? China's first Olympics in East Asian perspective," *Asia-Pacific Journal* (Japan Focus Online), vol.23-4-09 (June 8, 2009), accessed from: <http://www.japanfocus.org/-susan-brownell/3166>; Victor D. Cha, "Beijing's Olympic-sized catch-22," *The Washington Quarterly* 31:3 (Summer 2008), 105-123; Victor D. Cha, "Politics and the Olympic transaction: measuring China's accomplishments," *The International Journal of the History and Sport* 27:14-15 (Sep.-Oct.2010), 2359-2379.

⁶⁸ On October 18, 1992, in the 14th CCP National Congress, the CCP's constitution was formally modified to adopt an amendment on adopting a market economy and building up the socialist market economy system. See <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64567/65446/6415682.html>

⁶⁹ World Bank, *China at a Glance*, March 29, 2012, accessed from http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/chn_aag.pdf

⁷⁰ Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's new diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 82:6 (November/December 2003), 25-26; Xie Yixian ed., *Diplomatic History of Contemporary China*, 383-

also settled its territorial disputes with Vietnam, Laos, Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in order to build a favourable regional environment for its economic development.⁷¹ All in all, Chinese leaders tried very hard to break out of their post-Tiananmen isolation and rebuild China's image as an integral member of the global community. At the beginning of the new millennium, China made itself more accommodated by the world than it was in the early 1990s.

Beijing's successful bid for the 2008 Olympics brought an outpouring of nationalism. An estimated 400,000 people converged on Tiananmen Square. Their boasts, "Beijing won!" "China succeeded!" and "Long live the motherland!" were echoed not only in the Square, but all over the country⁷² and among overseas Chinese communities.⁷³ China's leading official newspaper exclaimed that this was "a victory for Beijing, a victory for China, and also a victory of the Olympic spirit," and it was "a sleepless night for the 1.3 billion Chinese people."⁷⁴ This victory was not just about the success of the bid *per se*; it meant that Chinese people had eventually realized their century-long "Olympic dream" and finally erased their historical label as the "sick man of East Asia." It represented a great step in the grand revitalization of the Chinese nation.⁷⁵ Equally important, this success also meant a lot for the ruling party of China, the CCP. The official Chinese media were quick to talk up the larger symbolism of the decision made by the IOC. For example, one party publication stated: "The 2008 Beijing Olympics will be the world's affirmation of contemporary China's economic and social progress."⁷⁶ Similar comments in the Chinese media hinted that this great feat was only accomplished under the rule of the CCP and thus this very achievement constituted a ringing endorsement of the CCP regime.

5.2 Constitution and mobilization of China's soft power in the 2008 Beijing Games

Hosting an Olympiad had been the Chinese people's dream for a hundred years, and China had been longing for the moment to demonstrate its arrival on the world stage as a modern,

395, 419-448.

⁷¹ For details, look at Xie Yixian ed., *Diplomatic History of Contemporary China*, 445-448.

⁷² "首都各界欢庆北京申办 2008 年奥运会成功" (All fields in Beijing celebrated Beijing's victory in bidding for the 2008 Olympic Games), *RMRB* (July 14, 2001), 1.

⁷³ See the section of "international responses" under the title of "2008 Beijing won!" from the website of *Renmin*: <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5934/5937/index.html>

⁷⁴ "奥运史上新的里程碑" (New milestone in Olympic history), *Xinhua News Agency*, July 13, 2001.

⁷⁵ Interviews of Chinese undergraduate/postgraduate students of history and international relations, carried out in Nanjing University, Shanghai Fudan University, Beijing University, Apr. 2009, Mar.-Apr. 2010, Dec. 2011, China.

⁷⁶ Editorial, "奥运圣火, 你终于来了!" (The sacred Olympic torch has come at last!), *党员之友* (*Friends of Party Members*), no. 15 (2001), 1.

civilised and respected member of the world community. Immediately after obtaining the right to hold the 29th Olympiad, Chinese authorities faced the question of how China would achieve this goal of staging a successful and magnificent Olympic Games. As discussed earlier, the Olympic Games are not only about sports, but are also a significant international cultural and diplomatic event. The hosting of the Games naturally became an important site to study the constitution and mobilisation of China's key sources of soft power located at the peak of the debate on China's soft power.

This section therefore explores the key elements of soft power utilized and promoted throughout the Games. It finds that China's soft power was tied to the following aspects: (1) the rehabilitation of traditional Chinese culture but in a way that blended it with modern aspects of Chinese culture; (2) China's economic vitality and how it had achieved modernization; and (3) the employment of various diplomatic means to demonstrate its "good global citizenship."

5.2.1 Cultural China

Chinese scholars have long argued that culture should play a vital role in lifting China's international image and neutralizing perceptions of China as a threat when Chinese global influence grows.⁷⁷ In the context of the coming of the Olympic Games to China, "the world's largest single event for the production of national culture for international consumption,"⁷⁸ cultural strategy became more prominent. Accordingly, Chinese authorities placed the idea of "cultural China" into "the centre of the dialogue with the international audience in Olympic discourse."⁷⁹ Posters, emblem, slogans, mascots, and opening and closing ceremonies, blended with Chinese traditional culture and modern culture, were designed to present a benevolent China full of good spirits, such as harmony, diversity, pacifism, good governance, inclusiveness and openness. The promotion of a "cultural China" is examined through the theme of "Humanistic Olympics" (*Renwen Aoyun*)⁸⁰ major symbols of the Beijing Games and the "Brilliant Civilization (*cānlán wénmíng*)" presented in the opening ceremony. A "cultural China" was used not only to amaze the international audience, but also to raise Chinese cultural nationalism – Chinese people's pride in their nation.

⁷⁷ Interview with Yu Xintian of Shanghai Institute for International Studies, March 10, 2010, Shanghai, China.

⁷⁸ Brownell, *Training the Body for China*, 314.

⁷⁹ Manzenreiter, "The Beijing Games in the Western imagination of China," 33.

⁸⁰ There are two other translations of 人文奥运 (*Renwen Aoyun*): "People's and Cultural Olympics" and "People's Olympics."

5.2.1.1 "Humanistic Olympics" (*Renwen Aoyun*)

"Humanistic Olympics," the first theme of the Beijing Games, demonstrated China's intention to leave its great human and cultural legacy to the world. Literally, *Ren* means people, and *Wen* means culture. Therefore, there were two aspects of this concept: one stood for the "people's" Olympics and the other highlighted the "multicultural" Olympics. Together with "Green Olympics" (*Lüse Aoyun*) and "High-tech Olympics" (*Keji Aoyun*), they were the three themes of the Beijing Games. According to Jin Yuanpu, executive director of the Humanistic Olympics Studies Centre at People's University of China, the "Humanistic Olympics" concept represented a creative idea of unique value, which was at the heart of the spirit of the Beijing Olympics. The theme referred to the Games as an opportunity to (1) promote a "cultural China," and advocate cultural exchange and understanding among nations; (2) advance the CCP party-state's idea of governance; and (3) garner public support and socialize the Chinese people to be a "civilised nation" in a globalized world.⁸¹

Firstly, Chinese Olympic organisers argued that the theme "Humanistic Olympics" had caught the essence of the principle of the Olympic Movement, namely, the promotion of internationalism through sports and cultural exchange.⁸² The Beijing Games organizers noted that "the Olympic Games in Beijing will be a bridge of harmony between cultures and embody Olympianism's unique integration of sport and culture."⁸³ A sports analyst commented that the 2008 Games' "meeting of East and West – China and the world – will likely be the defining encounter of the 21st Century."⁸⁴ The meeting of China and the world also echoed in the official Olympic slogan "One World, One Dream." Liu Qi, Chairman of the Beijing Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) and the CCP Secretary of Beijing, on June 26, 2005, the day Beijing announced its slogan for the 2008 Games, claimed that it "voices 1.3 billion Chinese people's aspiration to contribute to the establishment of a peaceful and bright world.... It conveys the noble ideals of people in Beijing as well as in China to share their civilization and create a bright future hand in hand with people from the rest of the world."⁸⁵ The Chinese seized the opportunity not only to secure international recognition, but also to reinterpret the fundamental Olympic principles

⁸¹ Jin Yuanpu, "和谐是人文奥运的灵魂" (Harmony as the soul of *Renwen Aoyun*), *红旗文稿* (*Red Flag Manuscript*), no.15 (2008), 12-14.

⁸² Peng Yongjie et al., *人文奥运* (*People's and Cultural Olympics*) (Beijing: Dongfang, 2003), 7.

⁸³ BOCOG, *New Beijing, Great Olympics: Highlights of Beijing's Olympic Candidacy*, official publication of the bid committee, 2000.

⁸⁴ Brook Larmer, "The Center of the World," *Foreign Policy*, no.150 (Sep/Oct 2005), 68.

⁸⁵ "同一个世界 同一个梦想——北京奥运主题口号发布" (The release of the slogan of the Beijing Olympic Games: One World, One Dream), *Xinhua News Agency*, June 27, 2005; also see "'One World, One Dream' slogan for Olympics," *China Daily*, June 26, 2005.

and to promote the harmonization of world civilizations.⁸⁶ In this sense, it obviously echoed the Chinese political notion of “harmonious world.” This term formed the setting for Hu Jintao’s high-profile speech, “Building a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity,” delivered at the convention of the 60th anniversary of the United Nations on September 15, 2005. He declared that China’s development was to “jointly construct a harmonious world,” and emphasized that China was a force contributing to international peace and development.⁸⁷ Overall, the Chinese authorities promoted the concept of “Humanistic Olympics” to tell the world that China had not only rapid economic development, but also a rich cultural heritage that could contribute to enduring harmony in the world. It thus projected an image of a “cultural China” and demonstrated its full grasp of the spirit of internationalism embedded in the Olympic Movement.

Secondly, advancing the cause of the people and their culture reflected the Party’s concern and understanding of its legitimacy, closely tied to the people. This had historical roots, resonating with an age-old Confucian dictum of good governance, “he who wins the throne wins the throne.”⁸⁸ After the gradual decline of Marxism and Maoism as the dominant ideologies in society since the late 1970s, the CCP had to explore other ideologies to consolidate its rule. In recent years, the party burrowed into the Chinese cultural legacy to find statecraft. In 2003, just after Hu Jintao came to power, he advanced his ideology for China’s modernization project – “a scientific outlook on development” (*kexue fazhan guan*). This ideology highlights that “people-oriented development” is the central tenet of the CCP,⁸⁹ taking “development as its essence; putting people first as its core; comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development as its basic requirement; and overall consideration as its fundamental approach.”⁹⁰ It aims at tackling imbalance in development between different regions, urban and rural areas, economy and society, and domestic development and opening-up to the outside world, thereby building “a harmonious socialist society.” Achieving a “harmonious society,” represents “a long-coveted dream of humankind,” a belief drawn from the ancient Chinese concept of “great harmony under heaven” (*tianxia datong*) and “harmony

⁸⁶ V. Girginov, “Creative tensions: ‘Join in London’ meets ‘Dancing Beijing’ – the cultural power of the Olympics,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 25:7 (2008), 893.

⁸⁷ Shi Yinhong, “‘Harmonious world’ is pragmatic foreign policy,” *China Daily*, July 5, 2007; Yu Keping, “We must work to create a harmonious world,” *China Daily*, October 5, 2007.

⁸⁸ “得民心者得天下” (*de min xin zhe de tian xia*), can also be translated into “whoever wins the hearts of the people rules the world,” developed from Mencius’s writing; for the original text see, Zhu Xi, *四书章句集注* (*An Interpretation of the Four Great Books*) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986), 280.

⁸⁹ Central Committee’s Documents Research Office, 《十六大以来重要文献选编》(上) (*Selected Important Documents since the 16th Party Congress*) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 2005), vol.1: 396.

⁹⁰ “Hu Jintao proposes Scientific Outlook on Development for tackling China’s immediate woes, challenges,” *Xinhua News Agency*, October 15, 2007.

between man and nature" (*Tian ren he yi*).⁹¹ In 2007, both concepts – the “scientific outlook on development” and “building a harmonious society” – were given an official endorsement at the 17th Party Congress. A new amendment to the CCP constitution was adopted which committed the CCP to the building of “a harmonious society characterized by sustained peace and common prosperity.”⁹² The Chinese government has encouraged the populace to study the Chinese classics, or *Guo Xue*.⁹³ Chinese elites found that the classics had a wide appeal in civil society because they help to reconstruct a moral social order based on classical cultural traditions, which in turn can overcome materialistic tendencies caused by China’s economy-focused modernization process. In short, advancing the interests of the people and traditional philosophical concepts in Chinese political ideology and policies reflected the ruling party’s concern for its legitimacy. At the same time, this move was used to reframe and redefine China’s identity into a modern, civilised and renewed nation, which was in line with traditional and universal values of greater appeal.⁹⁴

Thirdly, “Humanistic Olympics” indicated that the Beijing Olympics aimed at securing public support and training Chinese citizens fit for a globalized world by wide public participation. On the one hand, BOCOG mobilized the public through various public relations campaigns, both domestically and internationally. For instance, regarding Western accusations of the Chinese government’s manipulation of the social media,⁹⁵ BOCOG made a temporary rule that guaranteed more freedom to foreign journalists who could report and do interviews in China without hindrance, and particular services were set up to facilitate foreign journalists’ work in China.⁹⁶ Moreover, BOCOG claimed that it had recruited 1.7 million volunteers for the 2008 Games, the largest number of volunteers in Olympic history.⁹⁷ It also inspired public participation both at home and abroad in designing the emblem, mascots, ceremonies and so forth. On the other hand, the authorities were very aware that the nation’s image was closely associated with the behaviour of the populace, so they widely publicized programs

⁹¹ Yu Keping, “We must work to create a harmonious world.”

⁹² Ye Duchu, “科学发展和社会和谐是十七大最强音” (Scientific development and harmonious society are the strongest voices in the 17th National Congress), *瞭望* (*Outlook Weekly*), no.20 (May 14, 2007), 32.

⁹³ For example, “国学经典进校园让国民的素质得到改观” (Chinese classics enter into schools to improve the quality of the people), *Guoxue Education Online*, available at: <http://www.guoxuewang.org/gxzx/gxqy8295.html>

⁹⁴ Xin Xu, “Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight,” 97.

⁹⁵ For the discussion of this issue, see for instance, Cha, “Beijing’s Olympic-sized catch-22,” 2008.

⁹⁶ BOCOG, “北京奥运会及其筹备期间外国记者采访服务指南” (*Service Guide for Overseas Media Coverage of the Beijing Olympics and the Preparatory Period*), January 1, 2007, available at: http://www.beijing2008.cn/upload/Service_Guide_cn.pdf.

⁹⁷ “170 万奥运志愿者各就各位 人数创奥运之最” (1.7 million volunteers are ready, the largest number of volunteers in Olympic history), *新京报* (*Beijing News*) (August 2, 2008), available at: <http://news.21cn.com/domestic/yaowen/2008/08/02/5017197.shtml>

dealing with Chinese people's bad habits, Beijing city beautification and learning English.⁹⁸

5.2.1.2 Symbols of the 2008 Olympics

As discussed earlier, the selection of the "China knot" emblem for the 2001 bid had already reflected the Chinese authorities' intention to promote Chinese culture. After China obtained the right to host the Games, Beijing's careful selection of emblem and mascots for the Olympics further reflected Beijing's cultural promotion strategy: a good combination of a traditional culture and a modern China deeply committed to internationalization.

The Emblem: China Seal – Dancing Beijing

The official emblem for the Games, unveiled in the summer of 2003, entitled "Chinese Seal – Dancing Beijing," clearly indicates the capital of China with an ancient culture embracing the modern world. It shows graceful traditional Chinese calligraphy of the Chinese character for "capital" (京 *jīng*) on the top, with the words "Beijing 2008" written with a Chinese brush in the middle and the five Olympic rings at the bottom. The heart of the emblem is obviously at the top, which resembles a traditional red seal enclosing a figure with arms outstretched as if in the act of dancing or greeting. The open arms convey a message of invitation – an invitation to the world to share in Beijing's rich cultural heritage and dynamic present. The whole emblem carries the information that today's China not only has a long and glorious history, but is also full of modern dynamism, and ready for the world to come and explore.⁹⁹ It is said that it is the first time that a Chinese character has been introduced into an Olympic emblem, which means a lot to the Olympic Movement and China.¹⁰⁰ IOC president Jacques Rogge observed, "Your new emblem immediately conveys the awesome beauty and power of China which are embodied in your heritage and your people.... In this emblem, I saw the promise of a new Beijing and a great Olympics."¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ See "让奥运成为文明新起点" (Let the 2008 Olympics becomes a new starting point of civilization), *RMRB*, August 20, 2007; a website of "迎奥运讲文明树新风" (Welcome the 2008 Olympics, Promote Civility and Create a Favourable Social Atmosphere) was especially set up for the Olympics, see <http://2008.people.com.cn/GB/22192/99979/index.html>. Xin Xu, "Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight," 98; Hessler, *Oracle Bones*, 261; Susan Brownell studied how the Games influenced Chinese primary and secondary education, see her "Beijing's Olympic education programme: re-thinking Suzhi Education, re-imagining an international China," *The China Quarterly*, 197 (March 2009), 44-63.

⁹⁹ "Beijing Unveils the Emblem of the 2008 Beijing Olympics," *RMRB*, August 3, 2003, accessed from: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200308/03/eng20030803_121616.shtml

¹⁰⁰ 细读"中国印·舞动的北京" (Careful read of China Seal – Dancing Beijing), *RMRB Online*, August 15, 2003, accessed from: <http://2008.people.com.cn/GB/22180/22195/2019232.html>

¹⁰¹ "Beijing Unveils the Emblem of the 2008 Beijing Olympics."



Figure 4.2: The Emblem of the 2008 Beijing Games: China Seal – Dancing Beijing

Mascots: Fuwa

Beijing's announcement of its choice of mascots for the 2008 Games is another example of projecting a "Cultural China". The mascots consist of five stylized dolls representing a fish, a panda, the "spirit of the Olympic flame," a Tibetan antelope, and a swallow, which are respectively called "Beibei," "Jingjing," "Huanhuan," "Yingying" and "Nini." When these names are put together, it makes "*Bei Jing Huan Ying Nin*," which means "Welcome to Beijing."¹⁰² The two-syllable name is a traditional way of expressing affection for children in China. The name and the image carry a message of friendship, peace and goodwill from China to people and particularly children all over the world. The design of the five dolls was clearly influenced by Chinese traditional culture: they represent the five basic elements of nature, namely, water, wood, fire, earth, and metal. Meanwhile, their numbers and colours match those of the Olympic rings, which represent an aspiration to "seek to unite the world in peace and friendship through the Olympic spirit."¹⁰³ According to Liu Qi, these mascots "reflect the cultural diversity of China as a multi-ethnic country" and "represent the enthusiasm and aspirations of our people."¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² "The Official Mascots of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games," *beijing2008.cn* (The Official Website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games), accessed from: <http://en.beijing2008.cn/spirit/beijing2008/graphic/n214068254.shtml>

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ "Beijing chooses 5 dolls for Olympic mascot," *China Daily*, November 14, 2005.



Figure 4.3: Mascots for the 2008 Beijing Games: *Fuwa*

In addition, it is interesting to point out the story of the mascots' collective name. Originally, the organizers gave them an English name "Friendlies" in order to highlight the spirit of friendship and to enhance their popularity overseas. However, some Chinese scholars soon suggested that "Friendlies" was not a proper English name, and might be mistakenly pronounced as "friendless," or even worse, "friend lies."¹⁰⁵ Responding to that, the organizing committee finally replaced it with "*Fuwa*," a Chinese name with the meaning of "blessing dolls." This episode demonstrates that language has its own culture load and sometimes a corresponding word may not be found in another language. What is more, the name change reflects that the Chinese language and indeed Chinese traditional culture has its own charms.

5.2.1.3 The "Brilliant Civilization" (*canlan wenming*)

A "cultural China" was also promoted through the Games' spectacular opening ceremony, particularly the first part, called "Brilliant Civilization." China paid a lot of attention to this opening ceremony, being proud of its tradition and eager to present a fascinating image of China at this cultural feast. As one Chinese sport scholar pointed out, "In fact, there were two things that Chinese people were most concerned about at the 2008 Olympics – one was the opening ceremony and the other was the performances by Chinese athletes who won medals. The opening ceremony was an important opportunity to spread the Olympic spirit and display Chinese culture and history."¹⁰⁶ China thus sought to create a party that would amaze the world with the richness of Chinese civilization at the opening ceremony on August 8, 2008.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Wang Yinquan, "'福娃'英语之争与文化负载词的汉英翻译策略" (The contested translation of *Fuwa* and the strategy for Chinese-English translation of culture-loaded phrases), *中国翻译* (*Chinese Translation*), no.3 (2006), 74.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Dr Li Ning, Deputy Director of Department of Physical Education of Beijing University, April 12, 2010.

¹⁰⁷ "张继刚：北京奥运会开幕式将震惊世界" (Zhang Jigang: the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics will amaze the whole world), August 7, 2008, accessed from: <http://2008.people.com.cn/GB/22192/121135/121138/7624851.html>. Zhang Jigang was the deputy

Entitled "The Beautiful Olympics" (*Meili de Aolimpike*), the ceremony consisted of two parts – the "Brilliant Civilization" and the "Glorious Era" (*huihuang shidai*). The former reflected the beauty of Chinese culture, and the latter highlighted China's achievements and its promising future since the reforms began in the late 1970s. In this section, the strand of Chinese culture is discussed and the latter is illustrated in the next section.

The strategy of promoting a "cultural China" to an international audience was very clear through the opening ceremony. As the film-maker Zhang Yimou, the chief director of the ceremony, implicitly indicated afterwards, the ceremony's target audience was resolved in favour of the international audience over the domestic.¹⁰⁸ What might attract the global audience's attention? From the experience of the 1990 Beijing Asian Games, it was argued that "'ethnic cultural' (*minzu wenhua*) symbols were more attractive to the outside world in general and also constituted a shared cultural repertoire with East Asians and overseas Chinese."¹⁰⁹ However, the 2008 Beijing Games was very different in scale from the 1990 Asian Games as well as in the global audience it had access to. BOCOG required that the ceremonies should be creative and competitive in impressing the world and should present China as both an ancient civilisation and a modernizing nation.¹¹⁰ Zhang Heping, a Party cadre in charge of the ceremonies, said that the opening ceremony had to "use an international language to tell China's story."¹¹¹ Underpinning this thinking was a growing desire to turn the momentum of the ceremony into an opportunity for "cultural rejuvenation – a Chinese renaissance – and for China's deeper integration into the international community."¹¹²

"Brilliant Civilization" not only emphasised China's cultural heritage but also promoted China's historical interaction with the rest of the world and made reference to a united world of connections between people. Firstly, it projected a dynamic age-old civilization, a peace-loving and friendly China deeply rooted in its pacific culture. The performance demonstrated China's "four great inventions" (*si da faming*), namely, gunpowder, paper, printing and the compass which were manifested through fireworks, Chinese scroll painting, movable-type

director of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics.

¹⁰⁸ 张艺谋两万言细述开幕式幕后故事(Zhang Yimou tells the stories behind the opening ceremony), 南方周末 (*The Southern Weekend*), August 14, 2008, accessed from: <http://www.infzm.com/content/15978>

¹⁰⁹ Brownell, "The Beijing Olympics as a turning point?."

¹¹⁰ BOCOG, "BOCOG in Search of Proposals for Grand Ceremonies," March 1, 2005, accessed from: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/olympic/121732.htm>

¹¹¹ "张和平：用世界语言讲中国故事" (Zhang Heping: using international language to tell China's story), 三联生活周刊 (*Sanlian Life Weekly*), no.492 (18 August 2008), 70.

¹¹² Xin Xu, "Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight," 97.

printing and Chinese characters, and China's ancient maritime silk route. It also incorporated Chinese high culture such as Beijing Opera and *Kunqu*, and folk culture including puppet plays. According to Zhang Yimou, the performance of movable-type printing was distinctive and magnificent, representing the great contribution that the Chinese people had made to world civilisation.¹¹³ The act contained variations of Chinese characters by using the example of the character of “和” (*he* – harmony). It showed the evolving nature of Chinese culture in China's history, and more importantly, it sent out a clear message that China had always been a nation which sought harmony.

Second, in addition to the illustration of China's dynamic cultural heritage, it also showed China's historical contact and cultural exchange with the rest of the world, as performed in the act on the theme of China's ancient “silk road.” The Chinese “silk road” went in two directions: one on land and the other by sea.¹¹⁴ The “silk road” has become a cultural symbol, which represents China's historical efforts to spread Chinese civilisation and build cultural and economic relations with the peoples in Asia, Europe and Africa. The story of Zheng He, a renowned Ming Dynasty admiral, who sailed south and west on diplomatic and trade missions with the outside world in the early 15th century, is a well-known episode of China's maritime history. The ceremony staged Zheng He's story to hint that, despite their command of superior technological devices such as the compass and gargantuan seafaring vessels, Chinese people did not seek to conquer other nations. Rather, their intent was merely to disseminate Chinese civilisation, friendship and promoting cultural exchange. This story has been repeatedly cited by the Chinese leaders to highlight that China is a nation that has long loved peace and cherished friendship and respectful interaction.¹¹⁵

From these cultural symbols from the 2008 Beijing Games, its emblem, mascots and opening ceremony, we can see that the Chinese authorities were very careful in choosing their cultural

¹¹³ “浪漫中国·梦想世界——开幕式总导演张艺谋专访” (Romantic China and dream world – an interview with Zhang Yimou, director of the opening ceremony), August 9, 2008, *Xinhua News Agency*, accessed from: http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2008-08/09/content_1068148.htm

¹¹⁴ The exact routes on land and sea have been long under debate. Generally, the land route is understood from northwest China to Arabic countries, India, Central Asia and even Europe; the sea route was referred to from southern China to Southeast Asia, India and Eastern Africa. For the research on the “silk road” see for example, Gun Junxian, “‘丝绸之路’复兴计划与中国外交” (The plan of the revival of “silk road” and China's foreign policy), *东北亚论坛* (*Northeast Asia Forum*), no.5 (2010), 65-73; Gong Yingyan, “‘海上丝绸之路与世界文明进程’国际学术论坛综述” (A summary of the international symposium of “The maritime silk road and the process of world civilisations”), *中国史研究动态* (*Trends of Recent Researches on the History of China*), no.2 (2012), 78-82.

¹¹⁵ For example, “胡锦涛赠送连战‘郑和宝船’和平远航意味深长” (The significance of Hu Jintao's presenting Lian Zhan a “Zheng He Seven-Gem Ship”), *Xinhua News Agency*, April 30, 2005, accessed from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-04/30/content_2898235.htm; “郑和航海知识” (Voyage of Zheng He), *China Central Television*, June 14, 2005, accessed from: <http://www.cctv.com/history/special/C14156/20050614/101719.shtml>

elements. They tried very hard to link China's still-evolving national identity with their traditional values, which clearly reflected a return to and a renewed appreciation for Chinese traditional culture.

However, as analysed in the previous chapter, in Maoist times, China promoted a proletarian culture which denounced Chinese traditional culture such as Confucianism. The question then is how to understand China's rediscovery and re-embracing of its traditional culture – an about-face so prominently on display at such a high-profile global event? While it is a question far too complicated to engage with in this chapter, the implications may not be hard to scope. First and foremost, the Chinese must have found that presenting a “cultural China” would appeal to the international audience and might help alleviate international worries about China's increasing economic and military power. China has long been criticised as an authoritarian state lacking individual freedom and democracy – an “Other” in the international system. Its rising material power makes China's presence even more alarming. However, as shown in the cultural symbols it chose, China sought to tell the world a story of China greater than its newfound might. A “cultural China” demonstrated that it had a rich reservoir of cultural/soft power capital, embodied in its cultural heritage and society which emphasized the importance of harmony, people, diversity, meritocracy and good governance. All these clearly aimed at projecting a benign image of a China which cherishes its traditional moral values, with no totalitarian desire to conquer the world.¹¹⁶ In addition, the promotion of China's brilliant civilisation provided Chinese citizens and overseas Chinese with a sense of the country's greatness, to strengthen their cultural identity and enhance Chinese pride and national cohesion. China's approach to projecting its development path further elaborates these two points.

5.2.2 Modern China

In addition to presenting China's dynamic culture there was the promotion of a “modern China” with economic vitality and its own ideas and vision of development and modernization. In this sense, China has built itself as a model for development – an opening economy but with the state retaining firm control. This section illustrates a “modern China” by looking at the concepts of “High-tech Olympics” (*Keji Aoyun*) and “Green Olympics” (*Lüse Aoyun*), and the staging of “Glorious Era” in the second part of the opening ceremony. They all were utilized to promote China as a powerhouse of development, and to tell the world what China is capable of. A “modern China” not only lifted China's image as a renewed society but also enhanced the CCP's leadership role in guiding China's development.

¹¹⁶ Daniel A. Bell, “This is no Chinese triumph of totalitarianism,” *Guardian*, August 7, 2008.

5.2.2.1 “High-tech Olympics”

Promising a “High-tech Olympics,” Beijing desired to utilize the Games as a window to showcase China’s economic achievement and strength of innovation. After undertaking the central policies of “reform and opening up” for three decades, China’s economic achievement has transformed China’s landscape as well as people’s spirit. For the previous three decades, China had generally been regarded as a manufacturing factory for the world. Chinese authorities thought that hosting the 2008 Olympics would provide an optimum opportunity to demonstrate its innovative capacity.¹¹⁷ With the concept of “High-tech Olympics,” Beijing was meant to project a new image of China full of economic vitality.

First, “high-tech” and innovation were embodied in the most recent city hallmark architecture. Modern and stylish facilities for the Games were designed and built to impress the international audience. For instance, the National Stadium, or “Bird’s Nest,” a brand new stadium that secured its name from its physical appearance, was the venue for the opening and closing ceremonies. The structure was made out of special steel through manufacturing innovation made in China. It was said that the designers aspired to make it “the most visible icon in contemporary China.”¹¹⁸ Another iconic facility was the National Aquatics Centre, or “Water Cube,” strong and energy efficient. It was said that the material used in the exterior helped save half of the energy used for lighting during the day.¹¹⁹ Other strikingly breathtaking cosmopolitan buildings, such as the National Grand Theatre, a place for fine cultural performances, and the new Central China Television (CCTV) headquarters, were equally regarded as legacies of the Beijing Olympic construction boom. All of them occupied a prominent role in the campaign to display a glamorous urban face to international visitors, although they did not have direct association with the Games.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ BOCOG, “北京奥运会规划(一): 总体战略构想” (The programming of the Beijing Olympics (part one): overall strategic thinking), July 2007, accessed from: <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/177019.htm>

¹¹⁸ Carolyn Marvin, “‘All under heaven’ – megaspace in Beijing,” in Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan eds., *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 242.

¹¹⁹ “Green Olympics: a pledge to honour for Beijing,” *Xinhua News Agency*, October 4, 2006, accessed from: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/sports/182954.htm>.

¹²⁰ For the challenges of design and construction of those icons, see Marvin, “‘All under heaven’ – megaspace in Beijing,” 236-243.



Figure 4.4: Beijing city hallmarks (from left to right) Bird Nest, Water Cube, National Grand Theatre, CCTV headquarters

Second, Chinese efforts to promote its high-tech and innovative strength were demonstrated by projecting its home-grown brand names throughout the Games. When asked about products labelled “Made in China,” the most common responses up to now have been cheap pricing and low quality.¹²¹ The concept of “High-tech Olympics” was directed at changing the image of Chinese brands. For instance, before the Games, a number of Chinese companies were selected as sponsors for the Games, including well-known companies such as Lenovo and China Mobile.¹²² The dazzling opening ceremonies’ deployment of the world’s largest LED screen, which was produced by a local company, also demonstrated China’s high-tech capability.¹²³ Another effort to achieve a more positive technology-driven image was the construction of high-speed railways (*Gaotie*) across the country. This program was highly promoted in the run-up to the Games. It was claimed that high-speed railways would be a Chinese brand being based on China’s own design and domestic engineering technology and equipment.¹²⁴

In addition, the Beijing municipal government made a huge investment in transportation improvements, such as building and extending Beijing’s subway system, completing the city’s light rail system and constructing an enormous new international airport terminal. In the meantime, it made steady efforts to transform Beijing into a “digital” city with widespread use of digital and broadband telecommunications, wireless transmission and networking technologies.¹²⁵

The high-tech initiatives in the run-up to the Beijing Games were used to promote China’s

¹²¹ Pere Berkowitz et al, “Brand China: using the 2008 Olympic Games to enhance China’s image,” *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 3:2 (2007), 173.

¹²² For a detailed case study of choosing the two companies as the Beijing Olympics’ sponsors, see Lee Humphreys and Christopher J. Finlay, “New technologies, new narrative,” in Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan eds., *Owning the Olympics*, 284-306.

¹²³ This LED screen was made by Leyard Company, with its website at <http://en.leyard.com/>

¹²⁴ “温家宝出席京沪高速铁路开工典礼并为其奠基” (Wen Jiabao attended the ceremony for the start of the construction of the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway), *Xinhua News Agency*, April 18, 2008.

¹²⁵ Sands, “The 2008 Olympics’ impact on China.”

home brands and strengths in technology and innovation, and through that, to help secure international recognition of China's development and economic vitality.

5.2.2.2 "Green Olympics"

The second approach to promoting a "modern China" was demonstrated by the management of China's environment issues. Due to the priority given to economic growth in the previous three decades, China's environmental issues were looming large. China's poor environmental performance became a target both for domestic and international criticism. For instance, as early as China's first bid for hosting the Olympics in 1993, the environment had been one of the concerns of the IOC.¹²⁶ China's environmental degradation made the Chinese people ponder the future environmental consequences of the government's "attain economic development first, and then work on environmental governance" strategy.¹²⁷ Environmental pressure impelled Chinese authorities to engage with global concerns and standards. They also realized that in effect by taking proper measures they could recast China as a responsible and respectable participant in international environmental norms.¹²⁸

The "Green Olympics" delivered a promise not to dismiss criticism of China's pollution problems. In China's 2001 bid, the bidding committee emphasized that environmental improvement would be a priority through the implementation of the "Green Olympics" initiatives. Various environment-related projects were initiated to "ensure cleaner water and bluer skies for the 2008 Olympic Games." All the projects were required to reach international standards of safety management and environmental protection, as well as to meet the requirements of many green technology and management policies.¹²⁹ The Chinese government made and emphasized pledges to use cleaner energy sources and adopt green technology for transportation, recycling, and Games-related building projects, with the hope of reducing dependency on more polluting sources of energy such as coal, and building a circular economy.¹³⁰ Power plants in the capital area were converted to cleaner fuels, polluting factories were closed or curtailed, and private traffic was discouraged throughout the Games.¹³¹ In addition, Beijing Olympic authorities launched campaigns to plant millions

¹²⁶ "申奥成功"(The success of bidding for the 2008 Olympic Games), *China Online*, accessed from: <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/MATERIAL/178576.htm>

¹²⁷ For the discussion of Chinese concerns of the environmental issue, see Kathy Morton, "China and the global environment: learning from the past, anticipating the future," *Lowy Institute Paper* 29, 2009, 32.

¹²⁸ "China, UN sign agreement on environmental protection for 2008 Olympics," *Xinhua News Agency*, November 19, 2005.

¹²⁹ Yang Cheng, "Green Olympics underway," *China Business Weekly*, July 10, 2006.

¹³⁰ Li Fangchao, "Beijing unveils plans for 'green' Games," *China Daily*, May 29, 2006.

¹³¹ Mitchell Landsberg, "Clearing the air for Olympics," *Los Angeles Times*, August 11, 2007.

of trees and build its largest city park – Beijing Olympic Forest Park.¹³² By effectively facing environmental challenges, the Chinese government showed its willingness and capacity to respond to international expectations and improve the life quality of its citizens. It sought to seize the opportunity to build an environment-friendly China.

5.2.2.3 The “Glorious Era”

The “Glorious Era,” the second part of the performance at the opening ceremony, sought to advance Chinese visions of modernization. Comprising three acts, “Starlight, Nature and Dream,” this part of the performance projected Chinese modern achievements and their understanding of development – harmonious coexistence.

Harmonious coexistence could be regarded as the theme of the “Glorious Era” performance. Firstly, the Chinese traditional exercise *Taiji* was used in the performance to convey Chinese understanding of the harmonious relationship between humans and nature in the context of the modern world.¹³³ Secondly, the meaning of “One World, One Dream” was further elaborated by the segment with a blue orb representing our earth, with 58 performers running and dancing around the orb, a positive message about human unity and breadth of vision and tolerance (see Figure 4.5).¹³⁴ Even the spacewalk was utilized in the performance to represent human exploration of space, a “shared homeland” (*gongyou jiayuan*) of humanity.¹³⁵ The spacewalk also projected China’s achievements in spatial exploration and symbolized that China had crossed the threshold into this new frontier. Thirdly, China’s determination to safeguard world peace was illustrated by the image of a dove, projected on the rim of the stadium. Last but not least, the 2008 Olympic theme song, “You and Me” (*Wo he Ni*) expressed the hope of harmonious coexistence between the West and East, sung by the Chinese singer Liu Huan and the British singer Sarah Brightman, who were deliberately picked by the organizers.¹³⁶

¹³² “IOC supports Beijing’s clean-air measures: Jacques Rogge,” *Xinhua News Agency*, August 24, 2007; “Olympic Forest Park in Beijing,” *Xinhua News Agency*, July 10, 2008.

¹³³ “Romantic China and dream world – an interview with Zhang Yimou, director of the opening ceremony.”

¹³⁴ Geremie R. Barmé, “China’s flat earth: history and 8 August 2008,” *The China Quarterly* 197, 83.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ “Zhang Heping: using an international language to tell China’s story,” 71.



Figure 4.5: The blue orb in the opening ceremony of the Beijing Games, enhancing the theme of the Games – “One World, One Dream”

China’s projection of a high-tech and environment-friendly China throughout the Beijing Olympics on the one hand reflected its desire to meet the expectations of the international community. On the other hand the Chinese authorities attempted to promote a “modern China” with phenomenal economic success and full of ideas and vitality of development.

Overall, through the projection of a “cultural China” and a “modern China,” the Chinese people seized the moment to convey a message: China is a modern, civilised, dynamic and renewed nation, which has “come out” as a global power. This demonstrates the paradox of the Olympic Games – whilst the Olympics pay a tribute to internationalism, they reinforce nationalism at the same time. For Chinese people, the Beijing Olympics represented an important shift in their collective identity as they started to see their nation as an equal partner among other nations instead of “a sick man of East Asia” bullied by hostile powers.¹³⁷ They have been longing for China’s international status to bring acceptance and respect from the rest of the world. This nationalist sentiment may produce huge effects on this country and generate profound implications for China’s international relations. Whilst China sought this historical moment to promote a positive image of the country, how did it engage with foreign states and publics? The remainder of this section tackles this question with a focus on China’s Olympic diplomacy.

5.2.3 China’s “new” diplomacy¹³⁸

China’s diplomacy serves as both a source and a vehicle of soft power to project particular ideas and values which encapsulate what China stands for, and which shape or guide China’s

¹³⁷ Brownell, “The Beijing Olympics as a Turning Point?,” 9.

¹³⁸ For the discussions of “China’s new diplomacy” see Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing eds., *China’s “New” Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change?* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Zhiquan Zhu, *China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies, and Significance* (England ; VT: Ashgate Pub. Ltd., 2010).

role in world affairs. As discussed earlier, the Olympic Games in and of themselves are a form of diplomatic outreach and engagement. The Beijing Games provided China with a great platform for intensive interaction with the rest of the world. The hosting of the Games served as a venue of public diplomacy for China to fulfil two main roles: (1) announcing its arrival on the world stage as a global power but as a constructive and active participant in the existing international system through moral suasion rather than as a revisionist seeking to overthrow the system; and (2) rebutting unfavourable foreign reports and opinions of China through repeated emphasis of “peaceful development.”¹³⁹ In short, China sought to project a benign and responsible image which represented a new pattern of rising through peaceful means and an alternative to the aggressive powers in recent history that rose through strong-armed accumulation, such as Germany and Japan in World War II. In order to present this positive image, China invested heavily in its public diplomacy before and during the Games. This part of the second section analyses the hotspot issues in the run-up to the Games. It also explores China’s earlier diplomatic efforts to sell itself to the rest of the world. These efforts included media diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, institutional setup, and cultural diplomacy.

5.2.3.1 Media diplomacy

Media diplomacy¹⁴⁰ constituted a major effort to project China’s image in its run-up to the Games. It included both Chinese media’s “going abroad” and foreign media’s “coming in.” In the age of global information, media plays an increasingly important role in shaping a country’s image and constitutes an efficient way to promote a country’s soft power. As Nye clearly pointed out, international media, such as CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera, “had the field largely to themselves as they frame the issues.”¹⁴¹ The Chinese government understood that the Games certainly represented a global media event through which the state and a number of international and domestic institutions could attach needed attention and make a connection with the global audience. However, the actors which entered into the virtual platform could be both competitive and/or complementary in nature.¹⁴² China “must take the commanding height” in this media platform to convey its ideas and policies and regulate the flow of information.¹⁴³

¹³⁹ See for example, Yiwei Wang, “Public diplomacy and the rise of Chinese soft power”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol.616 (March 2008), 263; Pang Zhongying, “Soft power strategy for post-Olympics China,” *CSIS Freeman Report* (September 2008), 258.

¹⁴⁰ For the concept of “media diplomacy,” see Patricia A. Karl, “Media diplomacy,” *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 34:4 (1982), 143-152.

¹⁴¹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 54.

¹⁴² Monroe E. Price, “On seizing the Olympic platform,” in Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan eds., *Owning the Olympics*, 87-91.

¹⁴³ Yu-nu Lu, “The representation of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games: the rise of China’s soft

The Chinese government entered the field of the media in the mid-1990s to increase Chinese international media presence. China's state-owned media, such as *Xinhua News Agency*, *China Daily*, CCTV overseas television channels and *China Radio International*, received enormous support from the central government to enhance their influence on overseas audiences. For instance, in 2006, CCTV-4, an international channel launched in 1992 and targeted toward overseas Chinese, launched different time shifted feeds to make sure that overseas Chinese could watch the same programs that mainland Chinese watch on a similar daylight schedule.¹⁴⁴ This was further complemented by CCTV-9, a news channel launched in 2000 to attract an English-speaking audience all over the world. Following this step, in 2004, the CCTV expanded its channels into CCTV-E and CCTV-F to cater for Spanish-speaking and Francophone audiences. In 2009, Russian-speaking and Arabic-speaking channels appeared in the CCTV conglomerate as well.

In the information era, the internet provides another significant channel to reach out to the global audience. In the run-up to the Games, the Chinese broadcasting authority urged Chinese media to establish web-based radio and television networks for the purpose of transmitting important events of the Beijing Games to the international public in general and the overseas Chinese community in particular through the internet.¹⁴⁵ A major endeavour in this regard was to create the China Network Television (CNTV), "a global focused, multi-language, and multi-terminal public service platform that integrates network TV, internet TV, mobile phone TV, and mobile media" to reach internet users throughout the world.¹⁴⁶

China's media engagement during the Beijing Olympics comprised efforts not only to reach out, but also to invite the foreign media to come in. As mentioned earlier, before the Games, the Chinese government adopted a set of new regulations to relax restrictions on the foreign press, which allowed foreign reporters and journalists to travel around the country for interviews without prior government approval. It was estimated that more than 20,000 foreign press and an additional 10,000 freelance journalists showed up in Beijing during that period.¹⁴⁷ It was an unprecedented move by the CCP, but it brought both risks and opportunities for its engagement with the global audience.

power," in Baogang Guo and Chung-chian Teng eds., *China's Quiet Rise: Peace through Integration* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011), 33. Yu-nu Lu's paper focuses on the development of China's mass media in the context of the Beijing Olympics.

¹⁴⁴ See CCTV, "The introduction of the CCTV-4 channel," February 26, 2006, accessed from: <http://www.cctv.com/cctv4/20060206/102088.shtml>; Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings*, 158.

¹⁴⁵ Tian Jin, "抓住北京奥运契机 促进华语广播繁荣" (Grasp the opportunity of the Beijing Games, promote the prosperity of the Chinese broadcasting), September 12, 2007, accessed from: <http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2007/09/12/20070915151923500509.html>

¹⁴⁶ Yu-nu Lu, "The representation of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games," 34.

¹⁴⁷ Cha, "Beijing's Olympic-sized catch-22," 109.

For instance, the unrest in Tibet in March 2008 evoked massive international reports of China's human rights issues and denunciations of the PRC's rule of Tibet from Tibetan exiles and their supporters.¹⁴⁸ In the dominant global media, not only did they associate the unrest with the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, but they also made an analogy between the Beijing Games and the 1936 Olympiad in which the Nazis had earlier used the Berlin Olympics site for mass executions.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, partly due to the new foreign press regulation mentioned above and partly to rectify the "biased" reports from the international media, James Miles, a correspondent for *The Economist*, was allowed to stay in Lhasa during the riot. In his comment, he pointed out that it was "remarkable" that the authorities did not ask him to leave, "given that the authorities are normally extremely sensitive about the presence of foreign journalists when this kind of incident occurs."¹⁵⁰ More importantly, while James Miles noted that there were tensions between Han Chinese and Tibetans, he reckoned that "the authorities are trying their best to give the outside world an impression of normality. Unlike their response to a big outbreak of anti-Chinese unrest in 1989, this time they have not declared martial law, nor even announced any curfew or measures to expel foreigners."¹⁵¹ Such comments from a foreign reporter provided a somewhat balanced view of the Lhasa riot in particular and China in general in the context of the dominant negative coverage of China.

The opportunity for presenting a more positive image came with the Sichuan earthquake in May 2008. Compared to similar events in the past, Chinese authorities gave wider access to the area, allowing more foreign journalists to visit the affected site and make news coverage. They also accepted help from foreign rescue and medial teams. These measures attracted global attention to the severity of the Sichuan earthquake, which produced wide sympathy for the people affected. Moreover, foreign media covered former Premier Wen Jiabao's swift visit to the devastated region, the timely responses from the Chinese central and local governments,

¹⁴⁸ It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide explanations for the protests in Tibet in March 2008. It is generally regarded from the following three reasons. First, every March is quite sensitive in Tibet because March 10 is the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan revolt against the Chinese central government. The revolt prompted the spiritual leader Dalai Lama to flee into exile. Second, the migration waves either designed by the central government or prompted by the economic reforms to some extent aggravate ethnic tensions between Tibetans and Han Chinese. Third, there has been dissatisfaction among the locals resulting from economic-focused development which led to the decline of Tibetan culture and marginalization of traditional Tibetans. After the 2008 riot, there were various contested versions of reports from the Chinese and Western media. For instance, see Barry Sautman and Li Ying, *Public Diplomacy from Below: the 2008 "Pro-China" Demonstrations in Europe and North America* (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2011); Kevin Latham, "Media, the Olympics and the search for the 'real China,'" *The China Quarterly*, 197 (March 2009), 25-46.

¹⁴⁹ Cha, "Beijing's Olympic-sized catch-22," 110.

¹⁵⁰ James Miles, "Transcript: James Miles interview on Tibet," *CNN*, March 20, 2008, accessed from: <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/03/20/tibet.miles.interview/>; his writings on Lhasa riot, see James Miles, "Midnight ultimatum for Tibet showdown," *Times Online*, March 17, 2008.

¹⁵¹ "Lhasa under siege, our correspondent reports from Tibet" *The Economist*, March 17, 2008.

as well as the strenuous relief effort led by the People's Liberation Army (PLA).¹⁵² This Chinese rescue operation and worldwide news coverage to a large extent offset the negative reports of the Tibet issue.

In addition, the Chinese media went to tremendous lengths to project a positive image of China to address the foreign media's "distorted" reports of China for both domestic and international audiences. One prominent example was the setup of the "anti-CNN" website by a Chinese netizen, who offered detailed analysis of Western media coverage of the Tibet unrest.¹⁵³ The site pointed out the factual errors of reporting made by well-known Western media organizations, such as CNN, the BBC, The Washington Post, The Times, Radio France Internationale and Germany's NTV, RTL and *Der Spiegel*.¹⁵⁴ The factual errors included misidentification of the location of events, inaccurate captions attached to photographs and video clips, as well as misinterpretations of popular opinions.¹⁵⁵ The work of "anti-CNN" drove a new media discourse that paid attention to the "bias" against China in the Western media. Chinese people including overseas Chinese thereafter called for understanding of the "real China."¹⁵⁶ The "distorted" coverage from the Western media as well as the Chinese populace's efforts to expose the "biased" reports before the Games raised a new wave of Chinese nationalism both in mainland China and overseas Chinese communities. Chinese efforts in this regard were aimed at rebutting negative foreign public opinion toward China and supporting the Beijing Games. Different from the stereotypical state-led diplomacy, this media engagement conducted by the Chinese populace constituted a clear example of "public diplomacy from below."¹⁵⁷

5.2.3.2 Diplomatic engagement of the norm of global "responsibility"

Another aspect of China's "new" diplomacy was Beijing's efforts to accommodate the norm of global "responsibility." The Chinese government sought to meet international standards and respond to outside concerns of the rise of China by bringing itself more into line with the

¹⁵² Wang Yizhou and Wang Zaibang, "中国：危机外交 2008" (China: crisis diplomacy in 2008), *世界知识* (World Affairs), no.23 (2008), 18.

¹⁵³ It was set up by a former Tsinghua University student. The website was later changed into <http://www.m4.cn/>.

¹⁵⁴ See "German news television regrets error in covering Tibet riots," *Xinhua News Agency*, March 23, 2008; "'Anti-CNN' website reflects Chinese people's condemnation," *Xinhua News Agency*, March 27, 2008; Latham, "Media, the Olympics and the search for the 'real China'," 28.

¹⁵⁵ "German news television regrets error in covering Tibet riots," *Xinhua News Agency*; Latham, "Media, the Olympics and the search for the 'real China'," 29.

¹⁵⁶ "让更多人了解真实的中国" (Let more people understand the real China), *RMRB* (April 23, 2008), 4; "Young Chinese abroad launch Internet attacks against Western press over Tibet Unrest," *International Herald Tribune*, March 30, 2008.

¹⁵⁷ Barry Sautman and Li Ying, *Public Diplomacy from Below*, 10.

prevailing norms of the international community. It wanted to be seen as a responsible partner or a "responsible stakeholder"¹⁵⁸ within the existing international system. Due to the great exposure of the Olympics, it became imperative for Beijing to shape its image as a responsible global player through diplomatic engagement with the burning international issues of the day in the run-up to the Games. Particular attention is paid to Beijing's modified diplomatic behaviour in dealing with the so-called "failed states" such as Sudan and Burma. In all these hot spots, Beijing had evolved from a passive spectator and a guardian of the principle of "non-interference" to an active participant in efforts to solve these issues. In addition, there follows a brief discussion about China's embrace of multilateralism since the mid-1990s to show its sense of responsibility.

Firstly, concerning the international criticism of its close relationship with the Sudanese government in the context of human rights violations in Darfur,¹⁵⁹ Beijing moved steadily to construct a positive image as a leading champion for the conflict resolution process. Beijing went on a public relations campaign to demonstrate that it had made great efforts to gain the Sudanese government's acceptance of the hybrid peacekeeping operations plan offered by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. In February 2007, former President Hu Jintao himself travelled to Sudan and persuaded Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to comply with the plan. In May 2007 a special envoy was appointed for Darfur, Liu Guijin, who became the public face of China's efforts to explain China's about-turn in policies to the world. He made several trips to the region to persuade the Sudanese government to accept its obligations under the UN plan. China also contributed a 315-member peacekeeping unit to participate in the peacekeeping operation in the area when the action was approved by UN.¹⁶⁰ When Sudan accepted the United Nations' decision to deploy the largest-ever 26,000-strong UN peacekeeping operation to Sudan in December 2007, it was widely accepted that China's efforts had been critical to Sudan's acceptance. The U.S. special envoy for Darfur, Andrew Natsios, valued Beijing's critical role and its use of its considerable leverage to get UN peacekeepers into Sudan.¹⁶¹

Secondly, China demonstrated its evolving diplomatic behaviour in its dealings with the

¹⁵⁸ Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: from membership to responsibility?," Remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, September 21, 2005, accessed from http://www.ncusr.org/files/2005Gala_RobertZoellick_Whither_China1.pdf

¹⁵⁹ For the well-known criticism see Ronan Farrow and Mía Farrow, "The Genocide Olympics," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 28, 2007.

¹⁶⁰ "特使刘贵今谈达尔富尔" (Special envoy Liu Guijin talks about Darfur), January 10, 2008, *China Online*, accessed from: http://webcast.china.com.cn/webcast/created/1723/44_1_0101_desc.htm

¹⁶¹ Antoaneta Bezlova, "Sudan – showcase for new assertiveness," *Inter Press Service*, September 21, 2007; Lydia Polgreen, "China, in new role, press Sudan on Darfur" *International Herald Tribune*, February 23, 2008; Cha, "Beijing's Olympic-sized catch-22," 116.

Burmese ruling military junta. As Burma's largest trading partner since 2005, Beijing used to oppose any attempts by Western states to bring the issue of human rights in Burma to the US Security Council agenda.¹⁶² Responding to a *Washington Post* column calling for an Olympic boycott over Burma in the aftermath of the violent suppression of pro-democracy unrest in Burma in September 2007, the Chinese embassy in Washington declared that it was "totally irresponsible" to make such a linkage and politicize the Olympics.¹⁶³ In its diplomatic efforts, Beijing started to persuade Burma's military rulers to allow UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari to visit the country and meet the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.¹⁶⁴ What is more, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao even openly spoke of the need to achieve "democracy" in Burma.¹⁶⁵ Some Chinese scholars also began to do research on China's role in Burma's democratization.¹⁶⁶ Although China still publicly rejects "interference in other countries' domestic affairs," in practice, as shown in Sudan and Burma, there is clear evidence of China's shift in foreign policy away from its previous stance on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.

In addition to the changes in China's international policies in the run-up to the Games, it is worth pointing out the general shift toward multilateralism in China's international behaviour since the mid-1990s, which shows China to be a constructive international player. Noticing the shifting global environment due to the quickening pace of globalization in the information age, Chinese policy makers and experts on international relations have increasingly realized that China's future is closely connected with other countries. China needs to be more active in agenda setting and framing in the regional and international organizations.¹⁶⁷ As such, in the region, China is a participant in almost all official and track-two institutions and forums, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, 1991), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994), and ASEAN+3 (1997), just to name a few. China's response to the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-98) and its decision not to devalue the *Renminbi* suggested a sense of responsibility for the stability of the regional economic system.¹⁶⁸ China also played a

¹⁶² Cha, "Beijing's Olympic-sized catch-22," 117.

¹⁶³ Glenn Kessler, "China rejects attempts to link developments in Burma to Beijing Olympics," *Washington Post*, October 2, 2007.

¹⁶⁴ Roger Cohen, "Beijing may hedge its Burmese bets," *The New York Times*, October 10, 2007.

¹⁶⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao's regular press conference on 13 November, 2007," November 14, 2007, accessed from: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t380945.htm>.

¹⁶⁶ Bin Ke, "'中国责任论'与缅甸民主进程中的'中国角色'" ("China's responsibility" and "China's role" in Burma's democratization), 湘潮 (*Xiang Chao Monthly Magazine*), vol.293, September 2008, 41-45.

¹⁶⁷ For a thorough discussion of China's involvement into international institutions, see Lanteigne, *China and International Institutions*, 2005.

¹⁶⁸ Samuel S. Kim, "China's path to great power status in the globalization era," *Asian Perspective*,

leading role in initiating the most influential regional institutions: the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO, 2001) and the Six-Party Talks (2003). In its interaction with and participation in international organizations, China has also demonstrated its desire to play a constructive and responsible role. Since the end of the Cold War, China has become more active in the UN, for instance, providing financial support and military personnel in UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁶⁹ More significantly, when Beijing obtained the right to host the 2008 Summer Olympics in 2001, it coincided with China's accession to the WTO after 13 years of protracted and difficult negotiations.¹⁷⁰ It was a milestone in China's embrace of global multilateralism, which in turn accelerated China's pace of integration into the global economy. Furthermore, in recent years Chinese leaders could be found at many other multilateral venues such as the UN, G-8 (Group of 8) and G-20 (Group of 20) Summits, Euro-Asia Summit, China-Africa Cooperation Forum, and so on. In these venues, Chinese leaders repeatedly emphasized China's trajectory of "peaceful development." They sought to alleviate international worries about China's rising power by emphasizing a non-confrontational way of emergence, deep involvement into various international institutions, and closer "linkage with the international standards" (*yu guoji jiegui*).

In short, China's evolving policies toward Sudan and Burma as well as multilateralism represent big changes in China's international behaviour. China has been seen as one of the firmest supporters of the non-intervention and sovereignty norms, a "champion" of illiberal states. Beijing's association with authoritarian/totalitarian regimes as a means of enhancing China's soft power and fostering international clout against the West has provoked criticism.¹⁷¹ However, while Beijing did not want to jeopardise its ties with developing states such as Sudan and Burma, it did intend to win over its Western critics. The Chinese leaders saw economic development and a stable relationship with the West as crucial to China's on-going development and stability. China's evolving international policies in the post-Cold War era in general and in its Olympic moment in particular are attempts by China's "charm offensive" to allay Western fears about the "China threat" and to accentuate China's image as a responsible global actor.

27:1 (March 2003), 35-75.

¹⁶⁹ Lantaigne, *China and International Institutions*, ch.3; Shogo Suzuki, "Chinese soft power, insecurity studies, myopia and fantasy," *Third World Quarterly* 30:4 (2009), 779-93.

¹⁷⁰ For a detailed discussion of this difficult negotiation, see Zhiqun Zhu, "To support or not support: The American debates on China's WTO membership," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 6:2 (2000), 77-101.

¹⁷¹ For example, see Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive*, 43; Suzuki, "Chinese soft power."

5.2.3.3 Institutional efforts to public diplomacy

In addition to China's media and diplomatic attempts to project an engaged and responsible role in the run-up to the Games, this section also discusses China's efforts in terms of institutional setup and cultural diplomacy to better sell itself to the rest of the world. These efforts constitute an important part of China's mobilization of its sources of soft power to promote itself on the world stage.

To carry out its "image management" project systematically, Beijing started with tremendous efforts to establish new institutions and employ new methods to publicize itself to the external world. In 1991, the Information Office of the State Council (IOSC) was set up to publicize policies in various different governmental departments and organizations. At the same time, Beijing started to release white papers on issues concerning global audiences, such as human rights, Chinese policies on minorities and religions, national defence and the Taiwan issue.¹⁷² Designed to explain and advance Beijing's position on these sensitive issues to the outside world, the white papers themselves represent a big step in China's engagement with international concerns. In 1998, the English name of the Propaganda Department (*Xuanchuan Bu*) was changed into the Publicity Department, which showed Chinese authorities' sensitivity of the negative meaning of "propaganda" in English. At the National Overseas Propaganda Working Conference held in January 2002, Zhao Qizheng, then Director of the IOSC, underlined that, to create favourable international public opinion, "we must from now on have greater awareness of the need to provide better services, study the needs of overseas audiences, provide them with large quantities of information, help them understand China better, and make it possible for them to make use of various opportunities available in China."¹⁷³ Moreover, Li Changchun, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee in charge of the Party's propaganda, emphasized that China should adopt a new strategy in which Chinese media needed to "go abroad," and in the meantime invite foreign media to "come in."¹⁷⁴ On March 19, 2004, a new Division for Public Diplomacy was established under the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sheng Guofang, then Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained that this institutional setup was "to enhance the exchanges and interaction with the public in order to guide and win the

¹⁷² A series of China's white papers can be accessed from *Xinhuanet*: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-10/26/content_3685106.htm

¹⁷³ "全国对外宣传专题会议闭幕" (The conclusion of the National Overseas Propaganda Working Conference), *RMRB* (January 31, 2002), 2.

¹⁷⁴ "做好外宣工作 营造有利的国际舆论环境" (Do well in overseas propaganda, build favourable international public opinion [for China]), *Xinhua News Agency*, January 10, 2003.

understanding and support of the public for foreign policies.”¹⁷⁵

5.2.3.4 Cultural diplomacy

Along with China's institutional dedication to public diplomacy, China's cultural diplomacy serves as a prominent tool to develop cultural exchanges with other countries and enhance foreigners' understanding of China. In its promotion of cultural contacts with the external world, China re-embraced its cultural heritage by establishing Confucius Institutes (CIs) globally and encouraged educational and cultural exchanges with other countries. In this process, Maoist culture defined by class status almost disappeared.

Modelled loosely on the British Council, Goethe Institute, and *Alliance Française* in promoting their national language, in 2004, China began its own exploration through establishing the CIs globally to propagate Chinese language and culture. Recent years have witnessed a rapid growth of CIs around the world and this trend will continue with the central government's sponsorship.¹⁷⁶ At the Third Conference of Confucius Institutes held at the end of 2008, it was stated that there had been 249 CIs and 56 Confucius Classrooms established in 78 countries. Among these 305 CIs and Confucius classrooms, there were 90 in Africa, 103 in Europe, 81 on the American continent and 10 in Oceania.¹⁷⁷ Estimated setup costs were about US\$1 million for each Institute and operating costs in excess of US\$200,000 per year, which represented a sizable investment in public diplomacy.¹⁷⁸

In the meantime, China expanded its academic and educational exchange programs. On the one hand, China set up programs to cultivate its human capital and attract them back home. In the Maoist era, many talented Chinese were sent to the Soviet Union or Eastern European Socialist countries. In contrast, since the late 1970s, many more have gone to the advanced Western countries, such as North America, Europe and Australia. However, many chose not to come back. To lure back overseas talent, China initiated programs including the “Spring Light Program” (1997), “*Changjiang* Scholars Program” (1998) and “Thousand Talent

¹⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Academic seminar on China's public diplomacy,” March 19, 2004, accessed from: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t80368.htm>

¹⁷⁶ See “孔子学院发展规划（2012—2020年）” (The development program of Confucius Institutes (2012-2020)), *Guangming Ribao*, February 28, 2013, accessed from: http://www.chinese.cn/news/read/article/2013-02/28/content_486071.htm. In this report, it is estimated that there have been about 500,000 registered students in 358 CIs and 500 Confucius Classrooms set up in 105 countries by 2011. It suggests that China aims to have 150,000 students in 500 CIs and 1000 Confucius Classrooms around the world by the year 2015.

¹⁷⁷ “全球已建 305 所孔子学院和孔子课堂” (There are 305 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms across the globe), *CCTV*, December 9, 2008, accessed from: <http://cctvenchiridion.cctv.com/special/C22950/20081209/107124.shtml>

¹⁷⁸ Nicholas Kravlev, “China 60, US 0: cultural centers in other's country,” *The Washington Times*, April 8, 2010; Ian Hall and Frank Smith, “The struggle for soft power in Asia,” 4.

Program" (2008).¹⁷⁹ The Chinese Ministry of Education reported that from 1978 to the end of 2007, 1.21 million Chinese students and scholars had gone abroad to pursue education and training; of these, 319,700 had returned to China after they completed their studies.¹⁸⁰ It is said that with the economic downturn in the West since 2008, the number of Chinese students returning has been increasing.¹⁸¹ On the other hand, China has attracted a large number of foreign students and scholars to come to its universities. According to the China Association for International Education, there were 223,499 foreign students from 189 countries and regions enrolled in Chinese universities by 2008. The biggest sources of foreign students were South Korea (66,806), America (19,914), Japan (16,733), Vietnam (10,396), Russia (8,939) and other Asian countries.¹⁸² China thus hosted the fifth largest number of overseas students in the world.¹⁸³ In 1999, the central government set up an organization, the China Scholarship Council (CSC), to provide scholarships for Chinese students studying abroad and foreign students studying in China. It was reported that the CSC recently offered funding for 20,000 international students.¹⁸⁴

To enhance the exchanges and interaction with the public, the central government as well as private sectors organized and took part in numerous cultural events around the world. Examples included exhibitions, festivals, and Chinese cultural events including the Chinese Culture Year and Chinese New Year Receptions held in Chinese embassies around the world. For instance, a protracted China-France Culture Year was held in France from October 2003 to July 2004 and from October 2004 to July 2005 in China.¹⁸⁵ Similar cultural events were held between China and Russia in 2007. The 2008 year-long "China Now" festival was held in the UK. China also participated in various international book fairs including those held in Paris, Moscow, Seoul, Cape Town and Frankfurt. Chinese press and publication authorities perceived that these book fairs not only provided opportunities for China to engage with the foreign public, but more importantly pushed Chinese publishers to go abroad so as to increase

¹⁷⁹ Wang Huiyao, *国家战略——人才改变世界* (*National Strategy – Talent Change China*) (Beijing: Renmin, 2010).

¹⁸⁰ Quoted from Huiyao Wang et al, "Returnee entrepreneurs: impact on China's globalization process," *Journal of Contemporary China* 20:70 (2011), 414.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² "2008 年来华留学生统计简况" (Statistics on Foreign Students in China in 2008), extracted from *China Education Yearbook 2009*, available at: <http://www.cafsa.org.cn/index.php?mid=6&tid=603>

¹⁸³ Mara Hvistendahl, "China moves up to fifth as importer of students," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, September 19, 2008.

¹⁸⁴ China's University and College Admission System, "20,000 quotas for international students studying in China with Chinese Government Scholarship in 2010," available at: http://www.cucas.edu.cn/HomePage/2010-02-24/page_400.shtml;

¹⁸⁵ "中法文化年 2003-2005" (China-France Culture Year), *CCTV*, accessed from: <http://www.cctv.com/culture/special/C10779/01/index.shtml>

their international competitiveness in the global book market.¹⁸⁶ In addition, in recent years, it was recognized that non-state or less official Chinese actors could play a part in promotion of Chinese culture.¹⁸⁷ These actors, such as Chinese artists, friendship organizations and overseas Chinese associations were encouraged to play a role in promoting Chinese folk culture and traditions such as Chinese New Year celebrations. A good example is the annual Chinese-European Cultural Dialogue between the Chinese Academy of Arts and the European Union National Institutes for Culture.¹⁸⁸

To conclude this section, China's hosting the 2008 Olympic Games provided a powerful platform to examine how China mobilized key sources identified in the Chinese debate on soft power. The key sources of soft power that China utilized and promoted were: (1) a blend of traditional and modern aspects of Chinese culture, (2) its dynamic economy and its path to modernization, and (3) an omnidirectional engagement with the outside world through media, cultural and diplomatic means to demonstrate its "good global citizenship." These were used to attract and impress the world as well as the Chinese people by staging a splendid opening ceremony, showing China's rich cultural heritage, stylish modern architecture, the smooth organization of the Games, the hospitality of the well-mannered volunteers and the sense of responsibility to cope with international issues. On the one hand, Chinese authorities promoted these sources to target a global audience to announce its arrival as a civilised, modern, renewed and responsible global power. On the other hand, these sources were used to talk to Chinese citizens to raise their pride in their nation and enhance national cohesion under the leadership of the CCP.

5.3 Conclusion

Hosting an Olympiad had been a dream of the Chinese people for 100 years, and China had longed for the moment to demonstrate its arrival on the world stage as a modern, civilised, and renewed global power of the global community. The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games came to China at the culmination of its reform era after three decades of strenuous dedication to economic growth. They provided a unique opportunity and a powerful platform for China to make known its global presence as an emerging power and simultaneously a responsible

¹⁸⁶ "柳斌杰：中国出版‘走出去’" (Liu Binjie: China publishers [need to] go abroad), September 27, 2007, accessed from: http://webcast.china.com.cn/webcast/created/1539/44_1_0101_desc.htm

¹⁸⁷ See "李世杰：发挥海外华人社团作用，促中华文化走向世界" (Li Shijie: bring overseas Chinese associations into play, urge Chinese culture to go global), speech by Li Shijie at the CPPCC meeting on July 25, 2007, available at: <http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34961/90780/90789/6030216.html>

¹⁸⁸ "中欧文化交流进入快车道" (Cultural exchanges between China and Europe become intense), *Xinhua News Agency*, November 28, 2007; Ingrid d'Hooghe, "The limits of China's soft power in Europe: Beijing's public diplomacy puzzle," *Clingendael Diplomacy Paper* No.25 (Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'), 24.

power to earn recognition and respect from the global community by mobilizing and projecting its key sources of soft power.

This chapter argues that the hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympiad in China represented a milestone in China's reinterpretation and mobilization of its key sources of soft power so as to present a new image of China. China projected a "cultural China" by re-embracing its traditional culture but in a way that blends modern and scientific elements, very much a "people's China." The Beijing Games demonstrated a modern and emerging power born of on-going reform and economic development, achieved by opening its economy but with the state retaining firm control. China has also sought to build itself up as a responsible global power that cooperates with other world powers to solve international issues. By promoting key sources of China's soft power in the Beijing Games, China not only proved what it was capable of, but also demonstrated its reliability and willingness to engage with and accept the global community and international norms.

In this sense, China's soft power targeted both domestic and international audiences. At the domestic level, by showing what China was capable of, it sought to enhance national cohesion by reinterpretation of Chinese cultural assets – China's age-old civilisation and dynamic modern culture, and by demonstration of what China had achieved in its economic development and emergence as a global power. The mobilization of these sources of China's soft power was also utilized to strengthen the CCP's leadership role in guiding the process of China's modernization.

At the international level, these sources were mobilized to make China appealing, either in the sense of providing a worthy model for other societies to emulate, or by demonstrating its ancient and dynamic cultural assets. In the meantime, China's soft power was used to calm anxieties from various quarters about what China might do in international politics with its newfound strength. China's promotion of soft power in the post-Cold War era and in its Olympic moment in particular was not only to win affection from the "Global South," but to attain recognition from the "Global North." China's evolving international policies constituted a part of China's "charm offensive" to allay Western fears of a "China threat" and shape the country's image as a responsible global power. The Chinese government conducted an omnidirectional engagement with the outside world through media, cultural and diplomatic means and projecting China's potential economic development. By doing so, the Chinese authorities sought to counteract negative views from the global public and convince the rest of the world that China's rise would follow the path of "peaceful development," an alternative to the previous rising powers who had sought ascendance by might.

Finally, the study of China's soft power at the Beijing Olympic moment is significant in providing a prism to compare and contrast the constitution and mobilization of China's soft power in the past and present of the PRC, which is the goal of the next chapter.

6 China's Soft Power Trajectory: Change and Continuity

As I have pointed out in my discussion of the concept of soft power, sources of soft power do not equal soft power *per se*; these sources need to be cultivated, interpreted, mobilized and projected to a particular audience to let them speak to the target. The key sources of China's soft power identified in the contemporary Chinese discourse of soft power are Chinese culture, China as a model for development and Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy. The preceding two empirical chapters have demonstrated how these sources of soft power are interpreted, mobilized and projected by the Chinese authorities in two different historical periods, firstly in the first half of the 1960s and secondly during China's hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games. The first case study is located in the peak stage of revolutionary China and the second represents the culmination of China's reform to date. There are the two historical moments that the PRC has vigorously mobilized and projected its sources of soft power. The two case studies allow me to compare and contrast these processes of mobilization and projection of these key sources of China's soft power in the past and present. They also allow me to compare who the state was seeking to attract, for what purposes and through what tools.

Following the design of this study, this chapter sets out to compare and contrast the key sources of soft power and the way the PRC has mobilized them in two different eras. More precisely, it compares and contrasts the two cases by examining the following four factors: 1) the international and domestic contexts prevailing at the time, 2) the constitution of China's soft power by exploring the interpretations of the key sources, 3) the mobilization of these sources by demonstrating how they were projected, and 4) the purpose and target audience of soft power deployed in the two contexts. A comparison of these factors between the revolutionary China and China during the Beijing Olympics allows me to examine how the constitution and mobilization of the key sources of China's soft power has varied across time and what factors shape these processes.

The second section of this chapter looks in more depth at how to understand this variation and continuity in the way that the PRC has constituted and mobilized its key sources of soft power in the two eras. It points out that the change and continuity of China's soft power correlates with Chinese political elites' evolving sense of China's national identity and with the role of China in the world which they seek to project. As demonstrated by the case studies, soft power is not new to the PRC. However, it has been understood and used in different ways. The dynamic feature of China's soft power to a large extent is related to the Chinese shifting perceptions of China's national identity. In other words, soft power in the PRC has been nurtured, moulded, interpreted and reinterpreted in line with China's perceived national identity. There is a significant relationship between how China sought to represent itself in

the world and the way in which China constituted and mobilized soft power. The constitution and mobilization of China's soft power is both derivative of and reproductive of that representation.

6.1 A comparison of China's soft power constitution and mobilization between Mao's China and contemporary China

The two case studies in this research – one located at the peak of revolutionary China and the other in the hosting 2008 Beijing Olympics in China's reform era – provide me with a prism to compare and contrast these processes of mobilization and projection of the key sources of China's soft power in the different contexts. This comparison allows me to better understand the nature of China's soft power and what shapes it. This comparison is carried out by examining the four key factors as mentioned above. It demonstrates that changes and continuities are relevant across all these factors. The dynamic and multifaceted nature of China's soft power is reflected in the way in which the sources of soft power were interpreted and mobilized; in the expansion of the target audience; and in the purpose of utilizing soft power across the two eras.

6.1.1 Changing contexts in the PRC

The PRC has experienced a significant transition in its international and domestic environment from the 1960s to the 2000s. It endured non-engagement and non-recognition by the post-war international system in the 1950s and 1960s, but has had increasing interaction with the international community particularly since the late 1970s. Meanwhile, however, one key aspect of China that has remained constant in the domestic context is that the CCP remains in control of the state.

China in the 1960s was located within the turbulent Cold War, which featured intense competition between the two contending ideologies: liberal democratic capitalism versus socialism/communism. Accordingly, the two ideologies separated the world into two leading camps – one led by the US and the other led by the USSR. China's leaning to the Soviet bloc immediately after the founding of the PRC resulted in non-recognition and non-engagement from the US and American allies. The PRC was ostracised by the prevailing international institutions including the UN, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. China's international situation was worsened by its deteriorating relationship with the USSR since the late 1950s.

The increasing friction between Beijing and Moscow, and the on-going antagonism from the US camp from the late 1950s, radicalized Maoist China's domestic policies and catalysed an over-arching project of "continuous revolution." The deterioration of China's relationship with the Soviets prompted Mao's government to pursue a policy of self-reliance. The

ambition of catching up with the other major powers and playing a leading role in world politics pushed Maoist China to speed up its national development through domestic efforts with little international assistance. Consequently, Mao's government launched the GLF campaign. At the end of the 1950s, Communist China started to build People's Communes and sought to spread egalitarianism across the country.

In the meantime, however, the escalating struggles for national independence and development in Asia, Africa and Latin America against the rule of colonialism and imperialism provided the opportunity and space for the PRC to gain recognition and establish prestige. The CCP leaders believed that their particular experience and values, such as their path of revolution and building socialism/communism in an underdeveloped country, provided an exemplary model for the peoples in colonial or post-colonial societies to emulate. In this sense, Maoist China attempted to build itself as a "third pole" in the international system and a worthy example in world politics. It propagated a worldwide "continuous revolution" for the peoples in the Third World to attain liberation from Western colonialism and imperialism as well as full independence from control by the superpowers in the bipolar world system.

In contrast, the PRC in the reform era which culminated in the 2008 Beijing Olympics has generally enjoyed a more peaceful international environment, firstly because it obtained broader international recognition after joining the UN in 1971 and secondly owing to the collapse of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s. The PRC achieved "legitimate" status in the existing international system by replacing the ROC as the only legitimate body representing China in the UN – the fulcrum of the post-war international system. Since then, more states have established diplomatic relations with the Beijing regime. More significantly, China's adoption of the policies of "reform and opening-up" at the end of the 1970s propelled mutual engagement and recognition between the Chinese government and many other international forces including a number of international organizations as discussed in the previous chapter. China became a member incorporated into the international system, whereas prior to this its international engagement had been focused more narrowly on the Socialist bloc and developing world.

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR had created a new international geopolitical context. For China, it produced the welcome disintegration of the Soviet adversary – the colossus on its northern borders. China has thus faced a more secure international environment, apart from a short period after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown when the relationship between the Chinese government and some Western states soured. The PRC has quickened its pace of integrating into the various regional and international economic and political institutions since the mid-1990s, and has assumed a more active role

in regional and global affairs. This promising international environment combined with processes of economic reform within China contributed to the double-digit growth of China's economy in the 1980s and 1990s. At the beginning of the new millennium, China's emerging material strength and increasing global presence was driving the country from the fringes to the centre of the world stage.

At the domestic level, Mao's successors initiated the policies of "reform and opening up." The PRC entered into its reform era with the CCP still the sole ruling party of the state. The basic goal of reform under the CCP's leadership is to ensure continuing sustained economic growth and enrichment for the Chinese population, but to avoid dramatic regime change. Guided by this economic-driven reform, China's economy has moved from a self-reliant and rigid centrally planned economy in Mao's period to a more liberal and market-oriented system. China has experienced a phenomenal economic growth since the late 1970s. The legitimacy of the CCP's leadership role is no longer attached to revolution, but is performance-based. The CCP's economic-driven reform however has prompted a huge social, cultural and political transformation of the state, which is reflected in the discussion of the key sources of China's soft power in the following section.

6.1.2 Constitution of China's soft power

The second factor this chapter compares and contrasts is the constitution of China's soft power in the two periods. The preceding two chapters have demonstrated that the Chinese government have mobilized and projected Chinese culture, China as a model for development, and Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy both at the peak of revolutionary China and China during the Beijing Olympics located in the reformist China. In this sense, these are the key sources that constitute China's soft power that are relevant in both eras. However, while these have been promoted in both eras, one can find both continuity and variation in the constitution of each of the sources that were emphasized and promoted in both periods.

6.1.2.1 Chinese culture

Firstly, in terms of culture, although in both eras the Chinese government promoted Chinese culture to raise cultural nationalism and highlight cultural diversity, there were different aspects of Chinese culture that Chinese political elites chose to promote.

In the Maoist period, culture was moulded by "class struggle" and the CCP's revolutionary political ideology. The Chinese Maoists accordingly advanced the so-called "proletarian culture" which praised the revolutions carried out by the poor and highlighted the interests of the great masses. "Proletarian culture" was utilized to propagate "revolution," in particular, how the "revolution" had changed the fate of the poor Chinese people, as illustrated by the popular movies in the Maoist times. Of equal importance, this culture was used to legitimate

the CCP's rule of China and enhance the CCP's image globally. The promotion of a "proletarian culture" suggested that the Party was in line with the masses and represented the interests of the proletariat. It raised the "altruistic" nature of the CCP by highlighting the differences between itself and ruling parties in Western countries, its predecessors in the imperial Chinese dynasties as well as Chiang Kai-shek's regime, all of whom served the interests of the minority privileged classes.

In addition, Mao's China recast China's national culture according to the Chinese political elites' understanding of Marxist materialism defined in a "scientific" and "modern" way. Mao's government placed emphasis on antitheism in political ideology and education. The CCP asked the Chinese people to overthrow feudalism and "old" culture including Confucianism which was eulogized in imperial China. It also required Chinese people to break down their superstitions. The Chinese Maoists rejected Chinese cultural tradition because they regarded it as a hindrance to "continuous revolution" as well as building a "New China." During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), one of the stated goals was to bring an end to the "Four Olds (*si jiu*)," which were "old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits."¹ The promotion of this "scientific" culture was used to reconstruct a new image of China, a "new" nation quite different from the old, imperial and feudal China.

In China's international behaviour, the CCP leaders not only stressed the importance of cultural cooperation in the underdeveloped world in solidarity with the anti-imperialist revolutionary movements, but also encouraged cultural diversity in the non-Western world to counteract the dominance of Western culture.

In short, during the Maoist era, Chinese "proletarian" culture, on the one hand, discarded much of Chinese tradition and promoted a "universalistic" revolution and an image of the "New" China. On the other hand, this culture promoted cultural nationalism and diversity in the non-Western world. By doing so, Mao's China projected China's political identity as a revolutionary state and cultural identity as a non-Western nation. While today's Chinese culture has little relevance to revolution, China continues to highlight its cultural identity and appeal for cultural diversity in the non-Western world to neutralize the influence of Western culture.

Since China's initiation of reform in the late 1970s, China has rehabilitated its traditional culture in a way that blends it with modern aspects of Chinese culture. We thus have seen the emphasis of traditional Chinese values by the Chinese elites, the revival of Confucianism and the establishment of Confucius Institutes all over the world. These changes are directly linked

¹ "横扫一切牛鬼蛇神" (Sweep away all monsters and demons), *RMRB* (June 1, 1966), 1.

to regime legitimacy as well as recasting China's renewed, positive and dynamic image in the context of China's rise.

Firstly, the rehabilitation of Chinese traditional culture has been used to strengthen national cohesion when the ideology of communism and Maoism lost public appeal. As discussed in Chapters Three and Five, the CCP has launched various national patriotic campaigns by advancing so-called "Chinese socialist culture" and Chinese cultural heritage including Confucianism. Whilst the former has been promoted within the Party, the latter has been propagated in Chinese society. The rehabilitation of Chinese traditional culture has been done in a way that has been re-interpreted according to the CCP's political needs first and foremost to enhance the CCP's leadership role and the Chinese people's belief in this regime.² In this sense, Chinese culture has still been shaped by the Party's political need to retain and consolidate its rule in China.

In the meantime, Chinese culture has been re-interpreted by Chinese political elites to enhance China's global appeal and to placate certain international worries about China's fast material growth. The Chinese elites seek to present a cultured and benign China. They have burrowed into Chinese history to find aspects of traditional Chinese thought that may have global appeal. Chinese scholars have pointed out those concepts, such as harmony, diversity, pacifism, morality, and inclusiveness, have long been emphasized in Chinese history and tradition and these concepts have universal charm.³ These concepts have been endorsed by the Chinese leaders, for instance, building a "harmonious society" or a "harmonious world." Accordingly, the Chinese elites have made enormous efforts to project a "cultural China" mixing with the Chinese traditional culture with modern culture. Whilst the Chinese government still advances cultural diversity and cultural nationalism, it also puts emphasis on concepts such as "harmony without uniformity" and "peaceful coexistence" by promoting a Chinese culture featuring vitality, pacifism and inclusiveness.

These developments in the way that China's culture was understood and projected were a key component of the Beijing Olympics. During China's hosting of the Olympic Games, Chinese authorities projected the idea of a "cultural China" into the centre of Chinese dialogue with the foreign public. The "proletarian" culture which promoted revolution and condemned

² For example see Yu Dan, 于丹《论语》心得 (*A perception of the Confucian Analects from Yu Dan*), Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2006. She has built her fame in and outside of China by interpreting *Confucian Analects* in a modern way and making reference to contemporary China. However, many other scholars have pointed out her cherry-picking of the *Analects*, see for instance Li Yue, "《论语》可以乱讲吗?" (Can the *Confucian Analects* be annotated randomly?), *RMRB* (overseas edition, February 8, 2007), 4. Some are very blunt that Yu's way of interpretation alludes to regime legitimacy and rationale for an authoritarian state (interview with Chinese historian Zhao Tong, Canberra, November 21, 2011).

³ One recent research is Yan Xuetong, *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011).

Chinese traditional culture and the image of Chairman Mao disappeared.⁴ This interpretation of a “cultural China” was used to tell the world that China would not use its newfound wealth to launch revolution but that its rich cultural assets could contribute to a “harmonious world.”

From a comparison of the particular aspects of Chinese culture promoted by Maoist China and contemporary China, one can see a clear shift from condemning the traditional culture of China to a re-embracing of the culture. The denunciation of China’s “old” culture was used to serve China’s “continuous revolution.” The rehabilitation of Chinese traditional culture is for the purpose of creating a dynamic, cultured and benign China. Meanwhile, the CCP has consistently used Chinese culture to strengthen its rule over China and to consolidate its leadership role by circumspectly monitoring the Chinese free press.

6.1.2.2 China as a model for development

In both periods China clearly represented itself as a model for national development, particularly for those states in the “Global South,” still struggling towards independence and development. However the nature of the model of development that China has promoted has differed significantly across the two eras. China’s development model has moved from building an example for achieving revolution and communism to economic-driven reform. As discussed in Chapter Four, the CCP from the late 1950s vigorously promoted its experience of waging a war of national liberation against imperialism and colonialism for the benefit of the colonial and post-colonial societies. It sought to set an exemplary model for nation building for the underdeveloped world. China’s effort in this regard to some extent was motivated by the Sino-Soviet rift and the Chinese perception of the “degeneration” of the revolutionary spirit of the CPSU. Chinese Maoists thus thought that they should play a leading role in providing support for the struggling peoples in the underdeveloped world owing to “proletarian internationalism.” Maoist China as a model for revolution and nation building was strengthened by its assistance programmes for colonial or post-colonial societies. China’s foreign aid in this period constituted not simply a form of hard power but also a significant source of soft power. It was involved in the exportation of Chinese revolution and Maoist ideology, instigating local struggles against colonialists and imperialists as well as providing support for national development in the Third World. The example the Maoist China sought to build appeal to an alternative moral authority seeking to transform the international system based on revolution and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.

In recent years, China has also built itself as an exemplar for economic development. This time China as a model tied to economic-driven reform started in the late 1970s, which

⁴ Barmé, “China’s flat earth,” 64-86.

contrasts radically with the communist revolutionary model in Mao's era. Post-Mao China has maintained rapid economic growth even when some other countries have been struggling with financial crises. It has experienced a fast socio-economic transformation with overall supervision from a strong state government. As a result, more and more analysts tend to extract a "China model" for economic development. Nonetheless, worldwide opinion on the distinctiveness and integrity of the "China model" is split. Some analysts endorse the "China model." They argue that China's economic reform and development since the late 1970s provide more economic opportunities for other countries and represent an alternative to the Western neo-liberal model for other similar developing countries.⁵ On the other hand, some contend that the "China model" is just a replica of "mercantilism" and China actually applies "neo-colonialism" in regions such as Africa.⁶ They are also very sceptical about China's political system, arguing that if China represents a model, it actually promotes the development of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, the subject of a "China model" is still under debate particularly regarding what it represents and what the implications are for different audience.

Nevertheless, in its Olympic period, China made tremendous efforts to project its economic vitality and capacity by projecting a high-tech and environment-friendly China. It brought people's attention to a model for development – an opening economy but with the state retaining firm control. Compared to Maoist China, China as a model for development, although the CCP remains in charge, is no long self-reliant but opened to the rest of the world. It has shifted from the emphasis of egalitarianism by building People's Communes to market economy through gradual reforms, and competition and cooperation.

6.1.2.3 Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy

In both eras, China's foreign policy and diplomacy have been important sites in which soft power has been both constituted and mobilized. They provide a lens for us to investigate continuity as well as contrast in the way China's soft power is constituted. The PRC has made various adjustments to Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy to serve the state's interests and enhance its leadership role in world politics.

⁵ For instance, see Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, "African perspectives on China-African links," *The China Quarterly*, 199 (September 2009), 728-59; Barry Naughton, "China's distinctive system: can it be a model for others?," in S. Philip Hsu et al eds., *In Search of China's Development Model*, 67-85.

⁶ Such a review is referred to various studies, for instance, Chris Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, eds., *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace* (London: Hurst & Co., 2008); Ian Taylor, *China's New Role in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009); Special issue of *The China Quarterly*, "China and Africa: emerging patterns in globalization and development," vol.199 (2009); Yi-Feng Tao, "From a socialist state to a mercantilist state: depoliticizing central banking and China's economic growth since 1993," in S. Philip Hsu et al eds., *In Search of China's Development Model*, 111-127.

In the 1960s, China's diplomacy was guided by the "double-anti" foreign policy and the strategy of forming the widest "united front" among forces caught in between the two superpowers. In its rhetoric and diplomatic practices, Maoist China demonstrated that it was an independent force and a "third pole" in the bipolar world system and a major player fighting against the two hegemons, namely, the US and the USSR. It also attempted to promote solidarity in the Third World by providing support for movements of national liberation and development. Whether the issues related to China or not, the PRC was the firmest follower of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in dealing with international affairs, as demonstrated by the promotion of "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" and "Eight Principles of China's Aid" discussed in Chapter Four.

After China entered into its reform period, it has dramatically modified its foreign policy and diplomatic behaviour to better serve domestic economic development. China no longer exports revolution and political ideology. It has become more flexible and pragmatic, and put more emphasis on "peaceful development" through efforts to cooperate with others to maintain a stable regional and international environment. Since the end of the Cold War and particularly since the mid-1990s, China has clearly demonstrated its desire to play a cooperative and at times a leadership role in regional or global affairs, as illustrated in Chapter Five. More prominently, the hosting of the Beijing Games provided China a great platform for intensive interaction with the rest of the world. It provided a venue for China to project a role of benign and responsible power which represented a new pattern of rising through peaceful means such as cooperation and engagement with others *within* the international system rather than as a revisionist seeking to overthrow the system. Beijing accordingly constructed a leadership role in seeking solving the conflicts in Sudan and Burma in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics.

In short, in discussing the sources that constitute China's soft power in both eras, one can find both consistency and variation. First, we have seen that Chinese culture has been selectively interpreted according to political interests. Whilst traditional culture was largely denounced by Mao's government for the sake of carrying out his "continuous revolution" movement, this culture has been rehabilitated in recent decades. Chinese culture has been reinterpreted by the Chinese political elites by re-embracing their traditions but in a way blended with modernised elements, as staged in the opening ceremony of the Beijing Games to recast China's image as a dynamic, cultured and renewed nation. The selective use of Chinese culture in Mao's era as well as in the reform era is directly linked to regime legitimacy. Second, China as a model for development has gone from serving as an exemplar for revolution to being an example of economic-driven development. But in both eras, the China model is in contrast to the Western one, and the CCP's leadership role has been projected as a firm condition to achieve national development, in particular, to Chinese citizens. Third,

China has become more accommodated to the international system in carrying out foreign policy and diplomacy than in the Maoist period. At its Olympic moment, it brought global attention by projecting a responsible global power image.

6.1.3 Mobilization of China's soft power

The third factor that this chapter compares is the mobilization of China's soft power in revolutionary China and reformist China culminating in its hosting of the Beijing Olympics. As explored through the two case studies, soft power not only depends on the available soft power sources, but also the purposeful mobilization of these sources. Like the constitution of China's soft power, there have been both consistent and varying dimensions in the mobilization of soft power sources in the PRC.

The consistency is seen in a state-centric approach that has been adopted to mobilize and project the key sources of soft power in the PRC. In both eras, the Chinese government has played a central role in shaping and enhancing China's soft power, whether by cultural interaction, multilateral diplomacy, or foreign aid. For instance, both in the revolutionary period and the reform era, the government has authorized cultural interaction between China and foreign countries by media, educational, and cultural exchanges. The government has assigned cultural interaction a significant role in projecting China's global role. State-controlled media has served as an important source in projecting China's dynamic image and promoting Chinese government's views, actions or policies on specific issues. Educational and cultural exchanges supported by the government provide the opportunity for the engagement between Chinese and foreign peoples. These constitute Chinese efforts to promote China to serve Chinese political interests.⁷

This state-centric approach can be best understood by the fact that the PRC is a one-party state. The government or the CCP has been very careful in dealing with foreigners, perhaps as a result of its late arrival to modern international society. Chinese leaders once claimed that "there is no trivial matter concerning foreign affairs," and this mindset still has an impact on China's conduct in foreign affairs today.⁸ The CCP's caution and carefulness regarding China's foreign affairs since the beginning of the PRC reflect its sensitivity to foreign views of China. The Chinese political elites know that the legitimacy of the CCP at home is tied to how the Party manages China's international relations. The CCP thus will not loosen its control of international affairs.

⁷ PRC's efforts in this regard can be seen in Emmanuel John Hevi, *An African Student in China* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963); Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).

⁸ Chen Lifan, "周恩来未雨绸缪铸新中国外交脊梁" (Zhou Enlai laid the foundation for New China's foreign affairs), *党史博采* (Extensive Collection of Party History), no.2 (2007), 19-21.

There are changes however. The government has expanded its efforts to deploy soft power both in terms of the means it employs and the regions it reaches out to. Firstly, Mao's China in the peak of the revolutionary period rejected the majority of the international institutions created after World War II. Its multilateral engagement was confined to Asian-African regional organizations or activities, such as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization and the non-aligned movement in the Third World. China's multilateral engagement with Western countries in the 1960s was very limited. For instance, the Geneva Conference on a settlement of the Laotian question from 1961 to 1962 was one of very few such engagements.⁹ In contrast, China in the reform era has become more willing to participate in and engage with regional and international organizations and at times it has shown its willingness to play a leadership role such as in the UN. The Chinese government has increasingly used multilateralism to address and frame global issues according to its own position and project itself as responsible global power. Combination of international engagement but from a position of strength, the Beijing Olympics served as both a demonstration of China's identity as a responsible great power and a platform for the projection of this identity.

Secondly, China has intensified its cultural interaction by various means with different countries and regions all over the world. In Mao's times, as discussed in Chapter Four, the media was used as a major tool for propaganda and was mainly confined to exporting Chinese movies, publications and radio broadcasts to the underdeveloped world. Cultural interaction was limited to touring performances, holding and participating in cultural events in a few Asian-African countries. Thanks to the revolution in information and technology and, more importantly, China's reform program and growing economic strength, China's cultural interaction has expanded to a large number of countries and regions. China has scaled up the "going out" programmes of its culture. For instance, it has established numerous Confucius Institutes to introduce Chinese language and culture across the world. The numbers of students and intellectuals in exchange programs have increased enormously as shown in Chapter Five. In the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese government has also invested a lot in expanding its media programmes to push Chinese media "going abroad" to compete with other global media in providing Chinese news and information.

6.1.4 The purpose and audience of mobilizing and projecting China's soft power

The fourth factor to compare and contrast China's soft power between Mao's China and today's China is the purpose and target audience of deploying soft power in the two contexts.

⁹ See Xie Yixian ed., *Diplomatic History of Contemporary China (1949-2009)*, 116-119.

China's soft power mobilization and projection in the two periods vary in objectives, which determine the audiences that China seeks to win over. In the 1960s, the minimum goal of Maoist soft power promotion was to obtain recognition and prestige from the emerging forces in the Third World and to break up international isolation from the two superpowers. The maximum objective was to build itself as a political and moral leader in world affairs by leading a world revolution to overturn the bipolar world order. To break up China's international isolation, Maoist soft power was vigorously promoted to win the audiences caught in the competition between the two superpowers, the US and the USSR. For Mao's China, the emerging struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America represented the main forces that could undermine the foundations of the rule of imperialism and colonialism, great-power chauvinism, and transform the outlook of international politics. It thus targeted Third World societies that were undertaking anti-imperialist struggles and seeking national independence and development. Maoist China made tremendous efforts to demonstrate that it represented an alternative to the two superpowers, a worthy example for them to emulate. In pursuit of this objective, Maoist foreign policy practices were endowed with a missionary quality, visible in the manner in which the Chinese Maoists promoted their own way of life (such as wealth distributed equally, proletarian altruism and so on) to the foreign public. Chinese revolutionary foreign policy was entrenched in a normative direction to transform the international system from hierarchy to equality. This was the beginning of a period wherein China vigorously sought to influence other states either through demonstration or model effect, and claimed to be an actual or potential leader in a moral mission.

China in the reform era has sought integration into the existing international system. It intends to demonstrate that it is a benign, positive and responsible international actor in the global community including both developing world and developed societies. Responding to global concerns about China's rapid wealth accumulation and worries about whether China's rise will challenge the liberal international order, China has projected its soft power to persuade or convince the external world that China can achieve its great power status without posing a tangible threat to the existing international system. Soft power for contemporary China, therefore, represents both a campaign of "charm offensive" and a movement to play down fears of a "China threat."

That China secured the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games in 2001 provided a great opportunity for the Chinese people to project a positive image of China in front of the global community. China seized this great moment to reach out to a global audience, not only the "Global South," but also the "Global North." In this international spotlight, China projected itself a normal, modern, civilised and renewed nation. In the meantime, it sought to assuage international anxieties about China's rapid growth by engaging with the norm of "responsibility." Facing multiple global audiences, the Chinese elites articulated their vision

of Chinese history, society, development and relations with the outside world. They attempted to send a message that China had tried to play a constructive role and contribute to a world of "harmony without conformity."

During this process, however, one central purpose of China's soft power projection has not been changed: China has always sought to re-attain great power status in the international arena. As shown in the case studies, there has been very deliberate international political marketing pursued by the PRC. It has striven to "sell China" to achieve the recognition of China's international status as a key player from the international community. Whether it was the projection of the PRC as an inspirational beacon for the world revolution in the 1960s, or the emphasis on China as a responsible great power in the 2000s, China has attempted to demonstrate that it represents a great power on the world stage and to secure international recognition of what it sees as its rightful place. This desire is identical to the historical mission of the Chinese elite in rejuvenating the Chinese nation since the late 19th century, reflecting both the "Middle Kingdom" sentiment and a strong China complex as analysed in the two case studies.

Following the above point, there has been a constant reference to the domestic audience in China's soft power promotion in both contexts. This is certainly the case in the Maoist era. As discussed above as well as in Chapter Four, Maoist China propagated China's new "proletarian culture," the People's Communes, the world significance of the Chinese revolution and China's "proletarian internationalism," to support revolutions. In this process, the CCP enhanced its leadership credentials at home by demonstrating its "altruistic" qualities and its endeavour to build China as an alternative to the "selfish" superpowers. To some extent, this is also true with the hosting of the Beijing Olympics. By staging a successful and spectacular Olympic Games and projecting a renewed, civilised and rich China on the world stage, the Party sought to show its credibility and competence in leading the country to an audience of Chinese citizens. Therefore, in China's soft power promotion, there has always been a desire to seek domestic support for the Party's rule. As such, we can see a dualism between the state and the Party: when perceptions of the country are promoted through China's soft power, this has also raised the CCP's role and leadership credential at home and abroad.

To conclude this section, by comparing and contrasting the key factors, including 1) the context, 2) the constitution of China's soft power, 3) the mobilization, and 4) the purpose and target audience of deploying soft power in the two contexts, it demonstrates that changes and continuities are relevant across all these factors.

6.2 Understanding the nature of China's soft power

From the above comparison, it can be seen that China's soft power is dynamic and evolving. This study recognizes that such a nature of China's soft power is related to the changing domestic and international contexts, as discussed by the first section. At the same time, this study argues that the dynamic and evolving nature of China's soft power correlates with Chinese elites' shifting perceptions and representations of China's national identity in relation to the post-war international system. China's soft power is shaped by, but also constitutive of, the perceived China's national identity.

The PRC's national identity has changed greatly "from a revolutionary country that rejected the existing international regime to a responsible power within the system." Accordingly, "China has switched to a different strategic paradigm, one that sees the world in cooperative rather than confrontational terms . . . the main thrust of Chinese diplomacy today is not to create a new international order, but to join the existing order."¹⁰ This point of view sheds light on the understanding of a historical change in the way in which China's soft power is constituted and mobilized, which correlates closely with the re-orientation of China's national identity.

During most of the Maoist period, the PRC faced an unfavourable international environment. Maoist China experienced non-recognition and non-engagement from the post-war international system. It was denied membership in the UN and its international legitimacy was questioned by many states. Further, perceived ideological differences and conflicts of national interests between the PRC and the USSR since the late 1950s alienated China from the Soviet bloc. The Chinese perception of the PRC's marginal position in the post-war international system reinforced the mentality of "a century of humiliation." This victim mentality was pervasive among the Chinese political elites, particularly when they felt that China was denied and bullied by the superior powers, and when they contrasted this with the glory China had enjoyed as "the Middle Kingdom" in ancient times. This mentality and the denial of international recognition alienated China from the mainstream of the international community in the 1960s. Consequently, China felt and posited itself as an "outsider" with respect to the international system in so far as that system was one dominated by the superpowers; however it did not view itself as an outsider in relation to the developing world but instead saw itself as a revolutionary Third World power.

The perceptions of itself as an "outsider" of the system but also a revolutionary Third World power shaped the way in which China constituted and projected its soft power. As an "outsider" of the system, the PRC promoted its differences from the major powers. These

¹⁰ Ni Feng, "The shaping of China's foreign policy," 146-7.

differences were found in its past experience of fighting against imperialism and colonialism on the pathway to the Chinese revolution; and in its national traits of being “non-white” and less developed. The Chinese political elites framed China’s soft power through highlighting these differences, and used them as foundations upon which they sought to restore China’s rightful place on the world stage.

From a CCP’s point of view, its victory in 1949 was a victory over internal “reactionaries,” the KMT; but it was also a triumph over external foes including European and Japanese colonialism and American interventionist imperialism. Therefore, the CCP believed that its regime legitimacy was deeply rooted in its course of revolution. In the international arena, Maoist China’s credibility lay in “a far-reaching influence on the revolution in the East as well as in the whole world.”¹¹ Chinese leaders claimed that “the road that the Chinese people have followed ... is the road that the peoples of many colonial and semi-colonial areas should traverse ... It is the Mao Zedong road ... the fundamental road for the people in similar colonial and semi-colonial areas.”¹² In the Chinese leadership’s perception, the Chinese state was born of revolution and its legitimacy was based on the CCP’s successful campaign of revolution against the reactionary forces. The Maoists believed that the PRC’s international credibility and appeal lay in its path of revolution and as a model for emulation, as an inspirational beacon of world revolution.

Therefore, “China had a special role in the reshaping of a future revolutionary order in the world.”¹³ China’s revolutionary foreign policy actually reflected and reinforced its national identity as a revolutionary Third World power in world politics, as reflected in its support of the struggles in colonized non-Western world. The emerging revolutions in Asia, Africa and Latin America from the 1950s on “provided both a test and a validation of the PRC national identity as a champion of national liberation struggles in colonial and semi-colonial areas.” These movements “presented the exogenous trigger for national identity mobilization and confirmed for the national self and ‘others’ that China could stand up for the integrity of its self-image as a supporter of national liberation movements against imperialism and colonialism.”¹⁴ Therefore, Chairman Mao and his colleagues unwaveringly insisted on the wisdom and centrality of the Chinese model and experience of revolution.

However, this revolutionary rhetoric and practice were seen as a great challenge to the stability of the post-war international system. American leaders were aware of and frightened

¹¹ *Selected Works of Mao*, vol.1: 191, vol.4: 158.

¹² “刘少奇在亚洲澳洲工会会议上的开幕词” (Liu Shaoqi’s inauguration speech at the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries), *RMRB* (22/11/1949), 1.

¹³ Zhai Qiang, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2000), 21; Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, 122.

¹⁴ Zhai Qiang, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, 21-2.

by the challenges from Communist China to their dominant position in the international order. This can be seen in the debate over "who lost China," and the emergence of McCarthyism in American politics and the "domino theory" in Asia. To some extent, America's frustration, fear and resentment of "Red China" trapped American forces in Asia, intervening in two wars, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, both of which had Chinese backup.

China's projection of "Maoist soft power" and Maoist China's support of revolutionary movements in the Third World sent Americans' threat perceptions of Communist China spiralling. Compared to the USSR, which was viewed by many Westerners as "conservative" with its realist *realpolitik*, "Red China" was perceived as "a more ideologically charged, overtly revolutionary, face of Communism."¹⁵ Mao's later elucidation of the concept of the "intermediate zone," a part of his international united front strategy, was an extension of the CCP's revolutionary experience before 1949 to the entire world in the 1960s. In addition, the emphasis on "continuous revolution" immediately had international implications and applications, further contributing to the external perceptions of China. In short, "mutual suspicion and mistrust" perceptions were apparent between China and the West, the US in particular, and with it "a process of action and reaction" which hardened the positions of both sides¹⁶ and further cemented PRC's revolutionary identity.

All in all, China's revolutionary identity was founded on its past revolutionary experience, confirmed by Soviet endorsement at the very beginning of the PRC, and reinforced by American antagonism in the early days of the Cold War. This revolutionary identity framed China's soft power and was reflected in China's policies. The "double anti" and Third World revolutionary policies were the products of this identity. These policies further strengthened the perceptions of China's identity as a revolutionary power and an "outsider" of the international system, which contributed China's challenge to the CPSU's leadership in the world revolutionary movement in the post-Stalin era. To fulfil the mission of "continuous revolution," the PRC at home launched the GLF, a bold leap to bypass the Soviet path of industrialization and to overtake the West. Abroad, it challenged the Soviet proposition of "peaceful co-existence" between the different regimes. The PRC's simultaneous quarrels with both superpowers gave its revolutionary ideological presence global undertones. It thus aligned itself with the so-called "Third World," and vigorously promoted Third World solidarity and radical circumvention of the bipolar world order and of its established organizations by positioning itself in the centre of the world revolution. On the one hand, Mao enthused about "excellent" revolutionary upsurges around much of the Third World, where "[American] imperialism and [Soviet] revisionism are more isolated than ever." On the

¹⁵ Scott, *China Stands Up*, 25.

¹⁶ Yongjin Zhang, *China in International Society since 1949*, 49.

other hand, he insisted that across the Third World “people in countries realize that China’s road is the only road to liberation. China is not only the political centre of world revolution; it must also be the centre of world revolution militarily and technically.”¹⁷ Mao’s position on the world revolutionary movement and the role he prescribed for China to play in the movement informs what I have conceptualized as “Maoist soft power.” Maoist China promoted “proletarian culture,” China as a model for revolution and development, and a revolutionary foreign policy to attract the peoples in the (post)colonized non-Western world. The way Maoist soft power was constituted and mobilized in turn reinforced the PRC’s revolutionary identity.

However, the PRC’s revolutionary identity reached a turning point in the 1970s. First, China experienced dramatic changes in the international strategic environment at the beginning of the 1970s. The first significant event was the PRC’s admission to the UN as the sole representative of China in 1971. It became a legitimate member of the existing international system and this was followed by more than 50 member states’ diplomatic recognition of the Beijing government within the decade.¹⁸ Second, the Sino-US rapprochement in 1972 broke through the encirclement from the superpowers in the 1960s. The normalisation of bilateral relations between China and the US culminated in the establishment of a full diplomatic relationship in 1979. China thus began to end the situation of non-recognition and non-engagement between itself and the international system. It was no longer possible for China to shape its foreign policy from the point of view of an “outsider”; the changes catalysed a re-orientation of China’s national identity in the post-Mao era. In addition to the changed international strategic environment, the abandonment of China’s revolutionary identity also resulted from profound reflections on the Maoist path to attaining international leadership by revolution and associated policies, which had undermined China’s domestic development and affected the lives and well-being of the people. China’s revolutionary identity finally collapsed when Deng Xiaoping gained paramount status in the CCP by initiating the project of “reform and opening-up” at the end of 1978. This project was set to transform China’s economy, science and technology, education and national defence within the existing international system.

Soon after the decision to “reform and open up,” Deng set the tone of China’s role for the following decades: “the role we play in international affairs is determined by the extent of our economic growth. If our country becomes more developed and prosperous, we will be in a

¹⁷ Mao Zedong, “China should become the arsenal for world revolution (July 7, 1967),” in *Classified Chinese Communist Document: An Analysis* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1978), 455.

¹⁸ See the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/2193/>

position to play a greater role in international affairs.”¹⁹ Since then, the Chinese government has been giving priority to economic development. It aims to lift China from Third World socio-economic levels to those found in the First World through opening-up and interaction with the outside world, especially the advanced West.

The changed international environment and Chinese leaders’ determination to implementing “reform and opening-up” have had a significant impact on redefining China’s national identity. Along with China’s rapid economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, it has generated new confidence at home but greater concerns and expectations of China abroad. The concept of being a responsible great power has come to the fore at the turn of the new century, against the backdrop of warnings of a rising “China threat.” Additionally, due to the development of information technology since the 1990s, the speed of globalization has become faster and the scope wider. In this context, the Chinese political elite has begun to recognize that in the globalized world, the destiny of China is tied up with other countries, as evidenced by the Asian Financial Crisis, the spread of terrorism and epidemics, and the issue of climate change. The nature of security has changed dramatically. China senses that its security, traditional or non-traditional, is closely connected with the other powers and actors. Therefore, the rise of China as a responsible great power within the international community has been said to be not only a necessary step on China’s path to great power status but also an international requirement and aspiration.²⁰ China’s new identity as a responsible great power has been under shaping. It is the result of the Chinese reflection of the tragedies that happened in the Maoist period, such as the GLF and the Cultural Revolution,²¹ the changing international environment as well as the interaction with other actors. These forces together shape China’s international identity in the 21st century.

China’s seeking to enhance its international influence by redefining its identity as a responsible great power, is a significant factor in the reconstitution of China’s soft power. The way in which China’s soft power is reconstituted leads to the projection of a quite different image of China. In the first place, unlike in the Mao’s era, the greatness of China today has nothing to do with class struggle and revolution; instead, it relies on China’s socio-economic and socio-political development within the international community. Accordingly,

¹⁹ Deng Xiaoping, “目前的形势和任务” (The present situation and the tasks before us, January 16, 1980), *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, vol.2: 225.

²⁰ In China, the concept that China is a “responsible power” has been stressed in Hu Jintao’s and Xi Jinping’s leadership, whereas in the US, China has been asked to be a “responsible stakeholder” since it was addressed by US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in 2005. For the academic discussion, for instance, see Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin eds., *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy*. (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001).

²¹ See for example Cong Jin, *The Years of China’s Tortuous Development, 1949-1989*, 268-73; Luo Hanping, *China on the Eve of Cultural Revolution*; Su Tairen, “邓小平如何评价毛泽东” (Deng Xiaoping’s opinion towards Mao Zedong), *领导文萃 (Collected Digest)*, no.22 (2011), 56-60; Yang Jisheng, *Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962*, 2012;

China's socio-economic achievements, and the ideas and means conducive to its performance have been highly promoted. Many Chinese consider that the way China has conducted its modernization has resulted in a dramatic reduction of poverty in China and contributes to the growth of world economy. Secondly, the Chinese people have re-embraced and promoted Chinese civilisation and traditional culture. They believe that China's greatness is very much rooted in Chinese civilisation, which is significant for national coherence and the formation of national consciousness.²² They consider that many aspects of Chinese traditional culture would facilitate China's re-emergence and add to China's attractiveness around the globe. Further, to demonstrate China's responsibility, China has participated in various multilateral international organizations, signed numerous international treaties and taken part in a lot of international operations since it decided to join the existing international system in the late 1970s.²³ These changes in China's international behaviour demonstrate China's sense of membership of the international community. China sees its involvement in the multilateral international regimes and actions as indicative of its responsibility for managing the existing international system.

However, China's identity as a responsible great power is still taking shape. China has not established a clear-cut national identity. As argued by Allen Carlson, "China's national identity is now less well defined, and more contested, than many observers have previously thought."²⁴ To understand China's national identity, it is important to recognize that "there is an uneasy, shifting balance of competing forces and identities."²⁵ In addition to building China as a responsible global power, there are other facets of China's national identity. Chinese political elites still regard China as a socialist country with Chinese characteristics and as a major developing state following the sovereignty principle in the Westphalia sense.²⁶

First, the Chinese political elites maintain that China is a socialist country with Chinese characteristics, although contemporary China's socialism is "in sharp distinction with both the style in the former Soviet Union and that in the Maoist China."²⁷ This means that China

²² For instance, see Xiao Gongqin, "民族主义与中国转型时期的意识形态" (Nationalism and Chinese ideology in the transition period), *战略与管理* (*Strategy and Management*), no.4 (1996), 21-22.

²³ See Samuel S. Kim, "China's path to great power status in the globalization era," *Asian Perspective* 27:1 (2003), 35-75; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a status quo power?," *International Security* 27:4 (2003), 5-56; Lanteigne, *China and International Institutions*.

²⁴ Carlson, "China's conflicted Olympic moment," 254.

²⁵ Kim, "Northeast Asia in the local-regional-global nexus," 42.

²⁶ The most recent official claim of such was made by President Xi Jinping, see "中国是合作共赢倡导者践行者" (China is an advocator and practiser of cooperation and "win-win"), *RMRB* (December 6, 2012), 1; also see Tiejun Zhang, "Self-identity construction of the present China," *Comparative Strategy* 23:3 (2004), 281-301; David Shambaugh, "Coping with a conflicted China," *The Washington Quarterly* 34:1 (2011), 7-27.

²⁷ Tiejun Zhang, "Self-identity construction of the present China," 2004, 289.

will pursue gradual economic reforms whilst maintaining the political status quo, which is in contrast with “the ‘big bang’ and ‘shock therapy’ of Russia and Eastern European countries.”

²⁸ The emphasis of China’s socialist identity means that Chinese leadership seeks to avoid the road taken by the former Soviet bloc countries, which are viewed by Chinese political elites as negative examples of how to pursue reform. This concern is reflected in the debate of the “China model,” discussed in the Chapter Three. A further point of this official formulation of China’s national identity as a socialist country with Chinese characteristics is that it highlights the CCP’s status as the single ruling party and the guarantor for maintaining social and political stability in China. The CCP believes that this social and political stability will ensure continuous economic growth.

Second, the Chinese leaders have repeatedly pointed out that while China is rising, it still is a developing nation. This official representation of China as a developing state has three ramifications. This representation, firstly, justifies the government’s continuing focus on national economic development, which in turn would consolidate the CCP’s legitimacy that is premised upon economic performance. Secondly, identifying China as a developing nation can be used as a justification not allowing China to assume more international responsibilities, such as those required by the US,²⁹ as China’s capabilities are constrained when seen as a developing nation. Thirdly, China’s national identity as a developing nation can be used to enhance the sense of solidarity between the developing nations on particular issues, for instance, the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the country’s internal affairs.

These three facets of China’s identity – a responsible global power, a socialist regime and a developing state – are all reflected in the interpretation and mobilization of China’s soft power.

To sum up, the different processes through which China’s soft power is constituted and mobilized in the two eras, and the dynamic nature of China’s soft power are correlated to Chinese political elites’ evolving perceptions of China’s national identity and China’s global role in the international system. In its global role, China has moved from an “outsider” who sought to overturn the post-war international system to an “insider” playing the role of a responsible global power role within the system. China’s repositioning itself within the international system shapes the different ways in which China’s soft power is constituted and mobilized. The relationship between China’s national identity and its soft power is commensurate with this. China’s national identity is strongly reflected in the way in which soft power is constituted and mobilized. In turn, the interpretation and mobilization of soft power sources enhance and even affirm these perceptions of China’s national identity and of

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ See Zoellick, “Whither China: from membership to responsibility?”

China's role in the international system. Mao's China at the peak of revolutionary and the Beijing Olympics provide two valuable sites at which to explore these processes.

6.3 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter makes a comparison of China's soft power constitution and mobilization by drawing upon the two case studies in the first half of 1960s and the hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. This comparison of China's soft power constitution and mobilization in two different historical periods is made by exploring these factors: 1) the international and domestic contexts, 2) the constitution of China's soft power by reviewing the interpretations of the key sources, 3) the mobilization of these sources by demonstrating the way they were projected, and 4) the purpose and target audience of deploying soft power in the two contexts. It demonstrates that variations and continuities are relevant across all these factors. The way soft power has been constituted and mobilized projects two quite different "Chinas": one radical, revolutionary and revisionist; and the other cooperative, flexible and pragmatic. Across these two eras, the state government has played a central role in deploying soft power to attain China's "rightful" place in world politics. Despite the expanded audience from the developing world to multiple global audiences, there has always been a constant domestic orientation in China's soft power deployment so as to consolidate the CCP's leadership role at home. As such, we can see a dualism between the state and the Party: when China's soft power has been mobilized to enhance the charm of the state, it also raised the CCP's role and leadership credential at home and abroad.

This chapter also argues that the constitution and mobilization of China's soft power correlates with Chinese political elites' evolving perception of their state's national identity in the two eras. The re-conception of China's national identity from a revolutionary state that sought to overthrow the existing international system to a responsible and rising power within the system is strongly reflected in the different ways China's soft power is constituted and mobilized.

7 Conclusion

This thesis focuses on the constitution and mobilization of soft power in the PRC. It argues that soft power is dynamic and multifaceted, and this has been reflected in the study through the examination of how key sources of China's soft power have been interpreted, mobilized and projected over time by the PRC. This research also sheds light on how we should understand China's dynamic soft power.

There has been a burgeoning literature on China's soft power particularly in the first decade of the 21st century. This research was initially motivated by the puzzles about the nature of soft power and whether it is a "new" phenomenon in China. These puzzles drove this study to investigate the possibility of "soft power" efforts in the early period of the PRC and to compare them with contemporary China's soft power behaviour in international politics. In so doing, it allowed me to compare and contrast the degree of variation and consistency of China's soft power in different eras of the PRC. This study is keen to demonstrate the dynamic and fluid nature of China's soft power, the different ways that this power has been used by the Chinese government in different contexts, as well as the factors that have influenced the way that soft power has been treated in the PRC.

This conclusion chapter provides an overview of this study. It reviews the theoretical framework of this study, summarizes the main empirical findings, suggests a new perspective of the concept of soft power, and provides wider implications for IR and China in the world.

7.1 Overview of theoretical framework

This thesis is underpinned by the central question of *How has soft power been constituted and mobilised by the PRC?* The secondary question is *How has the constitution and mobilization of the key sources of China's soft power varied across time and what factors shape the way that it is constituted and mobilized?*

In order to provide a fuller and more historically nuanced understanding of the nature and role of soft power in the PRC, I adopted a longitudinal historical approach. This approach allowed me to explore the more specific questions: 1) the key sources that constitute China's soft power; 2) whether these sources have been mobilized and promoted by the PRC in the early period, and if so, how; 3) whether soft power is "new" to China, its variation and continuity; and 4) the way to understand such variation and continuity.

In answering these questions, I have developed an analytical framework to guide my case studies on the mobilization and projection of Chinese sources of soft power in different

historical contexts. My analytical framework includes two layers: one is the nature of soft power and the other is the key Chinese sources of soft power.

The first level of my framework, which follows the constructivist view of power, treats soft power as ideational, relational, and social power. In contrast to hard power, it is harder to ignore these characteristics which are entrenched in soft power. First, soft power is an ideational form of power, which involves ideational factors such as culture, ideologies, values, perceptions and intentions. These ideational elements can frame and inform policies, rhetoric and actions. Soft power in international relations is driven to secure sympathy, recognition and approval from other actors. Second, soft power is relational and relative. It is not an absolute term but is defined through the relationship – how the actor views its relationship with others. Soft power may vary when the subject or the target changes, as in these circumstances the sense of self can be different and this can affect how it defines the relationship with others as well as the sources of soft power to project. The shift in the sense of self and relationship can affect the way it defines and projects power. Therefore, soft power is not self-ordained but is shaped by the relationship and interaction, which leads to the third dimension of soft power that it is social. Soft power is constituted and mobilized in a multi-directional process through various forms of social interaction such as learning, adaptation and socialization.

Therefore, soft power is not a “hard thing” or a “fixed reality.” It is dynamic and may vary when the subject’s sense of itself or its relations with others changes. This approach conceives that soft power involves relationships not only with others in a certain context, but also with visions of one’s past, present and future. Therefore, this thesis has suggested that a better way of looking at soft power is to put it into a certain context and observe it in process rather than in a fixed situation. By doing so, I show the different ways that soft power is constituted and mobilized and factors that have influenced these processes.

The second level of my framework attaches to the understanding of Chinese thinking about soft power. I have gone to Chinese discourse to explore particularly what constitutes China’s soft power in Chinese thinking. I have identified that a large number of Chinese writings about China’s soft power have focused on Chinese culture, China’s model for development, and Chinese ideas of the way of dealing with foreign affairs. Chinese intellectuals have generally regarded that these are the most important soft power sources not only to enhance China’s attractiveness in the international arena but also to assuage foreign anxieties about the rise of China. The discussions of the three Chinese sources of soft power actually tell us much about how the Chinese elites see their country and what they seek to present China’s national identity in the contemporary world.

Combining the two levels of this analytical framework, I have proceeded with the exploration of the PRC's "soft power" efforts in its international engagement in two different contexts, one being Mao's China at the peak of revolutionary times and the other China during the hosting the 2008 Olympic Games. At these two historical moments, the PRC was remarkably active in its interaction with the outside world through the projection of its non-material power.

This study has demonstrated that Mao's government promoted "Maoist soft power." This power was promoted by the wish to propagate so-called "proletarian culture," China as a model for nation building, and Maoist revolutionary foreign policy and diplomacy. "Proletarian culture" was utilized to propagate "revolution" and "class struggle" as well as to attack the "old" "feudalist" culture in imperial China. The Maoists took their successful war of national liberation as an exemplar of nation building. They also stressed the importance of egalitarianism in developing the country. Maoist revolutionary foreign policy and diplomacy were used to instigate "continuous revolution" all over the world to overthrow the international system dominated by the superpowers.

In the recent years, the PRC has also employed a soft power strategy to engage with international audience, evident at the moment of its hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games. However, soft power at this time was constituted, interpreted and mobilized in a different way as compared with such in the Maoist period. It promoted a "cultural China" by rehabilitating China's traditional cultural heritage including Confucianism, a "modern China" achieved by the "reform and opening-up" policies, and China as a responsible global power in the international system.

After the two case studies, this thesis has compared and contrasted the degree of variation and consistency of China's "soft power" in the two different eras of the PRC. I have examined how the constitution and mobilization of the key Chinese sources of soft power varied across time and what factors shaped these processes. This study argues that the evolution of PRC's soft power is rooted in Chinese elites' evolving perceptions of their country's national identity, the role they would like China to play on the world stage, and China's relations with the international system. How this state seeks to represent itself on the world stage has shaped the way it chooses to interpret, mobilize and project its soft power.

7.2 Empirical findings

There are four key empirical findings of this study. First, this thesis has demonstrated that, although an American post-Cold War invention, the concept of soft power can be a useful analytical tool to study foreign policy of any states and to explore the antecedents of

contemporary soft power. My research has shown that soft power does not represent a “new” dimension in China’s international engagement. Rather, elements of soft power were practised by Maoist China. Second, this thesis has demonstrated that, in PRC’s case, soft power is not a “passive” and “latent” quality, but has been consciously constituted and mobilized by the state to speak to particular audiences – both domestic and international. Third, this study has shown that there is a degree of variation and consistency in the way China’s soft power is constituted and mobilized in the two historical contexts of the PRC. Fourth, my research has argued that the variation and consistency of China’s soft power correlates with China’s evolving identity perceived by the Chinese in the past decades.

To begin with, by an exhaustive collection and analysis of primary data, this research has shown that the deployment of soft power is not a “new” strategy used by the PRC; rather, elements of soft power were practised by the PRC in the early Cold War period. Under Mao, the Chinese state actively promoted China’s “new” proletarian culture, the notion of China as an exemplary model of revolution and nation-building, and China’s revolutionary foreign policy through China’s cultural diplomacy and foreign aid programmes from 1959 to 1965. This demonstrates that, although soft power is a concept developed in the post-Cold War era, this concept can be a useful analytical tool to investigate the antecedent(s) to contemporary soft power.

Secondly, this study has demonstrated that soft power is not purely passive in its mode of operation – others may want to do or follow what one wants them to do because of the affinity of culture, values and policies. Rather, it can be nurtured, interpreted and reinterpreted, and consciously mobilized and projected by the state. The two case studies in this thesis have revealed that soft power has been intentionally chosen and purposefully promoted by the Chinese government at different times. This finding is important to the conceptualization of soft power as well as its utility in the real world. On the question of whether soft power is *natural* or *nurtured*, Joseph Nye, the concept inventor, has been ambiguous and inconsistent. Sometimes Nye argues that soft power comes *naturally* from the universally attractive culture, political values and policies.¹ Other times Nye implies that a country’s soft power could rise and fall and highlights the importance of wielding public diplomacy to “convert” foreigners to obtain desired outcomes,² which suggests that soft power can be developed through using certain mechanism. Janice Bially Mattern points out that Nye’s “dual” treatments of soft power sows “confusion about the kinds of practical expectations one can stake on soft power.”³ From the empirical studies of the PRC’s soft

¹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 11.

² *Ibid.*, 111, 128-134.

³ Mattern, “Why ‘soft power’ isn’t so soft,” 591.

power in the two different periods, this study argues that soft power is *nurtured*, from purposeful mobilization of non-material sources of power.⁴ The constitution and mobilization of China's soft power has been a constant strategy not only to obtain international recognition and influence but also to enhance CCP's legitimacy at home and abroad.

Thirdly, following the finding that soft power has been purposefully mobilized by the Chinese government since the Maoist times, this thesis has demonstrated the change and continuity of China's soft power. A big change is that facing multiple international audiences, for contemporary China, soft power is not only to make China appealing in the sense of providing a successful model for other societies, particularly in the "Global South," to emulate, but is also to assuage the fears of China's rise which may pose a threat to the dominant Western states. As analysed in Chapter Six, the overall nature of China's soft power has changed: from revolutionary and revisionist to cooperative and pragmatic. It has departed from an overtly subversive approach to the post-war international system to a more complex orientation located within the existing international system. In detail, the soft power the PRC promoted in the two periods varies in content, targeted audiences, tools, and purposes (see Chapter Six). As for the continuity, this study finds that in both case studies, a state-centric approach was prominent and the Chinese government has always been keen to project a (potential) great power role in the international arena. Beijing has unfailingly supervised and even controlled the shaping and (re)interpretation of the sources of China's soft power. This makes the Chinese case of soft power an outstanding example of what Brian Hocking calls the "state-centred, hierarchical model."⁵ However, this state-centric approach reflects that the CCP – the only ruling party in contemporary China – is very sensitive to its international image, which attaches importance to its domestic legitimacy. It thus seeks an overarching control of dealing with international affairs. Meanwhile, the PRC has always sought to attain the international recognition of its (potential) great power status whether by propagating world revolution or by projecting its civilization and modernization. This desire is identical to the Chinese historic mission to rejuvenate the Chinese nation, reflecting both the "Middle Kingdom" sentiment and the "making China strong and rich" complex as discussed in Chapters Three and Chapter Four.

⁴ In this regard, Mingjiang Li has the same argument, see Mingjiang Li, "Soft power: nurture not nature," in Li ed., *Soft Power*, 3.

⁵ Brian Hocking, "Rethinking the 'new' public diplomacy"; Ingrid d'Hooghe, "Public diplomacy in the People's Republic of China," in Jan Melissen ed., *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 29, 96. Also see Ying Fan, "Soft power: power of attraction or confusion?," 150.

The fourth important finding of this study is that the variation and consistency in the way China's soft power is constituted and mobilized correlates with China's evolving identity perceived by the Chinese elites in the past decades. This is what the Chinese elites seek China to represent in the world that frames its soft power, whereas soft power in turn manifests and strengthens this representation. Therefore, identity-formation affects the models of soft power and different national identities can inform different forms of soft power. In this regard, "national identity" becomes an important factor in understanding soft power.

On the one hand, the Chinese perceptions of China's national identity have changed enormously over past decades. The Chinese reflection of their past (its glory and humiliation, its mistakes in the Maoist period), learning from others through interaction (with other powers and international institutions), and vision of "reality" (ever-changing international environment and world order) all together have impacted on the Chinese perceptions of China's national identity in relation to others. The Chinese perceptions of the PRC's national identity have shifted from being an "outsider" as a "revolutionary great power" to an "insider" as a (potential) responsible global power in relation to the post-war international system. These two different identities point to two forms of China's soft power. Each form of China's soft power reflects and strengthens China's national identity.

On the other hand, the CCP's unchanged views of China as a socialist country with Chinese characteristics and a major developing state requires this state to stick to and project its "particularity" in the Western-dominated international community in terms of its political system and non-European culture. This "particularity" in part reflects the PRC's sense of insecurity in the transformation of the international system since World War II: the PRC is not a liberal democratic state and it has territorial issues to resolve, including Taiwan, the *Diaoyu* (Senkaku) Islands, the South China Sea and the Sino-Indian borders. Chinese insecurity in the international system also derives in part from the Chinese historical sentiment related to its "century of humiliation." Therefore, China has often defended the principles of sovereignty and non-interference against foreign intervention in domestic affairs and has promoted these in China's foreign policy, a key source of China's soft power.

7.3 A new perspective on soft power

This study of China's soft power makes two main contributions: one is to the conceptualization of soft power in IR, and the other is to a more nuanced understanding of China's soft power. In terms of theoretical contribution, this study argues that one should not hold a fixed view of soft power. Rather, it is dynamic due to its ideational, relational and social nature. The dynamic nature of soft power also relates to national identity. A state's

perceived national identity can influence the way soft power is constituted and mobilized. What the state seeks to represent itself in the international community enables it to "intentionally choose" its soft power. The articulation and promotion of its "chosen" soft power is actually both derivative of and reproductive of that representation.

Following a constructivist view of power, this study recognizes that soft power is ideational, relational, and social. This perspective suggests that soft power be studied by taking into account an actor's role and what social relations the actor is involved in. Soft power therefore depends more on the actor's role in a certain context than hard power does. What then becomes important to ask is soft power in what context, and over whom. Although the main task of this study is not to compare China's soft power with that of America, in many respects, it has indicated that there are different aspects, such as culture, ideas of development and nation building, and the ways of dealing with foreign affairs. It thus has demonstrated that soft power varies from one country to another.

Not only does soft power vary when it is put into the context of another country, but it evolves within one state over time, as illustrated by the two cases in the PRC. This study argues that the evolution of China's soft power over the two periods correlates with the changing character of China's national identity, more specifically, Chinese political elites' sense of "what China stands for and against." What then makes the understanding of soft power crucial is to understand what the state seeks to represent in the world. This representation is socially constructed, by its sense of the past, relations with others, and the ever changing environment. According to the subjectivity of representation, the state then "intentionally" chooses and promotes its soft power strategy. The constitution and mobilization of soft power is actually both manifestation and reinforcement of that representation. However, if actions deviate from the articulation of what the state represents, its soft power is unsustainable. This was what happened to "Maoist soft power" in the 1970s.⁶ In this situation, it could lead to the political elites' rethinking of their country's national identity; and the state may re-position itself and re-identify its representation in the world, in short, a transition of its national identity. This in turn motivates the state to revisit and reorient its soft power. Soft power, indeed, issues from and is used to manifest and reinforce the state's identity.⁷

The second contribution of this project is that it provides a complement to the current academic debate on the particular form of China's soft power. Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in the research of China's soft power. Whilst acknowledging that the

⁶ See Van Ness, "Collapse of moral authority and the end of the civilizer state."

⁷ Mattern, "Why 'soft power' isn't so soft," 600.

existing academic efforts provides important avenues for readers to understand China's soft power and its impact, this author is not satisfied with the prevailing idea that soft power is something "new" or "given" in China's international politics. Therefore this study has employed a historical approach to examine if it is the case. It not only has focuses on China's contemporary soft power by looking at the case of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, but it also has investigated practices from the early days of the PRC. By doing so, this study has explored how and why the PRC promoted soft power in different times. It has shown the evolving nature of China's soft power and illustrated how we should understand this evolution. From this historical perspective, this study has demonstrated that soft power is not a new dimension in China international strategy, but it has been understood and used differently over time according to the Chinese elites' sense of what China is and stands for. Given that China's soft power has evolved and is still evolving due to what China seeks to represent in the international arena, its "choice" of soft power in the context of China's rise has significant implications for IR.

7.4 The wider implications for IR and China in the world

Soft power in this thesis is regarded as a manifestation and reinforcement of the Self. This argument has wider implications for IR. The first implication is how international relations looks like when soft power becomes involved in competition in world politics in the contemporary era. This is an implication that an anarchical world which featured soft power engagements by the states would avoid the relentless competition associated with material forms of power.⁸ This may be partly true. However, what is at issue is that when soft power is "intentionally chosen" by an actor to advance its Self, it is unlikely to avoid ruthless competition in world politics. On the contrary, it complicates the international competition among actors, which expands from the level of material resources to the subjective level of different "Selves." Soft power competition can appear in the form of exchanging and socializing others with one's attractive qualities, but also can be carried out by verbal fighting with "different others" to reinforce one's representation so as to attract a potential audience.⁹ This was the case in the "media war" between the West and China before the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Soft power competition could produce "power clubs", or "insiders" and "outsiders", as shown in the two case studies. Although today's world is different from that in the bipolar Cold War, there are still similarities, as demonstrated in America's "war on terrorism" – "you are either with us or with the terrorists," or the concept of "axis of evil."¹⁰

⁸ Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, 2002.

⁹ In this sense, it resonates with Samuel Huntington's view of the "clash of civilisations."

¹⁰ George W. Bush, "Address to a joint session of congress and the American people," September 20, 2001, accessed at: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>

These examples indicate that in addition to a power politics of material resources, soft power promotion as shown in this study of China, can involve a significant "power politics of identity" in international relations.

In addition to a reconsideration of competition in world politics, there is a rethinking of strategies for soft power. Given the evolving nature of China's soft power in the past decades due to the PRC's repositioning itself in the international system and the shift of national identity, this study has demonstrated the variability of soft power. It thus implies that soft power should not be treated as a static attribute or "hard thing" at a government's disposal. In this sense, perhaps we are unlikely to find a universally attractive soft power, but rather a somewhat confined soft power in terms of context and target. After all, soft power speaks to one's national identity. Due to the subjectivity and changeability of national identity in an anarchical world, a more feasible way of formulating soft power strategy is first to understand what an actor represents (or seeks to represent) and who the like-characteristic audience are and then to choose certain soft power qualities accordingly. However, as this study mainly focuses on the case of China, it admits that future research needs to pay more attention to other powers to study the relationship between national identity and soft power.

Regarding what the evolving nature of China's soft power means for the world, generally, it is promising to see a major transition from revolutionary Maoist soft power to today's China now advancing cooperation and development. The language of radicalism has been replaced by moderation and pragmatism. To some extent, it has engaged with the rest of the world in a more positive way. Again, the evolution of China's soft power is in close relation to China's reflection of its past (its glory, humiliation and mistakes), its relation to and interaction with others as well as its vision of the future. Therefore, what matters is not only the impact of its growing power, but also to recognize what China represents and seeks to represent in the world. As shown in Chapter Five and Six, China recently has sought to play the role of a more responsible power in the global community, but China is still in transition and other identities have intertwined to influence its international behaviour. As for the international community, we can see how important it is to interact with China to encourage positive changes. The future of China is increasingly affected by how the outside world sees China's role in the international system. In this regard, I agree with G. John Ikenberry's view that China should be continuously incorporated into the liberal international order while being patiently pressed to continue its changes.¹¹ While every actor can play the politics of soft power, it is unwise to produce the sense of "ingroup" and "outgroup," which probably

¹¹ G. John Ikenberry, "The rise of China and the future of the West," *Foreign Affairs* 87:1 (2008), 23-37; G. John Ikenberry, "The future of the liberal world order: internationalism after America," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2011, 56-68.

encourages the aggressive nationalism within China and leaves little room for the Chinese government to positively engage with external (hostile) societies. It is more sensible for the international public to develop a sympathetic understanding of alternative conceptions of society, modernity, development and responsibility. Due to China's fast development in a relatively short period, there has emerged a conflicted sense of itself in recent years. International participants have a responsibility to help shape China's global identity. As David Lampton suggests, "Change in China requires change...in others in a never-ending process of mutual adaptation and competition."¹²

As for China, it needs to continue to shape its national identity and clarify what it seeks to represent in its transitional period. Although there has been a historical aspiration to regain China's great power status, the Chinese people should recognize that the PRC's rise is unprecedented in the context of globalisation.¹³ China should not take its rise for granted but should view its success as being due to its integration into the global economy, as a beneficiary of the existing international system. Its success has generated opportunities for other powers as well as challenges, concerns and worries, and thus China needs to understand the global impact of its rise. To enhance China's global image, China needs to understand that its image is tied to two aspects. In the domestic aspect, China's image will be impacted by the state government's willingness and efforts to deepen China's political reform in a direction more in accordance with global values such as freedom of speech and more attention to individual rights. In the international aspect, China's image will be shaped by how China positions itself in relation to others and how it communicates with the outside world.¹⁴ In this regard, China also needs to develop its public diplomacy, which should not be simply under the control of the government, but should allow more NGOs to take part. The outside world needs to understand more about China, whereas China also needs to develop its understanding of the world. Through two-way communications, China can develop a better understanding of its role from a global perspective and continue to shape its desired role on the world stage.

¹² Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power*, 265.

¹³ See Yan Xuetong, "The rise of China in Chinese eyes," *Journal of Contemporary China* 10:26 (2001), 33-39.

¹⁴ Zhou Xinyu, "公共外交应该从'是什么'做起" (Public diplomacy should start from [understanding] "what is public diplomacy"), *公共外交季刊* (*Public Diplomacy Quarterly*), vol.13 (Spring 2013), available online: http://www.china.com.cn/international/txt/2013-02/28/content_28087768.htm

Interviewees

Chinese academics:

Dr Chen Yugang, Associate Professor of International Relations of Fudan University, Shanghai, March 15, 2010

Dong Manyuan, Deputy Director of China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, April 8, 2010

Dr Fang Changping, Associate Professor of International Relations of Renmin University of China, Beijing, March 29, 2010

Prof. Gao Zhongming, Shanghai Politics College, Shanghai, March 16, 2010

Dr Hui Liwen, China's National Defence University, Beijing, March 23, 2010

Dr Li Ning, Deputy Director of Department of Physical Education of Beijing University, Canberra, April 12, 2012

Dr Liu Feitao, research fellow in American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, April 8, 2010

Dr Liu Liyun, Associate Professor of International Relations of Renmin University of China, Beijing, March 21, 2010

Dr Ni Shixiong, Professor of American Centre of Fudan University, Shanghai, March 11, 2010

Dr Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Politics of Renmin University of China, Beijing, March 22, 2010

Dr Su Changhe, Professor of International Relations at Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai, March 12, 2010

Dr Ren Xiao, Deputy Dean of Institute of International Studies of Fudan University, Canberra, December 4, 2009

Dr Wu Guanjun, Institute for Advanced Study in Social Science of Fudan University, Shanghai, March 11, 2010

Dr Xu Xiujun, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, March 26, 2010

Dr Yu Keping, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Translation of the CCP Central Committee, Canberra, May 18, 2012

Yu Xintian, senior research fellow at Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, Shanghai,
March 10, 2010

Dr Zha Daojong, Professor of International Relations at School of International Studies of
Beijing University, Auckland, July 2, 2010

Dr Zhang Qianming, Associate Professor of International Politics of Zhejiang University,
Canberra, June 29, 2012

Anonymous interviewees from the Chinese public services:

Two Chinese officials of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, April 16, 2010

Two officials of International Department, Central Committee of CCP, April 20, 2010

Two Chinese diplomats, Canberra, May 28, 2010

An official of General Administration of Sport of China, Beijing, December 9, 2011

Bibliography

- Armstrong, J.D. 1977. *Revolutionary Diplomacy, Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine*. Berkeley: University Of California Press.
- Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. "Two faces of power," *American Political Science Review* 56:4, 947-952.
- . 1963. "Decisions and non-decisions: an analytical framework," *The American Political Science Review* 57:3, 632-651.
- Baldwin, David A. 2002. "Power and international relations," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons eds., *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage Press.
- Barmé, Geremie R. 2009. "China's flat earth: history and 8 August 2008," *The China Quarterly* 197, 64-86.
- Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. "Power in International Politics," *International Organization* 59:1, 39-75.
- Bartke, Wolfgang. 1975. *China's Economic Aid*. London: C. Hurst.
- Bates, Gill and Yanzhong Huang. 2006. "Sources and limits of Chinese 'soft power'," *Survival* 48:2, 17-36.
- Batson, Andrew. "Lin urges flexibility in fighting poverty," *Wall Street Journal*, February 29, 2008.
- Bell, Daniel A. "This is no Chinese triumph of totalitarianism," *Guardian*, August 7, 2008.
- Berenskoetter, Felix. 2007. "Thinking about power," in Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams eds., *Power in World Politics*. London; New York: Routledge. 1-22.
- Berkowitz, Pere et al. 2007. "Brand China: using the 2008 Olympic Games to enhance China's image," *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 3:2, 164-178.
- Bin, Ke. 2008. "'中国责任论'与缅甸民主进程中的'中国角色'" ("China's responsibility" and "China's role" in Burma's democratization), *湘潮 (Xiang Chao Monthly Magazine)* 293, 41-45.
- BOCOG. 2000. *New Beijing, Great Olympics: Highlights of Beijing's Olympic Candidacy*. Beijing: Official Publication of the Bid Committee.
- . 2007. "北京奥运行动规划(一): 总体战略构想" (The programming of the Beijing Olympics (part one): overall strategic thinking).
- . 2007. "北京奥运会及其筹备期间外国记者采访服务指南" (Service Guide for Overseas Media Coverage of the Beijing Olympics and the Preparatory Period).
- Brady, Anne-Marie. 2003. *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Brownell, Susan. 1995. *Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People's Republic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2009. "The Beijing Olympics as a turning point? China's first Olympics in East Asian perspective," *Asia-Pacific Journal (Japan Focus Online)*, vol.23.4-09.
- . 2009. "Beijing's Olympic education programme: re-thinking Suzhi Education, re-imagining an international China," *The China Quarterly* 197, 44-63.
- Cai, Tuo. 2005. "探索中的'中国模式'" (Exploring "China model"), *当代世界与社会主义 (Contemporary World and Socialism)* no.5, 12-14.
- Cao, Dong. 2009. "近年来国内外关于软实力研究的综述" (An overview of soft power study in and out of China), *领导科学 (Leadership Science)* no.35, 48.
- Carlson, Allen. 2007. "China's conflicted Olympic moment," *Current History* 106:701, 252-256.

- Central Committee's Documents Research Office. 2005. 《十六大以来重要文献选编》(上) (*Selected Important Documents since the 16th Party Congress, vol.1*), Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian.
- Cha, Victor D. 2008. "Beijing's Olympic-sized catch-22," *The Washington Quarterly* 31:3, 105-123.
- .2010. "Politics and the Olympic transaction: measuring China's accomplishments," *The International Journal of the History and Sport* 27:14-15, 2359-2379.
- Chang, Anita. "Young Chinese abroad launch Internet attacks against Western press over Tibet Unrest," *International Herald Tribune*, March 30, 2008.
- Chen, Dawei. 2007. "半个世纪之路——从华盛顿共识到北京共识" (The path of half a century – from Washington Consensus to Beijing Consensus), *理论探讨* (*Theoretical Investigation*) no.5, 74-5.
- Chen, Dundee. 2007. *周恩来飞往非洲: 探路在1964* (*Zhou Enlai's Visits to Africa: Exploring in 1964*). Beijing: Jiefangjun Wenyi.
- Chen, Jian. 2001. *Mao's China and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press.
- Chen, Lifan. 2007. "周恩来未雨绸缪铸新中国外交脊梁" (Zhou Enlai laid the foundation for New China's foreign affairs), *党史博采* (*Extensive Collection of The Party History*), no.2, 19-21.
- Chen, Xiaoming et al. 1994. "东方主义与后殖民文化" (Orientalism and post-colonial culture), *钟山* (*Zhong Shan*) no.1, 138.
- Chen, Zhirui. 2004. "关于和平崛起的文化战略" (Cultural strategy in peaceful rise), *教学与研究* (*Teaching and Research*) no.4, 20.
- China's Central Compilation and Translation Bureau. 1956. *苏联共产党第二十次代表大会文件汇编* (上) (*The Compilation Documents for the CPSU's 20th National Congress, vol.1*), Beijing: Renmin.
- Hill, Christopher R. 1977. *Olympic Politics*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Cohen, Roger. "Beijing may hedge its Burmese bets," *The New York Times*, October 10, 2007.
- Cong, Jin. 1990. *1949-1989 年的中国曲折发展的岁月* (*The Years of China's Tortuous Development, 1949-1989*). Henan: Henan Renmin.
- Congressional Research Service. 2008. *China's Foreign Policy and "Soft Power" in South America, Asia, and Africa*. Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office.
- Cox, Robert. 1983. "Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12:2, 162-175.
- Cui, Lequan. 2007. "奥林匹克在中国的发展" (Development of Olympic Movement in China), *武汉体育学院学报* (*Journal of Wuhan Institute of Physical Education*) no.4, 2.
- d'Hooghe, Ingrid. 2010. "The limits of China's soft power in Europe: Beijing's public diplomacy puzzle," *Clingendael Diplomacy Paper* No.25 (The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael').
- Dahl, Robert A. 1957. "The concept of power," *Behavioral Science* 2:3, 202.
- Dan, Chun. 1992. "国际传播中的帝国主义理论" (Imperialism in international communication), *新闻战线* (*News Front*) no.8, 44.
- Development and Planning Division of Education Department. 2010. *China Education Yearbook 2009*. Beijing: People's Education Press.
- Dittmer, Lowell and Samuel S. Kim (eds.) 1993. *China's Quest for National Identity*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Espy, Richard. 1979. *The Politics of the Olympic Games*. Berkeley: University Of California Press.

- Fang, Changping. 2007. “中美软实力比较及其对中国的启示” (A comparison between China's soft power and that of US and its implications for China), *世界经济与政治 (World Economics and Politics)* no.7, 21-27.
- Farrow, Ronan and Mia Farrow. 2007. “The Genocide Olympics,” *The Wall Street Journal*, March 28.
- Gao, Sipin. 1991. “增强反和平演变的战略意识” (Strengthening strategic awareness of anti-peaceful evolution), *高校理论战线 (Theoretical Front in Higher Education)* no.5, 18-22.
- Gao, Yifei. 2010. “中国的软实力在欧洲的视角” (China's Soft Power in European Perspective), *改革内参 (Reform Reference)* no. 32, 38-40.
- Girginov, V. 2008. “Creative tensions: ‘Join in London’ meets ‘Dancing Beijing’ – the cultural power of the Olympics,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 25:7.
- Goldstein, Avery. 2007. “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: theoretical expectations and evidence,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 30:4-5, 639-682.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 1995. “The coming Chinese collapse,” *Foreign Policy* 99, 35-53.
- Gong, Yingyan. 2012. “海上丝绸之路与世界文明进程‘国际学术论坛综述’ (A summary of the international symposium of “The maritime silk road and the process of world civilisations”), *中国史研究动态 (Trends of Recent Researches on the History of China)* no.2, 78-82.
- Gosper, Kevan and Glenda Korporeal. 2000. *Olympic Life: Melbourne 1956 to Sydney 2000*. New South Wales: Allen & Unwin.
- Grasso, June et al. 2004. *Modernization and Revolution in China: from the Opium Wars to World Power* (3rd edition). Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
- Griffith, William E. 1964. *The Sino-Soviet Rift*. Cambridge, M.A.: M.I.T. Press.
- Gu, Shiquan. 2003. *中国体育史 (The Sport History in China)*. Beijing: Beijing Tiyu Daxue.
- Gun, Junxian. 2010. “‘丝绸之路’复兴计划与中国外交” (The plan of the revival of “silk road” and China's foreign policy), *东北亚论坛 (Northeast Asia Forum)* no.5, 65-73.
- Guo, Shuyong. 2007. “新国际主义与中国软实力外交” (New internationalism and China's soft power diplomacy), *国际观察 (International Observation)* no.2, 43-52.
- Guo, Yingjie. 2004. *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: the Search for National Identity under Reform*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Hall, Ian and Frank Smith. 2013. “The struggle for soft power in Asia: public diplomacy and regional competition,” *Asian Security* 9:1, 1-18.
- Halperin, Ernst. 1967. “Peking and the Latin American Communists,” *The China Quarterly* no.29, 111-154.
- Halpern, A.M. (ed.) 1965. *Policies toward China, Views from Six Continents*. New York: published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill.
- Han, Nianlong. (ed.) 1990. *Diplomacy of Contemporary China*, Hong Kong: New Horizon Press.
- He, Wenping. 2007. “中非教育交流与合作概述” (A survey of Sino-African educational exchange and cooperation), *西亚非洲 (East Asia and Africa)*, no.3.
- He, Mingxing. 2009. “红色经典的海外遗产” (The legacy of the red classics overseas), *南风窗 (For the Public Good)* no.2, 88-90.
- Hessler, Peter. 2006. *Oracle Bones: A Journey between China's Past and Present*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Hevi, Emmanuel John. 1963. *An African Student in China*. London: Pall Mall Press.
- Hey, Colin. 1997. “Divided by common language: political theory and the concept of power,” *Politics* 17:1, 45-52.

Hinton, Harold C. 1982. "Sino-Soviet Relations: background and overview," in Douglas T. Stuart and William H. Tow, eds., *China, the Soviet, and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.

Hook, Leslie. 2007. "The rise of China's new left," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 170:3, 8-14.

Hsu, S. Philip et al (ed.) 2011. *In Search of China's Development Model*. London; New York: Routledge.

Hu, Angang and Men Honghua. 2004. "The rising of modern China: comprehensive national power and grand strategy," paper presented to "Rising China and the East Asian Economy" International Conference by KIEP, Seoul, March 19-20.

Huang, Ping and Cui Zhiyuan (eds.,) 2005. *中国与全球化: 华盛顿共识还是北京共识 (China and Globalisation: Washington Consensus or Beijing Consensus)*. Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian.

Huang, Renwei. 2003. "软实力与国家安全" (Soft power and national security), *学习月刊 (Study Monthly)* no.1, 23-28.

Huang, Shuofeng. 1987. "漫谈综合国力" (A random talk on CNP), *世界知识 World Affairs*, no.24.

———.1992. *大较量: 国力球力论 (The Great Combat: National Power and Global Power)*, Changsha: Hunan Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. "The clash of civilisations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72:3, 22-49.

Hvistendahl, Mara. 2008. "China moves up to fifth as importer of students," *Chronicle of Higher Education*. Sept. 19.

Information Office of the State Council of the PRC. 2005. *中国的和平发展道路 (China's Peaceful Development)*, Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC.

Ismael, Tareq Y. 1971. "The People's Republic of China and Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 9:4, 507-529.

Jepperson, Ronald L. et al. 1996. "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein ed., *The Culture of National Security*. Columbia: Columbia University Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jin, Jichong (ed.) 2003. *毛泽东传 (Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976)*, Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian.

Jin, Yuanpu. 2008. "和谐是人文奥运的灵魂" (Harmony as the soul of Renwen Aoyun), *红旗文稿 (Red Flag Manuscript)* no.15, 12-14.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2003. "Is China a status quo power?," *International Security* 27:4, 5-56.

Karl, Patricia A. 1982. "Media diplomacy," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 34:4, 143-152.

Kennedy, Andrew Bingham. 2012. *The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kennedy, Paul. 1987. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House.

Keohane, Robert and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little Brown,

Kerr, Pauline et al (eds.) 2008. *China's "New" Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change?*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Kessler, Glenn. 2007. "China rejects attempts to link developments in Burma to Beijing Olympics," *Washington Post*, October 2.

The Editorial Departments of RMRB and Hongqi. 1965. *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*. Beijing Foreign Language Press.

Kim, Samuel S. 2003. "China's path to great power status in the globalization era," *Asian Perspective* 27:1, 35-75.

———. 2004. "Northeast Asia in the local-regional-global nexus: multiple challenges and contending explanations," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *International Relations of Northeast Asia*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kirby, William C. 2011. *The People's Republic of China at 60: An International Assessment*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center.

Kissinger, Henry. 2011. *On China*. London and New York: Penguin Press.

Krlev, Nicholas. 2010. "China 60, US 0: cultural centers in other's country," *The Washington Times*. April 8.

Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2007. *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lam, Willy. 2010. *Changing of the Guard: Beijing Grooms Sixth-Generation Cadres for 2020s*. Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation.

Lampton, David. 1997. "A growing China in a shrinking world: Beijing and the global order," in Ezra Vogel ed., *Living with China: US-China Relations in the Twenty-first Century*. New York: W.W. Norton.

———. 2008. *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Landsberg, Mitchell. 2007. "Clearing the air for Olympics," *Los Angeles Times*. August 11.

Lanteigne, Marc. 2005. *China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Larmer, Brook. 2005. "The Center of the World," *Foreign Policy* no.150.

Latham, Kevin. 2009. "Media, the Olympics and the search for the 'real China'," *The China Quarterly* 197, 25-46.

Leonard, Mark. 2002. *Public Diplomacy*. London: Foreign Policy Centre.

Li, Baojun and Xu Xiyuan. 2006. "冷战后中国负责任大国身份的建构" (China's self-identity construction as a responsible power in the post-Cold War era), *教学与研究 (Teaching and Research)* no.1, 49-56.

Li, Fangchao. 2006. "Beijing unveils plans for 'green' Games," *China Daily*. May 29.

Li, Haijuan. 2004. "软实力竞争背景下的文化战略" (Cultural strategy within the context of soft power competition), *毛泽东邓小平理论研究 (Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories)* no.12.

Li, Jie. 2005. "提升软实力对实现我国和平崛起战略的作用" (The role of enhancing soft power in China's strategy of peaceful rise), *太平洋学报 (Pacific Journal)* no.12, 64-71.

Li, MingJiang (ed.) 2009. *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.

Li, Xiannian. 1963. "关于 1961 年和 1962 年国家决算的报告 (一九六三年七月四日)" (Report of the national budget in 1961 and 1962, 04/07/1963), in Research Centre of the Central Committee of the CCP, *建国以来重要文献选编 (Selected Important Documents since the Founding of the PRC)*. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1997, vol.16.

Li, Xiguan et al. 1996. *妖魔化中国的背后 (Behind Demonizing China)*. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press.

Li, Xuebao. 2005. "新安全观与中国的和平发展之路" (New security concept and China's peaceful development path), *社会主义研究 (Socialism Studies)* no.1, 116-118.

- Liang, Qichao. *新民说 (Theories of New Citizenship)*. Shengyang: Liaoning Publishing House, 1994.
- Liang, Shoude. 2003. *邓小平理论与当代中国国际关系学 (Deng Xiaoping Theory and Contemporary China's International Relations)*. Harbin and Beijing: Heilongjiang Jiaoyu & Beijing Daxue.
- Lin, Dechang. 1999. *海峡两岸援外政策之比较研究 (A Comparison of Foreign Aid Policies between the PRC and Taiwan)*. Taipei: Chengwen.
- Liu, Dengge. 2003. *中国的是非 (Yes or No Questions of China)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui.
- Liu, Guoxin. 1994. *中华人民共和国历史长编 (A Macro History of the People's Republic of China)*. Nanning: Guangxi Renmin, vol.2.
- Liu, Xige. 2004. “和平崛起的几个问题” (A few questions of peaceful rise), *教学与研究 (Teaching and Research)* no.4.
- Lodge, George C. 1966. “Revolution in Latin America,” *Foreign Affairs* 44:2.
- Longman, Jere. 2001. “Beijing wins bid for 2008 Olympic Games,” *New York Times*. July 14.
- Løvbræk, Asbjørn. 1976. “The Chinese model of development,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 13:3, 207-226.
- Lu, Yu-nu. 2011. “The representation of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games: the rise of China's soft power,” in Baogang Guo and Chung-chian Teng eds., *China's Quiet Rise: Peace through Integration*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.
- Lukes, Steven. 2005. “Power and the battle for hearts and minds,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33:3, 477-493.
- .2005. *Power: A Radical View* (2nd edition). Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Luo, Hanping. 2007. *文革前夜的中国 (China on the Eve of Cultural Revolution)*. Beijing: Renmin.
- Luo, Jianbo. 2007. “中国对非洲外交视野中的国家形象塑造” (National image building in the vision of China's diplomacy toward Africa), *现代国际关系 (Contemporary International Relations)* no.7, 48-54.
- .2007. “论中国和平发展视野中的国家形象塑造” (China image building in the view of peaceful development), *新远见 (New Thinking)* no.9, 45-59.
- .2008. “软实力与中国外交” (Soft power and China's diplomacy), *新远见 (New Thinking)* no.5, 40-54.
- Luo, Yuchao. 1995. “西方人权观念及其文化帝国主义特征” (The concept of human rights in the West and its characteristics of cultural imperialism), *湖南师范大学社会科学学报 (Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University)* no.3, 26-31.
- Luthi, Lorenz M. 2008. *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Polgreen, Lydia. 2008. “China, in new role, press Sudan on Darfur,” *International Herald Tribune*. February 23.
- Ma, Jiangyuan. 1997. “高科技发展与综合国力系统的优化分析和预测” (The development of high-technology and the analysis and prediction of CNP), *学术界 (Academia)* no.1, 79-85.
- Manzenreiter, Wolfram. 2010. “The Beijing Games in the Western imagination of China: the weak power of soft power,” *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 34:1, 29-48.
- Mao, Zedong. 1917. “体育之研究 (On physical culture),” *新青年 (New Youth)*, April 1.
- . *建国以来毛泽东文稿 (Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC)*. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 1992, vol.7.

- . 毛泽东外交文选 (*Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Policy*). Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1994.
- . 毛泽东文集 (*A Collection of Mao Zedong's works*). Beijing: Renmin, 1999, vol.6.
- Marvin, Carolyn. 2008. "'All under heaven' – megaspace in Beijing," in Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan eds., *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 236-243.
- Mattern, Janice Bially. 2005. "Why 'soft power' isn't so soft," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33:3, 583-612.
- McClory, Jonathan. 2010. *The New Persuaders: An International Ranking of Soft Power*. UK: Institute for Government.
- . 2011. *The New Persuaders II: A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power*. UK: Institute for Government.
- McGiffert, Carola. 2009. *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World, A Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative*. Washington D.C.: the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Medeiros, Evan S. and Fravel M. Taylor. 2003. "China's new diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 82:6, 22-35.
- Mei, Qiyou. 1999. "综合国力有'硬'、'软'之分" (There are "hard" and "soft" ingredients in CNP), *政工研究动态* (*Political Research Trends*) no.22.
- Meisner, Maurice. 1999. *Mao's China and after: a History of the People's Republic* (3rd edition). NY: Free Press.
- Melissen, Jan (ed.) 2007. *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan.
- Men, Honghua and Hu Jun. 2005. "新一届中央领导集体的外交战略思想 (一)" (Diplomatic and strategic thoughts of the new leadership, part 1), *Shanghai Studies on CCP History and Construction* no.4, 26-29.
- Men, Honghua. 2007. "中国软实力评估报告 (上)" (Assessment of China's soft power, part 1), *国际观察* (*International Observation*) no.2, 15-26.
- . 2007. "中国软实力评估报告 (下)" (Assessment of China's soft power, part 2), *国际观察* (*International Observation*) no.3, 38-41.
- Meng, Xiangqing. 2004. "和平崛起与安全崛起" (Peaceful rise and security rise), *教学与研究* (*Teaching and Research*), no.4.
- Miles, James. 2008. "Transcript: James Miles interview on Tibet," *CNN*, March 20.
- . 2008. "Midnight ultimatum for Tibet showdown," *Times Online*, March 1.
- Mitchell, J.M. 1986. *International Cultural Relations*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. 1978. *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* (5th edition). New York: Knopf.
- Morton, Kathy. 2009. "China and the global environment: learning from the past, anticipating the future," *Lowy Institute Paper* 29.
- Naughton, Barry. 2011. "China's distinctive system: can it be a model for others?," in S. Philip Hsu, Yu-Shan Wu and Suisheng Zhao eds., *In Search of China's Development Model*, London; New York: Routledge, 67-85.
- Ni, Feng. 2004. "The shaping of China's foreign policy," in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi eds., *The Rise of China and A Changing East Asian Order*. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange.

- Noya, Javier. 2006. "The Symbolic Power of Nations," *Place Branding* 2:1, 53-67.
- Nye, Joseph S. 1990. "The changing nature of world power," *Political Science Quarterly*, 105:2, 177-192.
- .1990. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.
- .2002. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press.
- .2004. *Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization*. London; New York: Routledge.
- .2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- .2010. "American and Chinese power after the financial crisis," *The Washington Quarterly* 33:4, 143-153.
- .2011. *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs.
- .2011. "The war on soft power," *Foreign Policy*. April 12.
- Pang, Zhongying. 2008. "Soft power strategy for post-Olympics China," *CSIS Freeman Report*.
- .2005. "从'北京共识'看中国影响" (Observing China's influence from "Beijing Consensus"), *中国招标 (China Bid)* no.42.
- Peng, Yongjie et al. 2003. *人文奥运 (People's and Cultural Olympics)*. Beijing: Dongfang.
- Petracca, Mark P. and Mong Xiong. 1990. "The concept of Chinese neo-authoritarianism: an exploration and democratic critique," *Asian Survey* 30:11, 1099-1117.
- Pollack, Jonathan D. 1984. "China and the global strategic balance," in Harry Harding ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Price, Monroe and Dayan Daniel (eds.) 2008. *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China*. University of Michigan Press.
- Propaganda Sector of the Chinese People's Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea Association compiled. 1954. *伟大的抗美援朝运动 (The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea)* Beijing: Renmin.
- Qi, Dexue. 2010. "中苏同盟在抗美援朝战争中的作用" (The role of Sino-Soviet alliance in the war of resisting America's aggression and assisting Korea), *世界历史 (World History)* no.4, 4-12.
- Qian, Qichen. 2003. *外交十记 (Ten Episodes in Diplomacy)*. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi.
- Qin, Yaqing. 2006. "国际关系理论中国学派生成的可能和必然" (Possibility and necessity of building a Chinese School in IR), *世界经济与政治 (World Economics and Politics)* no.3, 7-13.
- .2009. *国际体系与中国外交 (International System and China's Foreign Policy)*, Beijing: Shijie Zhishi.
- Ramo, Joshua Cooper. 2004. *Beijing Consensus*. London, U.K.: Foreign Policy Centre.
- Randal, Geoffrey J. 2008. *The Seduction of Soft Power: Diplomacy in Modern Times*. Canberra: ANU Thesis.
- Renmin Press (ed.) 1958. *Imperialists and All the Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers*. Beijing: Renmin.
- Reus-Smit, Christian. 2004. *American Power and World Order*. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Richard, W. and Amy A Wilson. 1970. "The red guards and the world student movement," *The China Quarterly* no.42, 88-104.
- Roche, Maurice. 2000. *Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture*. London: Routledge.

- Ross, Robert S. 2011. "China's three rises, regional power transitions, and East Asia security: 1949 to the Twenty-First Century," in William C. Kirby ed., *The People's Republic of China at 60: An International Assessment*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center.
- Sands, Lee M. 2008. "The 2008 Olympics' impact on China," *China Business Review* (July-August).
- Sautman, Barry and Li Ying. 2011. *Public Diplomacy from Below: the 2008 "Pro-China" Demonstrations in Europe and North America*. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press,
- Sautman, Barry and Yan Hairong. 2009. "African perspectives on China-African links," *The China Quarterly* 199, 728-759.
- Scalapino, Robert A. 1964. "Sino-Soviet competition in Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 42:4, 640-654.
- . 1993. "China's multiple identities in East Asia: China as a Regional Force," in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 215-236.
- Schram, Stuart. 1969. *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (revised and enlarged edition). New York, Praeger.
- (ed.) 1974. *Chairman Mao Talks to People: Talks and Letters: 1956-1971*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Schwartz, Benjamin. 1951. *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Scott, David. 2007. *China Stands Up: The PRC and the International System*. Routledge.
- . 2010. "China and the 'responsibilities' of a 'responsible power' – the uncertainties of appropriate power rise language," *Asia-Pacific Review* 17:1, 72-96.
- Shambaugh, David and Ren Xiao. 2012. "China: the conflicted rising power," Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally eds., *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia*, Oxford University Press, 36-72.
- Shambaugh, David (ed.) 2011. *Charting China's Future: Domestic and International Challenges*. London; New York: Routledge.
- . 2011. "Coping with a conflicted China," *The Washington Quarterly* 34:1, 7-27.
- Shen, Zhihua. 2001. "新中国建立初期苏联对华经济援助的基本情况——来自中国和俄国的档案材料 (上)" (Essential information on Soviet economic aid to China in the early days of the PRC – materials from Chinese and Russian archives (part one)), *俄罗斯研究 (Russian Studies)* no.1, 53-66.
- . 2001. "新中国建立初期苏联对华经济援助的基本情况——来自中国和俄国的档案材料 (下)" (Essential information on Soviet economic aid to China in the early days of the PRC – materials from Chinese and Russian archives (part two)), *俄罗斯研究 (Russian Studies)* no.2, 49-58.
- . 2010. "无奈的选择: 中苏同盟建立的曲折历程 (1944-1950)" (A reluctant choice: complicated process of the establishment of Sino-Soviet alliance, 1944-1950), *近代史研究 (Modern Chinese History Studies)* no.6, 51-52.
- Sheng, Ding. 2008. *The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.
- Sheng, Jiru. 1999. "不能忽视增强我国的'软实力'" (China must not neglect strengthening its "soft power"), *瞭望 (Outlook)* no.41, 12-13.
- Shi Yinhong. 2007. "'Harmonious world' is pragmatic foreign policy," *China Daily*. July 5.
- . 2007. "China's peaceful rise is all about soft power," *China Daily*. June 14.
- . 2008. "Value-added," in "Debating China's future," *China Security* 4:2.

Shi, Zhe. 1991. *在历史巨人身边——师哲回忆录 (At the Side of Historical Giants: Shi Zhe's Memoirs)*. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian.

Shih, Chih-yu. 1993. *China's Just World: the Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Boulder, Colo: Lynn Rienner Publishers.

Sino-African Educational Cooperation and Exchanges Editorial Team compiled. 2005. *中国与非洲国家教育合作与交流 (Educational Cooperation and Exchanges between China and African Countries)*. Beijing: Beijing University.

Snow, Nancy and Philip M. Taylor. 2009. *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. New York and London: Routledge.

Snow, Philip. 1988. *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Song, Ruhai. 1930. *我能比呀：世界运动会丛录 (I Can Compete: Records of the Olympic Games)*. Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan.

Song, Xiaofeng. 2005. “试析中国和平崛起中的软实力因素” (Soft-power factors in China's peaceful rise), *求实 (Truth Seeking)* no.8, 76-79.

Su, Tairen. 2011. “邓小平如何评价毛泽东” (Deng Xiaoping's opinion towards Mao Zedong), *领导文萃 (Collected Digest)* no.22, 56-60.

Suzuki, Shogo. 2009. *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society*. London; New York: Routledge.

———.2009. “Chinese soft power, insecurity studies, myopia and fantasy,” *Third World Quarterly* 30:4, 779-793.

Tang, Huiyun. 2008. “国内学术界中国软实力研究现状评估” (Review of the studies on China's soft power in China), *国际关系学院学报 (Journal of University of International Relations)* no.3.

Tao, Yi-Feng. 2011. “From a socialist state to a mercantilist state: depoliticizing central banking and China's economic growth since 1993,” in S. Philip Hsu, Yu-Shan Wu and Suisheng Zhao eds., *In Search of China's Development Model*, 111-127.

Taylor, Ian. 2009. *China's New Role in Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Teng, Yun. 1990. *当代中外文化交流史料 (Historical Material from China's Cultural Exchange with Foreign Countries in the Contemporary Period)*. Beijing: Wenhua Yishu Chubanshe.

Terrill, Ross. 1980. *Mao: A Biography*. Stanford University Press.

The Editorial Department of Hongqi. 1960. *Long Live Leninism*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press.

———.1963. *More on the Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press.

The Editorial Department of RMRB and Hongqi. 1965. *关于国际共产主义运动总路线的论战 (The Polemic on General Line of the International Communist Movement)*. Beijing: Renmin.

The General Office of the Ministry of Finance. 1983. *中华人民共和国财政史料 (Historical Material of PRC Finance)*, Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji, vol.2.

The Information Office of China's State Council. 1998. *中国的国防 (National Defence of the PRC)*. Beijing: The Information Office of China's State Council.

———.2005. *中国的和平发展道路 (China's Peaceful Development)*, Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC. *The Declassified Chinese Diplomatic Archives (1949-1965)*. Beijing: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (accessed from December 2011 – March 2012).

The State Council of the People's Republic of China. 2006. *Outline of the National Plan for Cultural Development During the Period of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan*.

- Tow, William and Richard Rigby. 2011. "China's pragmatic security policy: the middle-power factor," *The China Journal* no.65, 157-178.
- Van der Kroef, Justus M. 1967. "Philippine Communism and the Chinese," *The China Quarterly* no. 30, 115-148.
- Van Ness, Peter. 2012. "Collapse of moral authority and the end of the civilizer state: comparing two cases – Mao's China and George W. Bush's United States," *The East Asia Institute (EAI) Fellow Program Working Paper* No. 37.
- .1970. *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Vladislav M. Zubok. 1995. "Khrushchev's nuclear promise," in "Mao Zedong's handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese recollections and documents," translated and annotated by Li Xiaobing et al, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, nos.6-7 (Winter 1995-6), 225.
- Wang, Bo et al. 2008. "终于，我们走到了奥运" (At last, we have arrived at the Olympics), *世界知识 (World Affairs)* no.15.
- Wang, Dong. 2005. "The quarrelling brothers: new Chinese archives and a reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet split, 1959-1962," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin Working Paper* #49, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars.
- Wang, Fei-ling. 2005. "Preservation, prosperity and power: what motivates China's foreign policy?," *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, 669-94.
- Wang, Gungwu. 1977. *China and the World since 1949: the Impact of Independence, Modernity and Revolution*. London: Macmillan.
- .1991. *The Chineseness of China: Selected Essays*. Hong Kong; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wang, Hongying and Lu Yeh-Chung. 2008. "The conception of soft power and its policy implications: a comparative study of China and Taiwan," *Journal of Contemporary China* 17:56, 425-447.
- Wang, Huiyao et al. 2010. *国家战略—人才改变世界 (National Strategy-Talent Change China)*. Beijing: Renmin.
- .2011. "Returnee entrepreneurs: impact on China's globalization process," *Journal of Contemporary China* 414.
- Wang, Huning. 1993. "作为国家实力的文化：软实力" (Culture as a state's power: soft power), *复旦大学学报 (社科版) (Journal of Fudan University (social sciences edition))* no.3, 91-96.
- .1994. "文化扩张与文化主权：对主权观念的挑战" (Cultural expansion and cultural sovereignty: challenge to the concept of sovereignty), *复旦大学学报 (社科版) (Journal of Fudan University (social sciences edition))* no.3, 9-15.
- Wang, Jiaxiang. 1989. *王稼祥文选 (Selected Works of Wang Jiaxiang)*. Beijing: Renmin.
- Wang, Jisi. 2004. "'和平崛起'提出的意义" (The significance of advancing "peaceful rise"), *教学与研究 (Teaching and Research)* no.4.
- .2004. "China's changing role in Asia," in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi, eds., *The Rise of China and A Changing East Asian Order* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), 3-21.
- Yan, Fu. 1977. *复集 (Collections of Yan Fu)*, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986.
- Wang, Taiping (ed.) 1998. *中华人民共和国外交史 1957-1969 (Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China 1957-1969)*. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi.
- Wang, Xingfang. 1995. *中国与联合国 (China and the United Nations)*. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi,

- Wang, Yinqian. 2006. "'福娃'英译之争与文化负载词的汉英翻译策略" (The contested translation of *Fuwa* and the strategy for Chinese-English translation of culture-loaded phrases), *中国翻译 (Chinese Translation)* no.3, 74-76.
- Wang, Yiwei. 2008. "Public diplomacy and the rise of Chinese soft power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* vol.616.
- Wang, Yizhou. 2004. "中国和平崛起的国内基础" (Domestic basis for China's peaceful rise), *教学与研究 (Teaching and Research)*, no.4.
- Wang, Yizhou and Wang Zaibang. 2008. "中国: 危机外交 2008" (China: crisis diplomacy in 2008), *世界知识 (World Affairs)* no.23.
- Wang, Zhongren. 1997. "思考中国威胁论" (Thinking about the theories of "China threat"), *世界知识 (World Affairs)* no.12, 6-7.
- Watanabe, Yasushi and David L. McConnell. 2008. *Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Wen, Xi. 1993. "独立、主权和发展" (Independence, sovereignty and development), *当代思潮 (Present Ideological Trends)* no.3, 37-53.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Westad, Odd Arne (ed.) 1998. *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Wight, Martin. *Power Politics* (Continuum. 2nd edition), 2002.
- Williamson, John. 2002. "Did the Washington Consensus fail?" Outline of Remarks at CSIS, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, November 6.
- Worden, Minky (ed.) 2008. *China's Great Leap: the Beijing Games and Olympian Human Rights Challenges*. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- Wrong, Dennis. 1979. *Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wu, Di. 1993. "毛泽东和新中国对外文化交流" (Mao Zedong and China's cultural exchanges with foreign countries), *中外文化交流 (Cultural Exchanges between China and Foreign Countries)* no.6.
- Wu, Lengxi. 1995. "Inside story of the decision making during the shelling of Jinmen," in "Mao Zedong's handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese recollections and documents," translated and annotated by Li Xiaobing et al, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, nos.6-7 (Winter 1995-6).
- .1999. *十年论战: 1956-1966 中苏关系回忆录 (Ten-Year War of Words: A Memoir of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966)*. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian.
- Wu, Xiuguan. 2000. "跟随毛主席第一次访问苏联" (The first visit to the Soviet Union with Chairman Mao), in Chinese Communist Party History Studies ed., *亲历重大历史事件实录 (Memoirs of Living through Significant Historical Events)*, Beijing: Dangjian Duwu: vol.4.
- Wu, Xu. 2007. "中国软实力不能吃老本" (China's soft power cannot just rely on traditional cultural legacies), *Global Times*, June 27.
- Wu, Zhaoxue and Ma Yanchen. 2006. "中国新安全观与构建和谐世界" (China's new security concept and the construction of a harmonious world), *世界经济与政治论坛 (Forum of World Economics & Politics)* no.6, 84-89.
- Xi, Runchan. 1996. "增强综合国力问题的战略思考" (Strategic thinking on strengthening CNP), *世界经济 (World Economics)* no.12, 11-13&25.
- Xiao, Gongqin. 1996. "民族主义与中国转型时期的意识形态" (Nationalism and Chinese ideology in the transition period), *战略与管理 (Strategy and Management)* no.4.

- Xie, Yixian (ed.) 2009. *中国当代外交史(1949-2009) (Diplomatic History of Contemporary China (1949-2009))*. Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian.
- Xiong, Weimin. 2008. “在科学和政治之间：1964 年的北京科学讨论会 薛攀皋先生访谈录” (Between science and politics: the 1964 Beijing Scientific Symposium, interview record of Mr. Xue Pangao), *科学文化评论 (Science and Culture Review)* no.2, 58-70.
- Xu, Guoqi. 2008. *Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008*. Harvard University Press.
- Xu, Xin. 2006. “Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight: China's national identity and the 2008 Beijing Olympiad,” *Sociological Review* 54:2, 90-107.
- Xu, Zehao. 1996. *王稼祥传 (Biography of Wang Jiaxiang)*, Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo.
- Yan, Xuetong. 2006. “The rise of China and its power status,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 1:1, 5-33.
- and Xu Jin. 2008. “中美软实力比较” (A comparison of soft power between China and the United States), *现代国际关系 (Contemporary International Relations)* no.1, 24-29.
- .2011. “How assertive should a great power be?,” *The New York Times*, March 31.
- .2011. “How China can defeat America,” *The New York Times*, November 20.
- .2011. *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Yang, Cheng. 2006. “Green Olympics underway,” *China Business Weekly*, July 10.
- Yang, Jisheng. 2012. *Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Yang, Kuisong. 1999. *毛泽东与莫斯科的恩恩怨怨 (The Gratitude and Resentments between Mao Zedong and Moscow)*. Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin.
- .2008. “从 1955 年起毛泽东就憋着一口气” (From the year of 1955 Mao had been nursing a grievance), *南方周末 (Southern Weekly)*, April 3, B11.
- .2009. *中华人民共和国建国史研究 (A Study on the History of P. R. China's Establishment)*. Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin.
- Yang, Luhui. 2007. “地缘政治演变与中国新安全观——以上海合作组织新机制为视角” (Geopolitical evolvement and China's new security concept: from the perspective of new mechanism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), *社会科学 (Journal of Social Sciences)* no.3, 54-61.
- Ye, Duchu. 2007. “科学发展和社会和谐是十七大最强音” (Scientific development and harmonious society are the strongest voices in the 17th National Congress), *瞭望 (Outlook Weekly)* no.20 (May 14), 32.
- Ying, Fan. 2008. “Soft power: power of attraction or confusion?,” *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 4:2, 147-158.
- Yu, Keping. 2007. “We must work to create a harmonious world,” *China Daily*, October 5.
- and Zhuang Junju. 2004. “热话题与冷思考——关于‘北京共识’与中国发展模式的对话” (Hot topic and calm thinking – the dialogue on Beijing consensus and China model for development), *当代世界与社会主义 (Contemporary World and Socialism)* no.5.
- et al (eds.) 2006. *中国模式与“北京共识”：超越“华盛顿共识” (China Model and the “Beijing Consensus”: Beyond the “Washington Consensus”)*. Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian.
- Yu, Xintian. 2007. “软力量建设与中国对外战略” (Soft power building and China's external strategy), *国际问题论坛 (Forum of International Studies)*, autumn.
- .2008. “中国核心价值体系建设的国际视野” (International dimension of building China's core value system), *国际问题论坛 (Forum of International Studies)*, winter.

- Yuan, Shan. 2004. “关于‘北京共识’研究的若干问题” (Some issues on the study of “Beijing Consensus”), *当代世界与社会主义* (*Contemporary World and Socialism*) no.5, 17-21.
- Zagoria, Donald S. 1969. *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961*. New York: Atheneum.
- Zhai, Qiang. 2000. *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Zhang, Guozuo (ed.) 2011. *中国文化软实力研究报告 (2010)* (*Annual Report on China's Cultural Soft Power Research (2010)*). Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian.
- Zhang, Bo. 2008. *近代中国的奥运记忆* (*The Olympic Memory in Modern China*). Tianjin: Tianjin Guji.
- Zhang, Guogang. 2010. “丝绸之路与中西文化交流” (Silk Road and the cultural interactions between China and the West), *西域研究* (*The Western Regions Studies*) no.1, 1-3.
- Zhang, Heping. 2008. “张和平：用世界语言讲中国故事” (Zhang Heping: using an international language to tell China's story), *三联生活周刊* (*Sanlian Life Weekly*) no.492, August 18.
- Zhang, Jianjin. 2004. “‘北京共识’与中国软实力的提升” (The “Beijing consensus” and the enhancement of China's soft power), *当代世界与社会主义* (*Contemporary World and Socialism*) no.5.
- Zhang, Qing. 2008. *申奥纪实——亲历中国重返奥运和两次申奥* (*Witness of the Olympic Bids: Personal Experience of China's Return to the Olympics and Two Olympic Bids*). Beijing: China Social Sciences Press.
- Zhang, Tiejun. 2004. “Self-identity construction of the present China,” *Comparative Strategy* 23:3, 281-301.
- Zhang, Yongjin. 1998. *China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford.
- and Greg Austin (eds.) 2001. *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy*. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press.
- Zhang, Youwen et al. 2005. *中国国际地位报告 2005* (*China's International Status Report 2005*). Beijing: Renmin.
- Zhang, Yuhui. 2006. *中国对外援助研究* (*A Research on China's Foreign Aid*), PhD Thesis, Party School of the Central Committee of the CCP.
- Zhang, Zhizhou. 2012. “文化外交与中国文化‘走出去’的动因、问题与对策” (Cultural diplomacy and Chinese culture “go out”), *当代世界与社会主义* (*Contemporary World and Socialism*) no.3, 12-16.
- Zhao, Kejin and Peng Pingping. 2012. “中国文化软实力面临的困境及其解决路径” (The difficulties in China's cultural soft power and its solution), *当代世界与社会主义* (*Contemporary World and Socialism*) no.3, 22-26.
- Zhao, Litao and Lim Tin Seng (eds.) 2010. *China's New Social Policy: Initiatives for A Harmonious Society*. Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific.
- Zhao, Quansheng. 1996. *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach*. Hong Kong; New York: Oxford University Press.
- and Liu Guoli. 2007. “The challenges of a rising China,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30:4-5, 585-608.
- Zhao, Suisheng. 2011. “The China model and the authoritarian state,” *East Asia Forum*, August 31.
- Zhao, Tingyang. 2005. *天下体系：世界制度哲学导论* (*Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution*). Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu.
- Zheng, Bijian. 2005. “China's ‘peaceful rise’ to great-power status,” *Foreign Affairs* 84:5, 18-22.

Zheng, Yongnian. 1999. *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations*. Cambridge University Press.

——— and Zhang Chi. 2007. “国际政治中的软实力以及对中国软力量的观察” (Soft power in international politics and observation of China's soft power), *世界经济与政治 (World Economics and Politics)* no.7, 6-12.

Zhou, Enlai. 周恩来外交文选 (*Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai*). Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1990.

Zhou, Jianjun and He Hengyuan. 2005. “中国转型的世界意义: ‘从华盛顿共识’到‘北京共识’” (International significance of China's transition: from “Washington Consensus” to “Beijing Consensus”), *世界经济与政治论坛 (Forum of World Economic and Politics)* no.1, 72-75.

Zhou, Tiedong. 2002. “新中国电影对外交流” (New China's films in interactions with foreign countries), *电影艺术 (Film Art)* no.1.

Zhu, Tingchang. 1999. “世纪之交中国的综合国力评估” (The assessment of China's CNP at the cross of the century), *世界经济与政治论坛 (Forum of World Economic and Politics)* no.3.

Zhu, Xi. *四书章句集注 (An Interpretation of the Four Great Books)* Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986.

Zhu, Zhiquan. 2000. “To support or not support: the American debates on China's WTO membership,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 6:2, 77-101.

———.2010. *China's New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies, and Significance*. England; VT: Ashgate Pub. Ltd.

Ziegler, Charles E. 1993. *Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era*. Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zoellick, Robert B. 2005. “Whither China: from membership to responsibility?,” Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, September 21.

Zubok, Vladislav M. 2007. *A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

——— and Constantine Pleshakov. 1996. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.